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The ‘Theory of the Modern State’ (Lehre vom modernen Stat) by the
late Professor Johann Kaspar Bluntschli, of Heidelberg, may be de-
scribed as an attempt to do for the European State what Aristotle ac-
complished for the Hellenic. The material being far more complex, the
task is very much more difficult, but Bluntschli’s is, at least, the most
successful attempt that has been made. We have hardly any works in
English which we can put beside it in respect of intention and compass;
and of these, none is equally useful for the student. No writer can escape
the influence of his surroundings, and although Germany was only his
adopted country, he being a native of Zürich, Bluntschli’s point of view
is sometimes too exclusively German. But perhaps this is not altogether
a disadvantage to us: the endeavour to understand a mode of looking at
some political subjects, different from that to which we are accustomed,
may not be without its uses. On the whole, Bluntschli is a candid and
fair critic both of actual constitutions and of political theories. Occa-
sionally he may betray some of the prejudices of German officialism;
occasionally, too, he may push to a somewhat amusing extreme his ‘or-
ganic’ or ‘psychological’ conception of the State. But these are slight
defects, more likely to throw light on the individuality of the author than
to mislead the judicious reader.
The work here translated, the Allgemeine Statslehre, is only the
first part of the ‘Theory of the Modern State.’ The relation of the other
two parts, the Allgemeines Statsrecht and Politik, to it and to one an-
other is explained in Chapter I of the Introduction. This first part goes
over the whole ground of what we call ‘Political Science,’ though some8/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
subjects are treated in much greater detail in the two other parts.1
The translators have not aimed at a rigid uniformity. Where there
seemed a risk of misstating the author’s ideas, a more literal style has
been employed than where the meaning was quite obvious, and occa-
sionally considerable abridgment has been found possible. One of the
chief difficulties has arisen from the impossibility of getting exact equiva-
lents to the technical terms of German Law and Politics. As the use of a
translation is not limited to those who know nothing of the original lan-
guage, the practice has been adopted of giving the German words in
brackets, after the English, in all cases where this seemed likely to save
ambiguity or to help the student. It is a peculiar misfortune of our lan-
guage to have no precise term for Recht (jus, droit, diritto, tÕ dkaion)
as distinguished from Gesetz (lex, loi, legge, nÒmos). We are driven to
use ‘Law’ and ‘legal’ in a conventional way (thus Statsrecht = Public
Law, Rechtsstat = legal state, etc.), though these terms fail to express
the distinction.2 Sometimes, but rarely, the word ‘Right’ has been used,
e.g., where it was necessary to bring out the antithesis between Right
and Might. Bluntschli himself remarked on the difference between the
German and English uses of Volk and ‘people,’ Nation and ‘nation’
(Book II, Ch. ii); but it will be found that he goes too far in supposing
our use to be the exact converse of the German,3 the fact is, our word
‘people,’ though often less political in its signification than Volk, is more
political than the German word Nation. Thus we must translate
Volksvertretung by ‘Representation of the people,’ and we can only ren-
der Populus Romanus by ‘the Roman people.’ In many cases where
Bluntschli uses the term ‘State’ (Stat) it would be more idiomatic En-
glish to say ‘nation,’ which is more exclusively political in its meaning
than the German Volk; but the word ‘State’ has been advisedly retained
everywhere as a technical term to translate Stat, except where it occurs
in compounds such as Statsrecht. It should be noted however that Stat is
always much wider than our term ‘Government,’ with which ‘State’ is
often used convertible. ‘Government,’ again, because of this frequent
equivalence with ‘State,’ is wider than the German Regierung, which
excludes the function of legislation (see Book VII, Ch. vii) and often
means little more than ‘administration,’ though distinguished from it.
The word Stände has been translated ‘privileged classes, orders or es-
tates,’ though ‘Estates’ is generally limited to the estates as assembled
in Parliament (see Book II, Ch. vii).
The French version by M. Riedmatten, who has also translated theThe Theory of the State/9
Allgemeines Statsrecht (Le droit public général) and the Politik, has
been of great service, especially in regard to those many political terms
which we have in common with the French rather than the German lan-
guage.
The references given by Bluntschli in the foot-notes have been care-
fully verified as far as possible. Several of them, unfortunately, are to
works not easily accessible in this country. In many cases they have
been corrected and supplemented. Additional references have been made
to Aristotle’s Politics. In these the books are quoted according to the
order of the MSS. and the old editions, not the conjectural order of St.
Hilaire, etc., adopted by Congreve and Welldon. The chapters and sec-
tions are those of the Oxford edition of Bekker, and the pages of the
great Berlin edition of Aristotle have in most cases been added.
The translation was undertaken primarily in the interests of the
School of Modern History. As it was desirable to avoid delay, the work
was entrusted to three separate hands, but it has been subjected to a
mutual revision by the translators. The original division of labour was
as follows:—
Books I, IV, and VII, by D. G. Ritchie, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of
Jesus College and sometime Tutor of Balliol College.
Books II and III, by P. E. Matheson, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of
New College.
Books V and VI, by R. Lodge, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of Brasenose
College.
In this second edition the opportunity has been taken to correct some
slight errors. A few additional references have been inserted by the Trans-
lators, chiefly to recent English books on Political Science. No change
of importance has been made, except in the Translators’ notes on Book
IV, ch. ix, where Locke’s form of the Social Contract theory has been
more correctly represented than in the first edition.
Oxford, June, 1892.IntroductionChapter I: Political Science
Political Science (die Statswissenschaft) in the proper sense is the sci-
ence which is concerned with the State, which endeavours to understand
and comprehend the State in its conditions (Grundlagen), in its essen-
tial nature (Wesen), its various forms or manifestations
(Erscheinungsformen), its development.
Thus many sciences, which are sometimes regarded as political sci-
ences, are not really such, although they relate to the State and must of
course be taken account of as auxiliary. Such are:—
(a) The History of a people or nation, except in so far as it is exclu-
sively political or constitutional history. The general course of events in
a people’s life, the acts of individuals, the history of art, science, eco-
nomic conditions, morals, diplomatic and political struggles, military
affairs—all these form no part of political science.
(a) Statistics, so far as they include social and private matters and
are not exclusively political.
(c) Political Economy (Nationalökonomie), so far as it is an en-
quiry into economic laws which are applicable to every one and not
merely to the State.
(d) The study of society, so far as the life of society goes on of itself
and is not identical with the life of the State.
The ancient Greeks applied the name politiki to all political science.
We [Germans] distinguish Public Law (Statsrecht) and Politics (Politik)
as two special sciences. Alongside of these we put many special branches
with distinct names, e.g., Political Statistics, Administration, Interna-
tional Law (Völkerrecht), Police, etc.The Theory of the State/13
Public Law and Politics both consider the State on the whole, but
each from a different point of view and in a different direction. In order
to understand the State more thoroughly, we distinguish its two main
aspects—its existence and its life. We examine the parts in order more
completely to comprehend the whole. In this procedure there are not
only theoretic but practical advantages. Law (das Recht) has gained in
clearness, moderation, and strength, since it has been more sharply dis-
tinguished from politics; and Politics has gained in fullness and in free-
dom by being considered separately.
Public Law (Statsrecht) deals with the State as it is, i.e., its normal
arrangements, the permanent conditions of its existence.
Politics (Politik), on the other hand, has to do with the life and
conduct of the State, pointing out the end towards which public efforts
are directed and teaching the means which lead to these ends, observing
the action of laws upon facts and considering how to avoid injurious
consequences and how to remedy the defects of existing arrangements.
Public Law is thus related to Politics as order to freedom, as the tranquil
fixedness of relations to their complex movement, as bodies are related
to their actions and to the various mental movements. Public Law asks
whether what is conforms to law: Politics whether the action conforms
to the end in view.
Both Public Law and Politics have a moral content (ein sittlicher
Gehalt). The State has a moral nature (ist ein sittliches Wesen) and
moral duties. But Law and Politics are not determined solely nor com-
pletely by moral laws (Sittengesetz). They are independent sciences,
and not simply chapters of a Moral Philosophy. On the contrary, their
basis and their end are to be found in the State: they are Political Sci-
ences. Ethics, however, is not a Political Science, because its fundamen-
tal principles cannot be explained out of the State, but have a wider and
nobler basis in the universal nature of mankind and in the divine order-
ing of the world.
Public Law and Politics must not be absolutely separated from one
another. The actual State lives, i.e., it is a combination of Law and
Politics Again, Law is not absolutely fixed or unalterable; and the move-
ment of Politics has rest as its aim. Law is not merely a system, it has a
history; on the other hand, Politics has to do with legislation. As with all
organic beings, the influence is reciprocal. The difference we have
recognised is not thereby set aside, but is better explained. The distinc-
tion between the history of Law (Rechtsgeschichte) and political his-14/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
tory is just this: the former has only to point out the development of the
normal and established existence of the State and to describe the rise
and change of permanent institutions and laws: the latter lays stress
chiefly on the changing fortunes and circumstances of the nation, the
motives and conduct of its statesmen, and the actions and sufferings of
both the nation and its statesmen. The highest and purest expression of
Public Law is to be found in the Constitution or enacted positive laws
(die Verfassung; das Gesetz): the clearest and most vivid manifestation
of Politics is the practical conduct or guidance of the State itself, viz.,
Government (Regierung). Politics is more of an art than a science. Law
is a presupposition of Politics, a fundamental (though not of course the
only) condition of its freedom. Politics in its course must have regard to
legal limits, caring as it does for the varying needs of life. Law, on the
other hand, requires the, help of Politics in order to escape the numb-
ness of death and to keep step with the development of life.
Without the animating breath of politics the corpus juris
(Rechtskörper) would he a corpse; without the foundations and the lim-
its of Law, Politics would perish in unbridled selfishness and in a fatal
passion for destruction.
It is solely for the sake of clearness and simplicity that before these
two branches of the Theory of the State—it Public Law and Politics—
we place a third, or rather a first, division of Political Science, viz., The
Theory of the State in general (Allgemeine Statslehre). In this we con-
sider the State as a whole without as yet distinguishing its two aspects
(Law and Politics). The conception of the State, its basis, its principal
elements (the people, the country), its rise, its end or aim, the chief
forms of its constitution, the definition and the division of sovereignty
(Statsgewalt) form the subjects of the Theory of the State in general,
and this in turn is at the base of the two special political sciences, Public
Law and Politics.
The first part of this work is devoted to the Theory of the State in
General, the second to Public Law, and the third to Politics.
[Note: The present translation only comprises this first part.]Chapter II: Scientific Methods
The scientific study of the State may be undertaken from different points
of view and in different ways. There are two sound methods of scientific
enquiry, and two false methods which are the one-sided perversions of
them. The correct methods, we may call the philosophical and the his-
torical. The perversions come from pushing to an extreme one promi-
nent aspect of the first two methods. Abstract Ideology is the exaggera-
tion and caricature of the philosophical, mere empiricism of the histori-
cal method.
The contrast between the two methods is connected partly with the
characteristics of both Law and Politics, partly with the difference in
the intellectual temperaments of those who have pursued these studies.
All Law and all Politics have an ideal side—a moral and spiritual
element, but truth at the same time rest on a real (actual) foundation and
have a material form and value. This latter side is misunderstood and
disregarded by the ideologist, who thinks out some political principle in
its abstractness and draws from it a series of logical consequences with-
out paying any regard to the facts of actual political society. Even Plato
in his Republic has fallen into this error and adopted opinions contrary
to nature and the needs of mankind; and yet the richness of Plato’s spirit
and his feeling for beauty have saved him from those miserably arid
formulas which we find so often in the political philosophy of modern
writers. The State is a moral organism and not the product of mere cold
Logic: Public Law is not a collection of speculative opinions.
This method leads to unfruitful results in theory, and when trans-
ferred to practice gives a most dangerous influence to fixed ideas and16/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
tends to break up and destroy existing political institutions. In times of
revolution men’s passions are set free and they are attracted by these
abstract doctrines, the more so that they hope by their aid to break through
the bounds of law: and this sort of ideology easily obtains a terrible
force, and, incapable of creating a new organism, throws down every
thing before it with the energy of a demon. The truth of this observation
is proved in a fearful way by certain phases of the French Revolution.
Napoleon was right when he said: ‘The Metaphysicians, the Ideologists
have destroyed France.’ The ideological acceptation of ‘Liberty and
Equality’ has filled France with ruins and drenched it with blood. The
doctrinaire application of the ‘monarchical principle,’ has repressed the
political freedom of Germany and hindered the growth of her power.
The carrying out of the abstract principle of nationality has threatened
the peace of all Europe. The truest and most fruitful ideas become mis-
chievous if they are taken up by ideologists and then transferred to prac-
tice by narrow fanatics.
The exclusively empirical method is one-sided in the opposite way;
it holds to the mere outward form, to the letter of the law or to the
apparent fact. This method in science is valuable at the most in amass-
ing material in compilations; in actual politics it frequently gains many
adherents, especially among the officials of a bureaucracy. Empiricism
does not often, like ideology, directly endanger the whole State; but it
makes the bright sword of justice rust, hinders the public welfare in all
sorts of ways, causes a quantity of small injuries, weakens the moral
vigour and enfeebles the health of the State in such wise that in critical
times its salvation is made always difficult and sometimes impossible.
While the practical application of mere ideology brings the State into
the acute crisis of political fever, this mere empiricism rather produces
chronic maladies.
The advantage of the historical over the merely empirical method is
that it does not thoughtlessly and servilely honour actual institutions
and actual facts, but recognises, explains, and interprets the inner con-
nection between Past and Present, the organic development of national
life and the moral idea as revealed in its history. This method certainly
starts from the actual phenomena, but regards them as living, not as
dead.
Akin to the truly historical is the truly philosophical method, which
is not one of mere abstract speculation but of ‘concrete thinking’4 (concret
denkt), i.e., it unites together Ideas and Facts (Idee und Realität). WhileThe Theory of the State/17
the historical method is based upon the course of outward events and
their evolution, the philosophical starts from the knowledge of the hu-
man mind, and from that point of view considers the revelation of the
spirit of man in history.
Most of those who have attained to a higher scientific standpoint
have through natural temperament gone in either the one or the other
direction. Only a few have had the genius to unite both. Among these
Aristotle especially deserves our admiration. His Politics, although writ-
ten in that youthful period of the world’s history which preceded the
more advanced development of the State, has yet remained for two thou-
sand years one of the purest sources of political wisdom. Cicero imi-
tated, in the form of his reasoning and his mode of exposition, the philo-
sophical manner of the more richly gifted Greeks, but the best part of
the material of his work he rightly took from the practical politics of
Rome. Among modern writers, Bodin, Vico, and Bacon may be named
as early representatives of the philosophic-historical method. Burke, who
resembles Cicero in the grandeur and charm of his eloquence, resembles
him also in the way in which he grasped the principles of political wis-
dom from the history and life of his country, and expressed them with
the dignity of philosophy and the splendour of genius. Machiavelli, who
has stored up in his works the abundant and sad experience of a pro-
found and shrewd knowledge of mankind, and Montesquieu who looked
on the world with a frank, cheerful glance and abounds in acute remarks
and exact observations sometimes adopt one method, sometimes the other.
Yet the former is more given to the historical, the latter to the philo-
sophical.5 On the other hand, Rousseau and Bentham, like most of the
Germans, keep rather to the philosophical method, but, more often than
their great model Plato, they fall into the one-sided error of mere ideol-
ogy.
It is thus clear that the two methods, the historical and philosophi-
cal, do not conflict: they rather supplement and correct one another. He
assuredly takes a limited and narrow view of history who thinks that
with him history is at an end and no new legal conception (Recht) can
arise; and he is a vain and foolish philosopher who thinks that he is the
beginning and end of all truth. The genuine historian as such is com-
pelled to recognise the value of philosophy, and the true philosopher
must equally take counsel of history.
Each of the two methods has its peculiar advantages and its pecu-
liar weaknesses and dangers. The chief advantage of the historical method18/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
is the abundance and the positive character of its results; for history is
full of the complexity of life and at the same time is thoroughly positive.
Whatever the most prolific thinker may think out in his head will always
be only a poor fragment compared with the thoughts which are revealed
in the history of mankind, and will generally attain only an uncertain
and misty shape. But, on the other hand, there is the danger that, in
following the paths of history, we may forget and lose unity in abundant
multiplicity; we may be oppressed by the weight of the material, over-
whelmed by the mass of historical experience, and above all, attracted
and enchained by the past, we may lose the fresh outlook on the life of
the present and the future. Certainly these are by no means necessary
consequences of the historical method, but history itself shows us how
often men who have given themselves ardently to the study of it go
wrong in this way.
The advantages of the philosophical method, on the contrary, are:
purity, harmony and unity of system, fuller satisfaction of the universal
striving of man towards perfection, ideality. Its results have an espe-
cially human character, an especially ideal stamp. And yet, in turn, it
has its peculiar dangers: philosophers, in their striving after unity—
which they often regard as their sole aim,—overlook the inner complex-
ity of nature, and the rich content of actual existence; following the
swift flight of free thought, not infrequently, instead of discovering real
laws, they find barren formulae, empty husks, and take to playing with
these; misunderstanding the natural development, they pluck unripe fruit,
plant trees without roots in the ground, and sink into the delusions of
ideology. Only a few philosophical spirits have succeeded in avoiding
these errors.
Note. In what I wrote in 1841 on ‘The modern schools of Jurispru-
dence in Germany’ (Die neueren Rechtsschulen der deutschen Juristen,
2nd edit. Zürich, 1862), these and similar ideas have been followed out
in closer connection with German scientific study. Long ago, however,
the English Lord Chancellor, Bacon, censured the errors of the Law of
Nature and the positive jurisprudence as studied in his time and ex-
pected the necessary reform in the science of law from the combination
of history with philosophy. [Cp. De Augm. Scient. viii. c. 3. But see
Flint’s Vico, p. 151.]Chapter III: General and Special Political Science
Special Political Science is limited to a particular nation and a single
State, e.g., the ancient Roman Republic, the modern English Constitu-
tion, the German Empire of to-day. General Political Science, on the
other hand, rests upon a universal conception of the State. The particu-
lar State is based on a particular people, the State in general on man-
kind.6
The general theory of the State, and especially general Public Law,
is very often held to be the product of pure speculation, and the attempt
is made to deduce it, by mere logical consequences, from a speculative
view of the world. Thus there have arisen various systems of Natural or
Philosophical ‘Public Law,’ as distinct from that which is Positive and
Historical. I understand the difference otherwise. The State must be
philosophically comprehended as well as historically. Neither General
nor Special Public Law can dispense with this twofold work.
The special theory of the State presupposes the general, as the par-
ticular character of a people presupposes the common nature of man-
kind. General Political Science has to do with the fundamental concep-
tions, which appear in all sorts of ways, in the theories of particular
States. The history to which the former pays regard is the history of the
world or universal history, not the history of a particular country, and of
a particular State. The speculations of Political Philosophy must be
tested and supplemented by the actual history of mankind. Universal
history shows us the different stages of development which mankind has
lived through since its infancy; each stage has its own peculiar views of
the State, and its own political formations. We learn to understand in20/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
what ways the various nations have taken part in the common task of
the human race.
Not all periods of universal history, nor all nations, have the same
significance for our science. We are specially concerned with the mod-
ern State. The ancient and medieval forms of the State need only be
considered as preliminary, and in order, by contrast, to bring out more
clearly the character of the modern State. The value of different peoples
for the formation of the modern State is determined in general by their
share in the progress of political civilization, i.e., of a community of
men at once orderly and free. In the history of the world, the Aryan or
Indo-Germanic race is as significant for politics as the Semitic race for
religion; but not until they came to Europe did even the Aryans attain a
high and conscious political development. Among them the Greeks and
Romans took precedence in antiquity, the Teutons (Germanen) in the
Middle Ages; but our modern political civilization depends chiefly on
the mixture of Graeco-Roman and Teutonic elements. The chief share in
this modern political development has been taken by: (1) the English,
whose very race is a mixed one, (2) secondly by the French, who com-
bine Old Celtic and Romance with Teutonic elements, and (3) lastly the
Prussians, in whom the manly self-confidence and sense of Law
(Rechtssinn) of the Teuton is combined with the pliancy and submis-
siveness of the Slav. The political life of America is derived from that of
Europe, but it is only in the United States that it has made progress of its
own. General political science has thus to do with the common political
consciousness of civilised mankind at the present time, and the funda-
mental ideas and essentially common institutions which appear in vari-
ous ways in different States. Even General Public Law is no mere
theory—it has a positive although indirect influence, as it operates
through various particular States, and not through one universal State.
Like mankind and his history, it has a real, and not merely an ideal
existence.
Note.—The contrast in Aristotle’s Rhetoric (i. 10. 1368 b. 7) be-
tween nÒmoj dios and nÒmos koinÒj is different from that which we
have been considering. The former means the Law which a particular
state has worked out for itself, whether written or unwritten, the latter
that which is right by nature (fÚsei koinÕn dkaion) without regard to
any political community.Book I: The Conception of the StateChapter I: The Conception and Idea of the State.
The General Conception of The State
The conception (Begriff) of the State has to do with the nature and
essential characteristics of actual States. The idea or ideal (Idee) of the
State presents a picture, in the splendour of imaginary perfection, of the
State as not yet realised, but to be striven for.
The conception of the State can only be discovered by history; the
idea of the State is called up by philosophical speculation. The univer-
sal conception of the State is recognised when the many actual States
which have appeared in the world’s history have been surveyed, and
their common characteristics discovered. The highest idea of the State
is beheld when the tendency of human nature to political society is con-
sidered, and the highest conceivable and possible development of this
tendency is regarded as the political end of mankind.
If we consider the great number of States which history presents to
us, we become aware at once of certain common characteristics of all
States; others are only seen on closer examination.
First, it is clear that in every State a number of men are combined.
In particular States the number may be very different, some embracing
only a few thousands, others many millions; but, nevertheless, we can-
not talk of a State until we get beyond the circle of a single family, and
until a multitude of men (i.e., families, men, women, and children) are
united together. A family, a clan, like the house of the Hebrew patriarch,
Jacob, can become the nucleus round which, in time, a greater number
gathers, but a real State cannot be formed until that has happened, until
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become extended to the race. The horde is not yet a tribe (Völkerschaft).
Without a tribe, or, at a higher stage of civilization, without a nation
(Volk), there is no State.
There is no normal number for the size of the population of a State;7
Rousseau’s number of 10,000 men would certainly not be sufficient. In
the middle ages such small States could exist with security and dignity;
modern times lead to the formation of much greater States, partly be-
cause the political duties of the modern State need a greater national
force, partly because the increased power of the great States readily
becomes a danger and a menace to the independence of the small.
Secondly, a permanent relation of the people to the soil is necessary
for the continuance of the State. The State requires its territory: nation
and country go together. Nomadic peoples, although they have chiefs to
command them and law to govern them, have not yet reached the full
condition of States until they have a fixed abode. The Hebrew people
received a political training from Moses, but were not a State until Joshua
settled them in Palestine. In the great migrations at the fall of the Roman
empire, when peoples left their old habitations and undertook to con-
quer new ones, they were in an uncertain state of transition. The earlier
States which they had formed no longer existed: the new did not yet
exist. The personal bond continued for a while—the territorial connec-
tion was broken. Only if they succeeded in regaining a sure footing were
they enabled to establish a new State. The peoples who failed perished.
The Athenians under Themistocles saved the State of Athens on their
ships, because after the victory they again took possession of their city;
but the Cimbri and Teutones perished, because they left their old home
and failed to conquer a new one. Even the Roman State would have
perished, if the Romans, after the burning of their city, had migrated to
Veii.
Another characteristic of the State is the unity of the whole, the
cohesion of the nation. Internally there may indeed be different divisions
with considerable independence of their own. Thus in Rome there was
the patrician populus, and alongside of it the plebs. In the older Teu-
tonic states of the middle ages there was the constitution of the people
alongside of the feudal constitution. The State may also be composed of
several parts which in their turn constitute States: thus from the old
German Empire several territorial States have gradually grown up: in
the modern federations of North America and Switzerland, and in the
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number of confederated local States exist together. But unless the com-
munity forms a coherent whole in its internal organization, or can ap-
pear and act as a unit in external relations, there is no State.
In all States we find the distinction (Gegensatz) between a. gover-
nors and governed, or—to adopt an old expression which has been some-
times misunderstood, sometimes misused, but which in itself is neither
hateful nor slavish—between sovereign and subjects. This distinction
appears in the most manifold forms, but is always necessary. Even in
the most extreme democracy in which it may seem to vanish, it is never-
theless present. The assembly of the Athenian citizens was the sover-
eign, the individual Athenians were its subjects.
Where there is no longer any sovereign possessing authority, where
the governed have renounced political obedience, and every one does
that which is right in his own eyes, this is anarchy and the State is at an
end. Anarchy, like all negations, cannot last, so that out of it there at
once arises, perhaps in a rude and often cruel form of despotism, some
sort of new sovereignty which compels obedience, and thus reproduces
that indispensable distinction. Communists deny this in theory, but in
doing so, they deny the State itself. Even they have nowhere been able
by annihilating the State to introduce a merely social union, and, if they
ever succeed in temporarily winning over the masses to their projects,
we may be certain, from the example of the religious communists of the
sixteenth century, the Anabaptists, and from the natural consequences
of events, that they too would again set up a domination, and that the
harshest that has ever been.
Among the Slavonic peoples we find the old idea that only the una-
nimity of all the members of a community represents the common will,
and that neither the majority nor any higher authority can decide. This
principle however can at the most only serve as a principle of local
communities, and that only among a people where all easily and quickly
agree; it can never be a political principle, for the State must override
the unavoidable opposition of individuals.
The State is in no way a lifeless instrument, a dead machine: it is a
living and therefore organised being. This organic nature of the State
has not always been understood. Political peoples had indeed an image
(Vorstellung) of it, and recognized it consciously in language, but the
insight into the political organism remained long concealed from politi-
cal science, and even at the present day many publicists (Statsgelehrte)
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historical jurists to have recognized the organic nature of the Nation and
the State. This conception refutes both the mathematical and mechani-
cal view of the State, and the atomistic way of treating it, which forgets
the whole in the individuals. An oil-painting is something other than a
mere aggregation of drops of oil and colour, a statue is something other
than a combination of marble particles, a man is not a mere quantity of
cells and blood corpuscles; and so too the nation is not a mere sum of
citizens, and the State is not a mere collection of external regulations.
The State indeed is not a product of nature, and therefore it is not a
natural organism; it is indirectly the work of man. The tendency to po-
litical life is to be found in human nature, and so far the State has a
natural basis; but the realisation of this political tendency has been left
to human labour,8 and human arrangement, and so far the State is a
product of human activity, and its organism is a copy of a natural or-
ganism.
In calling the State an organism we are not thinking of the activities
by which plants and animals seek, consume and assimilate nourishment,
and reproduce their species. We are thinking rather of the following
characteristics of natural organisms:—
(a) Every organism is a union of soul and body, i.e., of material
elements and vital forces.
(b) Although an organism is and remains a whole, yet in its parts it
has members, which are animated by special motives and capacities, in
order to satisfy in various ways the varying needs of the whole itself.
(c) The organism develops itself from within outwards, and has an
external growth.
In all three respects the organic nature of the State is evident.
In the State spirit and body, will and active organs are necessarily
bound together in one life. The one national Spirit, which is something
different from the average sum of the contemporary spirit of all citizens,
is the spirit of the State; the one national will, which is different from the
average will of the multitude, is the will of the State. The constitution,
with its organs for representing the whole and expressing the will of the
State in laws, with a head who governs, with all sorts of offices and
magistracies for administration, with courts to exercise public justice,
with institutions of all kinds to provide for the intellectual and material
interests of the community, with an army to express the public force—
this constitution is the body of the State, it is the form in which the
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men in spirit, character, and form. The progress of mankind depends
essentially on the emulation of its component peoples and states.
The constitution is likewise the articulation of the body politic. Ev-
ery office and every political assembly is a particular member with its
own proper functions. An office is not like part of a machine, it has not
to exert merely mechanical activities which always remain the same,
like the wheels and spindles in a factory, which always do the same
thing in the same way. Its functions have a spiritual character, and vary
on particular occasions according to the needs of public life, which they
have to satisfy: they serve life, and are themselves living. Where an
office becomes lifeless, sinks into unthinking formalism, and becomes
like a machine, there the office itself is ruined, and the State, by becom-
ing a machine, inevitably falls.
Not only the official, but the office itself has a psychical signifi-
cance, it is animated by a soul. An office has a character and a spirit
which in its turn influences the person who acts in it. Even a very ordi-
nary man when elected to the Roman consulship had his character el-
evated and his natural vigour increased by the dignity, majesty, and
power of his office. The office of judge is so sacred, so consecrated to
justice, that even a weakling when appointed to it has his mind ennobled
and his determination aroused to maintain the right. The spirit of the
office cannot indeed alter the nature of the official, it is not powerful
enough so to permeate the character that the individual always fully
represents the significance of his office; yet every official experiences
some psychical influence on his spirit and disposition, and if he has an
impressionable mind it cannot escape him that his office itself has a soul
which, for the present, is in a close and immediate connection with his
own individuality, but which is different from him, and more enduring.
Nations and States have a development and a growth of their own.
The periods of national and political history are to be measured by great
eras which far surpass the age of individual men; the latter may be
measured by years and tens of years, the former extend beyond centu-
ries. Every period again has its special character, and the collective
history of a nation and state is a coherent whole. The childhood of na-
tions has a different character from their maturity, and every statesman
is compelled to consider the time of life in which his State happens to
be. ‘There is a time for everything.’
Along with this affinity to the development of natural organism there
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and decays in regular periods and stages, but the development of States
and political institutions is not always as regular. The influence of hu-
man free will or of external fate frequently produces considerable de-
viations, checking, hastening, sometimes reversing the normal move-
ment, according as it is broken in upon by great and strong individuals,
or by the wild passions of the nation itself. These deviations are indeed
neither so numerous, nor are they commonly so important as to invali-
date the general rule. On the contrary, they are much rarer and generally
much slighter than is fancied by those whose opinions are determined
by the immediate impressions of contemporary events. Yet they are
weighty enough to show that the idea of a mere natural growth of the
State is one-sided and unsatisfactory, and that eve must allow full play
even here to the free action of individuals.
Whilst history explains the organic nature of the State, we learn
from it at the same time that the State does not stand on the same grade
with the lower organisms of plants and animals, but is of a higher kind;
we learn that it is a moral and spiritual organism, a great body which is
capable of taking up into itself the feelings and thoughts of the nation, of
uttering them in laws, and realising them in acts; we are informed of
moral qualities and of the character of each State. History ascribes to
the State a personality which, having spirit and body, possesses and
manifests a will of its own.
The glory and honour of the State have always elevated the heart of
its sons, and animated them to sacrifices. For freedom and indepen-
dence, for the rights of the State, the noblest and best have in all times
and in all nations expended their goods and their lives. To extend the
reputation and the power of the State, to further its welfare and its hap-
piness, has universally been regarded as one of the most honourable
duties of gifted men. The joys and sorrows of the State have always
been shared by all its citizens. The whole great idea of Fatherland and
love of country would be inconceivable if the State did not possess this
high moral and personal character.
The recognition of the personality of the State is thus not less indis-
pensable for Public Law (Statsrecht) than for International Law
(Völkerrecht).
A person in the juridical sense is a being to whom we can ascribe a
legal will (Rechtswille), who can acquire, create and possess rights. In
the realm of public law this conception is as significant as in the realm
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public law (öffentlich-rechtliche Person). The purpose of the whole
constitution is to enable the person of the State to express and realise its
will (Statswille), which is different from the individual wills of all indi-
viduals, and different from the sum of them.
The personality of the State is, however, only recognised by free
people, and only in the civilised nation-state has it attained to full effi-
cacy. In the earlier stages of politics only the prince is prominent; he
alone is a person, and the State is merely the realm of his personal rule.
The same is true with regard to the masculine character of the mod-
ern State. This becomes first apparent in contrast with the feminine
character of the Church. A religious community may have all the other
characteristics of a political community, yet she does not wish to be a
State, and is not a State, just because she does not consciously rule
herself like a man, and act freely in her external life, but wishes only to
serve God and perform her religious duties. To put together the result of
this historical consideration, the general conception of the State may be
determined as follows:—the State is a combination or association
(Gesammtheit) of men, in the form of government and governed, on a
definite territory, united together into a moral organised masculine per-
sonality; or, more shortly—the State is the politically organised national
person of a definite country.
Notes—1. It is not without interest to observe how different peoples
have named the State. The Greeks still signified city and state by the
same word, pÒlis—a sign that their conception of the State was based
on the city, and was limited by the city point of view. The Roman ex-
pression, civitas, refers likewise to the citizenship of a city as the nucleus
of the State, but has more of a personal character than the Greek word,
and is better adapted to take up into itself greater masses of people. It
speaks too for the high significance of the State, that the expression
‘civilization’ is derived from the name of the State, and practically coin-
cides with the extension and realization of the State. In a certain way the
other Roan name, res publica, stands still higher, in so far as it contains
not merely a reference to the citizenship of a city, but to a people (res
populi) and a regard to the people’s welfare. In the sense of the ancients
the expression Republic does not exclude Monarchy but does not apply
to despotic governments. [Cp. Engl. ‘Commonwealth.’]
In modern languages the expression ‘State’ is the prevailing one,
not only in the Romance but in the Teutonic languages (state, état, Stat).
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at first the fuller expression status reipublicae was required in order to
bring out a more exact reference to the State), this term in course of time
has become the most universal denomination of the State, unambiguous
and needing no qualification. Although ‘the established,’ ‘what stands,’
is brought into prominence, this connexion is put aside, and the word
signifies not the existing arrangement and constitution of the State
(politea), but the State which can outlive even a complete transforma-
tion of the form of government.
All other modern expressions have only limited validity; e.g., the
proud word Reich only applies to great states under a monarchical or-
ganization, and suggests likewise a combination of several relatively
independent countries, like the Latin word imperium (Fr. and Engl.,
empire), in which at the same time there is an allusion to the imperial
(kaiserlich) rule. More narrow is the sense of the word ‘country’ (Land),
which primarily signifies the external territory of the State—(and of a
state that is not brokers up into separate parts) but secondarily is ap-
plied to the State itself which has this territory. This expression forms
the natural counterpart to the Greek pÒlis, since it bases the State pri-
marily on the country (Landschaft), while the other bases it on the city.
The false word ‘Fatherland’ is still narrower, by virtue of its relation to
the individual; but at the same time it is elevated and spiritualized by the
reference to the personal connection and transmission of blood relation-
ships in the country: in this word is expressed with clearness and with
feeling the whole love and devotion of the individual citizen to the great
and living whole to which he belongs with his body, with whose exist-
ence his own is bound up, and for which to sacrifice himself is the high-
est glory of man.9
2. In my Psychological Studies on State and Church (Zürich, 1845)
the masculine character of the State has been more exactly worked out.
The French expression, L‘état c’est l’homme, does not merely signify
‘the State is Man in general’ (der Mensch im Groszen), but ‘the State is
the man, the husband (der Mann) in general,’ as the Church represents
the womanly nature in general, the wife (die Frau).
[It may be as well to note that in German the word Stat is masculine
and the word Kirche feminine!]Chapter II: The Human Idea of the State. The
Universal Empire
Can we rest satisfied with such a conception of the State as may be
arrived at from a consideration of the various actual states which have
existed? The historical school is content to study the State as simply the
body of this or that particular nation.
Philosophy requires us to go deeper. “We find in human nature the
tendency to, and the need for, political existence. Aristotle long ago
uttered the pregnant truth, ‘Man is by nature a political animal’ (¥nqrwtoj
fÚsei tolitikÕn zùon. Pol. i. 2, §9). It is not any national peculiarity
which makes him require the State, and capable of it, but the common
nature of mankind. Further, in enquiring into the organism of different
States, we discover that the same essential organs are to be found in
very different nations. There is everywhere to be recognised a common
human character, compared with which the special national forms are
only like variations on the same theme. Finally, the conception of the
nation is not fixed and determinate in itself: it points with inner neces-
sity to the higher unity of mankind of which the nations are only mem-
bers. How then could the State be based upon the nation without regard
to a higher unity? and if mankind is in truth a whole, if it is animated by
a common spirit, how can it avoid striving after the embodiment of its
own proper essence, i.e., seeking, to become a State?
Merely national States have thus only a relative truth and signifi-
cance. The philosopher cannot find in them the fulfilment of the highest
idea of the State. To him the State is a human organism, a human per-
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body, for spirit and body belong to one another, and between them make
up the person. In a body which is not organised and human the spirit of
man cannot truly live. The body politic must therefore imitate the body
natural of man. The perfect State is, as it were, the visible body of
Humanity. The universal State or universal Empire (Weltreich) is the
ideal of human progress.
Man as an individual, mankind as a whole, are the original and
permanent antithesis of creation. On this, in the last resort, depends the
distinction between Private and Public Law. It is true the common con-
sciousness of mankind is still confusedly dreaming: it has not yet awaked
to full clearness, nor advanced to a unity of will. Mankind has therefore
not yet been able to evolve its organic existence. It will take many cen-
turies to realise the Universal State. But the longing for such an organised
community of all nations has already revealed itself from time to time in
the previous history of the world. Civilised Europe has already fixed her
eye more firmly on this high aim.
It is true that all historical attempts to realise the universal real
State have, in the end, failed. It does not therefore follow he that the end
is unattainable. The Christian Church cherishes the hope of one day
including the whole of mankind, and, though this hope has not yet been
fulfilled, its fulfilment is not therefore impossible. The Christian Church
cannot give up the belief that it will become universal, and human poli-
tics cannot give up the effort to organise the whole of humanity. The
idea of the universal State (Weltreich) corresponds to the idea of the
universal Church.
History itself, if studied without prejudice, points out clearly enough
the way which leads to this end, and warns us at the same time against
the erroneous paths into which even political genius has strayed in at-
tempting with the rashness of zeal to realise the universal State prema-
turely.
Since first a human consciousness of the State arose in Europe,
each age has made the attempt in its own way.
First, Alexander the Great.—In the marriage festival of a hundred
couples at Susa, Alexander gave the world a symbol of his idea.10 He
wished to wed the manly spirit of the Greeks with the feminine quick-
ness and susceptibility of the Asiatics. The East and the West were to be
united and mingled together, and from the mingling of both, as in a cup
of love, the new mankind was to issue, which should find its satisfaction
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following centuries was at all events determined by Alexander in this
way, and the Greek seeds of civilization grew luxuriantly in the new soil
of Asia. But this first brilliant attempt to establish a world state did not
endure, and was hopelessly wrecked with the death of Alexander. This
was not merely due to the sad fate which snatched away the founder of
the new universal state in the bloom of his youth, before he had estab-
lished uniform institutions and taken care for the future. The mingling
of diverse elements was unnatural, the leading idea itself was not clear.
Political ideas were confused by the mixture: the free human view
which the Greeks took of the State could not be united with the religious
regard of the Persians for a divine kingdom. The Macedonian monarchy
could not at the same time be an Asiatic theocracy. The Orientals will-
ingly believed that Alexander was the son of the most high God; the
Europeans were disgusted by his pretensions to divine honours.
And races were confused. Hellenic science and culture freed the
Oriental world from the limitations of its religious and political bonds;
but their effect was rather to break up the old than to create a new
world. The deification of a man drove out reverence for the old gods:
European civilisation became dissolute luxury, and helped to complete
the degeneracy of the East.
The attempt of the Romans to attain a universal dominion had a
more enduring result. The Roman Empire was a universal empire. The
whole Roman people felt itself called to extend its idea of the State over
the earth, and to subject all the nations to the Roman supremacy. The
manly power and iron force of the Roman character overcame the nu-
merous peoples who dared to oppose Rome’s victorious career, and al-
ready the Roman State with its legal institution as strong as rock had
been built upon firm foundations in three continents. The greatest of the
Romans, Julius Caesar, left to posterity the imperial idea (Kaiseridee)
as an inheritance, and in it he has founded an authority which tran-
scends national limits and embraces the world.
Even the effort of the Romans has been judged at the bar of univer-
sal history. It was not, like that of Alexander, based upon a mixture of
peoples, but upon the higher nature of one people which sought to stamp
its national character upon mankind, to Romanise the world. That was
its crime. No people is great enough to include mankind, and to stifle
other peoples in its embrace. The Roman universal State was wrecked
by the resistance of the Teutons in the freshness of their youth. It could
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to them.
The idea of the universal State has since then never shone with such
splendour on the political horizon, but has never altogether set. The
middle ages, with their combination of Romance and Teutonic elements,
again attempted in their way to realise it, first in the Frankish monarchy
and secondly in the Roman-German Empire—on a more modest scale it
is true, but not without having made important progress in the knowl-
edge of truth. There was no longer to be one supreme and absolute
dominion ruling equally the whole life of the community. Christianity
had in the meantime revealed the great opposition between State and
Church, so full of consequences for mankind. The State gave up the
claim to rule conscience by its laws; it recognised that beside it there
was a religious community with its own principle of life, and likewise a
visible body different from itself, and essentially independent. This was
a limit preventing it from exercising omnipotent sway. It was compelled
to hand over religious life to the guidance of the Church. It never indeed
attained to full clearness with regard to its relation to the Church, but
the freedom of religious belief and the reverence for God were saved
from the arbitrary will of the temporal ruler. The authority of Christian-
ity depended not on him.
Further, the Christian universal empire was no longer to devour and
annihilate the various nations, but to assure to all of them peace and
justice. The medieval Roman emperor was not absolute lord over all
nations, but the just protector of their rights and freedom. The imperial
idea was thus purified and became the inspiration of a statesman like
Frederick II11 and of a thinker like Dante.12 The medieval empire em-
braced a great number of essentially independent States, united indeed
in a common order and formally subject to the Emperor, but indepen-
dent in all essential matters, and living in their own way. Even the diver-
sity of peoples and races found favour and protection. But what in itself
was an advance in the development of the Universal State led to its
dissolution, because pursued in a too one-sided manner. The tendency
to separation was stronger than the impulse to unity. The difference of
nationalities, the opposition of languages separated France and Ger-
many and tore into two parts the Frankish universal monarchy. The
slender powers of the German king and Roman emperor could not op-
pose the rise of princes and local lords. The central institution had no
central basis, and so the centrifugal forces were too strong for it, and the
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sons to succeeding generations.
In the present century the Emperor Napoleon I again attempted to
revive the idea which for a time had been neglected. He avoided the
error of the middle ages, and took precautions for a strong and active
central power, but he did not retain the true advances of the middle ages
with sufficient care. He paid too little regard to foreign nationalities,
and thus went back on the course which the Romans had previously
adopted, although acting with more moderation than they. He wished to
organise Europe as a vast international State, with individual States as
its members. The imperial power was to belong to the French nation,
which was to take the place of head in the great family of nations. He
hoped to attain in one generation what the Romans had taken centuries
to do. His plan failed. Not this time because of the resistance of the
German people. They submitted reluctantly to the French supremacy;
but despairing of their own old empire, and discontented with the cir-
cumstances of their fatherland, they appeared to submit to Napoleon’s
arrangements. Only the two great German States, aspiring Prussia and
Austria with its complexity of countries and peoples, the former anx-
ious about its very existence, the latter feeling itself an imperial State,
sought in repeated wars to resist the supremacy of France but they too
were conquered by superior statesmen and generals. But Napoleon failed
to overcome the resistance of the English, in whom a great and histori-
cal national sentiment was united with Teutonic ideas of freedom: and
the still half barbarian Russians withdrew to their steppes, defeated but
not subdued. The French did not hold out in misfortune when united
Europe turned upon them. Thus the Napoleonic idea failed of fulfill-
ment like the Roman before it, and for similar reasons. The remaining
nations felt themselves threatened by the universal monarchy without
being assured or contented by the new government of the world, and the
French nation was not powerful enough to keep them permanently sub-
ject.
Meanwhile unconquerable time itself works on unceasingly, bring-
ing the nations nearer to one another, and awakening the universal con-
sciousness of the community off mankind; and this is the natural prepa-
ration for a common organization of the world. It is no mere matter of
accident that modern discoveries and numerous new means of commu-
nication altogether serve this end, that the whole science of modern times
follows this impulse and belongs in the first place to humanity, and only
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and barriers that lay between nations are disappearing. Even at the present
day all Europe feels every disturbance in any particular State as an evil
in which she has to suffer, and what happens at her extremest limits
immediately awakens universal interest. The spirit of Europe already
turns its regards to the circuit of the globe, and the Aryan race feels
itself called to manage the world.
We have not yet got so far: at the present day it is not so much will
and power that are wanting as spiritual maturity. The members of the
European family of nations know their superiority over other nations
well enough, but they have not yet come to a clear understanding among
themselves and about themselves. A definite result is not possible until
the enlightening word of knowledge has been uttered about this and
about the nature of humanity, and until the nations are ready to hear it.
Till then, the universal will he an idea after which many strive, which
none can fulfil. But as an idea of the future the general theory of the
State cannot overlook it. Only in the universal empire will the true hu-
man State he ret cared, and in it international law will attain a higher
form and an assured existence. To the universal empire the particular
states are related, as the nations to humanity. Particular states are mem-
bers of the universal empire and attain in it their completion and their
full satisfaction. The purpose of the universal State is not to break up
particular states and oppress nations, but better to secure the peace of
the former and the freedom of the latter. The highest conception of the
State—which however has not yet been realised—is thus: The State is
humanity organized, but humanity as masculine, not as feminine: the
State is the man.
Notes—l. A man of genius and a lover of truth, the Vaudois Vinet
(in L‘Individualisme et le Socialisme) objected to the islet of the Uni-
versal State, that it would absorb all the life of humanity, do away with
the principle of individual liberty, and exercise an improper temporal
rule over conscience and knowledge. This objection compels us to limit
this idea more exactly.
First of all, it must be recognized, that the State is not the sole
human community, is not the only form in which humanity embodies
itself. The Church, as visible and on earth, is also a community and an
embodiment of humanity This however is a recognition that the political
rule of the State does not determine the religious life of man, nor endan-
ger the freedom of conscience and the faith of the individual.
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State, that the State has a complete dominion over the individual. In
every single man may be distinguished two natures, the one individual,
the other common to humanity. The individual with his life does not
belong excessively nor altogether either to the community with other
individuals of to the earth, nor therefore to the State as a community of
life upon earth. The State is based upon human nature, not in so far is
this is variously manifested in millions of individuals, but in so far as
the common nature of humanity appears in one being and the authority
of the State does not therefore extend further than is required by the
common interests and the association of mankind. The State itself, when
it wrongly trespasses on the domain of individual freedom, is not able to
enforce its rule, for it cannot chain the individual spirit, it cannot kill the
individual soul.
2. Quite lately Laurent also has declared himself against the idea of
the Universal State (Histoire du droit des gens, i. p. 39 ff.). His reasons
are as follows:—
(a) The world-state would be universal monarchy, and this would
be incompatible with the sovereignty of states.
(b) There is a difference between individuals as natural and nations
as artificial persons. The former are defective and are moved by bad
passions; the latter are perfect and moral beings. That the former may
live together, there is needed the incessant activity of the power of the
State; that the latter may live together, this is not needed, or only excep-
tionally.
(c) The individual is weak, and must submit to the power of the
State. States are strong, and therefore will not yield to a higher power.
(d) If the Universal State were powerful enough to force the States
against their will, this superiority would oppress justice and freedom;
for where resistance is impossible, freedom cannot exist.
(e) For the development of the individual the national State is neces-
sary, but it is sufficient. The world-state is not required for the welfare
of individuals, and would be dangerous to the development of nations.
These reasons of my honoured friend have not convinced me: I should
answer them as follows:—
(a) The Universal State may be thought of with a monarchical head
(empire, Kaiserthum) but also as republic, whether a directory (I am
thinking of the European pentarchy) or a confederation or union of States.
In no case need we think of the universal government having absolute
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tion of spheres (Competenzen) necessary. There is no reason for extend-
ing the sphere of the latter beyond the common affairs of the world, e.g.,
maintaining the peace of the world, protecting its commerce, and espe-
cially what we consider the province of international law. We may find
a model in the form of a federal State (Bundesstat), or a federal empire
(Bundesreich), in which common federal matters are cared for by a
common legislature, administration, and judicature, while in matters
affecting each country the sovereignty of particular States is still recog-
nized.
(b) Nations have their defects and their passions like individuals,
and if there were no international law, those which are weak and help-
less would be an easy prey to the strong and ambitious. The basis of
international law is also the basis of the Universal State.
(c) The strength of national States, even as against a universal em-
pire, is the best guarantee that the former will be oppressed by the latter;
but the greatest national State is not strong enough, if it is in the wrong,
to engage alone in a struggle with the world. War will only be possible if
groups of States or parties oppose one another. In all other cases war
will become the execution of the judicial sentences of the universal tri-
bunals. The best political arrangements cannot completely ensure us
against civil war, and we must be content if a stronger organization of
international law makes war between States rarer. Justice never attains
its ideal, but in the best cases approximates to it.
(d) The universal empire would be in every way less powerful in
comparison with national States than a national State in comparison
with its citizens. And yet the freedom of the citizens is not threatened
but protected by the organization of the State.
(e) The State does not satisfy all individual needs. There are cosmo-
politan interests both spiritual and material (the science, literature, art
and trade of the world) which can only find a complete satisfaction in a
universal empire. The history of Europe and America shows us how
little in our days the rights of entire peoples are secured. Laurent bases
international law on the unity of the human race, and no other basis can
be found for it; but he recognizes this unity only as an internal one. In
my opinion logic and psychology both require that this internal power
should manifest itself outwardly. If mankind is internally one being, in
its complete development it must reveal itself as one person. The orga-
nization of humanity is the Universal State.
I know that the most of my contemporaries regard this idea as a38/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
dream; but that cannot keep me from expressing and defending my con-
viction. Later generations, perhaps centuries hence will finally decide
the question.Chapter III: History of the Development of Idea of
The State. I. The Ancient World
A. The Hellenic Idea of the State
Political science does not properly begin till we come to the Greeks. As
it was in Greece that the self-consciousness of man first unfolded itself
in art and philosophy, so it was in politics.
Small as was the territory, and limited as was the power of the
Greek State, the principles upon which the Greek political conceptions
were based were broad and comprehensive, and the political idea ex-
pressed by Greek thinkers is lofty and noble. They base the State upon
human nature’ and hold that only in the State can man attain his perfec-
tion and find true satisfaction. The State is for them the moral order of
the world in which human nature fulfils its end.
Plato (Rep. v. p. 462) utters the great saying: ‘The best State is that
which approaches most nearly to the condition of the individual. If a
part of the body suffers, the whole body feels the hurt and sympathises
altogether with the part affected.’ In this he has already recognized the
organic and even the human-organic nature of the State, although with-
out following out in its consequences this pregnant thought.
The State, according to Plato, is the highest revelation of human
virtue, the harmonious manifestation of the powers of the human soul,
humanity perfected. As the soul of man consists of a rational, a spirited,
and a desiring element, and as reason and spirit ought to rule the desires,
so in the Platonic ideal, the wise ought to rule, the brave warriors should
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rial acquisition and bodily work should obey the two higher orders. In
the body politic justice requires that each part should do its own work.
(Rep. iv. pp. 428–33.)
Aristotle, for whose political philosophy our admiration rises, the
more we consider the works of his successors, is less guided by imagi-
nation than Plato, examines reality more carefully and recognizes acutely
the needs of man. Plato cuts off from family life the ruling classes of the
philosophers and the guardians in order that they may live completely
for the State, and demands for them a community of wives and property.
Aristotle, on the contrary, wishes to maintain the great institutions of
marriage, the family and private property. He declares the State to be
‘the association of clans and village-communities in a complete and
self-sufficing life.’13 He says that ‘man is by nature a political animal’
and he considers the State as a product of human nature. ‘The State
comes into being for the sake of mere life, but exists (or continues to
exist) for the sake of the good life.’14
In this idea (or ideal) of the State are combined and mingled all the
efforts of the Greeks in religion and in law, in morals and social life, in
art and science, in the acquisition and management of wealth, in trade
and industry. The individual requires the State to give him a legal exist-
ence: apart from the State he has neither safety nor freedom The barbar-
ian is a natural enemy, and conquered enemies become slaves, who are
excluded from the political community, and are therefore thrust down
into a degraded and ignoble position.
The Hellenic State, like the ancient State in general, because it was
considered all-powerful, actually possessed too much power. It was all
in all. The citizen was nothing, except as a member of the State. His
whole existence depended on and was subject to the State. The Athe-
nians indeed possessed and exercised intellectual freedom, but that was
only because the Athenian State valued freedom in general highly, not
because it recognised the rights of man. This same freest of states al-
lowed Socrates to be executed, and thought it was justified in doing so.
The independence of the family, home-life, education, even conjugal
fidelity, were in no way secure from State interference; still less of course
the private property of the citizens. The State meddled in everything,
and knew neither moral nor legal limits to its power. It disposed of the
bodies, and even of the talents of its members. It compelled men to
accept office as well as to render military service. The individual must
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again to a free and noble life. The absolute power of the State, apart
from the influence of ancient customs, had almost no other limits than
the following: In the first place, the citizens themselves had a share in
the exercise of this power, and lest the despotism of the demos might
become injurious to themselves also, they avoided the extreme conse-
quences of political communism. In the second place, insignificant mat-
ters only supplied small material for their passions to work upon, and
they were compelled to pay regard to their neighbours. The Greek States
were moreover only composed of fragments of the Hellenic people and
sub-races of them. They did not rise much beyond mere city-communes
(Stadtgemeinde). The lofty idea had thus only a humble form; although
referring to mankind. it could only obtain a childish expression in the
narrow limits of a mountain valley or a tract of sea-shore.
The ideal omnipotence and actual impotence of the State are thus
closely connected; they are the two chief defects of the Hellenic concep-
tion of the State, which is in other respects most worthy, true to human
nature, and fruitful in results.
B. The Roman Idea of the State
The Romans had a greater genius for Law and Politics than any other
people of classical antiquity, and this more by their moral character
than by their intellect. They had therefore a greater influence on the
world than the Greeks.
At first sight tile Roman idea of the State is closely connected with
the Greek. Cicero, in his political writings, has Athenian models con-
stantly before his eyes. The Roman jurists, when explaining law and the
State in general, follow the Greek philosophers, especially the Stoics.
Cicero declares the State to be the highest product of human power
(virtus), and says that there is nothing in which human excellence comes
nearer the will of the gods than in the founding and maintenance of
States.15 Occasionally he too compares the State to the individual, and
the head of the State to the spirit which rules the body.16 But in some
essential particulars the Roman conception of the State is different from
the Greek idea.
The Romans first distinguished law from morality, and gave it a
definite form, and thus they brought out more distinctly the legal nature
(Rechtsnatur) of the State. Thereby they limited the State, and gave it
greater firmness and power. It no longer summed up for them the ethical
ordering of the world, but was primarily a common legal organisation42/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
(gemeinsame Recktsordnung). The Romans left very much to social
customs and to the religious nature of man. The Roman family was
more free as against the State. Private property and private rights were
in general better protected against the arbitrary exercise even of public
authority. Of course they too made the welfare of the State the highest
law (salis populi suprema lex). They arranged even the worship of the
gods from a political point of view. No one could resist the State if it
uttered its will. But the Roman State limited itself; it restricted the prov-
ince of its own power and its own action.
Further, the Romans recognised the conception of the People, and
brought the constitution into an organic connexion with the People. They
declared the State to be the People organised, and declared the will of
the People to be the source of all law.17 The Roman State was thus not a
mere commune (Gemeinde), it raised itself to a national State (res pub-
lica).
Besides, the Roman State was destined to embrace the world.
Through all Roman history runs this tendency to universal dominion;
the national jus civile was supplemented by the jus gentium. The eternal
city, the urbs, became the capital of the world, orbis. The imperium of
the Roman magistrate became imperium mundi, the Roman senate be-
came a senate of all peoples and their kings. The majesty of the Roman
People culminated in the majesty of the Imperial power. The history of
Rome, according to the proud expression of Florus,18 became the his-
tory of mankind. This effort gave the Roman idea of the State an impe-
tus which left the Greek States far behind, and a greatness before which
they were compelled to bow. It was not an illusion but a reality which
ruled the ancient world, and which only the Germans in the West and the
Persians in the East had the courage and the strength to resist.Chapter IV: II. The Middle Age
The two new forces which partly transformed and partly destroyed the
universal empire of Rome were Christianity and the Teutonic race.
A. Christianity
The Christian religion extended its power over the minds of men, deny-
ing alike the authority of the Jewish State and the Roman Empire. Its
founder was not a prince of this world. The ancient State persecuted
him and his disciples to the death. If the first Christians were not di-
rectly hostile to the State, they cared for other things than political orga-
nization and political interests. When the Christian world made its peace
with the old Graeco-Roman State the religious community—the
‘Church’—was already conscious of her peculiar spiritual existence,
and did not regard herself as a mere State institution. The new idea
prevailed that the whole religious life of the community, although not
altogether withdrawn from the care and influence of the State, was yet
essentially independent. The prominently marked dualism of Church
and State became an essential limitation of the State, which was now
only a community of law and politics, no longer also of religion and
worship.
When the Church had received in the Pope a visible head indepen-
dent of the Emperor, and Rome for her capital, the old Roman idea of
universal dominion re-appeared in a spiritual form. Although, even at
the height of her medieval reputation, the Church did not succeed in
abasing the State into a mere ecclesiastical institution, and setting up
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for a long time far outshone by her splendour. She could compare her-
self with the sun, and the State with the moon, and as the ruler over
men’s souls claimed precedence over the ruler of their bodies. But the
dualism of State and Church continued to be recognised, and thus in the
main point the independence of the State was saved. The sword of the
Emperor, as well as that of the Pope, was derived from God, the su-
preme and true ruler of the world.19
As far as the teaching of the Church prevailed, the idea of the State
again, as formerly in the East, received a religious foundation; the power
of the State was derived from God (Gotteslehen), but at the same time
the spiritual significance of the State was overlooked and misunder-
stood; all spiritual life was to come from the Church, and the State
being regarded as merely bodily was put in an inferior position. The
elevation of the idea of the State above the narrow limits of nationality
was an insufficient compensation. Not humanity, but Christendom was
to be organised and governed by it in outward things. The Roman em-
pire was so far renewed in mediaeval forms, but was represented in a
superior form by the Roman Church, and in an inferior by the holy
Roman Empire of the German people.
B. The Teutons
The old Roman universal empire could not permanently maintain itself
against the Teutonic races. These warlike tribes forcibly wrested one
province after another from Roman rule; or it happened that the Roman
provincials or the emperors themselves called in to their aid the arms of
Teutonic princes, who thus in a peaceable manner acquired territorial
sovereignty (Landeshoheit). During the middle ages the Teutons ruled
everywhere in the West.
They came under the Christian instruction of the Roman Church
and the influence of Roman civilization; but they maintained themselves
upon the thrones of princes, and in the fortresses of the aristocracy. The
sceptre and the sword were in their hands.
The Teutons are not, like the Romans, an eminently political people;
it is with reluctance that the individual submits to the sovereignty of the
whole body. Their strong, confident and self-willed individuality inter-
feres with the common consciousness, and checks its power. (Thus the
Teuton stood in need of the political discipline of the Roman.) But in
spite of this the development of the State in the world’s history owes
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State, and they have won a place in all modern political institutions for
the freedom of persons, associations, and ‘Estates’ (Stände). Montesquieu
said very truly, that the germs of parliamentary constitutions are to be
found in the forests of Germany. In the primitive forms described by
Tacitus,20 in which the Teutonic kings cooperated with the local princes
and other chiefs on the one side, and with the great community of free-
men on the other, we recognise clearly the rude beginnings of the free
representative government, which later centuries produced.
The Teuton does not derive law, at least not directly, from the will of
the nation: he claims for himself an inborn right which the State must
protect, but which it does not create, and for which he is ready to fight
against the whole world, even against the authority of his own govern-
ment. He rejects strenuously the old idea that the State is all in all. The
whole relation is reversed. To the Teuton individual freedom is the su-
preme thing. He is induced to sacrifice a part of it to the State in order to
keep the rest all the more securely.
It is a necessary consequence of this character, that the Teutonic
idea of the State respects the independence of private rights more decid-
edly than the Roman. The freedom of the person, the family, the asso-
ciation is thus more assured and more extended than in the old Roman
empire. The rights of the State are thus limited by the rights of the
individual as well as by those of the Church.
A further consequence for Public Law is that the Teutons in general
admit no absolute power of the State, even in matters affecting the com-
munity. The Roman conception of imperium is foreign to them. Before
obeying they wish to deliberate and vote. Their estates (Stände) are a
political power with which that of the king must be united in order to
make laws. Yet the idea of the State as a collective person is still, as a
rule, unintelligible to them. They tend rather to break up the State into
actual persons or groups of persons. They understand it primarily as
embodied in the king or other princes, who are at the head of the courts
of justice, and of the assembly of the people, in the chief of the hundred
(Gau), the tithing (Zent), and the township (Volksgemeinde). One set of
persons sometimes strengthens and sometimes limits another; thus the
whole organization of the community, even in its parts, is filled with the
spirit of freedom. Unity is relatively weak, but the independence of the
parts is strong.
These alterations of the idea of the State in which we recognise
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The Teutons had no political philosophy of their own. Science in the
middle ages was at first in the hands of the Church, and was afterwards
determined by the traditions of Roman jurisprudence and Greek phi-
losophy. Even in the old tribal laws are to be found reminiscences of this
sort: e.g., in the laws of the Visigoths, after the model of classical litera-
ture, the body politic is compared with a man, the king with the head,
and the people with the members of the body.21 But this was only a
borrowed rhetorical ornament without deeper significance, and with no
definite reference to the actual medians al State. In some other respects
the idea of the State suffered degradation, and that not merely because it
was disparaged by the Church.
The mediaeval State might be called a legal State (Rechtsstat), but
in a different sense from that of the Romans. It was not the organization
of Public Law only: all its institutions were interfused with elements of
Private Law. Territorial sovereignty was regarded as the hereditary prop-
erty of a family, and public duties were treated as burdens upon land.
The whole feudal law and the patrimonial State in all its aspects suffer
from this admixture. Roman Public Law only served as a starting-point.
The feudal law of the middle ages appeared to be the essential end of the
mediaeval State, and the welfare of the people was neglected for it.
The idea of the national State had perished, destroyed by the break-
ing up of the national and political unity, by the feudal system, by the
conflicting claims of territories, estates, and dynasties. What remained
of the Roman empire was rather an ideal international, than a political,
union of Western Christendom, and this union was held together more
by the authority of the Pope and the Roman clergy than by the Empire.
On the whole the seeds of a freer and better development of the State
had been sown, but the idea of the State had in the middle ages become
less precise and vigorous than among the Romans.
C. The influence of the Renaissance
Even during the middle ages the memory of the ancient State had never
been completely lost. Rome had remained the spiritual capital of the
West. The old Roman Empire had indeed been broken to pieces by the
Teutons, but the Teutons who had formed independent kingdoms out of
Roman provinces received their civilization, and, above all, their reli-
gion from Rome, and in the place of the fallen city the Roman Church
became the ruling power of the middle ages, to which the Teutons them-
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language of the Roman Church, a great, nay the chief, part of the odd
Roman State was preserved. The old Empire was transformed into the
new Papacy, the universal State into the universal Church, in order to
rule the nations more easily. The old Roman Emperor had exercised his
sway by his representatives and officials with the help of Roman law, in
the name of the Roman people, and enforced it by the power of his
legions; similarly the Roman Pope commanded reverence in the name of
God and the Church by means of his bishops, and with the help of canon
law and ecclesiastical discipline, and enforced his decrees by means of
the numerous monastic orders.
But alongside of the Church the memory of the old Empire still
remained. We know nowadays how totallyunlike was the Roman Em-
pire of the Frankish kings from Charles the Great and of the German
kings from Otto the Great to the old Roman Empire, which had had its
seat in Rome and m Constantinople. But the whole middle ages believed
that the one was only a continuation of the other, and that the Frankish
Emperor, or the Roman Emperor of the German people, was the regular
successor of Claudius, Antoninus, and Constantine. In any case the re-
newed dignity of the Emperors implied a reminiscence of the old Roman
Empire, and an ideal union of mediaeval ideas and institutions with the
ancient world.
To this must now be added the rediscovery of the old imperial code,
the Corpus Juris Romani, which from the twelfth century had been
expounded at the Italian universities, and was revered as a revelation of
all human law. From Italy its authority spread victoriously over all
Western Europe, from the thirteenth century in France, and with still
greater consequences from the fifteenth century in Germany. However
the learned jurists were thinking rather of private law, and perhaps of
criminal law, than of public law. But many fundamental views about the
State, about its legislation, and about its sovereignty which had been
expressed by the Romans, became in this way part of the ordinary ideas
of the learned class.
Recollections of the old Roman republic and its majesty sometimes
revived and animated the citizens of towns in their effort to found new
city republics. The very names of the civic magistrates in Italy and in
Germany implied a dim memory of the consuls of the Roman Republic.
Twice over in the middle ages the Roman populace in romantic enthusi-
asm attempted to reawaken and reanimate the long dead republic; once
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second time in the fourteenth century under the tribune Cola Rienzi.
Both attempts failed through the political incapacity of the medieval
Romans, but both testify to the power of the ancient tradition.
Even Greek political theories were not quite unknown to the Ro-
mance civilization of the middle ages. The Politics of Aristotle were
studied in many monasteries, and that most famous theologian, Thomas
of Aquino, wrote a commentary on the celebrated work of the Greek
philosopher.
Nevertheless the legal system, and still more the political organiza-
tion of the middle ages, were totally different from those of antiquity.
The institutions of the time were moulded mainly under Teutonic influ-
ences, and its ideas dominated by the theology of the Church.
In the second half of the fifteenth century the recollection of the
classical period awoke more vigorously, and the classical spirit of the
Greeks and the Romans was born again (the ‘Renaissance’). The works
of ancient art produced a liberating and elevating effect on the Italian
artists, in architecture, sculpture, painting, and poetry. The ideas of an-
cient science were again held in honour, and broke through the bounds
set by medieval scholasticism and monastic theology. Humanism rose
above the ecclesiastical contempt of the world, and a brighter and more
joyous way of looking at life found wide acceptance at courts and in
cities. As nearly 2000 years before the Sophists became the teachers of
young Greeks of good family, so now the Humanists became the chosen
instructors of ambitious youth in Italy, France, and Germany. Educated
men were no longer terrified by the reproach that from Christians they
were again becoming Pagans. Even the Popes put themselves at the
head of this intellectual movement. Nicolas V (1447–1455), Pius II
(Aeneas Sylvius, 1458–1464), Julius II (1503–1513), Leo X (1513–
1521), protected and encouraged the artistic freedom of the Renais-
sance. The princely Medici, especially Cosimo (1434–1464) and Lorenzo
(1469–1492), made Florence an Italian Athens.
The ancient conception of the State and ancient political theories
likewise reappeared in part and influeceed public affairs, especially in
the following ways: (1) A few bold thinkers dared to explain the rise of
States and the nature of political authority by human considerations,
and thus to oppose theocratic opinions.
(2) Secondly, the idea of power, consciously and calmly consider-
ing means and ends for the guidance of the State and the government of
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its clearest expression in the writings of Machiavelli (1469–1527). His
Discourses on Livy, in which he glorifies the Roman republic, and his
Prince, in which he points out the way to the ambition of rulers, are
filled with the political spirit of the Renaissance.
(3) Thirdly, we mark the renewal of a political Imperium and a
political Sovereignty before whose single authority everything else must
bow. In the hands of the prince who ruled the State, this authority, freed
from the limitations of feudalism and of the mediaeval ‘estates,’ grew to
an absolutism like that of the Roman Emperor.
(4) Finally, the Renaissance manifested itself also in an opposite
form, to which this growing tyranny incited. With the recollection of the
Caesars there awoke also the memory of Brutus; tyrannicide was praised
as republican virtue, and even ‘Catilinarian’ conspirators reappear.22
But all this revival of ancient political ideas and tendencies was
limited to a comparatively narrow circle of highly educated men. The
masses had no understanding and no capacity for it. The whole influ-
ence of the Renaissance on politics was only partial, and quickly passed
by, helping to break up the medieval, and to prepare the way for the
modern State, but bringing forth no new political organisation of its
own.Chapter V: The Modern Idea of The State
A. When does the Modern Epoch Commence
The historical consciousness of Europeans and Americans at the present
day is unanimous in accepting the idea of a period of many centuries in
the life of humanity which is called ‘the middle ages’; and in believing
that we are living in a new age. But opinions are still divided as to what
point of time separates the modern from the medieval period. we have
learned that the past is bound up with the future. Presentiments and
tendencies of the coming age make themselves felt long before, and count-
less effects of bygone days continue to operate in changed times. In the
depth of the middle ages a few distinguished men gave utterance to
ideas which have not been understood until the present century, and
even to-day we still find many survivals of medieval institutions care-
fully preserved, and that not merely in monasteries or the castles of the
nobility. fee old and the new are linked together by the very unity of
human life, and it shows a want of sense to sever them sharply from one
another. It is the same with the different ages in the life of the individual.
Nevertheless it is necessary to determine the different periods of time
which, though passing over into one another, may yet on the whole be
clearly distinguished.
Many date the beginning of the new age as far back as the second
half of the fifteenth century. The period of the Renaissance appears to
them the transition from the middle ages to the modern world. The
reawakening of the philosophical spirit after the slumber of more than a
thousand years, the revival of ancient ideas and memories in opposition
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more joyous art under the influence of classical models, above all the
rise of the Italian cities which did not shrink from withdrawing them-
selves as occasion offered from the protection of the Papal hierarchy,
the extension of Roman and the disparagement of Canon law, the inven-
tion of printing and the diffusion of printed books, the invention of gun-
powder and the consequent changes in warfare, the greater enterprise in
navigation, and the discovery of unknown countries on the coasts of
Africa and in India and of a whole new continent in the West—all this
certainly marks a transition from the old to the new. But it is not so
much the conclusion as the decline of the medieval period, and the prepa-
ration for the rising tendencies of the new era. The spirit of the age
(Zeitgeist) at the Renaissance had rather the character of maturity than
of youth or childhood. It was less inclined to create what was new than
to revive what was old; its efforts were directed throughout to the re-
vival of ancient ideas and the imitation of ancient models. It partly re-
formed and partly destroyed the institutions of the middle ages, but it
did not overthrow them nor replace them by creations of its own. The
movement ended by stiffening into the absolutism of princes, great and
small.
Still more often the period of the ecclesiastical Reformation is con-
sidered the beginning of the new period—not indeed the incomplete at-
tempts at reform in the German Empire at the Diet of Worms of 1495,
but the reform of the sixteenth century, which is usually dated from the
13th October, 1517, when Martin Luther nailed his theses to the church
door of Wittenberg.
As a matter of fact the world-historical breach with the mediaeval
authority of the Roman Church was then complete, and the foundation
of Protestant churches was actually a new creation in the ecclesiastical
sphere. The liberation of the religious conscience from servitude to Rome
undoubtedly gave a powerful impulse to the subsequent liberation of
science from all ecclesiastical authority. The moral purification and el-
evation of the idea of the State prepared the way for modern politics.
Nevertheless the fundamental idea of the German Reformation was
not the production of anything new, but the purging of the ancient Church
from long-standing abuses, and the restoration of the primitive purity of
Christianity. The old historical authority of the Papal Church and its
tradition was broken, but the still older and equally historical authority
of the Holy Scriptures was retained with greater strictness than before.
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tive Christianity as it was for the Italian masters to reproduce the clas-
sical art of Athens and Rome. The world had changed and old ideas
could only reappear in new forms. The life of Europe was still advanc-
ing, and the Protestant Church, as well as the State which was influ-
enced by Protestantism, were thus relatively new phenomena. But the
idea of the State itself remained essentially that of the middle ages. The
State was still the kingdom of this world and of the body, the Church
was still mainly the spiritual community of the saints preparing for
heaven.
A decisive proof that the Reformation of the sixteenth century be-
longs rather to the advancing age of the medieval period than to the
youthful efforts of the modern era is to be found in the character of the
two centuries from 1540 to 1740. This long period gives the impartial
observer the impression, not of youth but of old age. Even in the Protes-
tant Church a dead and rigid orthodoxy straightway regained the upper
hand, allowing no fresh movements, and fettering and repressing the
advance of science. In the Catholic Church we mark the growing influ-
ence of the Jesuits, the most pronounced supporters of the artificially
maintained mediaeval hierarchy. The absolute monarchy dominated over
the medieval nobility and broke up the feudal system, but there was no
new blood in the veins of this despotic system which prevailed over the
whole continent of Europe, and seas repulsed in England alone. It was
supported mainly by old ideas, dynastic and Roman, patrimonial and
theocratic. The rococo style, which gradually supplanted that of the
Renaissance, is a manifestation of senility. Everywhere there is rather
breaking up and decay of the mediaeval period than a fundamentally
new era. The young Leibnitz received so vivid an impression of this that
he wrote in 1669, ‘We may well believe that the world has entered on its
old age.’23
The same considerations prevent us from finding the beginning of
the modern period in the English Revolution, whether that of 1640 or
the so-called “glorious” Revolution of 1668. Certainly they brought about
something new—constitutional monarchy. But the more carefully we
compare the English with the French Revolution, the more is our con-
viction strengthened that the former belongs to the end of the Mediaeval
and the latter to the Modern period. The English were struggling mainly
for the old Anglo-Saxon liberties and for the traditional rights of Parlia-
ment against the absolutism of the king, whereas the French strove to
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freedom.
Many therefore see in the French Revolution the first decided move-
ment of the modern period, and date this from 1789, an opinion which
flatters French vanity. It is incontestable that the French Revolution was
filled and animated b, the modern spirit, but it had begun to work before
this. The “age of enlightenment” (Aufklärung) Which preceded had al-
ready the unmistakable stamp of the new time.
Among many others, Thomas Buckle, the learned historian of mod-
ern civilization, has remarked that in the year 1740 a change in the
current of men’s ideas becomes perceptible. As the sun first lights up
the mountain-tops, and only afterwards shines down into the valley, so
the new spirit first manifests itself in great men, and only gradually
diffuses itself among the multitude. In the second half of the eighteenth
century the new spirit animated not only a chosen few, the prophets and
forerunners of a coming age: everywhere new ideas rose on the horizon,
and the demand for change was universally felt. Men’s hearts swelled
with the hope of a new life. Art, literature, the state, and society were
transformed, the sentiments of the world were turned away decisively
from the middle ages towards a new creation.
If we compare men and events since 1740 with those of the preced-
ing centuries, we are struck by the vast change in the character of the
times. Not merely are the individuals different, but the conditions of
their existence, the ground on which they stand, the air which they breathe.
Compare, e.g., Frederick the Great of Prussia, the most significant rep-
resentative of the modern State and the modern view of life—not merely
with Louis XIV of France, the clearest representative of the absolute
monarchy by the grace of God, which closes the middle ages—but even
with his own great ancestor, the Elector Frederick William; or compare
the liberation of the Netherlands from Spanish rule with the liberation
of North America from English rule; or compare the French with the
English Revolution, or Rousseau with Ulrich von Hutten, or Lessing
with Luther, and the vast difference is at once apparent.
The newness of the period on which civilized mankind has entered
since the middle of last century, appears in the uncertain probing and
experimenting of political theory and practice, in the daring attempts at
a complete new creation, in the momentary despair which succeeds fail-
ure, in the oscillations between revolution and reaction. If the modern
era has on the whole the character of self-conscious manhood, in a higher
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noticed, show that we have only experienced the first stage of this man-
hood, and that it has still an immature and youthful, sometimes even
childish appearance, just as the last centuries of the middle ages have a
senile aspect. The organic and psychological law of growth does not
only govern the entire life of humanity: it repeats itself in recurring
circles in particular periods within the various ages of the world.
Thus we date the modern era from the year 1740. The rise of the
Prussian kingdom, Joseph II’s reforms in Austria, the foundation of the
United States of North America, the changes of the French Revolution
and the Napoleonic empire, the transplanting of constitutional monar-
chy to the continent, the attempted introduction of representative de-
mocracy, the foundation of national states, the gradual removal of reli-
gious privileges and disabilities in public law, the separation of Church
and State, or at least the clear demarcation between their spheres, the
abolition of feudalism and of all privileged orders, the rise of the con-
ception of national unity, the recognition of the freedom of society,—all
these are the achievements or at least the attempts of the modern State.
Note. We are accustomed to consider the history of the human race
in its inner connection, and in a regular order. We therefore distinguish
the different ages of the world, in the same way that we distinguish the
ages of the individual’s life. We speak of a childhood and of a youth of
mankind, and we consider the latter to end with the classical period of
Greek and Roman civilization. In the same way we separate the middle
ages from the youthful and brilliant era of the old Greeks and Romans,
and on the other side from the more mature and manly modern world.
Whilst the life of the individual is measured by years and decades
the life of humanity has to be reckoned by hundreds or thousands of
years. Within particular eras we sometimes discover the same cycle,
and the same succession of ages, and find first ascending and then de-
scending stages. Just as great eras of the world’s history have a definite
character and spirit, so it is with the periods and phases which we find
within them. Thus, the first and second halves of the eighteenth century
belong to thoroughly types, and so too the first and second halves of the
sixteenth century.
This whole manner of contemplating the history of the world is
however only valid on the presupposition that humanity is not merely a
sum of individuals, and its life not a mere sum of individual lives. It
depends on the assumption that humanity is a whole, and has a develop-
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periods of time than those of the individual life. In viewing whole peri-
ods of hundreds and thousands of years, we cannot but be impressed by
this mighty continuity, this fixed order of development, and we infer
therefrom the unity of the human race, and the destiny of humanity
whose great life advances regardless of the little lives of individuals,
which consciously or unconsciously contribute to it.
If this view is correct, we are led to ask what is the duration of that
humanity whose life is described by universal history. It is not probable
that the unknown or little known infancy of mankind should stretch
back immeasurably, whilst its youth and advancing maturity does not
exceed a few thousands of years. There must be some proportion. Yet
this presumption seems to be contradicted by the natural science of the
present day. The Semitic account of the creation reduces the age of the
earth to a few thousands of years. A more profound examination has
vastly extended it, and we have learnt to count by millions, or even by
milliards of years. The same researches have put the beginnings of the
human race further back to a time which it is difficult to determine
exactly, and the remoteness of which is immeasurably more vast than
any known periods of later history. It is at least very probable, if not
certain, that hundreds of thousands of years ago there were beings like
men. Natural History has discovered remains of primitive human bones
and sculls, which must have belonged to the same unknown pre-historic
age as the cavern bears. Even the connection and the transitional stages
which link the human body with the older forms of animal life have been
pointed out. It has been made probable that the pre-historic man was
more nearly related to apes and other animals, than his present repre-
sentatives. This at first sight appears to increase our difficulties, but on
further examination affords a solution of them. The history of man’s
creation may go back to far earlier times than the traditional view sus-
pects, but there is no reason for extending the history of civilization, and
what we call universal history, as far back. History could not begin until
a higher race showed the capacity of themselves working creatively at
the perfection of mankind. It begins therefore with the appearance of the
white races, the children of light, who are the bearers of the history of
the world. The white man cannot be so old as the anthropoid ape.
The law of the organic and psychological development of universal
history, must not be confused with the natural law of bodily descent.
The common feeling and the common spirit of humanity, the progres-
sive and changing forms of sentiment and thought which are manifested56/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
in the works of man, belong essentially to his higher nature, and not to
that of the animals.
The first appearances of inferior human races may be regarded as
the material cause [Ûlh] of the higher forms of humanity, but bear only
the same relation to his proper history that the pigments and brushes do
to the work of the artist.Chapter VI
B. Chief differences of the Modern Conception of the
State from the Ancient and Mediaeval.
These may be exhibited as follows:
Ancient State
1. The ancient State did not recognise the personal rights of man, nor
consequently the right of individual freedom. In all ancient States at
least a half of the population consisted of slaves without rights, and only
the smaller half of free citizens. Agriculture, and the rearing of cattle,
manufactures, household service, even trade in great measure were chiefly
looked after by slaves. Consequently labour was little esteemed, and the
labourer of little account. The slaves were only connected with the State
through their masters. They had no share in the State: they had no fa-
therland. The rights of man were almost altogether denied them. Cus-
tom was indeed often better than the law, but even at the best their
actual situation was uncertain, and might suddenly change to the worst.
From time to time servile revolts broke out, and were cruelly suppressed.
2. The ancient idea of the State embraced the entire life of men in
community, in religion and law, morals and art, culture and science. The
priesthood was a political office. The ancient State did not yet recognise
the full spiritual freedom of the individual.
3. Man had only full rights, qua citizen. Among the Greeks private
and public law were not yet distinguished. The Romans separated them
in principle, but their private law still remained completely dependent
on the will of the people and the State. Individual freedom as against the
State was not yet recognised.58/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
4. The sovereignty of the State was absolute.
5. Public authority was directly exercised by its holders. In the an-
cient republic the citizens appeared in great popular assemblies
(kklhsai, comitia, &c.), and decided directly on important public
affairs.
6. The Greek States were essentially city States (pÒleij). Rome
expanded from a city State to a world State.
7. In the ancient State public activities were distinguished by their
nature and objects, but usually the same assemblies and magistrates
exercised different functions, legislative and administrative, imperium
and jurisdictio.
8. The ancient State felt itself limited externally only by the resis-
tance of other States, and not by a common international law. Rome
pursued without scruple the dominion of the world as her natural privi-
lege.
Modern State
1. The modern State recognises the rights of man in every one. Every-
where slavery has been abolished as a wrong. Even the milder form of
serfdom and hereditary subjection has been set aside as inconsistent
with the natural freedom of the person. Man has no property in man, for
man is not a thing, but always a person, i.e., a subject of rights
(Rechtswesen). Labour is free and esteemed. All classes of the people
have a political position in the State, and the suffrage has been extended,
even to labourers and servants. The danger of slave revolts has disap-
peared. The whole State rests on a broader basis, its roots extend through
the whole population.
2. The modern State has become conscious of the limits of its power,
and its rights. It considers itself essentially a legal and political commu-
nity. It gives up its claim to dominate religion and worship, and leaves
both to churches and individuals. The priesthood is an ecclesiastical
office. The modern State claims no scientific and no artistic authority, it
esteems and protects freedom of scientific enquiry and of expression of
opinion.
3. Man has his rights as an individual, private law is sharply distin-
guished from public law, and is rather recognised than created by the
State, rather protected than commanded. The free person is not absorbed
in the State, but develops himself independently, and exercises his rights,
not according to the will of the sovereign State, but according to hisThe Theory of the State/59
own.
4. The sovereignty of the State is constitutionally limited.
5. The modern State is representative. In place of these mass as-
semblies comes a representative body chosen by the citizens. These rep-
resentative bodies have more capacity than the ancient popular assem-
blies to examine laws, to decide and exercise control.
6. Modern States are essentially national States. The city is only a
community in the State, and not the heart of the State.
7. In the modern State different activities have different organs, and
thus the earlier distinctions in the objects of authority have passed into a
personal separation of functions.
8. Modern States recognise international law (Volkerrecht) as a limit
to their dominion. International law protects the existence and freedom
of all nations and States, and rejects the universal dominion of one State
over all peoples.
The chief differences between the Modern and Mediaeval State are
as follows:—
Mediaeval State
1. The middle ages derived the State and the authority of the State from
God. The State was held to be an organisation willed and created by
God.
2. The conception of the State was based on and regulated by theo-
logical principles. Islam, which belonged altogether to the middle ages,
recognised only a kingdom of God, which was entrusted by God to the
Sultan. Mediaeval Christianity avowed the dualism of Church and State,
but believed that both swords, the spiritual and the temporal, were en-
trusted by God, the one to the Pope, and the other to the Emperor. Prot-
estant theology rejected the idea of the spiritual sword, and recognised
only the one sword of the State, but held firmly to the religious idea that
sovereign power comes from God.
3. The ideal of the medieval State was not indeed like that of the old
oriental peoples, a direct theocracy, but an indirect theocracy. The ruler
was the vice-gerent of God.
4. The mediaeval State depended upon community of belief, and
demanded unity of creed. Unbelievers and heretics had no political rights,
they were persecuted and exterminated; at the best they were merely
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5. Mediaeval Christendom considered the Church as spiritual, and
therefore higher; the State as bodily, and therefore lower. Thus the rule,
or at least the guardianship, of the priesthood was above that of kings.
The clergy stood high above the laity, and enjoyed immunities and privi-
leges. 6. In the middle ages the Church guided the education of the young,
and exercised authority over science.
7. Public and private law were not distinguished, territorial sover-
eignty was held to resemble property in land, and the royal power a
family right.
8. The middle ages produced the feudal system. The power of the
State was split up, and there was a gradual descent from God to the
king, from him to the princes, then to the knights and the towns. The
organization of law was particularistic.
9. Representation was according to estates. The aristocratic estates
of the clergy and the nobility dominated Law was different in each es-
tate.
10. Great and small lords had the freedom of their dynasties and
orders so extensively protected, that the authority of the State was weak-
ened. On the other hand the peasantry were kept in an unfree condition.
11. The medieval State was merely a legal State (Rechtsstat); but
the administration of justice was indifferently guarded, and people were
often left to maintain their own rights. Government and administration
were weak and little developed.
12. The medieval State had little consciousness of its own spirit. It
was determined by instincts and tendencies. It gives one the impression
of natural growth; custom was the chief source of its law.
Modern State
1. The modern State is founded by human means on human nature. The
State is an organisation of common life fanned and administered by
men, and for human ends.
2. The fundamental principles of the State are determined by the
human sciences of philosophy and history. Modern political science starts
from the consideration of man in explaining the State. Some consider
the State to be a society of individuals who have united together for the
defence of their safety and freedom; others as an embodiment of the
nation in its unity. The modern idea of the State is not religious, but not
therefore irreligious, i.e., it does not make the State depend upon reli-
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that His providence has a part in the government of the world. Modern
political science does not profess to comprehend the ways of God, but
endeavours to understand the State as a human institution.
3. All theocracy is repellent to the political consciousness of mod-
ern nations. The modern State is a human constitutional arrangement.
The authority of the State is conditioned by public law, and its politics
aim at the welfare of the nation (the commonweal), understood by hu-
man reason, and carried out by human means.
4. The modern State does not consider religion a condition of legal
status (Recht). Public and private law are independent of creed. The
modern State protects freedom of belief, and unites peacefully different
churches and religious societies. It abstains from all persecution of dis-
senters or unbelievers.
5. The modern State regards itself as a person, consisting at once of
spirit (the national spirit) and body (the constitution). It feels itself inde-
pendent, even as against the Church, which is likewise a collective per-
son, consisting of spirit and body, and maintains its supremacy even
over the Church. It recognises no superior status in the clergy, abolishes
their privileges and immunities, and extends the authority of law over
all classes equally.
6. The modern State leaves only religious education to the Church,
the school is a State school, science is free from ecclesiastical authority,
and its freedom is protected by the State.
7. Public and private law are distinguished, and public rights imply
public duties.
8. The modern State is an organization of the nation (Volk) and
preserves a central unity in its authority. States are formed on a national
(national) basis, and tend to become great in size. Law is national and
human, and applies to all equally.
9. The modern State requires a uniform representation of the people.
The great classes of the people have the chief power: the basis is demo-
cratic. Citizenship embraces all classes equally. The law is the same for
the whole country and people.
10. The modern State develops the common freedom of citizenship
in all classes, and compels every one to submit to its authority.
11. The modern State, because constitutional, is likewise a legal
State; but at the same time it concerns itself with economics and culture,
and above all with politics. Government is strong, and administration is
carefully developed with a view to the welfare of the nation, and of62/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
society.
12. The modern State is conscious of itself, it acts according to
principles and from reason rather than from instinct. Legislation is the
principal source of its law.Chapter VII: Development of Different Theories of
the State
Political science has had a very important share in altering the actual
character of the State and the ideal of what it should be.24 Modern po-
litical theory preceded modern political practice, and has generally ac-
companied and pointed out the way for change. More rarely, theory has
followed facts.
The following are the main phases in the scientific development:—
The conception of the State at the time of the Renaissance, espe-
cially as we find it in the works of Machiavelli, Bodin, and partly also
of Hugo Grotius, is the direct outcome of the ancient conception, but
begins to deviate from it.
The State is to Machiavelli the highest kind of existence. He rever-
ences it as the noblest production of the human spirit. He loves it pas-
sionately, and sacrifices to it without hesitation everything, even reli-
gion and virtue. But his State is no longer a legal or constitutional State,
such as seas that of the ancient Romans. Public law is to him only a
means to further the welfare of the State, and to secure the growth of its
power. His ideal is exclusively filled and determined by politics. The
State is for him neither a moral nor a legal (Rechtswesen), but only a
political being. Thus, the only standard of all state-acts is utility. What
the power and authority of the State demand. that must the statesman
do, undisturbed by moral and legal considerations. What is hurtful to
the welfare of the State he must avoid.
Machiavelli’s great service was to make political science indepen-
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law (Statsrecht) and politics (Politik). But he has adorned an immoral
and unjust policy, has put his prudent advice at the disposal of tyranny,
and has thus helped to corrupt the political practice of the last three
centuries.
Bodin sees in the State ‘a right government, with sovereign power,
of several households and their common possessions.’25 He bases the
State especially on the family, common possessions, and sovereignty,
and he blames the political ideas of the ancients for having looked too
much to happiness and success. By his doctrine of the sovereignty of the
ruler he gave a scientific support to the absolutism of the French monar-
chy.
Hugo Grotius still inclines to the definitions of Cicero, but the tran-
sition to modern political ideas may be quite clearly observed. He bases
the State, like the ancients, upon human nature, but he is thinking less
than they of mankind or of a whole people. He looks, above all, to the
individual man. His saying ‘hominis proprium sociale’ is a bad transla-
tion of the Aristotelian: Ð Ônqrwpoj zùon politikÒn. But it shows in a
characteristic way that the modern mind does not begin with the State,
but with the individual. The sharp separation of the religious commu-
nity of the Church from the worldly and political community of the
State, and the strong accentuation of personal freedom are two other
signs of the modern spirit of the Dutch writer. He declares the State to
be ‘the complete union of free men, who join themselves together for the
purpose of enjoying law, and for the sake of public welfare.’26 The per-
sonality of the State was not unknown to him, but it does not dominate
his political theory, and in making the consent of men the chief source of
public law he suggests a line of thought which was carried out in the
later theory of contract.
The idea of contract formed the basis of the modern theory of the
Law of Nature and the speculative political philosophy which was
founded on it in complete independence of ancient theories of the State.
The differences of philosophical schools and of political parties pro-
duced a great difference between opinions, hardly any one writer com-
pletely agreeing with another. But even into the present century, in the
many accounts of the Law of Nature, and of the general conception of
the State, there prevailed the fundamental idea that the State was essen-
tially an association of individuals, and therefore an arbitrary work of
individual freedom. The absolutist, Hobbes,27 who makes the authority
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radical Rousseau,28 whose ‘sovereignty of the people’ makes the con-
tinuance of the whole order of the State an open question. The ingenious
Samuel Puffendorf29 regards the State as a moral person, but its will is,
for him too, only composed of the individual wills of all, and he explains
the State by the theory of social contract John Locke zealously defends
this theory against the attacks of theological bigots, and finds in it a
guarantee of English civic liberty. Even Kant30 does not get beyond it,
although he shows a tendency to do so, and Fichte himself in his earlier
writings still adheres to the same view.
The State, according to the whole philosophy of natural rights, is
essentially based upon contract and upon association. If the ancient
philosophers did not sufficiently regard the rights of individuals, the
modern have committed the opposite error of regarding the individual
so much as to ignore the significance of the State as a whole.
It was only in the modern period that the theory of natural law could
obtain general acceptance, and lead to attempts to realise it. The abso-
lutist character of the two centuries before 1740 implied a theory of the
State, which based it upon the power of a superior. The source of this
conception received no further examination. Sometimes people were
content with the traditional belief of the Church, that the government
had received the sword from God: sometimes they inclined to the patri-
monial tradition that the prince was the supreme owner of the country.
Meanwhile these older doctrines had to undergo a transformation, partly
through the accentuation of the ‘public law’ (öffentlich-rechtiich) char-
acter of sovereignty, partly through the necessary regard to the public
weal.
The State was thus regarded as being essentially the sphere of the
power of a superior, and the government was actually identified with the
State (l’état c’est moi; as Louis XIV said). This was the fundamental
idea of the absolutist theory of the State which, prepared by Bodin and
Hobbes, was developed in a theological way, especially by Filmer and
Bossuet, and was taught with a hundred variations. In this one-sided
view of authority, the rights and liberty of the governed were of course
altogether left out of sight. Just as the Roman Catholic Church places
the essence of its being in the clergy alone, with Pope at their head,
while the laity are regarded as a flock of sheep, who have to be guided
and sheared by their spiritual shepherd: so according to this theory of
the State, only the prince and the government officials had any value,
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and governed from above, but with no claim to manage themselves, or
to share the government, or to control the conduct of their rulers.
It was with the immediate intention of narrowing the sphere as-
signed to government, alike by the theory of natural law and by the
theory of authority, that Kant and Wilhelm von Humboldt declared the
State to be a ‘legal State’ (Rechtsstat) in the sense that its sole duty was
the maintenance of the legal security of each individual. Fichte indeed
broke through these narrow limits in describing the State, as at the same
time concerned with economics, and in this respect he even exaggerated
its power, and towards the end of his life, inspired by the national enthu-
siasm for the liberation of Germany, he ascribed to the State still higher
spiritual functions. But most German philosophers and jurists of the
next generation still adhered to the theory in the narrow Kantian sense.
The idea obtained acceptance with many who sought a defence
against the mania of the time for over-government and against the arbi-
trariness of the police and the military. But those who opposed the legal
State to the ‘police State’ (Polizeistat), and who declared it to be the
work of modern times, to replace the latter by the former, were without
a clear consciousness of all that the State implied. The State must not be
made a mere legal State, any more than it can be a mere ‘police State.’
In the former case the State would at last become a mere institution for
administering justice, in which the legislative power would establish the
legal rules, and the judicial power would protect them and apply them to
particular cases, and the government would have almost no other activ-
ity left it than that of a servant of the law courts, a policeman.31 Eco-
nomic interests, culture, and the development of the national power would
be neglected, and there could be no greatness in the policy of the coun-
try. On the other hand, a one-sided development of the ‘police State’
would in the end sacrifice all individual rights and freedom to an exclu-
sive regard for that which appears useful to the whole, and would sub-
ject free men to an intolerable amount of protection.
If then by ‘legal State’ is understood (1) that the State is only an
institution for protecting the rights of individuals, all public law is clearly
turned into a mere means for private law, and the State sinks to the
position of a mere servant of private persons.
Further, if by ‘legal State’ is understood (2) that the State has to
organise the rights of the community, and at the same time to care for
the recognition of individual rights, this is a quite correct but an insuffi-
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for the material well-being and the spiritual elevation of the people, is
overlooked.
Or (3) if it is understood that the State has practically to further the
public welfare, but can formally only exercise compulsion in so far as
this is required by some definite legal rights, this is true enough, but at
the same time it is clear that only one side of political activity is thereby
determined, and that no account is taken of public care, e.g., for the
needs of food-supply, trade, and civilization generally, all of which move
freely within those legal limits, and need no formal compulsion.
If by legal State is understood (4) the denial of the religious basis of
the State, and the affirmation of its human basis and limits; or (5) the
resistance to all absolute authority, to the patrimonial State—too often
allied with arbitrary police interference—and the assertion that the citi-
zens must have a share in public affairs, the characteristics of the mod-
ern State are indeed indicated, but the expression is unfortunate. It is
better to call it a ‘constitutional State.’
The State has two aspects: rest and movement, continuance and
progress, body and spirit. There are two political sciences correspond-
ing to this internal distinction, Public Law and Politics; and so too there
are two great principles which, like two stars, illuminate and fructify
the life of the State, conditioning both its form and content: justice (justi-
tia) and the public weal (salus publica). Statesmen have especially the
latter before them, jurists the former. The idea of justice determines
public law, the idea of welfare guides politics.
The care of government relates rather to the public welfare, although
within the limits of law. The Romans, the political people par excel-
lence, assigned to their highest magistrates the care for the public weal
as their supreme duty,32 The activity of the law courts is limited to the
maintenance of the law. But if the State is to exist and prosper, it must
constantly pay regard to public welfare as well as to law. Now it is just
the needs of the commonweal which are more highly regarded by the
modern than by the medieval State, and therefore the former is less of a
mere legal State than the latter.
The historical school has the merit of having restored the conscious-
ness of the organic character of the State, of which indeed a few great
statesmen had never lost a vivid comprehension Frederick the Great of
Prussia expressed it clearly in his Anti-Machiavel: ‘As men are born,
live for a time, and then die from disease or from age, so states come
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had so completely neglected this view that the restoration of it by the
historical school had the effect of a new discovery, and science for the
future took a new and more fruitful direction. Meanwhile the historical
school was inclined to take up the conception of the State too much as
merely national, and to overlook or even to dispute its human signifi-
cance. Thus, Savigny declared the State to be ‘the bodily form of the
spiritual community of the nation,’ or ‘the organic manifestation of the
nation.’33 But the brilliant Englishman, Edmund Burke, in contending
against the theories of the revolution, brought the historical State into
the light of the divine order of the world, in a famous passage of his
Reflections on the Revolution in France: ‘Society is indeed a contract.
Subordinate contracts for objects of mere occasional interest may be
dissolved at pleasure; but the State ought not to be considered as noth-
ing better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee,
calico or tobacco, or some other such low concern, to be taken up for a
little temporary interest, and to be dissolved by the fancy of the parties.
It is to be looked on with other reverence; because it is not a partnership
in things subservient only to the gross animal existence of a temporary
and perishable nature. It is a partnership in all science, a partnership in
all art, a partnership in every virtue and in all perfection. As the ends of
such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes
a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those
who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born. Each
contract of each particular State is but a clause in the great primaeval
contract of eternal Society, linking the lower with the higher natures,
connecting the visible and invisible world, according to a fixed compact
sanctioned by the inviolable oath which holds all physical and all moral
natures, each in their appointed place.’34
Such a conception of the State is far more lofty than  was possible
according to the medieval doctrine that  the State was related to the
Church, as the body to the soul.
The historical school, however, only took up the State as it had
come to be. Looking only at the past, it was so powerfully attracted by
the scenes of ancient life, that many of its disciples lost understanding
for the present, and inclination to help in improving public conditions.
The school of natural law might frequently be reproached with making
the State the sport of arbitrary individual will. Similarly the historical
school may be blamed for having its conception of the State fast bound
to traditional authority and hereditary prejudices.35The Theory of the State/69
Although the works of the historical school are almost exclusively
limited to the legal and political history of particular states, yet even
speculative philosophy gained by the new inquiries.
Even Hegel in his theory of Law (Rechtslehre) paid more regard to
the historical formation of states than the earlier theorists of natural
law. He supposed indeed that he found in the history of the world a
dialectical process of reason. The ‘existing’ appeared to him ‘rational.’
His theory glorified especially the Prussian state, as it then existed, still
absolute although governed in a spirit of public duty. He defended the
power of the monarchy, and did not care for the advance of constitu-
tional freedom. But he emphasised the moral significance of the State,
and in opposition to the wretched idea that it was only a necessary evil,
he praised it, as the highest and noblest realization of the idea of Right.
Hegel’s State is however only a logical abstraction, not a living
organism, a mere logical notion, not a person.36 Hegel, by founding the
State and Law merely upon will, overlooks the fact that in the State not
merely is the collective human will operative, but all the powers of hu-
man spirit and feeling together.
Fr. J. Stahl, who, after Hegel, was the most important representa-
tive of the philosophical theory of the State in Berlin, argued against the
school of natural law and the Hegelian theory with zeal and ability. He
undertook to unite the historical tendency with the imaginative specula-
tions of Schelling.
Stahl has in many ways advanced political science by his dialectical
and critical ability in finding new points of view, and by the acuteness
with which he lights up many dark places; but in other respects his want
of thorough historical education, and his somewhat servile sophistry,
which made modern formulas subservient to the romantic fancies of
great and small despots, have done much harm Stahl considers the State
as ‘a moral and intellectual domain,’ or as ‘the union of the multitude to
an ordered common existence, the setting up of a moral authority and
power exalted and majestic, to which the subjects must submit.’ His
idea of the State is more living than Hegel’s. He recognises too that the
rule of the State ‘is limited to common interests,’ and in this way he
avoids the exaggeration of the ancient State, but a trace of the theocracy
of the Old Testament runs like a red line through his whole theory of the
State, destroying its value for the modern European world. The divine
or superhuman majesty of the power of the State can make no peace
with human and civil liberty.70/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
The old strife between the philosophical and historical school in
Germany has altogether ceased. Peace was made as early as 1840. Since
then it is recognised on all sides that the experiences and phenomena of
history must be illumined with the light of ideas, and that speculation is
childish if it does not consider the real conditions of the nation’s life. In
spite of this union of the two methods, which supplement and correct
one another, some authors have more of the philosophical, and others
more of the historical tendency.
Another characteristic of modern political science is the sharper
criticism which is exercised not only in examining facts, but in making
abstractions from them, and in forming conceptions. This criticism con-
siders the State from the most different points of view. A few of the most
notable writers may be named. The works of Robert von Mohl are writ-
ten mainly from the literary point of view, but they show a sober and
intelligent application of the standard of practicability. Alexis de
Tocqueville has always in view the movement of political life, whether
he is describing the American democracy, or the connexion of the French
Revolution with the old regime, or the condition of the English aristoc-
racy. The Baron Eötvös is influenced by a distrust of modern ideas.
John Stuart Mill criticises public affairs from the radical standpoint of
abstract logic, moderated however by his English temperament Thomas
Buckle applies the methods of natural science to the theory of the State,
and attempts to explain the life of the State by a consideration of the
forces of nature.
With other writers criticism has a decidedly historical character,
e.g., Gneist, the chief authority on English constitutional history; Édouard
Laboulaye, who writes admiringly of the American constitution; and
Heinrich von Treitschke, who first brought out the significance of the
Prussian monarchy. Lorenz von Stein follows the same method, but
occupies himself chiefly with details of administration.
In the more recent school of Gerber, criticism has taken especially a
juristic character. The writings of many of his pupils show the danger of
this method, which tends to repress progress by formal abstractions.
The psychological consideration of the State, on the other hand,
attempts to explain the life of the State more profoundly from the forms
and faculties of the human spirit. This method involves an opposite
danger, viz., that the movement of Politics may not sufficiently regard
the fixed and sure realm of Law, but disturb and transform it.
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alongside of one another, is in harmony with recent tendencies. Most of
the writers who have been named have used it with success. It is indis-
pensable for the general theory of the State.
Finally, in an age like ours, in which national States are formed, the
theory of the State accentuates more decidedly than before the national
character of the State. Welcker in Freiburg, Franz Lieber in New York,
Fr. Laurent in Ghent, Bluntschli in Zürich and Munich, had followed
this tendency in theory, even before the attempts of Italy and Germany
to realise their national unity. The newly awakened political science of
the Italians in its youthful ardour worked out the national basis of the
State with special prominence, and at first not without one-sided pas-
sion. Its most distinguished representatives are Mancini and Padeletti in
Rome, and Pierantoni in Naples. The Italians, like the Germans, unite
the historical and the philosophical methods in their works.
Note—There is still little understanding for the organic or, to use a
better expression, the psychological and human nature of the State. As
there are persons, sometimes educated persons, who have no musical
ear, or are completely insensible to the beauty of a painting or a draw-
ing, so there are manly learned men who are complete strangers to or-
ganic or psychological thinking. One must not blame them, for nobody
can go beyond his natural dispositions, but they would do well to ab-
stain from any judgment about things which they do not understand.
Otherwise they only exhibit their presumption as well as their deficiency.
One of the first to lead the way in the organic method was Fr.
Schmitthenner, who declared the State to be ‘an ethical organism for the
purpose of giving a public expression to external life, law, well-being
and culture.’
A remarkable attempt was made by Vollgraff to base the theory of
the State on the psychology of peoples. (‘A first attempt at a scientific
explanation of general ethnology by anthropology, and of the philoso-
phy of politics and law by the ethnology or national character of
peoples,’ 3 parts, 1851–53.) The work professes to be a first attempt,
and as such deserves respect, but is not well adapted to bring the psy-
chological method into repute. Neither the account of the powers of the
human mind nor the estimate of the different temperaments is satisfac-
tory, and the considerable amount of collected historical material and
the numerous observations and notes of travel are so uncritical, and so
much mixed up with mere fancy pictures, as not to give the impression
of accuracy.72/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
Ahrens, a follower of the philosopher Krause, has undertaken to
write an organic theory of the State (H. Ahrens, Die organische
Statslehre, Bd. I, Vienna, 1850); but by the organism of the State, he
does not so much understand a living and personal collective being, as
an organic arrangement for community in law.
Waitz (Politik, 1862, I. 5) says ‘The State is not something arbi-
trarily made, it does not arise by a contract between men, nor by the
power of one or more individuals. The State grows like an organism’
but not according to the laws, nor for the ends of mere natural life: it has
its foundation in the higher moral tendencies of man, and is a sphere for
the realisation of moral ideas, it is not a natural but a moral organism.
The State is the organization of the people.’ The State is not however
the realization of the moral life in general. The moral dispositions and
ideas of man determine also private life, the church, the family, and
society. Only if we understand psychologically the collective human
nature of peoples, and of mankind, do we get a clear and satisfactory
basis for the conception of the State. In my Psychological Studies on
State and Church, Zürich, 1844, I made the first attempt to explain the
State from the point of view of the psychology of Fr. Rohmer.
I made the mistake of presupposing some understanding for this
science which I had made known in my Theory of Parties, but I found
out that I was in error, and that all psychological thinking about the
State was strange and unknown to the education of the day. My Studies
were put aside as ‘the incomprehensible nonsense of an otherwise intel-
ligent man.’ The fruits of these studies, as they have been matured in the
present work, are received with general acceptance. Meanwhile the time
has come nearer in which the path on which those studies entered will no
longer appear adventurous, and the organic and psychological study of
the State will be readily pursued; then people will be better able to judge,
whether these studies have ally value or not. Meantime I find compensa-
tion for much misunderstanding and misappreciation in knowing that
the two most brilliant of German statesmen, Frederick the Great and
Prince Bismarck, have proved by word and deed their understanding for
the psychological life of nations and States.Book II: The Fundamental Conditions of the State
in the Nature of Men and of NationsChapter I: Mankind. The Races of Men, and
Families of Nations
Mankind has not yet found a collective organisation in a world-empire.
History in times past only knows of single empires and states limited to
parts of mankind. The general theory of public law (Statsrecht) must
therefore begin by observing those parts, and by defining the relation of
nations to humanity and the State.
A belief in the unity of the family of men is essential to the higher
religious sense. Christianity has called all men to be the children of
God. The civilised States assume the unity of mankind and recognise a
common human nature even in lower races and tribes. But, at the same
time, the diversity of races is of the highest importance for the State and
for public law: for in the State men appear in an order, and order cannot
be imagined without difference.
Science hitherto has failed to discover the mysterious origin of the
main races (Hauptrassen) of mankind. Are races due to separate acts of
creation? or have the different races parted gradually from one original
parent race? and if so, what natural forces were at work in the change?
We do not yet know. But at the very outset of the history of human
development, as we know it, we find the chief races differing in mental
capacity as well as in build and colour, and that diversity has remained
essentially the same.
It is true that no race has remained quite pure, and large portions of
primitive races have been torn away from their kinsfolk, and some of
them transformed into new nations.
But throughout we can see the distinction between white, black,The Theory of the State/75
yellow, and perhaps red races at work in the history of development,
especially if we look beyond mere colour, which is often deceptive.
There are, indeed, many thinkers who, in theory, deny the mental
inequality of these races, but scarcely one who does not constantly
recognise it in practical life. The whole history of the world bears wit-
ness to the different endowment of races, and even to the unequal capac-
ity of the nations which have grown out of them. It is probable that the
dark Ethiopian race, the ‘nations of the night,’ as Carus calls them, once
covered not only Africa, their special quarter of the world, but also the
southern countries of Asia, and even occupied the southern promonto-
ries of the continent of Europe. There can be no doubt of the great age of
this, perhaps the earliest of all races. But at no time or place has it, of
itself, attained even a moderate degree of legal and political develop-
ment. It has no real history. In every encounter with white races or men,
it has at once given in to them. With a luxuriant fancy and excitable
passions it unites a poor understanding and a weak will. Childish by
nature, it is meant to be educated and ruled by higher nations.
Even in antiquity the black race in India and Egypt were ruled by
the white Aryans and Semites. To the present day the old Negro monar-
chies of Africa are not proper States, but arbitrary and capricious des-
potisms. These tribes made a distinct advance when they came under
the influence of Mohammedan religion and culture, especially in North
Africa and the kingdoms of the middle Soudan. The attempts of the
Negroes of Hayti and Liberia to imitate the governments of the French
Empire and the United States are burlesques of the life of political na-
tions.
On the other hand, the red races of the American Indians are less
childish. But their political capacity is very small. No doubt before the
colonization of America by Europeans there were larger States there,
with a considerable and respectable civilisatiom But the theocratic mon-
archies of pew and Mexico were probably not the work of indigenous
races, but were founded by immigrants from Eastern and Southern Asia.
The name of ‘White Children of the Sun’ given to the Incas in Peru, and
the honour paid to white men as ‘sons of the Gods,’ point unmistakably
to an Aryan origin. Where the Indians were left to themselves, they
again relapsed into the state of wild hunters, and fell into small groups.
Their tribal republics with changing chiefs, impetuous orators and as-
semblies, rest on no firm foundation of law and institutions. They are
not States, but societies of hunters. Individuals, perhaps, enjoy a self-76/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
willed and froward freedom, but the bond uniting the whole is crude and
inflexible. They can offer no opposition to the advance of white civiliza-
tion, and are crushed out and destroyed by it.
The so-called ‘yellow’ race has more significance for political de-
velopment. Their home has always been in Asia, and they part into two
main tribes,—the browner type of the Malays, and the lighter type of
the Finns and Mongols. The latter especially has produced great princes,
commanders, and statesmen. Some, indeed, of these tribes have remained
to the present day in the nomad state, as herdsmen, hunters, and rob-
bers, chiefly in middle Asia; but other nations of this race have founded
great empires. They have retained their roughness in the West, and grown
more humane in the East. The race, as a whole, comes nearer to the
Caucasian than either the Negroes or the Indians do, and they have from
early times, especially in the upper classes, intermarried with whites.
The civilised nations (Culturvölker) of China and Japan have reached a
higher development than the Huns and Turks. They have produced a
subtle political philosophy, and the ideas of humanity as opposed to
barbarism, and personal merit as opposed to nobility of birth, were
recognised by them earlier than by the Aryans of Europe. They have
done much for agriculture, trades, schools, and police. But their ideas of
law were always mixed up with moral precepts, and limited by consid-
erations of family life and discipline. Their government is a benevolent
despotism. They have little sense of honour, and no idea of national
freedom.
Highest in the scale stands the white race of Caucasian or Iranian
nations, the ‘nations of the daylight,’ as Carus calls them in opposition
to the children of the night and of the twilight, the ‘children of the sun
and of heaven,’ as the ancients called them. They are pre-eminently the
nations which determine the history of the world. All the higher reli-
gions which unite man with God were first revealed among them; al-
most all philosophy has issued from the works of their mind. In contact
with other races they have always ended by conquering them and mak-
ing them their subjects. They give the impulse to all higher political
development. To their intellect and to the energy of their will, we owe,
under God, all the highest achievements of the human spirit. But these
‘nations of the day’ part into two great families, the Semitic and the
Aryan nations. The function of the Semites in the world is, above all, a
religious one. Judaism, Christianity, Islam, were all first given to the
world among Semitic nations, and in the East. But politically they areThe Theory of the State/77
less important. On the other hand, the Aryan family of nations, whose
language is the richest in forms and in thought, holds the first place in
the history of States and to the development of rights: they have found
their true home in Europe, and it is here that their manly genius for
politics has unfolded and matured.
On this rests the claim of these Aryan nations of Europe to become,
by their ideas and institutions, the political leaders of the other nations
of the earth, and so to perfect the organization of mankind.
This diversity of races, then, is natural: it is due to nature’s creative
energy, and is not merely the product of human history. On the other
hand, the nations into which these races divide, or which have arisen
from the fusion of different races, are clearly the product of human
history. Nations are ‘historical’ members of humanity and its races. We
do, indeed, know of primitive nations, nations, that is, which meet us in
early times, of which we have scanty knowledge, or whose origin is lost
in antiquity. But there are a very large number of nations whose origin
falls within the domain of cur historical knowledge, and we have suffi-
cient ground for believing that the ‘primitive nations’ arose in the same
way. History, by processes of separation and fusion, as well as by change
and development, has in course of time severed nations and produced
new ones. Hence the peculiarity of nations appears less in their physical
appearance than in their spirit and character, their language and their
law.
Notes—1. Prichard in his Natural History of Man has treated of
the differences and affinities of the chief races in physical structure and
speech: while A. de Gobineau in his Essai sur l’inégalité des races
humaines, Paris, 1852–1855 has tried to bring out political differences.
interesting and stimulating as these works are, there is still much to be
done before sure scientific results are attained. The latest and most com-
plete work is Th. Waltz, Anthropologie der Naturvölker (Theil vi.
bearbeitet von Gerland), 1859-1872; cf. also Peschel, Völkerkunde, 5th
ed., 1881, pp 337 ff.
2. Science has too long neglected the important bearing of race on
law and politics. Gobineau, who seeks to supply this want, often goes to
the opposite extreme of explaining everything by race. He also attends
too exclusively to race founded on birth and descent (Geburtsrasse),
ignoring the fact that a race, as we see both in families and nations, may
be produced by education (anerzogene Rasse). Such a ‘secondary’ race
though more dependent on human freedom, has a powerful influence on78/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
the development of rights. The Romish clergy are a striking instance of
this
The influence of individuals is distinct from that of race, and de-
mands equal attention individuals have determined the course of history
almost more than races. The treatment of these differences by Fr. Rohmer
in his Lehre von den politischen Parteien (dargestellt durch Theodor
Rohmer, Zürich, 1844) deserves more attention than it has received.Chapter II: The Conceptions ‘People’ And
‘Nations’
Vulgar usage confuses the expressions ‘people’ (Nation) and ‘nation’
(Volk); science must carefully distinguish them. But even scientific lan-
guage is often confused by the fact that the same words are used in
different senses by different civilised nations.
In English the word ‘people,’ like the French ‘people,’ implies the
notion of a civilization, which the Germans (like ea. the old Romans in
the word ‘natio’) express by Nation.37 The political idea is expressed in
English by ‘Nation,’ and in German by Volk. Etymology is in favour of
German usage, for the word natio (from nasci) points to birth and race,
Volk and populus rather to the public life of a State (pÒlij).
Thus the Germans in the middle ages were at once a people (Na-
tion) and a nation (Volk), while in the last few centuries they ceased to
be a nation, and were rather a people divided into a number of different
states, countries, and one may almost say nations. To-day the German
nation (Volk) has come to life again, although individual parts of the
German people form parts of non-German nations and states. Although
in our time the sense of nationality is stronger than ever before, yet even
now the ideas of ‘people’ and ‘nation’ nowhere fully coincide.
Peoples and Nations are the product of history. A People comes into
being by a slow psychological process, in which a mass of men gradu-
ally develop a type of life and society it. Which differentiates them from
others, and becomes the fixed inheritance of their race.
A mere arbitrary combination or collection of men has never given
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number of persons cannot create one. To form a People, the experiences
and fortunes of several generations must co-operate, and its permanence
is never secured until a succession of families handing down its accu-
mulated culture from generation to generation has made its characteris-
tics hereditary.
The rise of a Nation implies merely a political process, the creation
of a State, and may therefore be brought about quickly by a new consti-
tution, but not with real safety unless built upon a basis of nationality.
In the formation of a People many forces and factors are at work,
tending to unite the masses composing it by a common spirit, common
interests, and common customs, and to separate them from other masses
which have become strange to them.
Religious belief acted with such power, especially in mediaeval
Europe, but also in ancient Asia on the whole thought and life of men,
that community of religion was made the ground of nationality, and
unbelievers were excluded as foreigners.
Probably the Aryans of India and Persia first parted from one an-
other for religious reasons, and certainly the Brahmanists and Buddhists,
in spite of their common habitation, language and descent, fought with
one another as foreign peoples, merely on the ground of their faith. And
thus the Jewish people maintained their characteristics, not only in their
own home, but in the Babylonian Captivity, under the Roman Empire in
Alexandria and Rome, and even after the destruction of the Jewish state
had dispersed them among strange states and peoples. But now that
religious freedom is valued more highly than unity of belief, this influ-
ence of religion upon the formation and separation of peoples becomes
weaker. Nationality is now a stronger power to unite and to separate
than religion. Germans have become conscious of their unity as a nation
apart from the question whether they are Catholics or Protestants. Jews
or Pantheists, and they maintain their distinction from foreign peoples,
although many of these are of the same religion with them.
A stronger influence on the separation of Peoples than that of reli-
gion is difference of language. Common language is the special mark of
a People. The populations of different countries gradually give to their
language a new form of their own, until a time comes when those who
once used the same speech cease to understand one another, because
their languages have taken different ways. Henceforward those who still
speak and understand the same language recognise one another as mem-
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they no longer understand, are regarded as strangers.
Language is the expression of the common spirit and the instrument
of intellectual intercourse. It is carried forward and handed down as a
heritage in the family. The national language therefore keeps the sense
of nationality awake and living by daily exercise. Even strange races,
entering on the heritage of a new language, are gradually transformed in
spirit by it until their nationality is changed. Thus the German tribes of
the Ostrogoths and Lombards in Italy became Italian; the Celts, the
Franks and Burgundians in France became French; the Slavs and Wends
in Prussia became German.
If the feeling of nationality in our day has become more powerful
and effective than ever before, it is due in the main to the influence of
language, to literature, and above all to the periodical press. The ‘na-
tional’ movement has received its chief impulse from national literature,
which is the means to community of thought and feeling, and to the
common extension of intellectual possessions.
Still, language does not always decide nationality, and therefore the
notions of a ‘people’ and hereditary community of speech are not ex-
actly coincident. The Bretons and the Basques regard themselves as
part of the French people, although they speak French as a foreign lan-
guage. Here political union in one nation (Volk), common fortunes, in-
terests and culture have awakened and fanned the feeling of French na-
tionality. On the other hand, English and North Americans, although
they continue to speak a common language, regard one another as two
nationalities, distinct, although closely related. Here it is not language,
but the difference of natural circumstances and pursuits, and of histori-
cal, social and political conditions which have divided one people into
two. These instances show that, apart from (a) religion and (b) lan-
guage, (c) community (1) of country and habitation, (2) of way of life,
occupation and customs, and (3) of political union have their influence
in the formation of new peoples.
Finally, the mixture of parts of different nationalities may give rise
to a new type and a new character, and hence to a new nationality.
European and American history abound in examples of this.
The essence of a People lies in its civilization (Cultur): its inner
cohesion and its separation from foreign peoples spring mainly from
development in civilization, and express themselves chiefly in influenc-
ing its conditions. It can only be understood from a psychological point
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character which inspires it. It may be called an organisation so far as its
character has received a visible expression m the physique of the race
and in language and manners.
But it is not, as the Nation is, an organism in the higher sense of a
personality. The sense of association and the disposition to unity are
there, but there is no unity of legal will and of act, there is no legal
personality unless it has become a State and a Nation.
Although the human mind and human effort have a very consider-
able influence in the formation of peoples, yet for the most part the
process is an unconscious one.
The very fact that the one humanity parts into many peoples, en-
ables it by means of their competition and their manifold energies to
unfold all those hidden powers of its nature which are capable of com-
mon development, and to fulfil its destiny more abundantly. The growth
and development of Peoples is a powerful factor in the history of the
world, and certainly an essential element in its divine plan.
The conception of a ‘people’ (Nation) may be thus defined. It is a
union of masses of men of different occupations and social strata in a
hereditary society of common spirit, feeling and race, bound together,
especially by language and customs, in a common civilisation which
gives them a sense of unity and distinction from all foreigners, quite
apart from the bond of the State.
The limits of a People are capable of movement and change. It may
grow and spread continuously, by extending its language and manners,
its civilisation, among foreign masses, and so assimilating them. It may
decrease, collapse, and disappear if a foreign civilization comes victori-
ously against it, and absorbs and transforms its members. In this way a
great people with a higher civilisation gradually destroys the ruder civi-
lizations of small tribes and replaces them by its own.
By a Nation (Volk) we generally understand a society of all the
members of a State as united and organised in the State. The Nation
comes into being with the creation of the State. It is the consciousness,
more or less developed of political connection and unity which lifts the
Nation above the People. A Nation which leaves its own country may
be imagined as continuing to be a Nation, but only provisionally so,
until it succeeds in forming a new State in a new country. Again, the
Nation may precede the State, as the Jewish nation under Moses pre-
ceded the Jewish State: but here, again, it is only because the impulse to
State-life is strongly developed in it, and its unity of organisation pavesThe Theory of the State/83
the way for the foundation of a State.
So far the idea of a nation always bears a necessary relation to the
State, and we may say, ‘no State, no Nation.’ This genesis of the State
we shall consider specially in Book IV. But we do not usually give the
name of Nation to a merely passive governed body of people without
political rights. And therefore we cannot quite say, ‘no Nation, no State.’
Despotism knows nothing of Nations; only of subjects.
If a whole Nation or the main part of it belongs to one people, it is
naturally pervaded by the common spirit, character, language and cus-
toms of that people. If, on the other hand, it is composed of parts of
different peoples, it has less community of feelings and institutions than
a People.
On the other hand, the chief point which distinguishes a Nation
from a People is that in it community of rights is developed in a more
marked degree and is raised to the point of participation in the conduct
of the State, and its capacity of expressing a common will and maintain-
ing it by acts has acquired the proper organs in the constitution of the
State: in a word, it is a collective personality, legal and political. We are
justified, then, in speaking of a national spirit (Volksgeist) and a na-
tional will (Volkswille), which is something more than the mere sum of
the spirit and will of the individuals composing the Nation. That spirit
and will, both by its organs and content, is not individual and isolated
and self-contradictory: it has all the unity of a common spirit and a
public will.
Nations, moreover, are organic beings, and as such are; subject to
the natural laws of organic life. In the history, of their development the
same stages may be distinguished as in the life of individuals. The natu-
ral powers and conditions of a Nation. its ideas and needs. are not the
same in its old age as in its childhood. For Nations, as for individuals,
the middle period of their life is as a rule the time of highest develop-
ment for their spirit and power. Only these periods which are distin-
guished by decades in individual lives are to he measured in the life of
nations by centuries. But nations no less than men appear to be mortal.
Notes—1. Savigny did good service by insisting on the organic char-
acter of the nation and the influence of a nation’s age on the develop-
ment of law in Germany.
2. The family tie by itself does not produce a people or a nation, and
Schleiermacher’s remark, ‘If a number of families are united together
and excluded from others by connubium national unity is the result,’ is84/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
doubly contradicted by history. Both patricians and plebeians at Rome
were united by connubium, but at first they had no cozy with one an-
other, yet together they formed the Roman nation.
The Teutonic nations consisted of a union of estates, each of which
was united by the tie of connubium. And in modern times we find inter-
marriage between different peoples, without giving rise to a new people.
3. Mancini (Della Nationalità come fondemento del Diritto delle
Genti; Turin, 1873, p. 37) defines a ‘nationality’ as una società naturale
di nomini da unità di territorio, di origine di costume e di lingua conformati
a comunanza di vita e di coscienza sociale.’ At while he lightly regards
nationality as the natural condition for the formation of a State, he does
not properly distinguish nation and people—regarding a people as a
legal personality, which it cannot be till it is organised as a State.Chapter III: The Rights of Nationalities
The fact that we have begun to demand recognition for the rights of
nationalities (nationale Rechte) implies an advance in civilization. Na-
tionalities demand respect and protection as members of humanity and
as the product of historical evolution. The first and most natural right
which lies at the basis of all others is the right to exist. But what form of
human life could have a better natural right to existence than the com-
mon spirit of a people? It is at once the substrate of individual life and
an essential condition of the development of humanity. But it will take
time before this merely moral imperative is embodied in the correspond-
ing legal formula. The main significance of the principle of nationality
lies so far in the region of policy, not in that of public law.
But the following may be mentioned as principles which may rightly
be asserted by members of the same nationality.
Language is the most peculiar possession of a people, is the stron-
gest bond which unites its members, and the chief means by which it
reveals its character. For this reason the State cannot deny a nationality
(Nation) its language,38 nor prohibit its literature. It is, on the contrary,
the duty of the State to give free play to a language, and to promote its
use. So far as the general interests of civilisation are not injured thereby.
The suppression of the native languages of the provincials by the Ro-
mans was a fearful abide of the power of government, and the prohibi-
tion of the Wendisch language in the territory of the Teutonic Order,
under penalty of death was a barbarous violation of rights.
But it does not follow from this principle that one language may not
be preferred for State purposes, to the exclusion of all others. Where the86/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
life of the State is concerned, the interest of the nation, as a whole, man
require unity of language. This justifies the exclusion of Welsh and Gaelic
from the English Parliament of Basque and Breton from the French
Assembly, and Polish, Danish, and French from the German Reichstag.
But Switzerland has more respect for the different nationalities of which
it is composed, unites German with French as its official language, and,
on occasion, even recognizes Italian.
The State, too, is justified in providing that the developed language
shall be taught in the schools, so that the children of a still unformed
people may share in the heritage of a noble literature. On the other hand,
a civilised people feel it a bitter wrong if their language is crushed out of
School and Church, in favour of a foreign one.
Further, a people has a right to observe its own customs so far as
these do not condict with the higher moral law of men, or offend against
the rights of the State. The English are justified as rulers in not allowing
Indian widows to commit Suttee at their husband’s funeral. But the State
has no right to prohibit innocent national games.
In the sphere of Legal Institutions proper a People as such has less
claim to recognition and protection from the State, because the unity
and harmony of the State, and the civilization embodied in it, naturally
have a higher claim.
It is essential to the developed State to include the whole population
in its laws, and transform or abolish the rights or individual peoples. We
cannot find fault with the Roman; for trying to introduce Roman law
throughout their empire. But reckless interference is culpable. The En-
glish Government made one of the most serious mistakes in this direc-
tion when, in 1773, it wished to force the forms of English law and
judicial procedure in Bengal on the Indians who were unprepared for it.
The same time witnessed in German States, on the one hand, an over-
anxiety to keep a wilderness of traditional statutory rights for small
fragments of the nation, on the other hand, a bold and revolutionary
policy in the introduction of a foreign common law for the whole people.
In the development of law the Nation (Volk) thus has a stronger
claim than the People (Nation): differences of nationality must give way
before the unity and equality of law and of justice.
Certainly the Romans found it very much easier to Romanise the
subject peoples in law, than to Latinise them in language, and we find no
fault with the French for applying their Code Napoléon to the Germans
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apply uniform law to Welsh and Irish. Still, we cannot forget that it was
the attempt of the Romans to impose the Roman administration of jus-
tice on the yet uncivilised Germans which kindled the great struggle for
German freedom, and that for centuries it was an admitted principle of
German legal theory that every people must be allowed its own law, and
every man must be guarded by his own native or national rights.
The old Roman maxim, logically carried out, would have destroyed
all national freedom with national law; the old German method rigidly
applied would have made all higher development of government and
law impossible. Happily for the freedom of nationalities and the ad-
vance of civilisation, Romans and Germans met as enemies, and neither
principle obtained complete ascendancy.
If the moral or intellectual life of a people is attacked by the power
of the State, its members are driven to the most determined resistance.
Men can have no juster cause for resistance to the tyranny than defence
of nationality.39 Legality may suffer in the struggle, but law is not in-
jured.Chapter IV: Nationality, as a Principle in the
Formation of States
At all times in the history of the world nationality has had a powerful
influence on States and on politics. It was the sense of national kinship
and national freedom which inspired the Greeks in their struggle with
Persia, and the Germans in their conflict with the Romans. Differences
of nationality were at the root of the division of the Roman world be-
tween the Latin and Greek emperors. The split in the Frankish monar-
chy, and the separation of France and Germany, was largely due to the
difference between the Roman and German languages. Even in the middle
ages differences of nationality at times became prominent. Put it was
not till the present age that the principle of nationality was asserted as a
definite political principle. During the, middle ages the State was based
on dynastic or class interests (ständisch), and was rather territorial than
national. Later centuries saw the growth of the great European peoples
(Nationen), but the State did not as yet gain a basis of nationality nor a
national expression: it developed a magisterial character (obrigkeitlitche
Stat), finding a centre in the king and his officials.
Even the theory of natural rights grounded its claims, not on a com-
mon nationality, but on human nature and its needs, and on the free will
of individual men. Rousseau saw the foundation of the State in society,
not in a people (Nation). The ‘nation’ to which he ascribes the supreme
power in the State (souveraineté) is not the united people (Nation) but
the ‘collective body,’ or the ‘majority of citizens’ who have arbitrarily
combined to form the State, whether they form only a small fragment of
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French constitutions of 1791 (Tit. III. Art. I) and 1793 (Arts. 25–28)
and of 1795 (Art. 17) adopted the same principles: the words ‘people’
and ‘nation’ were used interchangeably, but both in the same sense of
the collective body of citizens (universalité des citizens). The govern-
ment of the State was simply transferred from the centre to the circum-
ference, from the king to the demos.
When Napoleon, at the beginning of this century, attempted to re-
vive the empire of Charles the Great, and, resting on the French people
as a support, to erect a universal monarchy over Europe, he found a
stumbling-block in the other peoples, who regarded the French rule with
disgust and hatred. In spite of his genius, national resistance proved too
strong for the Emperor who could not appreciate nationality. Even then
the sense of nationality was only imperfectly developed. Though the
sentiment was at work among the unconscious masses, the spirit of na-
tionality was not yet aroused. Even the stubborn and enduring hatred of
the English for the French was not so much based on a desire of freeing
nationalities (Nationen) from French oppression, as on the hatred of the
English aristocracy for the French Revolution, on fear of French pre-
ponderance in Europe, and on commercial interests.
The English, in spite of the heightened political consciousness which
springs from their manly pride and sense of law, distrust nationality as
a political principle. They know that their island kingdom includes dif-
ferent nationalities, and that the national feeling of the Celtic Irish has
more than once threatened the unity of the State. Their Indian Empire,
too, might be endangered by too strong an insistence on nationality. The
Spaniards, in their struggle with the French, felt their own unity as a
nation, and hated the French as foreigners: but they regarded it, not so
much as a struggle for nationality, as a war for their legitimate prince
and the Catholic religion against the fiends of the Revolution. The Ger-
mans, owing to the differences of religion and the disintegration of the
empire into independent dynastic kingdoms, had lost all sense of nation-
ality in politics, and only a few educated people listened to the inspiring
words of Fichte and songs of Arndt, when they tried to revive it. The
Russians went to battle and to death to defend their Czar and his holy
empire against the godless West: they had no thought for their claims as
a nation. The French Revolution vaguely proclaimed the principle of
the independence of nationalities, but it was trodden under foot at the
Restoration. The Congress of Vienna, with utter disregard of national
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ties. As Poland had been already divided among Russia, Austria, and
Prussia, so now Italy and Germany were cut up into a number of sover-
eign states, and Belgium and Holland pieced together into one kingdom,
in spite of conflicting nationalities.
The fact that neither the statesmen of the Revolution nor those of
the Restoration recognised nationality as a political principle, makes its
influence on the political history of to-day more marked and striking.
Science, especially in Germany and Italy, had already pointed to the
idea of nationality, and hinted at its consequences in politics. But only
since about 1840 has the natural right of Peoples to express themselves
in the State been appealed to as a practical principle. The impulses to
nationality were roused more strongly than ever before, even among the
masses, and demanded satisfaction in politics. Peoples desired to give
their union a political form and to become Nations. The dynastic system
which European States had inherited from the middle ages was now
threatened by national demands and passions Austria especially was
shaken by the consequent striving for independence among its various
nationalities. The foundation of a united Italy and of the German Em-
pire was inspired by the idea of nationality, which gathered the scattered
members of one people and organised them in one State. The power of
this national impulse is unquestionable, though its limits are not so cer-
tain.
Nationality clearly has a closer and stronger connection with the
State than with the Church, for it is easier for the Church to be univer-
sal. The State is an organised nation, and nations receive their character
and spirit mainly from the peoples which live in the State. Hence there is
a natural connection and constant interaction between People and Na-
tion.
A People is not a political society; but if it is really conscious of its
community of spirit and civilization, it is natural that it should ask to
develop this into a full personality with a common will which can ex-
press itself in act; in fact, to become a State.
This is the basis of nationality as a practical principle in politics; it
is not content with the State protecting national language, custom, and
culture, but demands that the State itself should become national. Abso-
lutely stated, it comes to this: ‘Every People has a call and a right to
form a State. As mankind is divided into a number of Peoples, the world
must be divided into the same number of States. One State for every
People: nationality the basis of every State.’ Is this true? Let us firstThe Theory of the State/91
compare People and State in regard to limits and extent, and see what
differences appear.
If the limits of the State are narrower than those of the people, we
find two opposing tendencies:—
If the citizens have a strong and lively sense of their political unity,
the State tries to form a new and distinct to people out of its inhabitants.
Thus, in antiquity, the Athenians and Spartans became distinct nation-
alities by virtue of their political education and isolation; the same was
the case with the Venetians and the Genoese in the middle ages, and later
still with the Dutch, and partially with the Swiss. But the grandest ex-
ample of the formation of a new people by the power of the political
spirit, aided no doubt by geographical differences, was the separation of
the North American States from England.
If, on the other hand, national impulses feel themselves cramped in
a narrow State, they strive to go beyond its limits, and unite with those
of the same nationality in other States to form a larger and a national
State. Such was the origin in early days of the French State, and in this
century of united Italy, and united Germany.
If the limits of the State are wider than those of the people, that is, if
it includes two or more peoples, or portions of peoples—
If the different peoples are settled in masses, side by side with one
another in one country; the following tendencies then appear:—
(1) The State, resting on the superior civilisation of one people,
tends gradually to assimilate the other elements, and so to transform the
whole nation into one people. Thus, in the old Roman Empire, the West
was Latinised and the East Hellenised. So at the present day the Belgian
State, resting on the Walloons and its French capital Brussels, seeks to
Gallicise the higher classes of the Flemish population; so Russia
endeavours to make the Poles Russian by force.
This only succeeds where the dominant people is decidedly superior
to the rest in education, mind, and power. The resistance of the Germans
and of the Persians shipwrecked the Latinising and Hellenising policy
of Rome and Constantinople.
(a) The different peoples tend towards political separation. The
movement for Repeal in Ireland, the separation of the Lombards and
Venetians from Austria, the constitutional struggles in Austria gener-
ally, the renewed double government of Austria and Hungary, as well as
the conflict between Magyars and Slavs, Germans and Czechs, all show
the persistent force of this tendency.92/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
On the other hand, the State may hold the different peoples together
without transforming them in favour of one nationality. But in that case
it must be impartial, and give up any claim to be specifically national. It
will allow each people free course in its inner life and civilization, and
regard them all as possessing equal rights. Its policy will be governed
by general and not by special and national considerations. This is how
Switzerland has solved the difficult problem of retaining different na-
tionalities side by side, without danger to the unity of the State. Thus in
the central mountain region between Germany, France, and Italy, por-
tions of the three great peoples have formed small republican communi-
ties, and united in a federation of peace and neutrality. No doubt indi-
vidual cantons have a national character, either because all their inhab-
itants belong to one people, as in the German cantons of Northern and
Eastern Switzerland, or in the French cantons of Western Switzerland,
or in Italian Ticino, or because one nationality decidedly prevails, e.g.,
the German in Bern and Graubünden, the French in Fribourg and Valais.
A very different way of holding different peoples in political union,
without transforming them, was long followed with apparent success by
Austrian policy, after the failure of Joseph II’s attempt to Germanise
Austria. Each individual state was to be compelled by the forces of the
rest.40 This mechanical method will only hold the parts in an artificial
union, which will last just as long as the compelling force is feared. If its
iron hold relaxes, or cannot be brought to bear, the injured nationalities
fly violently asunder. Austria has learnt this since 1848.
If the different nationalities are intermixed with one, another, there
is no danger to the unity of the State, but the weaker nationality will
probably be suppressed and destroyed by the stronger; the higher na-
tionality becomes dominant and assimilates by degrees the isolated ele-
ments of the rest. Thus it was that the Germans were finally Romanised
in what were once Roman provinces, although they were themselves the
ruling race. Thus Irish, German, and French in the United States, after
two generations, are assimilated by the Anglo-Saxon population.
From this general view it appears that the principles of Nationality
and of the State interact, but that People and Nation do not necessarily
coincide. We cannot therefore allow more than a relative claim to the
principle of Nationality, and on closer consideration we arrive at the
following results.
Not every people is capable of creating and maintaining a State,
and only a people of political capacity can claim to become an indepen-The Theory of the State/93
dent nation. The incapable need the guidance of other and more gifted
nations; the weak must combine with others or submit to the protection
of stronger powers. Thus, in the whole of Western Europe, the Celtic
peoples have served as passive material in the formation of Romance
and Teutonic states; the diverse nationalities in South-Eastern Europe
can only maintain a political existence by resting on one another: the
justification of the English rule in India rests on the need of the popula-
tion for a higher guidance.
Strictly speaking, only those peoples in which the manly qualities,
understanding and courage, predominate are fully capable of creating
and maintaining a national State. Peoples of more feminine characteris-
tics are, in the end, always governed by other and superior forces.
As the essence of a people consists in a common civilisation, not in
political unity, a people may be conscious of the former and yet be
politically divided. One part of it may be inclined to monarchy, another
to a republic, and each may be resolved to realise the ideal it prefers.
Such a people may not feel satisfied until it has expressed its character
in various forms of constitution. But this diversity is sometimes a source
of political weakness: it was because the Greeks were broken up into a
number of small city states, that they fell a prey, first, to Macedon, and
then to Rome. Owing to similar divisions, Italy and Germany have suf-
fered from foreign domination, and have been hampered in their politi-
cal growth.
On the other hand, the development of two or more States from one
people sometimes enriches the resources of the people, and is a sign of
great vitality: as in the case of the sister States of England with its
aristocratic monarchy, and North America with its democratic republic.
So, too, the existence of a German Switzerland and a German Austria,
outside the German Empire, is a proof of the resources of the German
people.
A People which is conscious of itself, and of a political vocation,
feels a natural need to embody itself in a State. If it has the power to
satisfy this impulse, it has a natural right to found a State.
In the face of the supreme right of a people to its existence and
development, all rights of its individual members or of its princes fall
into insignificance. The destiny of mankind cannot be fulfilled if the
peoples of which it is composed are not in a position to fulfil their func-
tion in the world. Peoples must, to use Prince Bismarck’s words, be able
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the sacred right of peoples to take political shape and to develop organs
for the movement and expression of their common life; the most sacred
of all rights, save that of humanity itself, and the foundation and bond
of all others.
But a ‘national’41 State (ein nationaler Stat) need not include an
entire people: only it must embrace a part which is large and strong
enough to assert its character and spirit effectively in the State. It is
stretching the principle of nationality too far to demand that the limits of
the national State should be as wide and as shifting as those of the
language of a People: and is incompatible with the permanence of the
State-personality (Statsperson) and with the general security of rights.
France, Italy, and the German Empire are ‘national’ States, although
there are parts of the French, Italian and German peoples which do not
belong to them.
A people (Nation) which has become or is just becoming a nation
(Volk), may be justified in drawing to itself such scattered members as it
needs for its existence, but has no right, if it can do without them, to tear
them away forcibly from a union with another State in which they find
satisfaction.
But Nationality is not the highest limit of political development.
The development of humanity demands as an essential condition, not
merely the free manifestation and competition of peoples, but also the
combination of these peoples in a higher unity. Law (das Recht) rests
more upon human nature than upon the peculiarities of Peoples. The
developed law of civilised nations is determined more by the require-
ments of human intercourse than by national custom. The essential in-
stitutions of the State are the same in different nations. The highest ideal
is of a State which should be based on humanity (die höchste Statsidee
ist menschlich).
And so a national State (Volksstat) may embrace various nationali-
ties, and even a State which is distinctively based on nationality may
gain in breadth and variety by the inclusion of foreign elements, which
serve to establish and keep open communication with the civilization of
other peoples. Such an admixture may serve as an alloy to give strength
and currency to the nobler metal.
On the other hand, it is of great advantage to the unity of the State if
the nation is based, in the main, a distinct nationality (Hauptnation), to
which the other elements of the population bear an insignificant propor-
tion, like the Germans in Russia, the Slavonic races in Prussia, the JewsThe Theory of the State/95
in Germany, and the French in North America. It is much harder to
establish and maintain the unity of a nation if it is composed of several
peoples vieing with one another in power and importance. England had
to overcome this difficulty by the union, first of the Saxons with the
Normans, then of the English with the Scotch, and finally of the two last
with the Irish; and it is a difficulty which Austria has not yet overcome.
If a State consists of different nationalities, which together form
one nation, political rights cannot be apportioned by nationality: politi-
cal community and equality of rights must be shared by all alike.42
How far a people is able and worthy to form a State, cannot in the
imperfect condition of international law be decided by any human judg-
ment, but only by the judgment of God as revealed in the history of the
world. As a rule it is only by great struggles, by its own sufferings and
its own acts, that a nation can justify its claim.
If the State is to fulfil its part as the embodiment of the nation, it is
plain that its laws and institutions must have regard to the capacities
and needs of the nation, in a word, it must be popular (volksthümlich).
A constitution which disregards the peculiar character of the nation,
and which does not correspond with its spirit and thought, is an unnatu-
ral and incapable body. If it is forced upon a people by a foreign power,
or if, as we have seen before now, in times of great political fever, it has
been chosen by the disordered and misguided nation, it collapses again
as soon as ever that power slackens or the nation recovers its reason. In
either case, however, the damage to the political organism is so serious
that it may result in the fall of the nation, and at least cripples its vigour
for a long time.
Every great people which is fit to become a nation and a State, has
its own political point of view and its own special function as a State,
and this cannot be fulfilled unless the nation gives to the State the im-
press of its own character. This is what is meant by the natural right of
a nation to a national constitution (volksthümliche Verfassung). Thus
the diversity of constitutions corresponds to the diversity of gifts with
which nations and peoples are endowed by God.
But it may well be that the peculiar character of a nation is not
mirrored, once for all, m the State. A nation outlives the changing phases
of its development, and although it remains essentially the same, yet its
needs and its views alter with the periods of its life. A national and
popular State adapts its organism to the continual development of the
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through all its varied changes reveals the character of the Roman people.
The monarchy, the republic, the empire correspond to the different stages
in the life of the people, but in all we see the distinctive impress of
Rome. The English monarchy of the Tudors differed from that of the
house of Hanover, because the nation developed between the sixteenth
and eighteenth centuries. This is what is meant by the natural right of a
nation to adapt its constitution to the time.
To sum up: a State is natural if its form, at any time, corresponds to
the peculiar character and period of development of the nation embod-
ied in it.
Notes—1. Cato in Cic. de Rep. ii. 21: ‘Nec temporis unius nec
hominis est constitutio reipublicae.’
2. Frederick the Great, Anti-Machiavel 12: ‘Tout est varié dans
l’univers les temperaments des hommes sont différents, et la nature établit
la même varieté, si j’ose m’exprimer ainsi, dans le tempérament des
États. J’entends en général par le tempérament d’un État sa situation,
son étendue, le nombre et le génie de ses peuples, son commerce, ses
coutumes, ses lois, son fort, son faible, ses richesses et ses ressources.’
3. De Maistre, Considérations sur la France. ch 6: ‘Mais one con-
stitution qui est faite pour toutes les nations, n’est faite pour aucune;
c’est une pure abstraction, une oeuvre scholastique faite pour exercer
l’esprit d’apres une hypothèse idéale, et qu’il faut adresser à l’homme
dans les espaces imaginaires où il habite.’
4. Napoleon to the Swiss (1803): ‘Une forme de gouvemement qui
n’est pas le résultat d’une longue suite d’evenements, de malheur d’efforts
et d’entreprises de la part d’un peuple, ne prendra jamais racine.’
5. Sismondi, Études sur la Constitution des peuples libres: ‘La
Constitution comprend toutes les habitudes d’une nation, ses affections,
ses souvenirs, les besoins de son imagination, tout aussi bien que ses
lois. . . . Aussi rien n’indique un esprit plus superficiel et plus faux en
même temps que l’entreprise de transplanter la Constitution d’un pays
dans un autre, ou celle de donner une constitution nouvelle a un people,
non d’après son propre genie ou sa propre histoire, mais d’après quelques
règles générales qu’on a décorées du nom de principes. Le dernier demi-
siècle, qui a vu naître tent de ces Constitutions d’emprunt, peut aussi
rendre témoignage qu’il n’y en a pas une seule qui a répondu ou aux
vues de l’auteur, ou aux espérances de ceux qui l’acceptèrent.’ (Intro-
duction, p. 38.)
6. L. Ranke (Zeitschr. i. 91): ‘Our theory is that every nation has aThe Theory of the State/97
policy of its own. But what is the meaning of this principle of national
independence (Nationalunabhängigkeit) which penetrates all spirits? Is
it merely that no foreign judge must sit in our cities, and no foreign
troops march through our land? Is it not rather this, that we must de-
velop our own mental powers, independently of others, to the full extent
of which they are capable?’
[There is an interesting chapter on ‘Nationalities’ in Laveleye, Le
Gouvernement dans la démocratie, Livre II. ch. iii.]Chapter V: Society
French political theorists, especially since Rousseau, have been inclined
to regard the State as a Society, and to identify the conceptions of ‘Na-
tion’ (nation) and ‘People’ (peuple) with that of Society. Hence the
science of the State has been confused, and political practice has also
suffered. German political theory distinguishes more sharply between
the different conceptions, and so saves many mistakes. It gives the State
a firmer basis and a more secure operation, and protects society against
the tyranny of the State.
The Nation (Volk) is a necessarily connected whole, while Society
is a casual association of a number of individuals. The Nation as em-
bodied in the State is an organism, with head and members; Society is
an unorganized mass of individuals. The Nation has a legal personality
(ist eine Rechtsperson), Society has no collective personality, but only
consists of a mass of private persons. The Nation is endowed with unity
of will, and the power to make its will actual in the State. Society has no
collective will, and no political power of its own. Society can neither
legislate nor govern, nor administer justice. It has only a public opinion,
and exercises an indirect influence on the organs of the State, according
to the views, interests, and demands of many or all of its members. The
Nation is a political idea: Society is only the shifting association of
private persons within the domain of the State.
No doubt a Nation and a Society, consisting of the same men, inter-
act in many and intimate ways. The State lays down the law for Society:
it protects it and furthers its interests in many ways. On the other hand,
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If the Society suffers, the State suffers with it: while a healthy, benefi-
cent, and cultivated Society strengthens the State, and is the condition
of its welfare. But there is not always entire harmony between the State
and Society. Sometimes Society, with an eye to its own special interests,
or guided by chopping winds of public opinion, makes demands on the
State, which it is obliged to reject as unjust or injudicious. Sometimes
the State claims of Society services and sacrifices which it is lath to
undertake. The permanent security of the State clashes at times with the
interests and desires of the moment. From time to time Society suffers
from disorders, which can best be relieved by the State, and defects
appear in the constitution or administration of the State, the removal of
which stirs Society to its depths. One of the main problems of public
law and of politics is to reconcile this opposition, justly and judiciously.
The conceptions of People (Nation) and Society also are related,
but not identical. Compared with a hereditary People, Society appears a
shifting conglomeration of individuals. A People has created in its lan-
guage an organic expression of its common spirit, and Society makes
use of the national language, so far as it finds it convenient, but has no
language peculiar to itself as a Society. A People may branch off into
different States: we limit our conception of a Society to the inhabitants
of one State: or if we speak e.g., of European Society, we include the
inhabitants of all civilised European States, notwithstanding that they
belong to different peoples. Within the State, too, the idea of Society is
independent of differences of nationality, including all who are living in
the State. A People seems to have a natural organization of its own, at
least on the physical side: a Society is only a sum of individual men.
Gneist has done a service to political science by accentuating the
difference between ‘State’ and ‘Society,’ and in calling attention to the
friction between them. But his designation of modern society as a Soci-
ety of Industry (Erwerbsgesellschaft) seems too narrow. Certainly the
acquisition of wealth is one of the strongest and most wide-reaching
interests of Society, but still not the only one, nor the most important.
Society has regard to the enjoyment of wealth as well as to its acquisi-
tion: further, it attaches a high value to family life, apart from all con-
siderations of wealth. It values sociability, and has a lively interest in
culture, literature and art. To lay stress on the acquisition of wealth, in
defining Society, is to make it too material and selfish, and to ignore its
efforts after ideals and a common good. The numerous institutions for
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endowed by Society, without any compulsion from the State, are suffi-
cient confirmation of the truth of this position.Chapter VI: Tribes
As the races of mankind part into different peoples (Nationen), so peoples
divide into tribes (Stämme). The careful observer can trace the kinship
of peoples in their language, customs, and laws; but they themselves,
though they belong to the same race, have become foreigners to one
another, and can no longer understand one another’s language.
On the other hand, the different tribes of one people feel themselves
bound in a common life by common language and custom. No doubt
even among tribes tribal distinctions and peculiarities come to disturb
the sense of common nationality. But the national language, to which
the ears of all the tribes are open, maintains the sense of national kinship
and unity. In dialects we see both elements, national unity and tribal
peculiarity. Dialects bear the same relation to a language as particular
tribal laws to common national law. Tribes, like peoples, are the prod-
uct of history, which tends to develop and bring to light internal differ-
ences. But they are only fractions of a people: they have no independent
national type of their own, but are only expressions, variously coloured
or accentuated, of the common national spirit.
They thus perpetuate their separate existence, and keep alive the
inner differences which influence the character of the people. While they
give a richness and variety to national life, they have often proved a
hindrance to the unity of a State. Though Rome grew strong by the
internal conflicts of parties, resting originally on tribal differences, it
was the violence of tribal antagonisms which prevented the Greeks from
forming a durable collective State.
The antagonism of tribes has also had a strong influence in modern102/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
Europe, especially among the Germans, whose ancient constitution was
nothing but an organization of tribes. The medieval tendency to indi-
vidualism found in it a strong support, as the modern tendency to unity
found a strong hindrance. This appears in the history of Italy and Ger-
many. In both countries, it is true, the old tribes were broken up at an
early date, in Italy mainly by the independent development of the towns,
in Germany chiefly by the policy of the kings and the separation of
territorial lordships. But tribal feeling and individualism still continued
to be a power in the cities, and although, when once the older tribal
duchies came to an end, the different tribes combined to form large
territories, tribal jealousy and enmity still played a considerable part in
the downfall of the German Empire, and even now the opponents of
German unity make use of tribal prejudices to embarrass, if they cannot
prevent, the national development.
History teaches us that a tribe may furnish the starting-point for the
formation of a new nation. It is more likely to become a nation and form
a new State, however small, than to form a new people. This last stage
of development is only reached when a fusion takes place, and with it an
alteration of language, as happened with the Teutonic tribe of the
Lombards in Italy, or if the tribe develops its dialect into a new language
of its own, as the Dutch have done.Chapter VII: Castes
Within the geographical limits of people, nation or tribe, appear further
differences which correspond to no geographical limits—we may call
them different platforms, so to speak, in the structure of society, or dif-
ferent tendencies of the collective life, or different grades of political
importance and development. Such are Castes, Privileged Classes or
Estates (Stände), and Classes.
The system of Castes has been most fully worked out in India, but
has not been without influence in Egypt and Persia. It belongs preemi-
nently to the Aryans of Asia, and has never been acclimatized in Eu-
rope. But in America it found a new application in the difference be-
tween the white and coloured races. The system of Estates (Stände)
appears among many nations, both ancient and modern, but was carried
to its fullest development in the Europe of the middle ages among the
Teutonic nations. The system of Classes presupposes a rationally
organised State, such as those of China, Athens and Rome, and many
modern States. Castes are regarded as the work of nature, or the unal-
terable creation of God; Estates appear as the product of national his-
tory, and differences of occupation; Classes are an institution of the
State. In Castes we see the authority of religious faith: in Estates, the
power of social life, of economical and educational conditions; in Classes,
the organising capacity of statesmen.
Castes are of necessity hereditary and unchangeable, like courses
of masonry firmly built one over the other. Estates grow like plants, and
have an organic development, like peoples and States. In them free choice
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times Estates are still hereditary and akin to Castes, but as civilization
advances, freedom of occupation comes in, and they approach to Classes.
Classes, like works of art, alter with the different aims of the State.
The Indian Caste-system, which may be regarded as typical, is rep-
resented in the Laws of Manu as a creation of Brahma. The belief,
which Plato wished to implant in his State by the myth of the metals,43 is
fully established among the Hindoos.
The highest Caste, that of the Brahmans, in which the Aryan blood
remained purest, though not quite untainted by other elements, came
from the mouth of God. They are therefore, as it were, the living word
of God, the purest and fullest expression of the Divine. Science, religion
and law are their special care. The meanest Brahman, as such, ranks
higher than the king. Their nature is preeminently divine, and though
they are not forbidden to occupy secular offices, and mix in secular
business, their purity is heightened by abstinence from material plea-
sures.44 The man who strikes a Brahman with a blade of grass, incurs
the condemnation of hell.
The second Caste, the Kshatriyas, from among whom comes the
king, is created of the arm of God. They are the incarnation of force and
physical strength, and are a Caste of born warriors and nobles. Though
trade is not forbidden them, their proper calling is to bear arms.
The third Caste, the Visas or Visayas, proceeds from the thighs of
God. The higher civil professions belong to them: they are called to
agriculture, cattle-raising, and commerce.
The fourth and lowest Caste, the Sudras, springs from the feet of
God. They are the servile population: devoted to the material wants of
life, and unworthy to read the sacred books.
The higher kind of marriage presupposes equality of birth: but a
man of higher Caste may marry a wife of lower Caste, though a wife
may not marry beneath her. But numerous mésalliances have in course
of time produced many inconveniences, and have given rise to new he-
reditary pseudo-castes (Misskasten) of rejected outcasts.
It is very rarely possible for an individual to pass from one Caste to
another: rigid exclusiveness is the general rule. The system of Caste
prevails even after death, dominating the future life as well as the present.
It is only very rarely, and at the cost of many thousand years of effort,
that even a Kshatriya can rise to the divine height of a Brahman. On the
other hand, a false step at once thrusts him downward, almost beyond
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We know that the Hindoos are mistaken in their belief, and that the
Castes are in great measure the product of human history. In the Vedas
is preserved the memory of a time when there were privileged classes
(Stände), but as yet no Castes.
The opposition between the three higher Castes, called collectively
Aryans, and the Sudras, can be traced back to original difference of
race: the white Aryans conquered the land of the dark-skinned Sudras,
and settled there as their lords, just as the white Europeans settled among
the primitive red population in America. The old name for Caste, ‘Varna,’
meaning ‘colour,’ points to this original opposition between white and
dark races. As we go higher in the Castes, we find the white race purer,
as we go lower we find more mixture with the original dark race.45 The
two highest Castes stand out above the third, as in most Aryan peoples
we find an aristocracy above the demos.
Finally, the elevation of the Brahmans over the Caste of knights and
nobles, and even over the kings, was the last in time; and can only be
explained, in my opinion, by the rise of the new pantheistic religion of
Brahma, which won a spiritual victory over the old polytheistic worship
of nature-gods, by the heightened sense of the divine among the Brah-
man priests, sages and saints, and by the energy and devotion with which
they remained loyal to their divine calling amid every danger, and will-
ingly resigned earthly sovereignty to the kings.46
The system of Castes thus arose gradually out of historical events
and struggles. But afterwards it received a religious sanction, and was
permanently stereotyped. It was fostered with such care in the whole
education of the young, by the prescribed religious duties, by all the
institutions of private and public life, that men ceased to consider any
deviation from it as possible, and the system was handed on unchanged
from generation to generation.
The Caste-system is not an institution of the State, nor a part of the
constitution. It is rather a framework into which the State is fitted, and
to which it is subordinated. It is a universal and perpetual arrangement
of the world, dominating all relations. For this reason higher develop-
ment of the State is impossible so long as the State is bound to serve the
system of Caste. It cannot develop freely according to its own principle
of life. How can a political ideal become actual in face of rigid unalter-
able masses, held in separation and bondage by a higher law? What
meaning can the authority of the State have, and how can it exercise its
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ment involves misery and suffering for thousands of years?
No doubt the hereditary principle (das Erbrecht) is of great impor-
tance in the State. It maintains the connection between past and future,
it secures the permanence, so to say, of the bodily structure of the State,
which survives the life of individuals. But where it dominates public
law absolutely and exclusively, it fetters and cripples the best forces.
The State becomes at last a mummy, in which the embalmer’s art vainly
tries to conceal the features of death.47
The system of Castes tends to harden and stereotype the differences
between the strata of society. The upper aristocratic Castes, richly en-
dowed with hereditary privileges, may feel satisfied with it, but it only
presses the more hardly on the middle and lower strata. It brands their
humiliation with the mark of contempt, and leaves the individual no
hope of escaping from the bonds in which he is held fast. It heightens the
authority of the upper and destroys the freedom of the lower classes.
It is true that comparative perfection in individual professions, and
even remarkable intellectual activity in the highest circles, is compatible
with it. But by making family succession and tradition of race the high-
est law, it denies utterly the individual freedom which strives to go be-
yond these limits. It has produced saintly hermits, great philosophers,
distinguished poets, brave warriors, excellent fathers and sons, clever
craftsmen, but it has never produced great statesmen, and nowhere tol-
erated free nations. All its institutions are directed to the maintenance of
order, none of them aim at progress in life. Its ideal is rest: movement is
dangerous. Life is an unchanging repetition, a wheel revolving for ever
in the same way and round the same axle. Where life has so little value,
we can understand how it was that the Buddhist doctrine of absorption
into nothingness appeared as a real relief from the eternal monotony,
and found numerous followers. Indian civilisation is the blossom and
fruit of the Caste-system. But deeply rooted as this was, it could not
permanently save that civilization from internal decay, or defend Indian
independence against hostile conquest.
The India of to-day inherits the relics of the Caste-system as a bur-
den from the past: it no longer bases upon it its conception of the order
of the world: under the influence of the English spirit it is building upon
another foundation.Chapter VIII: Privileged Classes or Estates48
Throughout the European nations we find Privileged Classes or Estates
(Stände) instead of Castes. Both give an organic order to the various
members of the nation. But Estates differ from Castes in this, that they
are influenced by the movement of history, they develop. In Europe es-
pecially, Castes have become Estates, and have passed through many
and varied changes.
The earliest form of Estates recalls the Caste-system. They were at
first hereditary, and the attributes assigned to them and the myths de-
scribing their divine creation point to an original affinity to the Indian
Caste-system. The Edda tells how the god Rigr, on his wanderings, be-
got first the Thral, the ancestor of the servile population; then, in a
better home, the free Karl, the ancestor of free peasants; and finally, the
noble Jarl, whom he taught to throw the dart and poise the lance, and to
whom he entrusted the sacred secret of the Runes. These Estates too
differed in build and complexion, the Nobles having brilliant white com-
plexion, bright hair and shining cheeks, the servants (Knechten) ugly
face and bony limbs.
The Druids of Gaul may be compared with the Brahmans.49 They
also have the care of religion, science and laws in their charge, although
they, and still more the pre-Christian priests of the Germans (whose
name Godi is derived from Gott, as Brahman from Brahma), are more
closely connected with the national nobility. The medieval position of
the Clergy, as a special order of Christian priests, bears a closer resem-
blance to the Caste of Brahmans.
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earliest records, was everywhere a hereditary class, and as a rule, ab-
sorbed the chief functions of the two highest castes. Language generally
bears witness to its hereditary character: the Athenian Eupatridai and
Roman Patricii are so called from their descent from noble fathers,
while the German Adalinge derive their name from the family (Adal)
from which they drew their blood.50
The Lucumones of Etruria and the knights of the Gauls were a he-
reditary nobility. Legend loved to derive the highest families, and espe-
cially these of princes, by immediate descent from gods or heroes, and
to honour them as the seed of the gods.
To this primitive nobility, as a rule, belongs the priesthood, and the
science of things divine, as well as the knowledge and practice of law.
They are appointed before others to the highest official positions, and
they take a high rank in the military system. On the other hand, civil
professions are for the most part closed to them. Usually they have
dependents (hörige Leute) under their protection and in their service;
and are distinguished even in the sphere of private law by their lordship
of the soil (Gutsherrschaft). They are fond of living on hills, and in the
cities, too, choose the high ground.51
These characteristic traits are found with slight variations in the
early history of the European nations. The further we trace back this
institution, half political, half religious, the closer do we find the like-
ness to be.
The Freemen (die Gemeinfreien), among Greeks and Romans and
Germans, form the strength of the demos and of the nation. They are in
the full enjoyment of national rights: and are the mainstay of the State.
The nobility indeed rise above them, but not like the Indian noble as an
essentially different creature, but as a distinguished class rising out from
their midst, but still united with them, and having their root in the same
ground of national rights.
The Freemen in early times are as a rule owners and tillers of the
soil. As such appear the Gewmoroi in the early Athenian constitution,
the ordinary Spartiatae, the Roman Plebeians, the Freemen of all Ger-
man tribes, among whom free birth and free land enjoy special rights.
They also take part in trade, though less readily. They may perhaps so
far be compared in their way of life with the Visas, but they are raised
above these, in public respect, by their capacity to bear arms—they
form the main body of the infantry—and they further exercise political
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Though subject to authority (die Obrigkeit), as freemen they are not
dependent on any special lord. They have not perhaps originally the
right of patronage (Schutzherrschaft), but they can have their ‘own men’
(Eigene). Their Estate is originally a hereditary one: as a rule the free
man is born free (ingenuus).
Lastly, we shall find many traces of an Estate which appears from
the first to be breaking up, and which therefore is somewhat doubtful,
an Estate of Dependents (hörige Leute), occupied like the Indian Sudras
with the lower needs of life. Sometimes it consists of conquered inhab-
itants, always of the same race as the conquerors, sometimes of the poor
brought into permanent servitude by oppression and debt. To this class
belong the qhtej and pelatai of the Greeks, the ‘Clients’ in Rome, Gaul,
and Britain, the Liten of the Germans.
They have a lord to guard and protect them (Mund- und Schutzherr),
prostathj or patronus. They are part of the nation, and are not on the
same level as slaves (die Eigene), but their freedom, their rights, and the
value attached to them, are less than those of the freeman proper. Handi-
crafts are chiefly carried on by them: and freed servants generally pass
into this class.
The history of these estates is most closely interwoven with the his-
tory of each several State: changes and revolutions of constitutions are
very often only the result and the expression of internal and unnoticed
changes in the relations and ideas of Estates. The whole structure of
law, in the middle ages, takes its character and colour from the idea of
Estates. Every Estate had its own special laws and forms of justice, as it
had its own costume. The Clergy lived by canon law, Princes by the law
of nobles (Herrenrecht), Knights had their feudal law (Lehensrecht),
Retainers (Dienstleute) their special law (Dienstrecht), Citizens the law
of their city, and Peasants their manorial customs and law (Hofrecht).
The political structure of the nation was conditioned by these differ-
ences, and its unity broken up.
But during the middle ages these privileged classes (Stände) tended
to become less hereditary, and more professional (Berufsstände). In later
centuries there are four main Estates—(1) Clergy, (2) Nobles, (3) Citi-
zens or third Estate, (4) Peasants. The two first, aristocratic Estates,
won a commanding political position. The third saved civil freedom.
The fourth was powerless, and subject.
At the end of the middle ages we find these four Estates have de-
cayed, and in great part dissolved. But isolated remains last on like110/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
ruined masonry into the modern world. To understand the modern State
aright we must know the meaning of these Estates in the middle ages. It
is only by contrast with them that the modern State comes to understand
itselfChapter IX: I. The Clergy
The Clergy held the first place among the mediaeval Estates. According
to the strict doctrine of the Church they were not a national estate at all:
they were an ordo ecclesiasticus, not an ordo civilis. The State was
regarded merely as an organization of laymen, above whom the priest-
hood were raised by their consecration. The Christian priests did not,
like the Brahmans, rest their claims on divine descent—for they did not
perpetuate their order by marriage—but rather on divine institution.
They are filled by the Holy Spirit, and consecrated by the vows of the
Church. The basest and most corrupt Clerk, in virtue of his order, stands
high above the most eminent and virtuous laymen, as gold above iron,
or the spirit above the body.
The ideals of the Clergy were near akin to those of the Brahmans.
Only the Christian clergy did not give up the secular rule as the Brah-
mans did, and were less inclined than they to conform to the ordinance
of the State. According to the logical doctrine of the mediaeval Church
the laws of the State were not binding on the clergy: it was for them to
examine and judge, and then decide how far they would voluntarily
obey them. As soon as the privileges of the clergy or the interests of the
Church seemed in danger, the clergy refused all obedience, resting on
the word of Scripture, ‘We ought to obey God rather than man,’52 and
on their spiritual superiority. On the other hand, they demanded of the
secular authority that it should obey the lanes of the Church without
contradiction, and lend its power to carry them out.
They even withdrew themselves from secular jurisdiction in civil as
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premacy of secular judges, of ‘the sheep above the shepherds.’ They
were not bound to service in war, because weapons of iron did not suit
their religious vocation. But they also avoided the obligation to pay
taxes, appealing on every occasion to their immunities, in order to shake
off every burden the State laid on them. As clergy of Rome they de-
spised the limitations of nationality. They were not citizens of any one
nation, or of any definite country; they only recognized the universal
bond of Christendom centred in Rome, the capital of the world, the seat
of the Popes. The canon law was the law of their life, and they refused
to be accountable except to the mild jurisdiction of the Church.
However, even in the time of their greatest power the clergy never
completely severed themselves from the State, partly owing to the cir-
cumstances of their history, partly from considerations of their own in-
terests.
The Christian Church, with its clergy, had arisen and become great
within the old Roman Empire with its worldwide and far-reaching domi-
nation; and the political powers of Rome did not resign their authority.
They demanded of all inhabitants of the Holy Roman Empire obedience
to the laws, to the imperial government, and the imperial courts. The
clergy could at most secure isolated privileges from the emperors: their
subjection was unquestionable.
The Frankish monarchy still held fast to the subordination of bish-
ops and priests to the king, and to the imperial laws and courts, al-
though now the power of the State had diminished, and the Church had
become more independent. Under the German princes the immunities of
the Church were extended by slow degrees, at first more by grace and
favour of the king than by any recognition of the ecclesiastical law,
which now began to assert its own authority with arrogance. Even when
the rights of the Church had gradually won their way against contradic-
tion and resistance, their authority was not everywhere the same.
Interest also united the clergy most closely with the laity and the
State. During the middle ages the head of the Church, the Pope of Rome,
acquired a political sovereignty over the so-called Patrimonium Petri.
Partly by royal grant, partly by the gifts of princes, there arose a Church
State governed by clergy. The highest spiritual authority thus came to
be associated in Rome and the Roman territory with secular sovereignty.
Not merely were the Popes called upon, as supreme bishops, to repre-
sent the interests of the Church, if need were, before the Emperor and
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deeply involved in the interests of Italian policy. This was indeed ‘the
ruin of Italy.’ (Machiavelli, Discorsi, i. 12.) They were strong enough
to keep divisions alive in Italy, but not to unite Italy under their sover-
eignty, nor to defend it from the inroad of hostile armies, though they
were always ready to call in foreign powers to their help if their policy
required it.
They raised Rome again to the position of the first city in
Christendom, and adorned it with churches and works of art; but the
gifted Romans, under their Church government and discipline, fell be-
hind the citizens of the Italian republics in civil virtues and achieve-
ments, and the Church State became the warning instead of the pattern
of higher political development. The modern world has learnt that eccle-
siastical rule is not fitted for the sound government of the State, and the
secularization of the States of the Church has proved a great political
gain to the Romans.
Next to Italy, Germany did most to raise the political power of eccle-
siastical princes. Even under the Frankish monarchy the bishops held a
prominent place in the national assemblies, sometimes associated with
the great laymen, especially the counts of districts (Gaugrafen), as an
assembly of Majores or Seniores, sometimes in separate ecclesiastical
assemblies. But their contact with secular power and dignity comes out
most clearly in the constitution of the German Empire. There we find
three out of the seven electors are ecclesiastical princes, the Archbish-
ops of Mainz, Köln and Trier; and the Archbishop of Mainz, as Arch-
Chancellor of Germany, votes first. They held the first place in the Elec-
toral College, and at the same time as territorial princes they early ac-
quired an almost sovereign independence.
Besides these there was a large number of Archbishops, Bishops,
and Abbots, who had acquired rights of territorial sovereignty over defi-
nite districts, and who sat and voted at the imperial diets, either giving a
vote each (eine Virilslimme) as proper princes of the Empire—e.g., the
Archbishops of Bremen, Magdeburg and Salzburg, and the Bishops of
Augsburg, Wurzburg and Basel; or taking part in a collective vote
(Curiatstimme), and sitting together on the so-called ‘Prelates-benches’
(Prälatenbänke) which corresponded to the benches of the Counts. In
the heraldic order (Heerschildsordnung) of the law-books, the ecclesi-
astical princes ranked next to the king. The secular princes, though equal
with them in the constitution of the Empire, were placed third, because
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while the converse would be unseemly.
In the great contest of Investitures between the Popes and the Saxon
emperors, it was proposed that the princes of the Church should give up
their secular sovereignty and devote their life to the Church, but in vain.
Such a suggestion, even when it came from the Pope, was indignantly
rejected by the ecclesiastical princes of Germany. The consequence was
that in Germany too ecclesiastical offices became involved with politi-
cal offices and political interests.
The same thing happened in the provinces of the Empire.
The local prelates—bishops, abbots, priors, masters of religious
orders—formed a separate estate, with a right to sit in the provincial
assembly (Landtag), either as a separate Curia (Prälatencurie) or along
with the nobles, and exercised a more or less extensive jurisdiction on
their domains. Their rights in the provincial estates (landständische
Rechte) were generally based on their position as territorial lords. Hence,
although they might secure their own immunity from taxes and military
service, they could not urge the same claims for their servants
(Ministerialen) and peasant dependents (Hintersassen) who were al-
ways laymen. The country needed their taxes, and the prince of the
country as feudal lord required them to furnish mounted troopers.
One advantage which the ecclesiastical aristocracy had over the
secular was that it was not hereditary, but rested on personal education
and election. The son of an artisan might become pope, the son of a
peasant an archbishop.53
But as time went on this predominance of the clergy and the aristo-
cratic powers of the ecclesiastical princes and prelates was shaken and
destroyed. The German Reformation of the sixteenth century struck a
fearful blow at the secularised Church. With the spread of Protestant-
ism ecclesiastical princedoms became temporal, sees were abolished,
monasteries broken up, and religious orders dissolved. Before the Ref-
ormation there sat in the German Reichstag the three ecclesiastical
princes, three other archbishops, and thirty-nine bishops. After the peace
of Westphalia the number was reduced to three electoral princes, one
archbishop (Salzburg), and twenty bishops. Only Swabia and the Rhine-
provinces now retained their bench of prelates. The whole of the North
and a good part of the South had rid itself of ecclesiastical sovereignty.
Even in the countries which had remained Catholic the change was
only postponed. There was no part of Germany where ecclesiastical
sovereignty survived the revolutionary movement at the beginning ofThe Theory of the State/115
this century. Even the electoral princes of the left bank of the Rhine
were carried away by the storm, and their domains incorporated with
France. The domains of the other ecclesiastical princes were granted by
way of compensation to secular dynasties.
With the end of the Empire the ecclesiastical lords lost their position
as an imperial estate, and maintained an insecure position in certain
provincial diets (Landstände). Once again, after many centuries, the
episcopate became a purely ecclesiastical office, without political power.
Their jurisdiction fell with their territorial sovereignty.
The Catholic clergy having thus lost their temporal position and
power could no longer realise the medieval ideal. Modern political feel-
ing could not tolerate any subordination of laymen to clergy: it demanded
universal obedience to the laws and the constituted authorities of the
State. The time for clerical immunities and privileges was gone by; all
were subject to one law, one jurisdiction.
The history of the clergy in England and France was somewhat
similar. They had never acquired the same territorial sovereignty as in
Germany, and in both countries the secular side of the State was more
strongly asserted than in Germany. But the clergy were an estate: in
England they sat with the lords temporal in the Upper House;54 in France
they formed a separate estate, the first in the kingdom. But the Reforma-
tion in England and the Revolution in France profoundly affected their
position. The medieval immunities disappeared before the principle of
common and equal obligation to the law (Rechtspflicht).
When Louis XVI summoned the States-General in 1789, the clergy
voluntarily abandoned their separate position and anticipated the nobles
in entering the National Assembly which represented not the estates of
the middle ages, but a body of free citizens.
Thus the mediaeval estate of the clergy was everywhere broken up.
The great distinction between clergy and laity had lost its practical ef-
fect, and was no longer recognised by the State in its system of rights.
The great mass of the clergy were merged in the middle classes, the high
dignitaries of the Church in the aristocracy.Chapter X: II. The Nobility
A. The French Nobility
The Patricians of ancient Rome formed a hereditary nobility of birth
(Geschlechtsadel): but internal party struggles early transformed it into
a political aristocracy, based not on descent, but on the free choice of
the people to public offices. This political aristocracy of the senatorial
families lasted through the Republic into the Empire. The old patrician
families, which in the time of Augustus had dwindled down to fifty, and
very seldom received an addition (the families of the Emperors were in
law always patrician,55 still perhaps in fact, though no longer in law,
formed the nucleus of this aristocracy; the ancient glory of their name,
traditional experience in State affairs, often too their large property and
personal connections, won them the respect to which they owed their
place in the Senate. But besides these, the aristocracy was constantly
renewed and quickened by the addition of eminent men, distinguished as
generals, statesmen, orators, or lawyers, who under the Republic en-
tered the Senate by election to public offices, under the Empire by the
summons of the Emperor. Thus political merit and public distinction
had become the basis of the later Roman nobility, which even at the time
of its decadence retained a remnant of its bygone freedom and great-
ness.
Maecenas’ famous discourse56 on the Principate is an excellent ex-
pression of the idea which Roman statesmen had of the aristocracy in
imperial times. The Emperors friend advises him to purge the Senate of
the incapable members thrust upon it by the confusions of the civil wets,
and to fill up the vacancies by careful nominations. He recommends himThe Theory of the State/117
to reject no one on the score of poverty, but rather to supply poor and
capable men with the needful means. In the choice of senators he should
look not merely to Italy, but also to the allies, and even to the provincials,
and so assemble round him the first men from among all the peoples of
the empire, men marked by family, character or wealth, as leaders of the
people, and should give them a share in public affairs and in the govern-
ment of the world. To increase the number of eminent men that assembled
in the Senate at Rome, would be to secure a better provision for the
needs of the State and the loyalty of the provinces. The Equites, distin-
guished by their wealth, should form a lower aristocracy of wealth,
composed of eminent men of the second rank. Further, that the sons of
senators may be fit to succeed to the duties of their fathers, they must be
worthily educated in the sciences and in arms.
The history of the French Nobility is a very chequered one. We can
distinguish the following periods, each with its special characteristics.
1. The foundation of the French Nobility belongs to the Merovingian
period (481–752). Strangely enough the traces of an old Frankish nobil-
ity of birth are very uncertain. But this period developed a nobility of
personal fealty (ein persönlicher Treuadel), based mainly on the rela-
tion of the king to his people. Perhaps even here special regard was paid
to the old families of nobles. But besides these, other free Franks and
Germans were received by the king among his Antrustiones, and even
Romans as guests of the king (convivae regis) received a similar rank.
Sometimes persons of low birth, slaves and dependents, are found rising
to the highest offices of the empire, and thus becoming nobles.
This Nobility then had grown out of very mixed materials. It was,
at least for the most part (as Schäffner has shown in detail,57 not a
hereditary nobility, but a nobility of personal service, bound by an oath
of fealty. The privilege of a higher Wergeld was a sign and a conse-
quence of the higher value attached to its members. Beyond this its privi-
leges in private law were few. But politically it was distinguished partly
by the association of the position of an Antrustio with high offices of
State, court posts, and ecclesiastical dignities, partly by participation in
the King’s Council and a prominent place at the national assemblies.
In the institution, as in the members who composed it, we find the
same mixture of Romance and Teutonic elements. But the Teutonic ele-
ment tended to gain the mastery. To this belong, (1) the personal tie of
fealty to the king (trustis dominica), which was propagated by family
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other lords (Seniores); (2) the grant of royal benefices to the great nobles,
mainly in the form of lands.
These two relations form the chief source of the later Feudal Sys-
tem.
2. The change in the royal dynasty was in great measure the work of
a revolution in the nobility. The Carolingian Mayors of the Palace, as
representatives of the king, put themselves at the head of the powerful
military nobility. They helped to confirm the nobles in their domains:
and then with their aid they drove out the degenerate kings.
This movement, as Guizot has pointed out,58 found its main and
constant support in northern France, in Austrasia, where the Germans
were dominant, and which was hence called Francia Teutonica, as op-
posed to the Roman France of the South. The result was that the French
Nobility received a distinct Teutonic stamp.
The Nobility of office and service became more and more a feudal
nobility (Lahensadel) of Barons, Seniores. and Vassals, each of whom
learnt to feel his independence within his own sphere. Thus the transi-
tion was made from the hierarchy of royal officials to the independent
sovereignty of Seigneurs: and the nobility became hereditary with their
fiefs.
3. The new Feudal Nobility reached its highest development and
power in the third period, that of the Capets (987 to St. Louis, 1226).
Charles the Great had understood how to preserve the unity of the State
and strengthen the royal power but under his successors the universal
monarchy of the Franks parted into several independent States, and in
the Frankish monarchy itself offices and fiefs became more indepen-
dent. Charles the Bald was obliged59 to recognise the hereditary prin-
ciple for Countships and Fiefs of the empire in favour of the sons of
vassals, and even of inferior vassals. Soon after the same right was
admitted for collateral relatives. Only in the Church the idea of a per-
sonal nobility of office was maintained, while in the State it was trans-
formed into a hereditary feudal nobility. Thus the rule of hereditary
Seigneurs spread in various degrees and forms over the whole of France.
Some of them had supreme authority (obrigkeitliche Gewalt) in all
essential respects, and only recognised a very limited feudal authority
over them on the part of the king (oberlehensherrliche Gewalt).
To this haute noblesse (der hohe Adel) belong Dukes, Counts, Vis-
counts, and Barons. Most of them were crown vassals, some of them
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They possessed Saute justice (die hohe Gerichtsbarkeit), and stood at
the head of the military constitution, which had now lost its earlier na-
tional character and become a feudal and knightly service. On the other
hand, the military services they owed to the king were exactly fixed and
defined. The king could not issue laws or levy taxes without their con-
sent. In the same way they issued ordinances and imposed taxes in their
domains with the consent of their vassals. Whoever lived on their do-
main (Herrschaft) had to swear loyalty (fides) to them, and the vassal
had to swear fealty and homage (foy et hommage): he was their subject
(Urterthan).
Political sovereignty was thus split up among a loose association of
hereditary sovereignties based upon private rights.
The higher nobility was no longer a pre-eminent class of the people,
nor did its essence lie in the fealty and services which it owed to the
king. Its chief characteristic is that its members have become feudal
princes and seigneurs. In fact it has attained sovereignty (die
Souveränität).60
The lower nobility underwent similar changes. It had; sprung from
two sources, first the profession of knight, and second the offices of the
court. At first it was their profession which made the position of the
knights or retainers (Diersitleute, Ministeriales), who were bound in
special loyalty to a lord: the knights were generally free, but the retain-
ers were often of servile birth.
But the professional nobility in time became hereditary and feudal.
The knights acquired feudal estates, which became hereditary in their
family, the officials (Dienstleute) received court fiefs. As wealthy men
(riches oms) they stood apart from the yeomen (roturiers), and as vas-
sals they were brought near to their lords (seigneurs). As the lord sat at
the king’s table (conviva regis), so the knight sat at the table.61 Of his
lord. Their services in war and at Court were attached to their estates,
as the sovereign rights of the Seigneurs to their domains. They too had
a limited territorial sovereignty (Grundherrlichkeit), and generally had
an inferior and intermediate jurisdiction (basse justice) over the sub-
jects of their feudal lords. Their class became more and more exclusive,
and came to imply knightly birth and knightly education.
The new nobility, on the ground of their birth, were called gentile
homages. Certainly birth alone did not make a knight,62 but one who
was not born of a knightly father—the condition of the mother did not
matter—could not, as a rule, become a knight. The king alone could120/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
raise a man to the nobility.63 At the same time the association of this
nobility with the possession of a fief was at first so close that the yeo-
man (roturier) who bought a fief and lived on it became a franc homme
in virtue of his estate, and if his grandson succeeded him in it, he be-
came a gentil homme.64 But the ‘free knighthood’ (freies Ritterthum)
without fief, which grew up by the side of the other, held its position in
virtue of birth, education, and profession.
This lower nobility, too, had many degrees, from the Vavasseurs or
Bas Sires up to the Vigulers (vicarii), who were specially numerous in
the South, and often had an intermediate jurisdiction; the Châtelains,
some of whom came near to the Barons, and the Vicomtes, some of
whom belonged to the Barons, while others had an inferior position in
the feudal service of a Count. But throughout this confusing diversity of
degrees and privileges the feudal principle is always fundamental.
4. The fourth period witnessed an entire transformation of the no-
bility. First came a struggle for sovereignty between the Monarchy and
Nobility. The kings were the representatives of the awakening spirit of
national unity and the quickened consciousness of the State. In this
struggle they were supported by the jurists, who maintained and finally
brought into use the principles of Roman law. They found a powerful
organ for their doctrines in the royal court of justice, the Parliament
(Parlement). The nation, and chiefly the people of the towns, though
seldom interfering, supported them indirectly.
A new system of royal officials, independent of the feudal tie, was
gradually introduced. Paid troops of the king served the royal power
without limit or reserve. The great fiefs of Dukes and Counts were one
after another absorbed by the crown, sometimes by succession or con-
tract, often by armed force, and the alienated sovereign rights were once
more concentrated in the crown.
Thus the independent sovereignty of the nobility was broken. The
victory of the King over the Seigneurs was completed by Louis XI (1461–
1483).
The Nobles only saved remnants of their earlier territorial sover-
eignty (Landeshoheit): they became Governors (Gouverneurs) in cer-
tain provinces, but lost the position of territorial nobles. They had be-
come merely a privileged class of subjects, whose distinctions and privi-
leges more and more appeared to conflict with new ideas and beliefs.
The later struggles of the King and the Nobility were of quite a different
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of mere court parties, headed usually by nobles.
If the nobles wished to attain influence and power, they could only
do so in the service of the king. They could not play any considerable
part in the States-General, for it never took a fixed and regular form.
The old feudal nobility was thus transformed into a mere nobility of
the court, based rather on outward rank and honours than on political
rights. Henri IV had commanded the nobles to live on their estates. Louis
XIV brought them to the court to dazzle them into complete subjec-
tion.66 In the first rank stood the Peers of France (Pairs de France), at
first twelve in number, six ecclesiastical lords, six secular vassals of the
crown; but they were afterwards increased by the addition of the royal
princes and many other secular nobles. The Peerage was hereditary: it
had the privilege of free access to the king and to the Parliament of
Paris, before which alone it could be brought to trial. At the coronation
the Peers carried the insignia of royalty.
Next to the Peers came the Dukes, Marquises, Counts, Barons, Vis-
counts, Châtelains, whose rank appeared in their titles and arms.
Last came the lower nobility of Squires and simple Gentlemen
(Gentilshommes).
The old nobility had depended mainly on birth, though partly deter-
mined by the possession of seignorial rights (Grundherrschaft). But
now a new nobility appeared by its side, taking its origin chiefly from
royal grant. It consisted mainly of those who were nominated to the
higher civil and military offices, and above all of the lawyers in the
sovereign courts, the noblesse de role. These posts were no longer he-
reditary, or attached to the soil, and hence this nobility constantly re-
ceived new accessions. Connected with it was the nobility of the Doc-
tors of law (milites litterati, legales), which, unlike all the rest, de-
pended not on the royal favour, but on scientific eminence.
A lower element in the nobility consisted of the many who were
raised to it by letters patent, often for the sake of the fee, sometimes as
a reward for services, not always the most honourable.67
5. The brief and violent catastrophe of the French Revolution de-
stroyed the whole system of nobility. It began with the fusion of the
hitherto separate Estates in a general National Assembly. It went on to
abolish the nobility as a distinction opposed to the democratic principle
of equality.68 finally, it tried to exterminate the nobles with the help of
the levelling guillotine.
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the blood of eminent men, and its theory of equality had dulled its sharp
edge on the iron of facts,—attempts were made, even in France, to re-
store the nobility in a new form on the levelled ruins of the past, but
without lasting success. The most interesting was the attempt of Napo-
leon, who saw in aristocracy at once an essential support and a limita-
tion to monarchy. In the order of the Legion of Honour he created a sort
of modern knighthood, which was open to every one who did eminent
service to the State, but was essentially a personal and honorary distinc-
tion. He also thought of founding a higher hereditary Aristocracy, in
which the surviving families of the old historic nobility should be united
with the descendants of the new French marshals, ministers, and other
high officials. One can see that Napoleon’s idea was to combine the
institutions of the early Roman Empire with the traditions of French
history. Meanwhile he had hardly taken the first step for the renewal of
the nobility when his own fall came.69
Louis XVIII (1814) in his Peerage (Pairie) came nearer to the En-
glish pattern. But he failed to establish a political peerage. The constitu-
ents of the old Peerage had been too completely destroyed by the Revo-
lution: the spirit of the people was so entirely given up to the principle of
equal rights and free circulation of property, that any renewal of the
nobility seemed like an attack on popular rights: many of the old nobil-
ity had borne arms against their country, and their new claims rested on
the conquest of France by the foreign armies.70 The old hatred was as
strong as ever, and the aristocracy had not done any new services which
would have reconciled the people to a political rehabilitation. The July
Revolution of 1830 again abolished the hereditary peerage and the sys-
tem of Majorats,71 and the personal peerage for life, which followed it,
was swept away by the storms of February, 1848. The Republic again
pronounced against all titles and privileges of nobility.72
The French nobility has never again been reorganized. The dignity
of Senator, which Napoleon III adopted in his constitution’ was a step
towards it, but this attempt ended with the fall of the second empire.
Since then the French nobility has only been so far restored that the old
titles have been sanctioned73 and secured against abuse.
There are still aristocratic elements and tendencies among the people,
but they have no chance of making way against the democratic spirit of
the masses. The remains of the French nobility are now nothing more
than a titular nobility, without special rights, and are kept up rather by
family vanity than by public institutions.74Chapter XI: II. The Nobility
B. The English Nobility75
England is almost the only modern European State where the nobility
has held its place as a great national institution. This result is due to
various causes.
1. The English nobility of the middle ages, like the French, com-
prised elements of two nationalities, English and Norman; but the con-
nection between them was much closer than in the French nobility.
No doubt in the early centuries after the Conquest (1066) the
Normans maintained a predominance over the Saxons, but their rela-
tions were much more intimate than those between the Romans and
Franks in France.
The Saxon Eorls had been long distinguished from the free Ceorls
as a national nobility: their education, their life, and their ideas were the
same as those of the Norman nobles; and they maintained their old rights
even against their new kings. The Conquest only served to strengthen
their free spirit; and the increased zeal and vigour with which they main-
tained their rights gave to the nobility, as a whole, that spirit of political
freedom which has made England great.
2. On the other hand, one great effect of the Conquest was that the
royal power, on which the unity and security of the State mainly rested,
held its own against the nobles, and the sovereignty was not split up, as
in France, among a number of great vassals. The feudal system found
its way into England, but it took a different form. The old idea that it
was first introduced into England by the Normans has been exploded by
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holders of fiefs, and were thereby bound to the kings by a tie of special
loyalty and military service. But it remains true that the Norman rule
gave a much more marked feudal character to the State as a whole. At
the time of the Conquest feudalism was more developed in Normandy
than in England, and the conquerors brought their ideas with them.
William the Conqueror himself established the principle that hot
only the tenants in chief, but also the sub-tenants and larger freeholders
(die grösseren Freisassen), must swear the oath of feudal allegiance
immediately to the king, so that in the sphere of military duty all sub-
jects held immediately of the king (reichsunmittelbar).76 In the course
of a century all landed estates were drawn into the feudal bond, and thus
the phrase ran, ‘The king is universal lord and original proprietor of all
estates in his kingdom, and no one can occupy a part of them except by
grant, direct or indirect, from the king.’ Thus all landed property was
made uniformly subservient to the State.77 The feudal sovereignty thus
exercised by William was much more powerful than that of the French
king of his day, whose sovereignty over the duke of Normandy, who as
such was a French vassal, was but a slight one, more formal than real.
Thus the Norman and Saxon nobles, though they held and exercised
rights of jurisdiction and police over their dependents, after the mediae-
val manner, still remained in a condition of real subjection to the king,
and the unity of the State was not sacrificed to the barons.
3. But if the rights of the English nobility in this respect were nar-
row, their political rights, on the other hand, were all the more impor-
tant. It is these which are the ground of their greatness and permanent
significance.
These political rights found their sphere in the great Councils, which
early bore the modest name of Parliaments. In the Parliament the old
Anglo-Saxon Witanagemot was revived in a new and nobler form, which
gradually helped to unite the two races by the tie of common interests
and fortunes. The earlier assemblies of the great vassals may have had
no object beyond that of adding to the glory and dignity of the crown at
the festivals of Easter, Whitsuntide, and Christmas. But gradually they
gained a great political significance, and the most serious affairs of State
came to be discussed and decided there, though at first without fixed
rules or exact definition of their sphere. In the thirteenth century they
took a more regular form. The Magna Charta of 1215, wrung from
King John Lackland by the victorious nobles who had taken up arms in
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Counts, and great Barons should be summoned to Parliament (com-
mune concilium regni) individually, by royal letters (sigillatim per
litteras nostras), and the other immediate vassals of the king by a gen-
eral summons through the king’s officers (in generali per vicecomites
et ballivos nostros),’ and that new taxes might not be levied without
their consent.
The first class, who as hereditary councillors of the king and hold-
ers of the highest offices of the court and kingdom had the chief man-
agement of public affairs, became in course of time the Upper House:
the second class became a part of the Lower House. Both had at first a
personal right to sit in the Council (Reichsstandschaft) but in the case
of the second class it became a right to representation
(Representationsrecht), shared with the knights, the inferior vassals of
the great vassals of the crown, and with the inhabitants of the cities and
towns. The lords henceforth formed the higher aristocracy (der hohe
Adel): while the rich bourgeoisie took their place by the side of the lower
aristocracy of the Gentry.
The Nobility found its natural position in the State when the consti-
tution of Parliament became complete at the end of the thirteenth and
beginning of the fourteenth century.78 In the reign of Henry III it seemed
as if the Barons, under the leadership of the Earl of Leicester, would
endanger the existence of the monarchy, and take the government into
their own hands. But this was only a temporary encroachment, and soon
afterwards the principle was once more established that the aristocracy
were entitled to a definite influence on public affairs, and in particular
to a share in legislation, but not to the exercise of the sovereign rights of
government.
Their political power was further limited by the enlargement of Par-
liament, through the addition of representatives of the towns and cities,
and by the fact that the English knights were elected to Parliament by
free tenants (libere tenentes), not, as on the continent, nominated by
their own order.
The nobility proper consisted entirely of the Lords: it never became
a dynastic and territorial nobility as in France and Germany, but re-
mained an estate of the realm (reichsständischer Adel), exercising rights
subject to the king and the law in the military and judicial system, as
well as over their sub-tenants.
The Knights, that is to say, free men in possession of knights’ fees,
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They held the first place in the militia, and, as justices of the peace, were
entrusted with a power of police and administration of justice. The rep-
resentatives of the county in parliament were chosen from them. The
association of their younger sons with the upper citizen class, and their
parliamentary connection with the representatives of the towns, the
‘honoratiores,’ gave rise to the essentially modern conception of the
Gentry, all who by birth or office, education or property, are distin-
guished as honoratiores from the masses. Unlike the gentilshommes in
France, they are not a rigidly exclusive order, but an elastic aristocracy,
daily receiving new accessions and occasionally rejecting unworthy
members.79
4. There is a further characteristic of the English nobility which
deserves special notice, as it marks an honourable distinction between
them and the nobility of France, and in the main of Germany also. Even
when the barons were the only political power in the State, they had in
view something more than themselves and their own rights. They early
felt their vocation as a national corporation to defend the rights and
guard the freedom of the nation in the general interests of the public.
Magna Charta contains many and important clauses to this effect. The
political freedom of England is to a great extent their work. When this
had been once firmly established, the higher aristocracy became a solid
embankment against the streams of democracy: they exchanged the role
of defenders of the national freedom for the less popular but equally
useful task of defending the throne and established institutions
(Statsordnung). Standing between the king and the mass of the people,
not powerful enough to rule for themselves, and too independent to obey
every impulse from below or every humour from above, they main-
tained the freedom and rights of both from encroachment and abuse.
The English nobility80 have always taken an active and leading part
in public duties. Their very education is permeated with the spirit of
political freedom and personal independence. Party politics, their work
as justices of the peace, their share in elections, in the county adminis-
tration, and in juries, their voluntary societies and contributions for public
purposes—all these forms of activity keep them in touch with the life of
the people and train them in the duties of self-government and patriotic
service.81
5. The hereditary principle in the case of the English lords became a
rule of public law, though not in so absolute and exclusive a form as on
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peerage was closely connected with occupation of the soil or with of-
fice. Peerage had a strictly territorial character. But later this connec-
tion was severed, and peerage was transmitted by inheritance as a per-
sonal dignity. But this early association of the peerage with a definite
estate, castle or office gave rise to the important principle that only one
of the sons or relatives of the deceased lord could take his place in
parliament. By the principle of primogeniture only one son became a
lord, the others received a lower rank, and were excluded from the up-
per nobility. Not only are younger sons of a lord in law merely ‘es-
quires,’ but even the eldest son in his father’s life-time is only called
‘Lord’ by courtesy. Thus, on the one hand, the dignity and wealth of the
great families remained concentrated in one head, while on the other
hand the easy transition from one class to another served to minimise
the distinctions of birth.82
6. Further, a Peer was not bound to marry into a noble family. The
wife of a Lord is a Lady, although she may come from the citizen class.
This principle has not lessened the dignity of the nobility, while it has
done far more to secure it from attack than the caste-like principle of
equality of birth, to which the German nobility cling so closely.
7. Finally, the Peerage was from time to time enlarged and enliv-
ened by the creation of new peers. The privilege of creating them was
reserved for the king as ‘the source of all political honours.’83 He alone
could add new members to the nobility and confer the rights of a peer
upon them, with the title of Duke, Marquis, Earl, Viscount, or Baron.
But in the nature of things this political dignity was only conferred on
men who had distinguished themselves by their public services as gen-
erals or statesmen, and who possessed or now received enough property
to satisfy the claims of their position. This constant supply of new and
really aristocratic forces saved the English aristocracy from the danger
of stagnation and incapacity. The ablest and most gifted men in the
nation could thus look forward to raising themselves and their families
by their public service to the sunny heights of political life. Thus, from
1700 to 1800, 34 dukes, 29 marquises, 109 earls, 85 viscounts, 248
barons were created. During the same time more than 500 baronetcies
were conferred. At the present day rich citizens who buy large estates in
the country count among the country gentry, though without a title of
nobility.84
If we now look as a whole at these characteristics of the English
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undisputed, and continues to occupy a useful and brilliant place in the
constitution, while in every continental country the aristocracy have ei-
ther entirely disappeared, or maintain only a struggling and precarious
existence.Chapter XII: C. The German Nobility. (1) Princes
If we look at the history of the German nobility we find everywhere a
number of distinguished families, raised above all other free men by
military fame, by wealth or popular leadership, and in fact occupying a
princely position. This ancient nobility of race (Stammesadel), often
confined to a few families, was the foundation of the dynastic or princely
nobility of the middle ages (Hoher Adel, Herrenadel, Standesherren).
The lower nobility of knighthood was a growth of the middle ages.
The position of the Princes, the highest secular class, was closely
connected with the constitution of the Empire. The families whose heads
had risen to the highest rank of independence and sovereignty were
counted hochfrei; sendbarfrei, semperfrei. From the end of the twelfth
century, only those secular lords counted as princes of the Empire who
held at least a Countship in fief from the king, and were not vassals of
any other temporal lord. But only the heads of these princely families
were regarded as properly lords (Herren). The status was dormant in
the case of the other members of the family: they were only companions
(Genossen) of the princes and lords.
This high status in the Empire depended on:—
(a) The office of Prince (Fürstenamt), that is originally on the ducal
military power, which was conferred along with a banner.
By the side of the secular princes (Dukes, Margraves, and Counts-
palatine), and sometimes taking precedence of them, stand the ecclesi-
astical princes of the Empire, carrying their sceptre. The former office
had become hereditary, and was, as a rule, only bestowed on descen-
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princely houses: frequently clergy of knightly birth, or even learned citi-
zens, were elected to it, and in rare cases even peasants’ sons were
raised to the episcopal throne.
(b) The office of Count (Grafenamt), which also became a heredi-
tary and territorial rule. After the fall of the powerful tribal dukes
(Stammesherzoge), and the partition of their territories among different
princes, these dynasties of counts increased in dignity. Formally their
position depended on the grant of the royal ban (Königsbann) by the
king; in fact, it was a hereditary territorial lordship.
(c) Besides these there were a number of great allodial lordships,
whose lords, by the grant of immunities and of seignorial rights, had
obtained a sovereignty and jurisdiction like that of the counts—these
were the Barons (freie Herren).
The families of the old tribal nobility, which had no position in the
Empire, could not long remain members of the imperial nobility, and
were merged in the other classes, mainly in that of the knights.
This nobility of the Empire (Reichsadel) is mainly distinguished by
two political rights:—
(1) Territorial sovereignty (Landeshoheit).
(2) A seat in the imperial estates (Reichsstandschaft). It was thus a
ruling class in the fullest sense of the word, being sole ruler on its own
domains, joint ruler in the Empire. This tendency to sovereignty was
characteristic and powerful, and had a disastrous effect on the Empire.
It led the most eminent families to sacrifice the majesty of the Empire to
the claims of the Papacy, to weaken and cripple the German monarchy,
completely break up the national unity, and make German territory sub-
ject to foreigners This crime against their country and the world is not
compensated by the brilliance of their courts and palaces, nor by the
ennobling works of art which flourished under their protection.
Their territorial lordship acquired in time the semblance of sover-
eignty, without real strength or security for the future. Only some of the
great territorial princes were able to maintain some measure of separate
political existence; most of them were too weak in resources and ability.
Their power as an imperial estate was rarely exercised for the fur-
therance of German interests, the development of a public rights, or the
support of popular freedom: it was generally used to evade national
duties, and extend the special powers of the members of the Empire.
The tendency to family exclusiveness was specially strong. This
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of mesalliance (Missheirath), and in the extension of equal privileges to
all children. The only form of marriage which was quite unexception-
able was where both parties were descended from hochfrei families.
Even the marriage of a hochirei man with a mitlelfrei wife was regarded
in many families as a mesalliance, compromising the equal birth of the
children and the princely rights of the sons. The king could indeed re-
move the defect by raising the wife to a higher rank; or a family, in
virtue of its autonomy, might adopt higher principles, or give its consent
to a particular case of unequal marriage.
No German dynasty could keep quite pure, according to the strict-
est principles of equal birth. But in many cases morganatic marriages
were concluded, with the express condition that the children should not
inherit their father’s rank: the same result followed in cases of undoubted
misalliance, especially where the wife came from the lower citizen or
peasant, or even the serf class; when, according to the later electoral
capitulations, even kings could not wipe out the stain.
At the time of the ‘Mirrors’85 the title of prince, count, and baron
was only given to those who actually exercised the functions of prince
or count, or occupied a barony.86 But in time all sons of princes and
counts bore and bans misted the title of their father. This multiplication
of unreal titles, apparently with a view to the honour of families, only
served to lower their dignity among the people, and to weaken them
before the great territorial princes. In the same way the rigid mainte-
nance of the principle of equality in marriage dried up the sources which
should have renewed the nobility, and cut it off from the attachment of
the people.
Ever since the Thirty Years’ War the dynastic nobility steadily de-
clined, until its final collapse in this century. The decisive points in its
history were these:—
(a) The secularisation of the ecclesiastical principalities, for which
the way was prepared by the treaties of peace between the French Re-
public and the German Empire at Campo Formio 1797, and Luneville
1801, and confirmed and concluded by the extraordinary decree of a
diet of deputation (Reichsdeputationshauptschluss), Feb. 25, 1803.
The German estates of the ecclesiastical princes were used to com-
pensate the secular princes for their losses on the left bank of the Rhine,
and to furnish German territory for Italian princes who were driven out
of Italy. Of the three ecclesiastical Electors, only the electoral prince of
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Primate to Regensburg, and then to Aschaffenburg. The Grand Duke of
Tuscany received the Archbishopric of Salzburg and the priorate of
Berchtesgaden. The Bavarian Palatinate acquired the bishoprics of
Wurzburg, Bamberg, Freising, Augsburg, Passau, etc.; Prussia those of
Hildesheim and Paderborn; Baden parts of those of Constanz, Strasburg,
Speyer, Basel, etc.
The secularisation was no doubt a breach of the historical rights of
the Empire: but it was justified by the change in public opinion, which
would no longer tolerate a political sovereignty of the clergy, and by the
public needs of the population, which wanted secular government.
(b) The ‘mediatisation’ of a large number of secular princes and
lords, by the Confederation of the Rhine, July 12, 1806.
Like the Act of secularisation it was mainly due to Napoleon I, and
the ideas of the French Revolution: but at the same time it marked an
advance in the political development of Germany, which had been hin-
dered by the petty lords. The seventy-two ‘mediatised’ princes and lords
lost their sovereignty, and became subjects of the great princes; but they
still retained an inferior jurisdiction, and many privileges. Of their do-
mains, thirteen fell to Bavaria, twenty-six to Wurtemberg, nine to Baden,
seven to Hesse, seven to Nassau, twelve to the Grand Duchy of Berg.
Later on, some of those who had survived were ‘mediatised,’ i.e., they
became subjects of other German princes, e.g., the princes of Salm,
Isenberg, and the Duke of Aremberg: some survived to the days of the
Restoration, when they fell as dependents of Napoleon.
The dissolution of the German Empire, August 6, 1806, put an end
to their rights as an Imperial estate (Reichsstandschaft).
(c) The German Confederation of June 8, 1815, revived the memory
of the imperial privileges of these families by recognising them as equal
in birth with those German princely houses which had become sover-
eign, and guaranteeing them certain honours and privileges, among oth-
ers the right to sit in the first chamber of their country. The Matricula of
the Confederation numbered at first forty-nine princes, forty-nine counts,
and one baron: some of these families have since become extinct, others
have lost their property.
The modern development of constitutional law in the different States
was unfavourable to the patrimonial rights of these lords. They could
not long maintain their special powers of jurisdiction and police in the
face of laws which enforced legal equality and a centralized administra-
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themselves resigned their separate lordship (Sonderherrschaft).
The number of thirty-four sovereign German princedoms, recognised
by the Federal Act of 1815, has since been diminished by death, by
resignation, and by deprivation. The princes of Hohenzollern-Hechingen
and Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen voluntarily resigned their sovereign rights
in favour of the King of Prussia, Dec. 7, 1849. The royal house of
Hanover, the electoral house of Hesse, and the ducal house of Nassau,
lost their sovereignty to Prussia by the war of 1866, and the establish-
ment of the North-German Confederation. The present number of Princes
in the German Empire, with territorial sovereignty, is twenty-two.
But although the imperial nobility, in the old sense, has come to an
end in Germany, there is still a higher aristocracy of distinguished fami-
lies, composed partly of the old imperial families (reichsständische
Geschlechter), partly of new families, which have been raised above the
gentry by the public services of eminent men, such as Prince Bismarck
and Count Moltke, or by princely favour. It is worth noticing that this
high aristocracy, though its tone is rather conservative than liberal, has
been distinguished by broad-minded views, and, so far from adopting a
narrow and petty individualism, has shown complete sympathy with the
national development and greatness of the German Empire.Chapter XIII: C. The German Nobility. (2) Knights
Midway between the old dynastic nobility and the simple freemen came
those who had been raised out of the class of freemen into the class of
the mittelfrei, as the ‘Swabian Mirror’ calls them. In the South of Ger-
many they may be traced back to the time of the Frankish monarchy, but
it was not till the fourteenth century that they were called noble and
came to form a lower nobility (niederer Adel) above the simple free-
men. The chief elements in this class were:—
(a) The freemen who were eligible to the office of assessor (die
schöferbar Freien87), originally owners of larger estates (three hides
and upwards88), and chosen for assessors as the richer and more impor-
tant of the freemen. In time the office, like all others, became hereditary,
and they succeeded for a longer time than the mass of free peasants in
keeping their estates free from burdens and subject to the jurisdiction of
the counts instead of that of the bailiffs. Later on they were merged in
the class of knights or of territorial lords.
(b) Vassals of the nobility; and after the rise of knighthood, knights
with knight’s fees.89
(c) Later on, many knights without fees, most of them descendants
of vassals, who had received a knight’s education; but also, as time
went on, soldiers raised to knighthood by the emperor or his representa-
tives.
(d) Numerous retainers (Ministeriailen, Edelknechte) often sprung
from the servile or half-free class, and even in the thirteenth century
sharply distinguished from men of knightly birth. These rose by their
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living: at first they had no feudal rights, but they gradually rose to the
level of the knights, and were absorbed in their order.
(e) The noble families (die Geschlechter, Patrizier) in many cities
of the Empire, more rarely in provincial cities (Landstädien), originally
descended from the assessor class or from knights, and distinguished by
their share in city government.
In the lower nobility, as well as the higher, the principle of inherit-
ance tended to supersede considerations of landed estate, of knightly
life, or of court service, and hence arose a large number of nobles, who
owned no other title to nobility but an old family-tree. At the same time
their attitude towards the freeman and peasant class became more ex-
clusive at the very moment when the distinction between them was ceas-
ing to have a real meaning. Thus the passion for grand titles was abun-
dantly gratified. A large number of barons and even counts and princes
issued from this order, getting their titles either by regular grant or by
usurpation, but without any reality to correspond to them.
In Germany a nobility was never developed out of the civil and
military offices to the same extent as in France. The learned nobility of
the Doctores Juris were the only exception to the hereditary principle.
On the other hand, Germany showed the greatest readiness in adopting
the French form of nobility by letters patent.
The knights of the Empire, on their scattered domains, obtained a
considerable degree of independence, but the lower nobility, as a whole,
had no territorial sovereignty and no place in the Imperial Estates. On
the other hand, they had a share in feudal law, and had certain special
privileges in religious foundations and benefices. Some of them exer-
cised the jurisdiction of bailiffs and territorial lords, which they inher-
ited in connection with definite domains.
Finally, they had the right to sit in the estates of their country
(Landstandschaft), and formed the nobility of its court.
The power of this order rose to its highest after the thirteenth cen-
tury, and survived till the middle of the sixteenth, when it began to de-
cline before the irresistible revolution in economical, military, social
and official relations. The Thirty Years’ War helped to complete its
destruction.
In the Germany of to-day the lower nobility, as a political institu-
tion, has become more completely disorganized than the imperial insti-
tution of the higher nobility. Many causes combined to undermine it: the
feudal tie became weak, and States lost their feudal character and con-136/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
stitution, armies were revolutionized, the official class ceased to be he-
reditary, citizen families rose to high places, the old German Empire fell
to pieces, and representative institutions were developed. More recently,
too, changes from above and from below have abolished these privi-
leges, sometimes singly, sometimes in the mass.
In Germany, as well as in France, the third estate would not tolerate
the privileges of the nobility, and disputed its very existence. The unlim-
ited extension of nobility to all descendants brought the claims of the
nobility into glaring contrast with the facts on which they were founded,
and the inconsistency was heightened, and the confusion increased, by
comparison with the upper citizen class. If the inferior princes of the
Empire could not resist the land-hunger of the princes of the Confedera-
tion of the Rhine, still less could the knights of the Empire. Their estates
were incorporated in the territories of princes. The Confederation of
1815 tried to presence a privileged position for their families, and to
secure them autonomy, a seat in the provincial estates, rights of juris-
diction and patronage, forest privileges, and a privileged position in the
courts. But this tinkering was ineffectual. To the modern conception of
public law, patrimonial jurisdiction was as intolerable as freedom from
taxation.
Speaking generally, the so-called lower nobility in Germany has no
longer any special rights in law. As a political and imperial institution it
has ceased to exist. What remnants of its old glory, besides its name and
arms, it retains and exercises on occasion, have only an antiquarian
interest. But still the territorial nobles, and in less degree the nobles of
the court, though without landed property, occupy an important place in
society, and indirectly exercise a considerable influence on policy and
on official appointments. The appointments to the higher military posts,
and to offices at court and in the diplomatic service, are mainly, though
not necessarily, made from this class.
The merely titular nobility have gradually become merged by mar-
riage and occupation with the upper citizen class, both in social and
political life. The German nobility of Knights have not a patriotic and
national history like the English aristocracy. A large part of the territo-
rial nobility offered a long and stubborn resistance to modern ideas and
reforms. Many of these nobles, in their romantic enthusiasm for medi-
aeval conditions, were readier to serve territorial absolutism than the
freedom of the people. Hence the German nobility are not so popular as
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with distrust and hatred by the masses. Still they have produced many
enlightened men and distinguished patriots. They have given the army
its best leaders, and in the great crisis of the national development, the
leaders in the struggle for reform have come from among the nobility.
The question of a reform of the German nobility, as an institution, has
been much discussed in recent times; but the best opportunity for it, the
period from 1852 to 1860, was passed over. The attempts at reform
only showed how little influence the friends of reform had with the mem-
bers of their order, and how opposed the mass of them were to any
thorough and effective change.
With the foundation of the German Empire the possibility arises of
a reconstituted and national aristocracy, in which the lifeless and un-
fruitful constituents of the old nobility should be ruthlessly set aside,
and the sounder elements retained, to be blended with other and more
modern aristocratic tendencies. An aristocracy, powerful, independent
and educated, is a necessity of life to a great people like the Germans,
and such a counterpoise of quality as against quantity is especially nec-
essary when the weight of the democratic masses is so heavy in the
balance. In a purified aristocracy which should thus form a middle es-
tate (aristokratischer Mittelstand) the hereditary principle would not
have the sole nor unlimited sway. Personal nobility (Individualadel)
demands recognition as well as nobility of race (Rasseadel): a noble
race separated from its foundations in Society may in time lose its no-
bility.
Notes—1. Riehl, in his book on die bürgerliche Gesellschaft (1854),
has given a lively picture of the social significance of the German aris-
tocracy. The social position which it still occupies has a value of its
own, but without political organization it cannot be permanent or effec-
tive. Classes (Stände) which are merely social groups, are only the foun-
dation of classes in the organic and political sense.
2. In the Deutsches Statswörterbuch (i. p. 30 ff., and p. 58 ff.) I
have based my proposals for reform on the distinction between passive
(ruhender Adel) and active nobility (wirklicher Adel). The former is
conferred by birth, and is only potential: the latter starts with personal
preeminence, in which the potential nobility becomes actual. I have since
made the pathetic discovery that my idea was anticipated two genera-
tions ago by Justus Möser (Patriot. Phantasien, iv. 248), only to be
disregarded. See my Geschichte der Statswissenschaft, p. 423.Chapter XIV: The Citizens
The Citizen class (den Bürgerstand) in Europe, though later in its rise
than the lower nobility, became a national estate with its own political
rights as early as the middle ages. Its roots are to be found in the old
hereditary class of Freemen (die Gemeinfreien), who originally formed
the tribe proper in the various German tribes and nations. But it was
only in the precincts of the towns, and under the protection of the law
and constitution of the towns, that it could attain to a free growth.
The middle ages, generally, were not favourable to popular free-
dom. The hierarchical, dynastic, aristocratic classes were in the ascen-
dant, and in the greater part of Europe the free proprietors of the soil
were subject to the grasping dominion of the feudal nobility and the
bailiffs (Vogteiherren).
The strong legislation of Charles the Great checked the worst op-
pressions, but could not prevent the advance of the evil. Under the Frank-
ish monarchy a very large part of the peasant population, which be-
longed by free birth to the genuine German tribes, by settling on royal or
ecclesiastical estates, or on the lands of the territorial nobles, and culti-
vating land which was not their own property, or by making over their
property from pious motives or necessity as gifts to churches and mon-
asteries, and receiving them back as tenants, fell into a condition of
manorial servitude (Hofhörigkeit), which made them little better than
slaves, and deprived them of many of their political privileges.
In time even the small estates, which had remained the property of
their free cultivators, were unable to escape the jurisdiction of the bai-
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change in the organization of the army, from the old basis of knightly
and feudal service to that of mercenary troops, deprived the free peas-
ants of their military efficiency and dignity. They were loaded, often
arbitrarily, with taxes of every form and for every sort of pretext: and in
the courts too, and still more in the political corporations of the country,
they lost the place which the old German constitution had secured them.
Even the free proprietors of the soil, as people of the bailiwick
(Vogteleute), gradually dropped to the level of servile peasants, and both
were classed together under the common name of the peasantry
(Bauernschaft).
Thus the political rights of the peasants were for the most part much
curtailed, and the old hereditary class (Erbstand) was transformed into
a professional class (Berufsstand). Only some of the free peasants, gen-
erally the larger owners of land, rose into the new class of Knights.
There were exceptions. Individual communities of free men were able,
under favourable conditions, to preserve their free ownership as well as
their higher political privileges from the dangers which threatened them.
One of the most notable examples of this is the village-community of
Schwyz, which gave the impulse as well as the name to Swiss freedom.
In the country then the old freedom was suppressed, but meanwhile
the towns became the home of a new civic freedom. The history of the
towns had a decisive influence on the development of the modern idea of
freedom and citizenship Both ideas were civic (städtisch) before they
became national (Statsbegriffe). Centuries were needed to develop fully
the idea of citizenship in a town, and centuries more before it was en-
larged to citizenship in a State.
At first the privileged classes, with their variety and separation, the
outcome of mingled Romance and Teutonic elements, were reflected in
the life of the towns. The variety was greatest where a large population
was enclosed in a narrow space.
Often within the circle of the same walls were found:—
1. Ecclesiastical princes with their courtly state and special rights
of sovereignty, bishops and abbots.
2. The lower ecclesiastics of all sorts and degrees.
3. Secular nobles of high rank, e.g., royal counts or high barons, the
Capitanei of Italy, who resided in the country and only made short stays
in the towns unless they possessed castles there.
4. Knightly families, often owning fiefs in the country.
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6. Mittelfreie.
(a) In the Romance towns of Italy and France, frequently the de-
scendants of the Roman decuriones, who possessed landed property in
the town.
Or (b) German freemen who had settled on their own land in the
town, and were distinguished by property and political position.
7. Simple freemen (Gemeinfreie) still owning land in the town.
8. Men free in person (persönlich Freie), but living on the estates of
lords in the town, and therefore subject to manorial law, e.g., to an
abbacy.
9. A mass of serfs of different lords, in the most various conditions,
(a) some living independently as artisans;
(b) others in dependence on a household as messengers and ser-
vants, etc.
The union of all these elements of the mediaeval system within one
town, necessarily tended in time to break down the separation between
them and to produce a new combination. Community of life, of inter-
ests, and of fortune, as well as party struggles, brought them into closer
contact. or gave rise to new differences not determined by birth.
The civic constitution brought into being new corporations and coun-
cils, in which the various classes were merged in a new unity. This
process varied with the conditions of different times and places, but was
essentially the same. The most important stages in this development
were the following:—
1. First in this citizenship of the towns came the distinguished fami-
lies of Knights, Retainers, and Mittelfreie, who, as Consules in the Coun-
cil, strove for independence and limited the lordship of the old lords of
the town (Stadtherren). This nucleus was enlarged by gemeinfrei ele-
ments, and new oppositions arose between the old aristocratic families
and the young and pushing societies of free citizens. Thus Milan, about
the middle of the eleventh century, saw the rise of the Motta, a political
society of doctors of law, physicians, bankers, merchants, and even men
of knightly family, who did not live the life of knights: later, under the
name popolo grasso (populares), they opposed the noble Capitanei and
Valvassores, and in the twelfth century took their place beside them in
the Great Council (Concilium Generale),90 forming the common coun-
cil of the town.
The rise of a civic authority in the Consuls was the first decisive
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rule, the formation of Great Councils and the name of Communes
(Gemeinden): last came the Guilds (Zünfte). And thus by degrees the
older and narrower societies were included in a wider circle of citizen-
ship.
This development was first seen in Lombardy, where the Teutonic
tendency to corporate life and independence was blended with memories
of ancient Rome. From there the movement passed to the towns of South-
ern France, during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. There it found
its main support in the remains of the old free municipal citizenship
(which had fallen lower in France than in Lombardy. represented by
elected Prudhommes.
2. A more decidedly democratic character and corporate form is
found in the sworn confederations of citizens in the communes, which in
the North of France about this time engaged in bloody struggles with the
lords of the towns. Here we find new elements of citizenship, especially
in the Guild-society (Gildonia, Conjuratio, Fraternitas).91 Entrance into
this, accompanied by an oath of obedience to the statutes, was the only
road to citizenship in a commune. Thus civic freedom and civic rights
were disconnected from mere birth or ownership of land, and stress was
laid instead on corporate union. The feudal principle and the old Teu-
tonic principle of privilege gave way to a new and personal principle.
Further, the constitution of the commune was favourable to the ex-
tension of freedom and citizen rights to the lower strata of the town
population. The mass of artisans, who had freed themselves from serf-
dom, found entrance into the society, and the principle was established
that the serf who had lived in the town a year and a day unclaimed and
unpursued by his lord became a free man. Town-law throughout Eu-
rope92 bears witness to the important principle that ‘the air of the town
makes a man free.’ It is true that the exaggerations and excesses of
democracy in the towns often led to reactions. The kings who had helped
to free the towns from the lordship of their seigneurs, now took occasion
through their officers to take the government into their own hands and
make it severe. In the same way the Lombard towns, for the most part,
lost their self-government at the beginning of the fourteenth century,
and fell into the power of individual princes. There, in the thirteenth
century, the new citizen body of the Popolo, composed largely of the
lower elements of the town population, under its democratic captains
(Capitani), had begun the struggle for dominion with the city nobles,
and had frequently overpowered and expelled them.142/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
Besides the towns with a consular and a communal constitution,
there were many towns in France which had remained more dependent
on their lords, and were ruled by provosts (prévôts), often very arbi-
trarily. However, even in these towns the burdens of servitude were re-
moved or much lightened, and the idea was developed of the Bourgeoi-
sie as a free class, into which a man could enter by settlement in the
town, or perhaps by royal grant of citizen rights.93
3. In Germany, too, the different meanings of the word citizen
(Bürger) indicate the various stages in the development of the idea.
In the thirteenth century it was still the practice, as it was earlier in
Italy and France, to distinguish Knights and Citizens (milites et bur-
gesses), and to understand by the latter those freemen who belonged to
the town society, and were eligible for its council, but who did not live
as knights. This citizen body had its foundation in the free householders
of the town, who usually shared with the families of knightly birth the
offices of assessor and councillor in the town.
These two bodies, the knights (including the Ministerialen) and the
citizens combined, were regarded as the citizens with full rights, or as
the ‘families’ (Geschiechter), and opposed to the artisans and other in-
habitants of the town.
After the middle of the thirteenth century, the time of the great town-
federations (Städtebunde) for the protection of trade, it appears that the
merchants in many German towns were acknowledged as citizens and
obtained the right of representation in its Council, on the ground of
personal freedom, apart from ownership of land.
Thus the idea of citizenship was to some extent divorced from con-
nection with the soil, and more significance than before was given to
profession and personal association. This tendency received new strength
when it became usual, in the early fourteenth century, for the artisans in
their companies to be incorporated as a new constituent in the citizen
body. The word citizen (Bürger) had thus gained a wider meaning. Hence-
forth it was regularly applied to all who shared in the life of the town
and its corporations. Servitude, so far as concerned town citizenship,
was abolished, distinctions of birth were essentially modified and soft-
ened, feudal law made way for the town law (Stadtrecht), which was
common and personal, and all citizens as such were brought into imme-
diate relation with the town to which they belonged.
This citizenship of personal freedom (das persönlich-freie
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of self-government, was limited to the sphere of town interests. The
details of the different constitutions varied with the history and circum-
stances of the town.
Some towns were subject to the territorial sovereignty of princes,
and were hence called provincial towns (Landstädte). Others acquired
royal rights for their councillors, and became territorial lords
(Landesherren) to the surrounding villages and to the lordships which
they acquired. In view of their immediate relation to the emperor and the
Empire they were called imperial towns (Reichsstädle).
In the sixteenth century the German towns were still wealthy, flour-
ishing, cultivated. The buildings of the period still maintain the reputa-
tion which they had in Machiavelli’s94 days. But the Thirty Years’ War
destroyed the power and prosperity of the towns, and they fell into a
miserably low condition, from which it took them more a than a century
of suffering and struggle to recover. Provincial towns lost their position
in the provincial estates, while imperial towns scarcely maintained a
shadow of independence. The towns anxiously cut themselves off from
the country: they were impoverished and oppressed, and became the
victims of a narrow and petty provincialism.
4. The following are the characteristic features of the cat medieval
citizen class:—
(a) It does not, like the Clergy and the Nobility, form cat a privi-
leged order, but a national class (einen ordentlichen Regel- und
Volksstand). It is distinguished from the peasants by its relation to the
town, by its culture, its freedom, and its law.
(b) In spite of differences of origin and of occupation the citizen
body is felt to be a united and homogeneous class. It is the guardian of
civic freedom, and of the equality of all before the law. It lives by the
same town laws, and has the independent ordering of its constitution.
The citizens are sons of the town, and share in its common life. The
political and social life of the town are closely connected.
(c) But further, the citizen class obtained a political position and
significance which went beyond the precincts of a single town, and em-
braced the citizens of many towns in one corporate class. This new
development found expression in the organization of the mediaeval Es-
tates, provincial and imperial. From the middle of the thirteenth century,
the citizens of the English towns, at first separately from the Knights,
afterwards along with them, obtained the right of representation in the
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formed the ‘third estate’ (tiers état), summoned at first separately from
time to time, but from the beginning of the fourteenth century as part of
the Estates General (États généraux).
In Germany, the ‘benches of the towns’ in the Imperial Diets
(Reichstage) after the elevation of Rudolf of Hapsburg in some measure
represented the citizen class; and in the Provincial Diets (Landtage) the
towns received a seat and vote, as a third estate, by the side of the
nobility and clergy.
5. Finally, the new ideas which had taken form in the te citizen class
of the towns were extended to the wider field of the whole nation; the
citizenship of the town gave birth to the modern citizenship of the State.Chapter XV: IV. The Peasants
If the old class of freemen lost ground in the middle ages, the servile
class gained: the depression of the freeman and the rise of the serf tended
to a mingling of the two classes. A small part of the servile class as
Ministerialen rose above the freemen and became part of the inferior
nobility. Their service at court brought them into close connection with
princes, and gave them the education and manners of a court: and this,
with their rich estates, in time gave them a place by the side of the
knightly nobility.
Another and larger part settled in the towns, where they enriched
themselves by trade, and acquired personal and civic freedom. The Ital-
ian towns deserve the credit of having been the first to free their serfs.
The town of Bologna, always a champion of freedom, on the proposal
of the Podestà Accursius de Sorrecina, generously resolved to purchase
the freedom of all serfs in its domain, and to declare serfdom at an end.95
The development of civic life also elevated the Artisan (Handwerker)
class, who had hitherto held a low place, especially in Teutonic Europe,
and had chiefly consisted of serfs. From Italy, where free citizenship
blossomed early, the Scholae spread to France, where, under Teutonic
influence, they took the corporate form of Ministeria (mestiers) and
Guilds, and were finally transplanted to Germany. Their effect was to
strengthen the rights of their members and to raise the dignity of their
masters. The systematic education and gradual development of the arti-
san class, their progress in technical skill and in wealth, their new privi-
lege of carrying arms under the banner of their corporation or their
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the town, all tended to awaken in the artisans a sense of their importance
and their claims. Many were serfs, but now obtained freedom by pur-
chase or by revolt. They could no longer be deprived of the rights of
citizens of their town.
In the country the road to freedom was more difficult. In many places
it was a principle that ‘the air makes a serf’ (die Luft macht hörig). It
was an exception for peasant serfs to become completely free, but by
slow degrees they generally acquired a personal freedom which, though
heavily burdened and politically insignificant, was secured by the pro-
tection of the law, and tended constantly to extend. They united with the
free peasants to form one professional class with equal rights.
The detailed relations of serfdom to freedom, and the transitions
from one to the other, were very various. The elevation of the serfs, like
the abolition of slavery, was largely due to the influence of the Church.
Where churches or conventual establishments were lords of the manor,
they generally led the way by giving definite rights and exemptions to
their serfs, and thus the dependents of religious houses (die
Gotteshausleute) were the first to approach the condition of free peas-
ants. The example was followed by the kings. The Carolings bestowed
freedom on the Fiscalini, and Louis X,96 enfranchising the serfs on the
royal domains in 1315, declared that he was fulfilling his duty as king
of France.
The same spirit which made the sovereign rights of the great barons
hereditary fiefs attached to the soil, and which gave to vassals as against
their lords secure and permanent n rights in their benefices, tended also
to confirm the rights of the peasant serfs of the manor (hoflörige Bauern)
to their holdings, and gave rise to inheritance subject to manorial law
(hofrechtliche Erbe) and to a peculiar system of patrimonial jurisdic-
tion, in which the peasants took part under the leadership of their Maires
or Aleyer (villici majores).
The position of the French Serfs and Vilains was, as the name im-
plies, less favoured than that of the German Hofleute and Grundholden;
but the freedom of the latter was later in its development, and in France
the higher classes of privileged peasants, the Costumiers and Roturiers,
and the Ostes (Hospites), came near to the position of freemen.
In England, on the other hand, the serf population, after the Black
Death (1348–9), acquired personal freedom, but without land: and thus
arose a class of free labourers instead of free peasants.97
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sphere of private law, and of the communal and judicial constitution. In
combination with the free peasants who had become subject to the he-
reditary lordship of bailiffs, and whose holdings had to bear various
perpetual burdens, to the profit of their lord, they formed the so-called
Peasant Class (Bauernstand).
The peasants did not become a political estate in the full sense,
except in a few countries: in Scandinavia, where they had fortunately
retained their old common freedom (Gemeinfreiheit) and the old consti-
tution; in the Tyrol, where they were summoned by the princes to the
provincial diets (Landtage); in Switzerland, where they formed free
peasant republics.
In most countries they were treated as a subject class, with no claim
to political, least of all to representative rights, and as marked out by
nature to bear public burdens. They were essentially an ‘economical’
class (ein wirfhschaftlicher Stand ), not like the citizens of the towns an
‘educational’ class (ein Culturstand).
The great Peasant War of the sixteenth century was a strong but
vain effort of the German peasants to break the heavy yoke of their
lords. When we now read the Twelve Articles summing up the demands
of the peasants, and remember the violent indignation which they aroused
in the educated classes and in the ruling aristocracy of that day, we may
notice with some satisfaction that in our century the peasant class have
everywhere obtained, without a struggle, as rights of men and citizens,
more than they then dared to ask.
But it was only gradually that men accustomed themselves to the
idea that peasants were not merely a subject race, only fit to be enlisted
and taxed at will. The English constitution once more showed its regard
for popular freedom when it granted to the Yeomen (probi et legales
homines), who drew a moderate income from their holdings, the right to
take part in county elections for the House of Commons.
But it was not till lately that the blessing of full personal freedom
and political rights was generally extended to all classes. The philoso-
phy of the eighteenth century, by winning recognition for the idea of the
natural rights of men, gave the intellectual impulse to this great ad-
vance. In Germany, King Frederick I of Prussia led the way by abolish-
ing serfdom on the royal domains in 1702: the emancipation of other
serfs was encouraged and extended by the laws of Frederick II, and the
example was followed by the Emperor Joseph II, in 1782, for Germany
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most German States held back, until the enthusiastic declaration of the
4th of August, 1789, and the proclamation of the ‘rights of man’ by the
French National Assembly produced its effect on civilised Europe. The
emancipation of serfs and dependent classes was recognized as a uni-
versal duty and an irresistible demand of the new age, and was carried
out in Western Europe in the first half of this century, and since then in
Eastern Europe. At the same time, or even afterwards, political citizen
rights (Statsbürgerrecht) were extended to the peasants as well as to the
citizens of the towns.Chapter XVI: V. Slavery and its Abolition
The Slave enters the family or nation, to which he is subject, as a for-
eigner. Widely as slavery was spread in antiquity, I know of no nation
which would have regarded it as a national class (ein nationaler Stand).
In this we have at once a proof that slavery is not a necessity of human
nature.
Aristotle (Pol. i. 4–6) has exercised much subtlety to prove that
some men are masters by nature, others slaves by nature. But his argu-
ment, so far as it is true, only establishes the necessity of a class occu-
pied in service, not of a slave-class without rights. Doubtless the man of
higher talents, if he is to fulfil his function, does require what Aristotle
calls ‘living instruments’ (myuca Ôrgana), and doubtless there are
men specially adapted by nature for bodily activity, who need the com-
manding guidance of a master if they are to fulfil their vocation. But this
only proves that there is a mutual need which unites master and servant,
master and journeyman, farmer and labourer, manufacturer and me-
chanic: it does not prove that the relation of the employed to the em-
ployer is to be compared to that of the domestic animals to their owners,
nor that workmen must surrender individual freedom and human per-
sonality, and become mere things, mere instruments of an appointed
master,—that is to say, become slaves. Man is by nature a person: he
cannot become a thing, that is, a slave. The Roman jurists, in their
theory of Law, have applied the notion of property to slaves with a
severity which was remarkable even in antiquity, representing them
throughout as beings without rights, as mere things: but even they felt
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common usage of nations.98 They therefore explained manumission as
the restoration of a natural right.99
But in spite of this knowledge, Roman jurisprudence, for more than
a thousand years, applied the principle of property to slaves with rigid
consistency. The imperial ordinances against excessive or groundless
severity of masters against slaves,100 acted like the present laws against
cruelty to animals, in preventing the worst cruelties, but did not affect
the principle: and the slave, as before, not only had no property, but had
not even the right of marriage or kinship.
The German law recognised with equal clearness, to use the strong
words of the author of the Sachsenspiegel,101 that all slavery had arisen
from compulsion, capture, and unjust force, and that what was now
given out as right was only custom, ancient but unjust.
The Teutonic nations always recognised certain rights in their serfs.102
Their rights of property and of family were in complete and insuffi-
ciently guarded, being in fact dependent on the good-will of their lord:
but the germ of their later enfranchisement was stronger than in Roman
law. The personality of the German slave was never completely lost and
so it was possible to improve his condition.
Slavery in Western Europe disappeared to a great extent in the middle
ages, by passing into the milder form of serfdom (Hörigkeit). Its last
remains were only banished with the final abolition of serfdom, at the
end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century.103
The earlier and gradual process, as well as the more thorough en-
franchisement of recent times, may be regarded as due in part to Chris-
tianity, which, without violently attacking the positive laws of slavery,
destroyed its intellectual basis. Property in man was incompatible with
the belief that all men are the children of God, and brethren of one
another. But the change is due still more to the Teutonic sense of law
and freedom, and to the progressive spirit of humanity.
The history of slavery in Russia is peculiar. In early times there
existed a sort of personal bondage (Knechtschaft), but in the sixteenth
century the mass of the peasants were free. The wide estates required a
large number of labourers, and the territorial lords found it to their in-
terest to attach the peasants to their estates by various favours, and so
put an end to the free movement and constant change of dwelling which
their old nomadic impulse still prompted. But the peasants did not be-
come serfs until the financial and military needs of the State bound them
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did the freedom of peasants, in the seventeenth century, suffer so se-
verely as in Russia. Serfs (Knechte) and peasants were involved in a
common servitude, which put their persons and property almost entirely
at the disposal of their lord. But in Russia, too, the new age brought
alleviation, and in our days enfranchisement. The work of emancipation
carried out by the Czar Alexander II, by the law of February 19, 1861,
in spite of the resistance of many nobles, was the beginning of a new
period of personal freedom in Russia.104
Thus Europe was gradually purified of the primeval curse of sla-
very. But it found a new soil, and in some respects a more vicious devel-
opment, in the new world. The American civil war of 1861 to 1865 was
the fearful retribution for this outrage upon the spirit of humanity.
Negro slavery was less objectionable in this respect—that the slave
was not like the slave of Greece and Rome, of the same white race as his
master, but of a black and naturally inferior race. But, on the other
hand, this difference encouraged the passion and arrogance of the white
master, who was not inclined or obliged to recognise a common human
nature in the negro: and hence, cruelty and abuse was more frequent and
violent than in antiquity. There is force in the bitter and scathing irony
with which Montesquieu (Esprit des Lois, xv. 5) touches the overbear-
ing contempt of the white master for the negro slave: ‘On ne pout se
mettre dans l‘esprit que Dieu, qui est un être trèssage, ait mis une âme,
surtout une âme bonne, darts un corps tout noir: . . . Il est impossible
que nous supposions que ces gens-là soient des hommes; parce que, si
nous les supposions des hommes, on commencerait à croire que nous ne
sommes pas nous-mêmes chrétiens.’
American slavery then was far harsher than European. Any care
and attention which the slaves received from their masters was of the
same kind as that which the peasant gives to his cattle. The denial of
their dignity as men, the disregard of marriage and the family, the ab-
sence of religious or moral education, unchecked traffic, often carried
on with the most revolting cruelty, combined to thrust them down, mor-
ally and legally, to the condition of domestic animals. It was a grievous
offence against all order, divine and human.
It was a misfortune for America that Jefferson did not carry his
proposal to add to the Declaration of Independence of July 4, 1776, in
which freedom is declared to be an inalienable right of man, a protest
against the admission and encouragement of negro slavery by the royal
government. The original idea of a gradual removal of slavery was too152/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
feebly supported to overcome the effort of the slaveholders to protect
and extend their property.
The free States could hardly maintain their balance in the federal
government against the slave-holding States. In the course of a century
the slave population had increased from several hundred thousand to
several millions. The rapid development in the cultivation of cotton and
sugar-cane had a disastrous influence in this direction.
Meanwhile the idea of the abolition of slavery passed from Europe
to America. England here set the example, and on a large scale. Inter-
ested motives may have had a share in this, as in all human movements,
but the cause was a just and sacred one; and William Wilberforce, the
man who first devoted his life to it and maintained it with energy and
success, in and out of Parliament, was inspired by the greatness of his
cause. In spite of all mistakes in detail, the abolition of slavery in the
English colonies, the compensation to the so-called owners, and the in-
ternational treaties made for the suppression of the slave-trade, were
acts of high service to mankind.
The victory of the Union over the slave-holding Confederate States
of the South at once determined the abolition of negro slavery in North
America. The Union no longer tolerates slavery within the limits of its
authority (Constitutional Amendment of Dec. 18, 1865). Indirectly this
decides the question for the whole continent, for South America cannot
long refuse to recognise the same principle. In fact, slavery has already
been abolished in Brazil by a law of September 28, 1871.
So far only the personal freedom and private rights of the coloured
races have been recognized. The difficult problem the of the political
rights and position of the negro has yet to be solved. At present North
America seems disposed to give the negro full political rights, but it is
doubtful how long this will last. Political rights presuppose political
capacity.
Is representative democracy, which hitherto has only succeeded
among politically developed peoples, the natural form of government
for masses of negroes? Are they capable of worthily maintaining and
bravely defending a democratic constitution, which demands a rare self-
control and manly energy? Those who best know human nature and
political history will hardly dare to say yes.
However, the following general principles may be recognised as
following from the principle of the State, as founded on humanity (das
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(1) It is the right and the duty of a State to sweep away any remains
of personal slavery which exist in its territory. In so doing it is removing
injustice.
(2) The State cannot tolerate any new introduction of slavery, even
if a man wishes to make himself a slave.
(3) The State rightly refuses legal protection to a foreigner if he
wishes to pursue his property in his slave within its territory.105
(4) Slaves who tread on a free soil are ipso facto free, and can claim
the protection of the courts for this freedom.Chapter XVII: Principle of Modern Classes
The privileged classes (Stände) of the middle ages are everywhere bro-
ken up. The clergy have lost the position which their claim to divine
dignity once gave them, and have generally ceased to be a separate po-
litical order. Their prelates are merged in the aristocracy, the rest form
part of the upper citizen class. A glance at recent history will show how
completely the medieval Nobility (Adel), higher and lower, is disorga-
nized, and how little adapted to hold an independent position as a privi-
leged order. The Citizen class has lost its old character of a compact
order: the educated classes occupy a very different place in modern rep-
resentative States. Even the Peasant class, with its quiet and strong at-
tachment to traditional ideas and customs, is drawn into the movement
of the age and affected by its progress. Industry, too, has established
itself in the country, and has disturbed the simple peasant life. Hitherto
all attempts to reform the mediaeval classes and rest the State upon
them have utterly failed. The national instinct distrusts them, the na-
tions feel that they have outgrown the medieval organization, and do not
wish to see it restored, even in a revised form.
Still it is plain that the differences which undeniably exist between
masses of the people have a real political significance, and that a mere
fusion of all estates is unsatisfactory. If we wish to give these differ-
ences a place in a constitution we must substitute Classes for Estates.
Indeed what we still call Estates106 (Stände) are often not really estates,
but Classes (Classen).
The difference between them is this. Classes start with the State and
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suppose the unity of the nation, Estates ignore it. Classes are a political
institution based on national unity and public law (eine nationale und
statsrechtliche Instutation), Estates are groups formed on the basis of
individual and private rights (eine particulaire und privatrechtliche
Gruppirung), and their object is not exclusively or primarily political.
The Clergy put the Church before the State: the Nobility think first of
themselves and their own social interests, the Citizen lives for his busi-
ness, the Peasant for his husbandry. Thus in the Estates we see the bond
of common education and common way of life: the division between the
groups is a professional one, while the State is only indirectly consid-
ered.
Estates are a natural growth: Classes are a phenomenon of civilised
society, the national product of the organizing power of political wis-
dom. Hence we only find Classes in civilized nations with a developed
political sense: among the Greeks, especially at Athens, after the Solo-
nian constitution in Rome, after the Servian constitution, to which we
owe the name ‘Class’; and among the States of modern Europe.
There is no reason why existing estates (Stände) should not be con-
sidered in the formation of classes, but it is neither necessary nor desir-
able that classes and estates should coincide. If they do, the estates will
determine the ordering of the State, as they did partially in the middle
ages, and the inevitable result is that the estates become close, and the
State is divided. The interests and prejudices of particular estates, backed
by political power, will easily overbear the general interests of the na-
tion and its best thought. On the other hand, where there is a cross
division, so that each class is composed of members of different estates,
national life becomes more social, and politics gain a more varied stimulus
and a higher tone.
Classes have very often been formed on the basis of property. In
these constitutions, by census (Censusverfassung), property becomes
the determining political force, and citizens are valued by the amount of
their income This arrangement seldom corresponds to facts, and its prin-
ciple belongs rather to economics and private law than to public law
and politics. A mere mathematical principle of this kind is not to be
compared with an organic division which looks first to the differences in
political fitness and capacity, so far as it is possible to see and measure
them. But to do this is no easy task. Speaking generally, four main Classes
may be distinguished in the modern State:
(1) The Governing Class: princes and officials, with public author-156/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
ity, which gives them a superior position to all other Classes, at the head
of the State.
(2) The Aristocratic Class, which does not govern as such, but oc-
cupies an independent and distinguished position between the Govern-
ing Class and the nation at large.
(3) The so-called ‘Third Estate,’ i.e., the class of educated and free
citizens in town and country: the Middle Class proper.
(4) The People (die grosser Volksclassen), or the Fourth Estate,
including the lower class of citizens in the towns, as well as the peas-
ants: the great mass of the ‘working classes.’
The Governing Class form the apex of the State, the People are its
base: the energy and solid strength of a nation depend mainly on healthy
relations between these two classes. The two intermediate classes com-
plete, while they limit the action of the first class: modifying it with the
influencess of aristocracy and representative democracy. Their higher
education and more favoured social conditions give them the capacity,
as their lofty feeling for law and freedom prompt them, to watch over
the conditions of the general national welfare. They are the natural guard-
ians, leaders, and representatives of the lowest and largest class.Chapter XVIII: Survey Of Modern Classes
The Governing Class of to-day is historically connected through its
princes with the earlier Nobility, though it c has now risen above them
to a sovereign position in the State.
The subordinate members of the class, officials and functionaries,
and in republics the highest officials of all, spring chiefly from the two
middle classes, and are socially connected with them: or if their parents
belong to the great lower class, their superior education and profession
put them socially on a level with the aristocracy or upper middle class,
and they retain this position when they resign or lose their office. The
authority of their office raises them above their neighbours. The lowest
posts and offices reach down into the lowest class of all, that of the
uneducated masses.
The Aristocracy no longer form a close estate with special rights.
Socially and legally they are connected with the other classes by the
common rights of citizenship and essential equality, both in public and
private law. Distinguished men from the lower classes from time to time
raise themselves and their families to the social level of the aristocracy,
and are gradually recognised as belonging to it. Still oftener, members
of the aristocracy or their descendants lose the conditions which make
their position possible, and are obliged to drop from the sunny heights
of aristocratic life to the lower levels of society. It is impossible to ac-
quire the appearance or attributes of aristocracy without property, or
liberal profession, or higher education. Hence the class is essentially a
shifting one, exposed to constant changes by the ebb and flow of its
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with the upper and educated citizen class; and facilitates intermarriage
with the classes below it.
The transformation of the mediaeval nobility into the modern aris-
tocracy was first and slowly accomplished in England amid an aristo-
cratic people. On the continent the debris of the feudal nobility occa-
sionally obstruct the path of public life: but as yet the new aristocracy
only occupies a doubtful and disputed position. The influence of aris-
tocracy is visible in society, in the manners of courts, and in nomina-
tions to higher offices, but has as yet no recognised place in the legal
and political consciousness of European peoples.
The German Empire ought to supply this want by a timely reform,
which should follow on the lines suggested by the progress of history.
Aristocracy can no longer be an exclusive or a sovereign order. Its place
is that of a mediator softening the violence of authority, controlling the
passions of the masses, and giving a higher tone to public life.
The educated citizen class (gebildetes Bürgerthum) or the Third
Estate.
The history of the French Revolution throws a clear light on the
character of this class. The term ‘third estate’ (tiers état) in France was
borrowed from the organization of the feudal State, where it denoted the
Citizens summoned to the States General, and there occupying a modest
and humble position below the aristocratic estates of clergy and nobil-
ity.
The Abbe Sieves, whose famous pamphlet on the third estate brought
light and fire to the revolution, asked and answered two questions: first,
What is the third estate?—Everything; second, What has the third estate
been hitherto?—Nothing. Both answers are extravagant, but the first,
by exaggerating the claims of the third estate, makes the very concep-
tion of it impossible. If it is really everything, there can be no first or
second or fourth estate. It ceases then to be an estate or separate class,
and is identical with the whole nation.
In the first French Revolution the third estate did actually demand
that the two first estates, the clergy and nobility, should unite with them
in a single National Assembly.107 When this was accomplished, the third
estate absorbed the rest, and as the one and equal nation (das eine und
gleiche ständelose Volk) destroyed the entire organization of the State.
But in spite of their theories of equality, the natural differences among
the people made themselves felt. The clergy and nobles were merged in
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cuted orders and fell a bloody sacrifice to the Revolution. But the Gov-
ernment was still a chaos fermenting with new divisions: the fourth es-
tate sprang into power and produced the leaders of the Convention, whose
red rule made the power of the Gironde and the third estate grow pale.
Thus the Revolution, which sought to prove the truth of Sieyès’ words,
only showed how false and inadequate they were.108 The third estate had
identified itself with the people, and posed as its representative. It had to
learn that there were great masses outside it who were not content to be
merged in one general body under its guidance.
The same opposition between the educated bourgeois class and the
lower classes of the people came out most clearly in the French Revolu-
tion of 1848 and the Napoleonic Restoration of 1850, and again took a
grim form in the Commune of 1871. Napoleon III, resting on the sup-
port of the fourth estate, had forcibly overthrown the third estate which
had a large majority in the National Assembly. Then, after his defeat at
Sedan, he was dethroned by a general rising of the masses; but the fourth
estate soon snatched the power from the bourgeois class in Paris, and
established the Commune.
The same opposition was seen in Germany at the time of the Peas-
ants’ War. But happily for Germany the antagonism has, in recent times,
been less sharp and hostile there than in Paris: though It is not without
influence both in the town and country population; in the latter, more in
questions of religion and the relation of the uneducated masses to the
authorities of the Church, in the former in economical and social ques-
tions.
This citizen class, though historically connected with the an third
estate of the middle ages, cannot properly bear this name; it is no longer
a rigid exclusive estate with special rights. Like the aristocracy it is a
fluid body, whose members continually come and go. But the more edu-
cated citizens, the ‘educated classes’ (die Gebildeten), are still essen-
tially distinct, both from the aristocracy and from the people, and the
distinction affects the constitution, and still more the policy and admin-
istration of the State. They differ from the aristocracy in this, that they
make no special claim to a position of authority, and therefore demand
no peculiar privileges, either of title or rank, or of representation in an
Upper House or a first chamber. Their education is of a civil character,
their social and political status rests on the basis of common nationality
and common rights, so that they naturally share in popular representa-
tion. They are raised above the more numerous classes of the people by160/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
superiority in scientific or artistic training, by social refinement and the
practice of liberal professions; they work with the brain rather than the
hands, and devote themselves less to the material needs of life than to its
higher intellectual efforts.
They form a popular class (Volksstand), but rise above the mass of
the people: like the aristocracy, they are an intermediate estate
(Mittelstand), but they are nearer to the class below them, and they
receive constant accessions from it. In England ‘gentlemen’ come under
this head, but are a narrower and more select class than that of the upper
citizen class (das höhere Bürgerthum) in Germany, France and Italy.
Under this head come the following classes of the population:—
1. Government officials (Statsbeamte), excepting the highest, who
belong to the first, or governing class, and the lower grades, of mere
clerks and servants.
2. The Clergy, and the Teaching Class generally.
3. Lawyers, physicians and chemists, students, and men of letters.
4. Artists, engineers, and members of the higher technical profes-
sions.
5. Merchants and manufacturers.
6. The highest class of handicraftsmen.
7. Capitalists (Rentiers).
8. Great landowners, not belonging to the aristocracy.
Higher education, though not necessarily that of an University or
Polytechnic, is an essential attribute of this class, and it generally im-
plies an amount of means sufficient to allow leisure for public affairs.
Election to government offices, as a rule, presupposes an University
education: and the superior fitness of this class to take part in the work
of representative bodies generally gives them, in the absence of special
laws against it, a preponderance in national assemblies and legislative
chambers.
This class, as a rule, is the most influential in the life of the State: it
takes the lead in public affairs, and determines public opinion. Though
its membership is determined by education, property, and profession,
without regard to birth, it may fitly be compared with the old class of
Freemen  (Vollfreie) or the mediaeval class of the Mittelfreie. Like them
it forms the main body of those who possess political rights, and holds a
prominent place in public offices.
The great popular classes (die grosser Volksclassen), the ‘fourth
estate,’ and the proletariate. In this class we include the great mass ofThe Theory of the State/161
the people who do not belong to the three upper classes, ‘the people,’ as
we sometimes call them. It includes men of the most varied occupations
and conditions of life, but all connected by the tie of common country
and nationality, and above all, common rights as citizens
(Statsbürgerrecht). It comprises the following groups, occupying vari-
ous places in the economy of the State:—
(a) The mass of peasants who work by themselves or with their
servants, ploughing, mowing, gathering crops, tending vines or cattle.
They form the largest and most vigorous element in this class, and are a
great source of national strength, from which the other classes draw
new life and vigour.
(b) Herdsmen, fishermen, seamen, and miners, and generally all
labourers whose work brings them into immediate contact with nature.
(c) The lower citizen class (der niedere Bürgerstand), both in town
and country, including first the small master artisans with their men,
and small tradesmen, but also the lower industrial classes, whether they
work in their own homes, at hand-looms for instance, or in factories.
(d) The lower employees of the State, or of professional men; pri-
vates in the army, clerks, etc.
(e) The ‘proletariate,’ consisting of the lowest class of servants and
day-labourers.
All these groups have this much in common, that they are engaged
in bodily labour and in the supply of material wants. It is of course
impossible to draw a hard and fast line between brain-work and hand-
work, for, as a rule, each is impotent without the other. But the distinc-
tion is a sound and intelligible one. Brain-work requires a higher intel-
lectual training, and a higher standard of life. Mechanical work is pos-
sible with a minimum of education, and a simple and rudimentary way
of life. Hence they naturally fall into different classes.
A further characteristic of the fourth class is that, while they form
the necessary substratum of all States, and of national life generally,
they have no capacity for government. Hence they need leaders and
representatives. As a rule they express the passive and subordinate ele-
ment in the social body, but when their passions are roused to revolt,
nothing can resist the force with which they overturn the existing order
and make their will law. They are strong enough to change a govern-
ment or to extort a constitution: they can overturn a throne and entrust
the power to new men or new dynasties, but they have no capacity for
government; for them to govern is for the pyramid to stand on its apex.162/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
This class has never yet had such an importance in political life as
in the European States of the present day. For the first time the serving
classes (die dienenden Classen), in the narrow sense of the word, have
become free men: even the lowest class feel that they have a share in the
well-being of the State, and a claim to political rights. The statesman of
to-day is forced, by circumstances, to pay special attention to the condi-
tion of this fourth estate. It is not enough now to hear and consider the
public opinion of the educated classes: the masses, with their instincts
and passions, have gained in influence. The modern State—speaking
primarily of the European, that is, of the Aryan nations—has, in this
sense, become more widely human.
But the fourth class is so wide that it includes large groups of differ-
ent occupation and grades of life. It unites in it the strongest and weak-
est elements in the political body. It is essential to the safety and the
maintenance of the State, but it is constantly threatening its very exist-
ence. Its soundest part is to be found in the peasant-class, but even they
need to be quickened by some relit intellectual movement if public order
is to be saved from destruction. Next to them come the lower citizen
class (Kleinbürger). Both still retain the communal organisation. But
this is not enough for the needs of the crowded masses of citizens in the
towns, and other social bonds have been broken. The old organization,
which united master craftsmen with one another and their journeymen,
has perished. The old system has decayed, and has left whole classes,
especially the workmen in factories, unorganised. The voluntary asso-
ciations and trades-unions of workmen are the first germ of a new orga-
nization. Society suffers from this disorganization: community of inter-
ests, of education and of spirit among the different classes of labour, if
not annihilated, is certainly disturbed, and the general ferment tends to
an aimless war of every man against his neighbour. Measures of police
are useless: they may check or suppress the evil in particular cases, but
they often aggravate it by applying an irritating treatment where reme-
dial measures are needed. It is not surprising that atheism eland commu-
nism have found a fruitful soil in the lower strata of the fourth estate,
and that in most large towns, and I even in some parts of the country, the
rank weeds threaten to choke the nobler growths of the past.
The Proletariate form the lowest grade of the fourth class. It must
not be identified with it, or organised as a class or order. The business of
the statesman is rather to merge it, as far as possible, in the other classes,
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waste (Abfälle) of other classes, of those fractions of the population
who, by their isolation and their poverty, have no place in the estab-
lished order of society.
It is false and politically dangerous to divide the inhabitants of a
State by a fixed line into ‘those who halve’ and ‘those who have not,’
and to sum up the latter as the proletariate, and set them in opposition to
the former. If this inorganic view, which has been too much encouraged,
were to spread and become dominant, it would involve the destruction
of civilised society by a new wave of barbarism. Happily, the majority
of those who have not are still in organic connection with the other
classes, and find satisfaction in this. Children without property are not
part of the proletariate, because they find support and education in the
family, and share the position of their parents. Even orphans find family
life in the organization of the parish.
Again, the mass of farm servants, male and female, who have no
property cannot be included in the proletariate, because they do not
stand alone in the world, but find a home in the farm or family of the
peasant, and share in the life of his class. When handicrafts were better
organized, the journeyman was a member of his master’s family, and
even now that this tie is dissolved, the sense of belonging to the artisan
class lifts him above the proletariate. Even domestic servants
(Dienstboten) live in a position of some comfort, and have some share
in the life of their masters. The occupation of a soldier supplies him
with pay and honour.
The most dangerous feature is the disorganized condition of the
common labourer: it is in this class that the mass of the proletariate has
grown to such large and threatening proportions. The true art of the
statesman will lie, on the one hand, in trying to prevent members of the
organised classes of labour from falling into the unorganized proletari-
ate; and on the other, in assisting as many as possible to rise from the
proletariate into the organised class, where they can obtain a compara-
tively secure subsistence. The proletariate thus narrowed would need
not an independent organization, for which it is unfit, but a body of
guardians (Patronat), which should defend its interests and act and speak
on its behalf.
The fourth class has not the capacity to fill the offices of: the State,
but its better members are capable of holding, municipal offices, and
cannot be excluded from them. It ought to have a share in the represen-
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with their superior education and greater leisure, do not, as they do,
completely deprive them of this. But as the members of this class often
have neither leisure nor ability to represent their interests in person, they
must be able to elect representatives from beyond their own class. Fi-
nally, the importance of this class entitles it to a vote: but where the
social importance and capacity of the individuals composing it is so
various, it is unjust to give equal power to all.
The real interests of the proletariate proper demand Patrons (Patrone,
Schutzherren, Mundherren) rather than representatives, which it can-
not find in its own ranks. The higher the position and influence of the
‘patron,’ the more effective would be the defence of the rights of the
proletariate.Chapter XIX: The Relation of the State to the
Family
I. The Tribal State—Patriarchal Government—Marriage
Ancients and moderns alike have found in the family the pattern of the
State.109 The State, they say, is an extension of the family, the head of
the State being the father, the people his children.
This comparison is only true in a limited sense; it only applies to the
patriarchal State, not to the higher forms of the State, which are based
on nationality or humanity. It is necessary then to point out the radical
differences which distinguish the State from the family.
1. The family is based upon marriage. Its members are united by the
marriage tie or by blood. But these conceptions which are essential to
the family are by no means essential to the State. The members of a
State, as such, are not connected by marriage or blood. They have not
always the right of intermarriage, still less do they share a common
descent. The fundamental rights of the family are then independent of
the State.110
2. The State is based on the organization of the nation and its rela-
tion to the soil. But these ideas find no place in the family. The State
consists rather of individuals, or orders, or classes, than of families, and
only exceptionally approaches its members through the family, only in-
terfering in family life when there is a special demand for it, and in the
case of guardianship. Lastly, the family has no connection with the soil.
3. The two organizations differ in character. The head of the family
is the father, whose authority is the care of a grown man for the defence
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(Vormundschaft). In the nation the different classes have interests apart
from those of the prince their head; their families are not connected with
his, nor are their individual members his children or his wards. The
government of the State is political. Hence the family is not a pattern of
the State, but only of one particular form of it, the patriarchal.111 Family
law therefore belongs to private, not to public law.
But even in the Aryan nations the beginnings of the State are con-
nected with the bond of the family and the tribe. It was here that the first
leaders, judges and magistrates found the necessary support for their
authority: and it was only gradually that a political order arose which
outgrew these limits. The tribal-constitution (Geschlechterverfassung)
served as a bridge between the family and the State, and fell away as
soon as the State was assured. Among most ancient peoples, in the Mosaic
constitution as well as in those of Greece and Rome, we find tribes with
a political meaning, which afterwards disappear. The filial respect of
the Arabian tribes for their chiefs finds its parallel in the Scotch clans.
The old German names of villages point to the settlement of tribal com-
munities,112  and the old Slavonic community is also based on the fam-
ily.
The tribe differs from the family in being extended to include sev-
eral groups of blood-relations (Sippschaffen), but its organization fol-
lows that of the family. The chiefs of the tribe are generally marked out
by their high position in the family, but the need for unity limits the
headship of the tribe to a single head of a family, and it may happen that
choice or election takes the place of hereditary right.
The only State strictly modelled on the family is the patriarchal
State (die Patriarchie). The Chinese Empire of ‘the mean,’ or of perfec-
tion, has held fast for centuries to the fiction that the head of the State is
father of his people. Gobineau, who has shown grounds for believing
that the State was first founded by Aryans, ascribes the patriarchal idea
to their suggestion. But the vast mass of the population of this great
empire, which has been gradually united in one family, is of a Malay
stock, a yellow race, modified by darker elements. This population, which
is naturally inclined to an easy material existence, willingly acquiesces
in the paternal absolutism of its rulers, and honours the traditional order
of the State as a divine civilization. It is not stirred by the sturdy sense
of freedom which is inborn in the Aryan nations, and it has no aspira-
tions. The authority of the Emperor is in theory absolute, but is in fact
limited in many ways by the quiet spirit of all classes of the people, byThe Theory of the State/167
the scholastic learning of the mandarins, and, above all, by the force of
hereditary family usage. ‘Le Fils du ciel peut tout, mais à condition de
ne vouloir que ce qui est connu et tradititionel;‘ (Gobineau). But a
vigorous political development is impossible where the State and its
members are kept in a perpetual childhood.
The influence of family life on the well-being of the State is a very
different question. Its influence, though mainly indirect, is wide-reach-
ing, and can hardly be estimated too highly. Hence the State is not only
bound to defend family law as a part of private law, but has a special
interest in advancing and maintaining the welfare of family life. As the
family is not a political institution, the power of the State is small, and
mainly indirect: but there are some relations in which it can and ought to
limit individual caprice.
All the more advanced nations attach cardinal importance to Mo-
nogamy. Polyandry confuses descent: polygamy produces discord. The
full unity of marriage, the complete reconcilement of the sexes, can only
be realised in monogamy. Nature and the moral ideal alike demand it.
When the Gallic bishops were zealous against the bigamy of the
Merovingians, and did not yield till the latter resigned this ancient privi-
lege of Teutonic kings, they were defending not merely a Christian, but
also a political principle. Monogamy raises the wife to a full society
with her husband, and so gives her an ennobling influence on him. Po-
lygamy degrades the wife, and her degradation reacts on the husband
and debases him. Monogamy is one of the advantages of European and
Christian peoples: polygamy is the hereditary curse of the East.
The legal relations of husband and wife are a matter of great impor-
tance. Here Roman law fell short of the Roman ideal of marriage.
While the Romans regarded marriage as a complete and intimate
union for life,113 their older law treated the wife as a daughter, no less
absolutely in the power of her husband [conventio in manum] than the
son in that of his father, and the slave in that of his master: while the
later law resolved the union into a mere connection of too independent
persons. This ‘free’ form of marriage [sine conventione in manum] be-
came more frequent as Roman morals grew more corrupt, and helped
forward the decay of the Republic.
German law, on the other hand, both in its older form, where man
and wife retain their own property, while the unity and community of
marriage finds legal expression in the guardianship of the husband, and
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so nobly expressed in the Jewish Scriptures: ‘And they shall be one
flesh:’114 and ‘The husband is the head of the wife.’115
Even the outward forms of marriage are not indifferent. A form
which emphasises the intimacy and sanctity of the relation is to be pre-
ferred to one which treats it as the arbitrary result of a mere agreement.
The old Roman principle that ‘consensus facit nuptias’ is dangerous
because it leads to the idea that marriage is a merely conventional rela-
tion: and hence it is only natural that the customs of many peoples de-
mand a religious ceremony, and the usage of the Christian Church lays
stress on this. But, further, the legal security of the family, which is of
the utmost importance, is incompatible with a secret marriage, and is
only satisfied by a public form with documentary evidence. The ‘civil
form’ satisfies these conditions. Had not the ecclesiastical form been
abused by the clergy to interfere with the freedom of marriage recognised
by the State, and to make legislation dependent on the views of the
Church, modern States might have rested satisfied with it. But these
abuses and the existing diversity of religious opinion, have made a purely
civil form necessary. A twofold form is now in use.
(1) The civil marriage before the officers of the State, which is nec-
essary to make a marriage valid.
(2) The subsequent ecclesiastical ceremony, conducted by a clergy-
man, which gives a religious sanction to the marriage. This is voluntary.
The emperor Augustus made an attempt to encourage marriage and
population by law. Such measures could only be necessary in an un-
healthy and abnormal condition of the people. The life of large towns is
apt to be unfavourable to marriage, and in Rome the liberty of bequest
acted as an additional check, since a rich man who was unmarried could
be sure of being cared for in his old age by the servile complaisance of
greedy relatives and friends. Augustus might well say: ‘It is not houses,
or colonnades, or marketplaces which make a city, but its men.... If you
persist, Rome will become the prey of Greeks or barbarians.’116
But in the country, too, we find legal restrictions with a view to
maintaining peasants’ holdings, and to prevent the partition of estates.
Thus in many places only two children inherit (Zweikindersystem), in
others all but the eldest son (her Erbsohn) are regarded as farm-ser-
vants, or sent abroad. The means which the State can use to encourage
marriage and population are limited, and in any case, as Augustus found,
are unpalatable. Marriage cannot be directly enforced, because the free-
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of the State, where public interest may make a marriage very desirable,
the will of the State has to give way rather than encroach upon indi-
vidual rights or violate human freedom. Queen Victoria successfully
maintained the freedom of the monarch in this respect against urgent
political considerations. The State can only act indirectly, by attaching
privileges to marriage, and disadvantages to celibacy, without treating
the latter as a crone; and this was the method adopted by Roman legis-
lation.
In modern States, on the other hand, it is more common to find
restraints put upon marriage in the interest of public welfare.117 Such
Laws are prompted by an unsound condition of society, especially by
the evil of classes without property or occupation. The community may
then demand, in its own interest, that those who wish to marry and
found new families should prove that they can support a family without
burdening the public. But to go beyond this, and make marriage condi-
tional on the arbitrary consent of the State, is an unjustifiable infringe-
ment of individual rights. Further, legal restrictions on marriage rather
promote than hinder the birth of illegitimate children, and so increase
the number of the ill-fed and ill-cared-for population. The foundation of
a family and the help of the wife exert a moralising influence on the
husband, and may even be economically advantageous: and therefore,
as a rule, freedom of marriage is to be recommended. If the laws have in
view the good of all, they must make it possible for the poor man to
choose a mate in his poverty and a legitimate mother for his children.
The State cannot properly interfere with the private relations of
man and wife.118 But it can and ought to punish breaches of conjugal
fidelity, on the complaint of the injured party: and so defend the purity
of marriage.
Community of wives, as proposed by Plato for the guardians of his
ideal State, degrades marriage and destroys the family. The prostitution
of the wife, practiced in some cases at Sparta, is a relic of barbarism.
But the ‘emancipation of the flesh,’ advocated by the radical-socialist
school, as a progress in the freedom of the individual, is a degradation
of the moral freedom of man to the sensual freedom of dogs.
Lastly, the State’s provision for permanence of marriage and limi-
tation of divorce must be mentioned.
Even in pre-Christian times dissolution of the tie was not always
left to the will of the individual man and wife. Many legal systems al-
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to show sufficient reason, and, as we see in the old Teutonic laws, in-
curred serious disabilities if he could not. The wife, on the other hand,
could not dissolve the marriage. These regulations, confirmed by cus-
tom, express the public regard for marriage as a union for life. It was a
distinct breach in this conception when Rome, adopting the Athenian
view, made free marriage dissoluble at the notice of either party (nuntium
mittere uxori, s. marito). This was in great measure a result of the de-
cay of morals at Rome, and again reacted on it.
Christianity introduced a new and more complete law on this ques-
tion. The words of Christ himself against divorce were so emphatic
that,119 though they did not definitely create a new law or alter the old,
they indirectly moulded the legal conceptions of Christian States. The
Catholic Church developed a rigorous system of marriage law, and in
spite of Christ’s express recognition of adultery as a ground for divorce,
in time came to forbid complete divorce altogether, and only to allow
outward divorce (separatio a toro et mensa), and that on few and grave
grounds. The mediaeval Christian States so far adopted this view that
they allowed questions of divorce to be treated entirely before ecclesias-
tical tribunals. In more recent times the State has rightly resumed the
treatment of these questions, and the Protestant Church has admitted
divorce on ground of adultery or equivalent reasons. Finally, in defer-
ence partly to modern ideas of natural rights, partly in the interest of
individual freedom, modern legislation has extended the grounds of di-
vorce, and made it easier.
But two principles have been generally retained:—
(1) That marriage may not be dissolved merely by the will of one
party, or the agreement of both, but only with the intervention and sanc-
tion of a court of law.
(2) That this sanction must not be given without sufficient reason.
The Church, speaking to the moral and spiritual nature of man, is
the proper advocate of the principle of indissolubility which the ideal of
marriage demands. The State, as concerned with external compulsion,
is bound to consider the imperfections of actual conditions, and to per-
mit the outward dissolution of marriages which have no inward unity or
cohesion. But, so far as national customs and individual development
allow, it ought still to retain the principle of indissoluble marriage as an
ideal, and to subject divorce to a rigorous control.Chapter XX: The Relation of the State to the
Family
II. The Position of Women
Hitherto all nations have regarded women as belonging to the same people
and nation as their husband or father, but as only indirectly connected
with the State, not as full members of the State with full rights
(vollberechtigte Statsglieder und Statsgenossen). But the modern pe-
riod has given birth to a different view. As early as the French Revolu-
tion of 1789, a women’s petition to the king demanded that political
rights should be granted to women. The petition, though supported by
Condorcet, was rejected with scorn by the National Assembly. In our
own time the same demand has been advocated in different countries,
and especially by John Stuart Mill both in his writings120 and in Parlia-
ment. In France, Édouard Laboulaye121 has spoken on the same side. In
some States of America attempts have been made to give women a share
in political rights and duties.122
The main reasons alleged by Mill for the direct participation of
women in the State are:—
(a) Women have the same right as men to be well governed, and
good government is the object of representation.
But children have a natural right to be well governed, that is, to be
protected by the State; but no one argues that they must therefore have
a vote. The right to be well governed does not involve the right to take
part in or to control the government: the former is a purely passive right,
the latter presupposes personal capacity.
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which ought to be removed. In private law women were at first limited
in their acts, and regarded as wards of their husbands, but when it was
recognized that women could manage their own property, this tutelage
was abolished, and the sexes put on an equality. On the other hand, in
public law, the difference is maintained. We require women to pay taxes
with men, and refuse them the right of giving their assent to them or of
controlling their expenditure. It is unjust to deny here the capacity which
we have admitted elsewhere, and to prevent the extension of an equality,
which has proved beneficial in private life, to the field of public affairs.
(c) There is a further inconsistency in our present laws. Many na-
tions which deny all political rights to women, occasionally bestow the
supreme power of government upon a queen.
This does not apply to Greece and Rome. Heliogabalus introduced
his mother into the senate, but so shocked Roman ideas, that after their
death a decree of the senate was passed devoting to the gods below any
one who should introduce a woman into the senate.123 Most Teutonic
nations confined the monarchy to males. Tacitus (Agricola 16) men-
tions, as a peculiarity of the Britons, that they admit female rule [neque
enim sexum in imperiis discernunt].124 The Lombards too often allowed
succession to the monarchy through the female line. In more modern
States women have frequently sat on the throne, and the last few centu-
ries have seen female rulers in England, Austria, Russia, Spain, Portu-
gal, and elsewhere, under various forms of government.
Why this strange exception? It might seem more natural for a woman
to hold a subordinate office in the State than to be its queen. It can only
be explained on the ground that the position of the head of the State has
been treated as family property, and a woman has been allowed the
same right of succession to the throne as to the estates of her father. The
land of the estate was treated as a domain (Allod or Lehensgut), subject
to the same principles of inheritance. This right had its origin in antiq-
uity, and was afterwards extended: and many modern States which have
outgrown the idea of the feudal state, and in other matters draw a sharp
distinction between private and public law, still retain this relic of the
old system, which attaches more weight to the family tie of blood than
to the nature of the State and the vocation of woman.125
(d) As most women live in a family, they would as a fact generally
go with the head of the family: the wife would vote with her husband,
the daughters with their father. Thus the political importance of the heads
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ened as against the less organised constituents of the State.
(e) The influence of women on politics is inevitable, but at present it
is mainly indirect and irresponsible. If it once found a recognized chan-
nel, it would act with greater moderation and sense of responsibility.
Perhaps the last argument is the strongest: but still stronger argu-
ments may be urged on the other side.
(a) The consensus of usage in all civilised nations is a presumptive
argument against a change, which runs counter to the permanent condi-
tions and feelings of mankind.
(b) The nature of woman. Her proper sphere is the life of the family,
for which she would be unfitted by mixing largely in public duties and
political struggles. Womanly virtues would suffer,—woman’s love as
mother and wife, her housewifely skill, her fine sensibility and sweet-
ness of character,—and there would be no gain in political capacity to
make good the loss.
(c) The manly character of the State. The State, as the nation, con-
sciously determining and governing itself, cannot afford to weaken its
manly character by the admixture of feminine weakness and suscepti-
bility.
(d) The great danger, that political struggles would become more
passionate and less amenable to the guidance of reason. The State would
suffer if its passive elements were thus increased, and the active dimin-
ished.
Hence, while we may tolerate such exceptions as female succession
to the throne, which in favourable circumstances and in a civilised country
may do no harm, it would be disastrous to bestow political rights on
women generally.
But if women are thus excluded from a direct share in public af-
fairs, their indirect influence on the public welfare is not to be despised.
Even here it easily degenerates if it is guided by political aims: it only
remains pure and wholesome when it is determined by moral or reli-
gious motives. Women who have been famous in politics have generally
done harm to the State and their friends. Their cleverness and acuteness
become dangerous intrigue: and when once the passions of political ha-
tred, revenge, and greed have been kindled in a woman’s breast, they
spread like wildfire. This is true not only of the mistresses of princes,
but of many wives and mothers notorious in history. The history of
Rome, the French Revolution, the courts of the French kings, all tell the
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On the other hand, statesmen have often owed much to that quieter
influence of women which no history records: they have found in their
homes the peace which compensated them for the turmoil of public life,
and strengthened them afresh for their duty. Woman’s gentleness has
softened their savage humours, her prudence and her sense of conduct
have kept them clear of extravagance and crime, and her courage has
saved them in time of need. For woman’s power is never so great or
helpful as in time of suffering and danger. More patient than man, she
can help him to bear suffering without being humiliated by it: her devo-
tion rouses him to sacrifice himself for his country, and her admiration
of his courage incites him to deserve it.
It is a fine feature in the public law of the Teutonic nations, that the
wife is regarded as sharing the political dignity of her husband. Thus
woman receives her true place in the organization of the State, and is
amply compensated for her exclusion from political rights.
Note—Riehl in his social-political study on ‘die Frauen’ (Deutsche
Vierteljahrsschrift, 1852), and in his book die Familie, among other
subtle observations, has rightly called attention to the difference in the
relation of the sexes in different classes. The manners and life of a peas-
ant woman are much more like those of the peasant, than those of the
woman of the upper middle class are like those of her husband; but on
the other hand, the former is subject to a severer domestic discipline.
But I object to Riehl’s attributing a distinctive party character to woman
and calling her a conservative. Women are only indirectly interested in
political parties, but they are interested in all. If we adopt Fr. Rohmer’s
division of parties into ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine,’ it is plain that liberal
and conservative will come under the former, radical and absolutist un-
der the latter.Chapter XXI: Relation of the State to Individuals
I. Natives and Aliens
Individuals are not only connected with the State as members of fami-
lies, estates and classes, but stand in immediate relation to it. Modern
political theory and modern constitutions have tended to emphasise this
direct relation. Hence we have to consider—
(1) The difference between Natives, or Members of the State or
Nation, and Foreigners.
(2) The difference between Citizens and other members of the na-
tion. We need not consider the different grades within the citizen body
till we discuss the constitution in detail. The first difference depends
mainly on race, and is primarily a personal one: considerations of domi-
cile are secondary. A man’s first connection is with the nation, his rela-
tion to the land is less essential.
The ancient view that a stranger has no rights, and must be treated
as a creature without rights, unless he is put under special protection,
though held by the Greeks and Romans,126 was a barbarous blot on
ancient civilization. The Teutonic principle was more humane, ‘Every
man after the law of his own nation’ (Jeder nach seinem angeborenenn
Volksrecht). Modern law recognises that the foreigner has rights, and
protects him accordingly.
1. But there are various answers to the question, who is to be re-
garded as a native, and how a man becomes a member of a nation.
Descent and domicile are the determining factors, but they may be com-
bined in different ways.
Nationality may be determined by—176/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
(a) Place of birth (Geburtsort). This is in the main the later medi-
eval view, and is still the principle of English law, which distinguishes
‘natural-born’ subjects from ‘aliens.’ Birth on an English ship or in an
English embassy is equivalent to birth in England. But the principle has
been so far modified that the children of Englishmen, born abroad, be-
come English citizens: and naturalization has become much easier.127
The law of the United States goes on the same principles.128
(b) Domicile.
This form of the territorial principle is more in keeping with modern
ideas, because it lays stress not on the casual place of birth, but on the
permanent domicile of the parents, and subsequently of the man him-
self. But here differences arise, according as settlement is made easy or
difficult. This was the principle partially followed by Austria in earlier
times and by individual German states.129 But there, too, it was modi-
fied by the forms of a personal grant of native rights.
(c) Midway between these comes the Swiss principle of member-
ship in the commune, which forms the basis of membership of the Can-
ton (Cantonsbürgerrecht), and of the Swiss confederation
(Schweizerbürgerrecht). The rights in the commune depend not on place
of birth or domicile, but on descent from parents who are citizens of the
commune, even though they live outside it.130 It is not unlike the old
Roman municipal law, which was also based on origio from a particu-
lar municipium.131
(d) Modern States, generally, recognise nationality as a personal
relation, not mainly dependent on place of birth or domicile, but on
descent from members of the nation and personal reception into its mem-
bership. Place of birth and domicile come in to complete the notion.
This, in the main, is the principle for France,132 Prussia,133 and the
German Empire.134 This system best corresponds to modern political
ideas, which regard the personal relation to the nation as the essential
germ of the conception of the State.
But the different systems tend to approach and supplement one an-
other. Descent birthplace, domicile and naturalization, and legitimation,
thus all combine, directly or indirectly, to constitute the qualification for
citizenship.
To sum up: Membership of a State is generally acquired by—
(1) Birth: in the case of legitimate children the father must be a
member of the State, in the case of illegitimate children, the mother.
This is the most general ground of State-membership. Foundlings be-The Theory of the State/177
long to the country in which they are found.
(2) Marriage: the foreign wife becomes a member of the family and
nation of her husband.
(3) Naturalisation; by which a foreigner, at his desire, is received as
a member of a State. But its conditions vary very much in different
countries, some encouraging, some discouraging immigration. In many
countries mere settlement in a permanent domicile, with or without no-
tification, is enough: elsewhere a special act of the administration or
even of the legislative is necessary. Sometimes appointment to State
offices carries citizenship with it, sometimes it does not. Many States
require that the foreigner should be expressly released from, or at least
should expressly resign his connection with the old State, others dis-
pense with this condition.
2. A person ceases to belong to a State by—
(1) Death. Most men remain their life long members of the State
into which they were born.
(2) Marriage. The wife who acquires the nationality of an alien
loses her former nationality.
(3) Discharge (Entlessung) from membership in nations. As this
membership is now generally regarded as a personal right (ein
persönliches Recht), it is not lost by mere settlement or even by perma-
nent residence in a foreign country. The tie is naturally severed by a
twofold act, an act of resignation of rights on the part of the individual,
and an act of discharge on the part of the State: this expresses the mu-
tual character of the tie. Most modern States, however, think it unwor-
thy for a State to hinder a man who wishes to resign his nationality, and
have recognised the principle of freedom of renunciation (freie
Verzichtleistung). In many cases, as for instance in emigration, where
there is no idea of returning, the act of the individual is construed as
implying renunciation.135
The English law, though it was among the first to accept the right of
free migration, continued to retain the feudal theory that the subject
cannot put off his allegiance without the consent of the prince, so that an
English subject does not cease to be such by mere emigration.136
French law treats naturalization in a foreign country, or entrance on
the service of a foreign government,137 without consent of the French, as
equivalent to emigration: this is going beyond the principle of resigna-
tion (Verzichtleistung), for a man may often connect himself with a for-
eign State without any desire to resign his connection with his own.178/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
However, in case of return to France, it is easy for him to recover
his rights.138
It is quite possible for one person to have the rights of a native
(Heimatsrechte) in two States at once,139 and modern conditions indeed
encourage this. In the rare case of a conflict of duties it may be hard to
reconcile them. It is not always a safe principle that the earlier right
should take precedence, especially where it is dormant, while the later
right is actual. In such cases the first duty, e.g., of military service, is to
the country in which a man is living.140
It naturally follows that the State which confers naturalisation on a
foreigner, or appoints him to an office, may either demand a renuncia-
tion of his old rights, or allow him to retain them.141
3. As the conditions of acquisition and loss of national rights differ
in different countries, a convict may arise either where two States both
claim a man as their subject and demand his service, or where both
refuse to receive him. To avoid conflicts of this kind a treaty was made
on Feb. 22nd, 1868, between the North-German Confederation and the
United States of America, at the instance of Bancroft, the American
Envoy. The treaty lays down that a naturalisation of five years’ dura-
tion, in either State, shall be recognised by both as terminating the pre-
vious relation. The same principle was adopted between England and
the United States in 1868, and has now been generally approved.
4. The consequences of membership in a State belong partly to pri-
vate, partly to public law. In private law the distinction between citizen
and alien used to be far more important than now. The spheres of pri-
vate and public law are now much more sharply distinguished, and hence
nationality, which is essentially a political idea, has no place in private
law. As a rule natives and aliens are alike regarded as both possessing
full rights in private law.142
The ancient principle that aliens can acquire no landed property is
now only exceptional.143 Restrictions on the exercise of certain handi-
crafts and of retail trade by aliens are more common.144
On the other hand, the Jus albinagii (Fremdlingsrecht) which made
the prince of a country heir to the property of aliens, and the tax levied
on inheritances which went abroad (Gabella hereditaria), have almost
everywhere been swept away, and so far freedom of migration
(Freizügigkeit) has been generally recognised.145
But in the sphere of public law the distinction between citizen and
alien remains in full force. The following rights, except in case of spe-The Theory of the State/179
cial grant, are confined to natives:—
(a) The right of permanent residence in the country.146 A native can-
not be handed over to a foreign State, or banished, without grave politi-
cal reasons.
(b) The right to the protection of his State, even if he is staying
abroad.
(c) The exercise of the franchise and of the rights of a full citizen.
(d) The right to hold a public office.147
(e) Sometimes such general political rights as those of association,
petition, or free publication.148 This does not mean that foreigners are
absolutely excluded from these rights, but that they only enjoy them on
sufferance.Chapter XXII: Relation of the State to Individuals
II. Citizens
The body of full citizens rise above the general mass of the members of
a country or nation. Full citizenship implies membership in the nation,
but, more than that, it implies complete political rights: it is thus the
fullest expression of the relation of the individual to the State.
Its conditions have varied from time to time: in ancient Greece and
Rome it depended on citizenship in the governing city, in the middle
ages on freedom (Volkfreiheit), and later on the rights of a privileged
class, and on landed property. In modern States it has often become
almost coextensive with membership in the nation (Volksgenossenschaft).
The following limitations are now generally recognised:—
1. Women are excluded (see above, Ch. XX).
2. Minors are excluded, on the ground that the exercise of political
rights demands mature judgment.
Some modern States fix the majority for political purposes at a
different age from that of private law. There is some reason for fixing it
later, for it is easier to judge clearly on ordinary matters than on politics.
In France, England, North America and Italy political and civil major-
ity are both fixed at twenty-one,149 and in some German States also,
e.g., Bavaria;150 in Prussia, the German Empire,151 Spain,152 and Portu-
gal,153 the qualification for a vote is twenty-five years, in Austria154
twenty-four. In Switzerland some cantons fix the political majority ear-
lier than the civil, generally at the completion of the twentieth year.155
3. Various persons are excluded whose civil status has been im-
paired or lost—e.g., criminals, declared spendthrifts, bankrupts, or per-The Theory of the State/181
sons in receipt of poor-relief.
Many States require further qualifications:—
4. A certain degree of outward independence, variously defined in
different States. In earlier German law the qualification was occupation
of land or separate household (‘a hearth of one’s own’): in recent Ger-
man law independent occupation and active membership in a commune.
The former view has prevailed in England156 and some States of North
America, the latter has found a place in modern German constitutions.157
It excludes all hired servants, often too the workers in factories, at least
the lower class of them, and most journeymen craftsmen. Other modern
States have moved in the direction of universal suffrage, and relaxed or
abolished this qualification. Such are the Swiss constitutions since 1830,
the constitutions of the French Republics of 1848 and 1870; of the French
Empire, the North-German Confederation of 1867, the German Empire
of 1871, and the Greek constitution of 1864. The United States are
following the same democratic tendency of the age.
5. In some States citizen rights are conditional on the possession of
a certain amount of property. It is quite right to make property an im-
portant factor in the distribution of voting power, but it is a violation of
the idea of the State to exclude a man from the rights of a citizen on the
ground of insufficient property, provided that he is morally and men-
tally capable of taking part in public duties, and is in an independent
position. If property is interpreted to mean income or earnings, and the
limit is put at a modest subsistence, there is no objection to it, but it is
then equivalent to the preceding qualification. The result is the same in
constitutions such as those of the United States, the Bavarian of 1848,
and to some extent those of Austria and Prussia, where the franchise
depends on payment of direct taxes.
6. In Christian States, till lately, a profession of Christianity was
required. Jews, Mohammedan and others, though tolerated, were ex-
cluded from political rights. During the middle ages religion and law,
Church and State, were closely associated. Exclusion from the religious
society meant exclusion from the political. Toleration was the utmost
that unbelievers could hope for. Even within the Christian pale differ-
ence of faith carried with it political consequences. In some countries
only Catholics, in others only Protestants, acquired full rights. The peace
of Westphalia put Catholics and Protestants, in Germany, on an equal-
ity in civil rights, but not in political.158
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for the recognised religious parties in Germany, Catholics, Lutherans,
and Calvinists (Reformirten), but left the position of other sects uncer-
tain.159
In modern States there is a decided tendency to make the exercise of
political rights entirely independent of religious creed. This is by no
means entirely due to religious indifference. When the American Con-
gress of 1789 forbade the passing of any law establishing a dominant
religion, it did not mean that it was indifferent to the power of Christian-
ity, nor did it intend to hinder the State in its duty of supporting Chris-
tian institutions.160
The modern principle really has its root in the idea that religious
belief is entirely a matter of conscience, and beyond the sphere of com-
pulsion, and that therefore no political disadvantages ought to be at-
tached to deviation from the Christian faith. The Americans made a
sharp distinction between Church and State, and were inclined to leave
both free: and in this spirit they never refused political rights on reli-
gious grounds to those who were otherwise capable. But, on the other
hand, the adoption of these principles in the French Revolution, as the
frequent religious persecutions of the time show, was certainly not due
to regard for freedom of conscience, but rather to the negative spirit of
the age, which began in frivolity and ended in savage hatred of Chris-
tianity.161
In Germany the modern principle found definite expression in 1848,
and is now recognised. The Austrian fundamental laws of 1849 (§1)
and of Dec. 21, 1867, on the general rights of citizens, as well as the
Prussian constitution of 1850, agree with the draft of the imperial con-
stitution framed at Frankfort and Berlin in making ‘the enjoyment of
civil and political rights independent of religious creed.’ They prudently
add that religious creed is no ground of excuse from public duties.
A law of the North-German Confederation (now of the German
Empire, dated July 3, 1869, enacts: ‘All existing limitations of civil and
political rights grounded on difference of creed are hereby abolished. In
particular, participation in communal and national representation, and
tenure of public offices, shall be independent of religious creed.’
This has entirely altered the position of the laws in these countries.
In Germany, where they were before almost entirely excluded from po-
litical rights, they can no longer be refused them on religious grounds.
But the principle has not yet been universally accepted. The Papacy
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part, by Catholic States, where the influence of the clergy is dominant:
Norway162 and Sweden still refuse to accept it. In Switzerland political
rights were dependent on Christian confession till the constitutional law
of 1866. Even in England, though the disabilities of dissenters, Catho-
lics, and Jews have been removed earlier in the century, the modern
principle is not yet completely accepted.
On the whole the modern State, true to the idea of its human and
national basis, tends distinctly toward uniting the followers of different
creeds by its common institutions, and gradually abolishing the mediae-
val association of public rights with definite religious conditions or eccle-
siastical rules.Book III: The Conditions of The State in External
Nature. The LandChapter I: Climate
Unlike the lower animals, man can live and retain his characteristics in
all regions of the earth. He has a greater power of resistance to atmo-
spheric influences, and completer means for facing dangerous climates.
But he is still affected both in mind and body by heat and cold, day and
night. The conditions of his life change as he approaches the equator or
the poles. Though the individual alters little when he travels north or
south, and makes a long stay in a different latitude, climate has its effect
on the mass, and in the course of generations produces changes in phy-
sique, and still more in character.
The Romans in the East became effeminate, the Germans on the
African coast lost their vigour, the English easily become lazy and sen-
sual in India. Bodin (Bk. V), Montesquieu (Bk. XIV, Filangieri (I. 14,
15), and Buckle (History of Civilisation, I. ch. 2) have considered the
influence of climate on public life, and have tried to determine its laws.
Long ago it was noticed that the hot tropical countries (up to 23°
23') and the cold polar zones (beyond 66° 23') are less favorable to the
development of States than the temperate zones which lie between them.
The latter include more than half of the solid surface of the earth, and in
the northern hemisphere, where most civilized nations are situated, land
and water are of nearly equal extent, whereas in other parts the propor-
tion of water is far larger. In cold countries it is difficult for men to live
in society because they cannot procure food or fuel near at hand: and the
scattered families have such a hard struggle with nature for their very
existence, that they have no time nor desire to busy themselves seriously
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lence, only relieved by violent outbursts of the passions: they develop
man’s passive inclinations at the expense of his active forces. But the
State, aiming at self-control and freedom, requires active and manly
qualities. The inhabitants of the cold zones are independent, but are
wanting in the power of political union, while those of the hot zones are
readier to bear with despotism than to defend their rights or develop a
free State. Bodin long ago observed (V. p. 671), ‘Les peoples des régions
moyennes ont plus de force que ceux du midi, et moins de ruses, et plus
d’esprit que ceux de Septentrion et moins de force. Et vent plus propres
à commander et gouverner les républiques et plus justes en leur action.’
[cf. Arist. Pol. vii. 7.]
Besides ‘mathematical’ climate, which is expressed by latitude and
depends on the relation of the surface of the earth to the sun, modern
science investigates ‘physical’ climate. By measuring the average tem-
perature of different places it describes isothermal lines, which do not
exactly coincide with the circles of latitude, but diverge to North or
South according as the temperature is modified by other factors, such as
the height of the land above the sea, the neighbourhood of lakes and sea,
the currents of wind and water, etc. This enables them to make more
numerous and minute distinctions, but only confirms the previous expe-
rience that the temperate zones are more favourable to civilization than
the extremes.
It is a striking fact that the capitals of nearly all important States lie
in the midmost temperate zone, where the average temperature ranges
between 8° and 16° C. Most European States, many Asiatic States (the
isothermal curve here takes a great sweep to the South), and the States
of North America fall within this zone. It includes: Rome, 15°.4; Madrid,
14°.2; Paris, 10°.8; London, 9°.8; Vienna, 10°.5; Constantinople, 13°.7;
Berlin, 9°.1; Hamburg, 8°.9; Copenhagen, 8°.2; Zürich, 8°.8; the Hague,
10°.5; Dresden, 8°.3; Munich 9°.1; Boston, 9°.6; Washington, 13°.5;
Philadelphia, 11°.9; Richmond, 13°.8; Pekin, 11°.3. Almost the only
European capitals belonging to a colder zone are St. Petersburg, 3°.1;
Christiania, 5°.3, and Stockholm, 5°.6; while their mean summer heat
rises to 15° or 16°. Montreal, with a mean temperature of 6°.4, has a
summer heat of 20°.5. The mean temperature of more southern cities,
Naples, 16°.4; Lisbon, 16°.4; Mexico, 16°.6; Buenos Ayres, 16°.9;
Palermo, 17°.2; Sidney, 18°.1; Nagasaki, 18°.3, is only slightly above
the limit of the temperate zone. On the other hand, the mean heat of
Canton is 21°.6; Cairo, 22°.4; Rio de Janeiro, 23°.1; Calcutta, 25°.8;188/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
Singapore, 26°.5; but it is worth noticing that China is ruled from Pe-
kin, and that the civilization of India has come from the wilder regions
of the Panjab and the Upper Ganges.
The succession of the four seasons, which is peculiar to the temper-
ate zone, seems to act as a mental stimulus: by giving men frequent
change of scene and of occupation.
Within the temperate zone we find the same distinctions on a smaller
scale. Even within the same country we find intelligence and sobriety,
muscular strength and endurance in the cooler regions; cunning and
imagination, passionate and excitable temperament in the warmer. We
see this at once if we take Italians, French, Germans, and Russians, and
compare the Northern population with the Southern in each country,
comparing, of course, not individuals but masses. Bodin goes too far in
saying that the Northern nations beat the Southern in war, but are beaten
by them in diplomacy. But the distinction between the Northern and
Southern population of the temperate zone is a real one, and the states-
man will do well to take account of it. Politics can do very little against
the evil effects of climate; the forces of nature are too strong for them.
The statesman must do what he can to use the advantages of climate and
to avoid its evils. Education and law can do something. Legislation will
vary with the vices which the different climates encourage: but it must
also consider the necessities of different climates. For instance, labourers
in cold regions need more meat and drink than in warm regions, and
strong liquors which are dangerous in the latter may be necessary in the
former.
Hence Mohammed’s prohibition of wine is suited to Arabia, but
absurd for Europeans. In the cooler regions labour may be left to itself:
in the warmer it may be necessary to encourage it. But in spite of all
modifications produced by climate, human nature remains at bottom the
same in all zones, able to cope in some measure with the difficulties of
any climate. Men of energy and good endowments are not much troubled
by it.
Where there is any question of founding or removing a capital,163
considerations of climate are of great importance. Otto III made a great
political blunder when he wished to make Rome the capital of the Ger-
man empire: and it is not a happy idea to govern India from Calcutta.
There is much to be said against the choice of Berlin as capital of Prussia,
but it is far better than Konigsberg. The temporary choice of Florence
as capital of the kingdom of Italy was good in this respect, that its cli-The Theory of the State/189
mate, being a happy mean between the severity of Turin and the soft-
ness of Naples, is well suited to maintain the equilibrium of the national
character.Chapter II: Natural Features
Since Carl Ritter, geographers have paid more attention to the connec-
tion between the configuration of a country and the civilization of its
inhabitants. But the Greeks had noticed it long before.164 The fact that
the earliest great civilised States are found in river valleys—in the Panjab,
on the Upper Ganges, the Nile, the Tigris and Euphrates, and the Pei-
Ho—leads to the conclusion that life on a great stream is specially adapted
to the early development of human powers and human thought. As he
builds ships and cuts canals, and makes the stream serve him, man gains
confidence and wealth; and life upon the water develops the love of
adventure and commerce. For the same reason, islands and countries
with a seaboard develop early. The ancient pre-eminence of Greece and
Italy, the: success of Spain and Portugal in the west, the early develop-
ment of free states in England and Holland, were largely due to their
maritime position. If it costs man greater labour and effort to subdue the
sea to his use, its influence is more powerful than that of the stream.
Mountain countries have a peculiarly strong influence on: character
and feeling. The varied grandeur of the mountains, no less than the aw-
ful power of the ocean, elevates and strengthens men’s minds. The dwell-
ers on the mountains are obliged to exert their power to the utmost every
day: this gives them a strength and a power of self-help which makes
men of them. Then the broken character of a mountain country, with its
many secluded valleys, favours the rise of small communities, which
grow up in sturdy independence, and are firm to resist invasion. Per-
sians, as well as Israelites and Arabs, the tribes of the Caucasus no less
than the Greeks, Swiss and Samnites, exhibit the same characteristics.The Theory of the State/191
But the spirit of freedom takes a different colour from the sea and the
mountain. In the mountains it is stubborn and resolute, by the sea it is
excitable and fickle. It was the peculiar fortune of Rome to enjoy the
influence of mountain and sea at once.165
Inland countries, especially with broad plains, develop more slowly,
because there is no natural stimulus: the State developed later in France
than in Italy, later in Germany than in England.
Worst of all is the position of plateaus far removed from the sea,
with no great rivers or mountains, but only broad steppes or deserts.
Compare Europe with Africa, the interior of Asia with its coasts, West-
ern Europe with Eastern, and the difference is plain at once. In such
countries despotism has always found stupid and unresisting obedience.
The statesman cannot produce these natural conditions, but he has
more power over them than over climate. He cannot move mountains or
conjure the sea to his country; but he can make rivers navigable, cut
canals, build roads and railways, and spread a net of telegraphs. He can
enliven the monotony of a country by commerce, and connect inland
countries with the ocean. Civilisation here has before it, and will finally
accomplish, the great task of uniting all parts of the habitable globe in
one unbroken and fruitful bond of union.
Thomas Buckle called attention to the influence of more temporary
and changing phenomena. Here again the scenes of sea and mountain
make a deeper and more striking impression than those of the inland
plain: but there are other influences besides. In the tropics, nature often
appears so overpowering, that, in despair of conquering her, man gives
up all effort: and his fancy sees nothing but the awful force of nature;
his heart is filled with fear and superstition.
Violent snows, the march of glaciers, and fall of avalanches in moun-
tain regions, the heavy rains and floods, the terrific storms and hurri-
canes in many hot countries, the rapid change from luxuriant vegetation
to parched desert, the desolating swarms of insects and the peril of wild
beasts— all these influences may depress and confound, instead of stimu-
lating, those who live among them. For this reason, a temperate country
is best adapted for the growth of man’s mind. A monotonous climate is
not stimulating enough: a violent one shocks him. He needs a varied and
temperate climate to excite his thoughts and call out his effort: his mind,
which would run riot in the tropics, then develops with an orderly and
rational growth.
But we must not exaggerate the importance of natural phenomena.192/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
After all, less depends on them than on the moral and intellectual educa-
tion of man by man. Even in hot countries reason may be educated and
fancy curbed by a feeling for the beautiful: and superstition may grow
rank and thought be choked under a temperate sky. Man is not the crea-
ture of natural forces: he must face nature boldly and independently,
making use of her when she is kind, and combating her when she is
cruel.Chapter III: The Fertility of The Soil
Where the soil of a country is fertile it is easier to support life: and
population increases in proportion. It might appear that a fruitful soil
was the most favourable condition for the welfare of society and of the
State. This thought gave birth to the idea of a blissful Paradise, where
rich and varied fruits grew ready to man’s hand: and even now this is the
ideal of the childish and the indolent. But riper years and human effort
bring with them a contempt for a condition which has no conception of
the true end of life, the development and perfecting of man’s nature.
Certainly a very barren soil is unfavourable for social life: for man
is then obliged to procure his food from a distance, by means of com-
merce. In such cases commercial cities may rise and flourish, as did
Venice, the daughter of the unfruitful sea. But the peoples as a whole in
barren countries can only live poorly and painfully; the population is
sparse and has but a meagre growth. A fixed home is hardly possible;
men live a nomadic life in scattered families and hordes. Buckle has
pointed out that the Mongols and the Tartars made little progress on
their own barren steppes, only developing a civilization in the richer soil
of China and India: and that the Arabs did not become an advanced
state till they left Arabia for the fruitful lands of Persia and the coast of
the Mediterranean. The slow development of the State in cold climates
is not merely due to the difficulty of procuring warmth and the severe
struggle with nature, but also, and largely, to the barrenness of cold
countries. The same effects are to be found in those hot countries, where
the apparent fertility is great, but is marred by frequent and sudden
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much hindered by difficulties in gathering and preserving rich crops as
by absolute scarcity of produce.
A very fruitful soil, which furnishes sufficient food without requir-
ing labour, is better than an unproductive soil, but it is by no means the
best basis for the State, for these reasons:—
The main motive to human effort is the desire for subsistence. If this
is removed by the bounty of nature, men work little, or not at all; and
generally sink into indolence and sensuality. Where they do not work,
men fail to develop the hidden resources of their nature, and society
does not advance. On many tropical islands the people live a happy
sensual life, but remain uncivilized. Naples made a great advance when
she converted her idle lazzaroni into industrious labourers.
Where labour is not needed, labour and labourer are despised; the
life of the mass of the people counts for nothing. Nowhere is human life
so brutally disregarded as in the negro despotisms of Africa, where the
soil is fruitful without tillage, and there is no industry to ennoble labour.
Great fertility of soil promotes an unequal distribution of property.
We find a few rich men, living in superfluity, hardly any middle class,
and a great mass of poor and servile population. As there is no check on
population in such countries, it increases rapidly. But an occasional
famine or invasion reduces the careless population to misery. Those few
who have had the providence to hoard their fruits, compel the masses to
surrender their fruit-trees and their land in return for food. Military
leaders, in return for their protection, exact taxes and service: priests,
who reconcile the gods and invoke their blessing, receive large estates
from the faithful. Thus there gradually arises a class of rich landlords
and princes, of nobles and priests, who own the whole country. They
attain to some degree of civilization and to great material wealth. They
exact labour from the subject classes, but hold them cheap, because
there are plenty of labourers, and man, as such, has no value. The masses
become poor, despised, and completely dependent: they live a dull and
brutal life of service, completely cut off from any civilising influence.
Buckle was the first to lay proper emphasis on these facts, and to
establish them historically. But he certainly goes too far when he ex-
plains the early Indian civilization and the system of castes by this cause,
and maintains that higher civilization pre-supposes superfluity. Like all
Englishmen, he lays too much stress on economical conditions. The fact
is, that the most eminent Brahmans and Buddhists preferred poverty to
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wealth, while the Visas, who did not belong to the aristocracy, set a high
value on the wealth that they amassed by industry, trade, and usury. The
Sudras were reduced to a servile condition, not because they were poor,
but because they were a conquered population of inferior race.
Still, it is true that the luxuriant rice plantations easily support a
large population, so that, as the land gradually became the property or
the fiefs of princes and nobles, the contrast of few rich and many poor
was developed, and has lasted up to the present day: on the one side, a
small and highly civilised body, enjoying great material comfort; on the
other, a despised and oppressed multitude.
The same was the case in Egypt. There the date-palm yields a large
harvest without much attention. The vast buildings of the kings point to
an enormous expenditure of strength and human life. The Hebrew records
describe the miserable condition of the servile labourers. Joseph’s ad-
vice might be of service to the treasury of Pharaoh ‘but it was disastrous
to the people.
Again, in Mexico and Peru, we find a small body of rich and pow-
erful men exploiting the masses, and again the mischief is partly due to
the seeming bounty of nature, which produces maize, bananas, and po-
tatoes in abundance. Naked slavery below, arts and tyranny above, ex-
ternal weakness, gigantic buildings and poor hovels, such is the picture
of these favoured lands.
Can statesmen remedy this evil? They can if they are seriously de-
voted to the work of advancing a healthy national life. In spite of a
fertile soil, it is possible to protect the lower classes against the upper,
and to educate them to be free men, to promote a better division of
property, and raise the middle class.
The most favourable soil then is one of moderate fertility, f which
requires the expenditure of serious and persistent t labour. There labour
and the labourer are properly valued, but they are not overtasked, and
there is no destitution. Man’s powers are developed, and the conditions
of life perfected: families enjoy a secure existence in moderate prosper-
ity, and wealth is so distributed that the middle class is numerous and
well to do. One class shades off gradually into another: there is no dan-
ger of the lower classes being enslaved, nor of the higher becoming a
privileged caste. There is a great diversity of occupations, but the people
form a coherent whole, animated by a common spirit.
Doubtless history proves that these conditions do not necessarily
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are many other more powerful factors involved. But if we compare Eu-
rope with Western or Southern Asia, or North America with Central
and Southern America, or even South Italy with Lombardy and Swit-
zerland, the superiority of such conditions becomes evident. The main
business of the State in this sphere will be to defend healthy natural
conditions against human interference, and to maintain an equilibrium
of forces, so as to promote mutual aid and advancement. Legislation
and economy may help in saving the soil from desolation or exhaustion,
and may prevent the accumulation of land in a few hands, especially in
mortmain, and secure a natural distribution of wealth. It may some-
times transform a barren soil into a fertile one, and so increase the pro-
duction of the country by providing for the drainage of marshes or the
irrigation of meadows.Chapter IV: The Land
As the State has its personal basis in the people, it has its material basis
in the land. A people does not become a permanent State till it has
acquired a territory.
The part of the earth which the nation occupies, or which the State
governs, is called its land or territory (Statsgebiet). Its extent, like the
development of the nation, is determined by historical events: for the
legal existence of the State it is unimportant. There have always been
small monarchies and republics, and they have maintained a certain
degree of equality by the side of their greater neighbours. It is, there-
fore, absurd to try to fix a normal limit for the territory of a State. The
Greek city-states looked petty in face of the Roman Empire, but Athens
takes her place beside Rome in the history of the world. But still the
extent of a State has a great influence on its political character and
importance, and is closely connected with many grave political ques-
tions.
Obviously these two necessary elements of the State, the land and
the people, react on one another. The land may be too small for the
people, inadequate to supply its intellectual and material wants. The
growth of population may lead to the foundation of colonies to receive
the surplus. Or the sense of power or the requirements of its civilization
may demand an extension of territory, and lead to annexation or con-
quest. In this case it is hard to reconcile the natural right to growth and
self-development with the historical rights of other nations.
Again, when a State becomes too small to maintain a secure exist-
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other States, or allow itself to be absorbed by a more powerful State.
On the other hand, a sparse population may feel its territory too wide, or
some particular part of it may desire to be independent. In the first case
the State will encourage immigration, in the second it will adopt a policy
of separation or dismemberment.
Here the present age differs entirely from the middle ages: then the
general tendency was to small States, now it is to large ones. Then Italy,
France, Germany, Spain, and at first the British Isles and the Slavonic
countries, were all divided among a number of petty monarchies and
republics. The unity of the Roman Empire was ideal rather than actual.
The tendency to form larger States began with England, and is seen on
the Continent after the latter part of the fifteenth century, and has not yet
reached its limit.
The mediaeval States were innumerable. Almost every lordship,
many towns and religious houses, and even villages, maintained an in-
dependent political existence. Only a few of these constitutions now
remain, and there is small prospect of their survival. Many influences
co-operated to substitute this infinite partition for the old unity of the
Roman ideal:—want of roads and posts, and of means of locomotion;
the tendency to special rights (die particuläre Recktstildung), the defec-
tive system of police, the feudal constitution, with its limited military
service and defective means of war, the narrow circulation of money,
the separation of estates, the fundamental conceptions of dynastic rule
and private law, the want of a national consciousness, and the Teutonic
tendency to independence and to corporate organizations. On the other
hand, the formation of large States has been promoted by the improve-
ment and extension of means of communication, high-roads and rail
ways, steamships, postal and telegraphic service, the quickened impetus
of trade and commerce, increased military and financial resources; in a
word by the entire development of modern civilization and the awak-
ened national consciousness and more rational legislation which it has
brought with it.
The modern State needs a broader basis than can be found in a mere
municipal or judicial district. As privileged class (Stand) and tribe have
had to give place to people and nation, so towns and manors have to
merge themselves in the wider unity of the country: only so can the
conception of a Nation (Volk) supersede the conceptions of local citi-
zenship or narrow association. A Country and a Nation are both essen-
tial to the modern idea of a State: without a country the State is at bestThe Theory of the State/199
insecure and ineffective; it may be retained for a while as a curiosity,
but being quite cut off from modern life it is exposed to the general
hatred of the small-state system (die Kleinstaterei). This principle fixes
the lower limit for the size of a State. Its higher limit is determined by
the principle that every part must be within reach of the central author-
ity. But this limit of course is an elastic one. Since the invention of
steam-locomotion and the telegraph, no country is too remote for com-
munication with its capital. It can no longer be denied that it is possible
to unite the whole globe in one political organisation, now that interna-
tional law, with its hypothesis of the union of many States in one hu-
manity, extends over the greater part of the inhabited earth. Of the total
land surface of the globe, estimated at nearly 54,000,000 square miles,
Great Britain governs nearly 9,000,000 square miles, Russia about
8,300,000 square miles, China 4,500,000, the United States over
3,000,000 square miles. Here are vast and distant territories, which are
still animated by one political spirit.
But the power of a State is not to be measured by its mere extent.
The German Empire has a territory of about 210,000 square miles, and
yet is the most powerful State in Europe. France, with its 204,000 square
miles in Europe, is at least as strong as Russia, whose territory in Eu-
rope is ten times the size. The European territory of Great Britain only
covers 121,235 square miles, but from this it governs colonies and de-
pendencies far larger than itself. Population is a far more important
factor in determining the power of a nation than extent of territory, though
the latter is not without weight.
The further a territory extends, the greater becomes the difficulty of
movement, and hence also of government. Its scattered forces can only
be slowly collected, and its distant provinces are not under perfect con-
trol. Improved means of communication have lessened this difficulty,
but not removed it. The word of command can be flashed to the farthest
limit of the State, but it lacks the emphasis of immediate authority: and
it may be misunderstood, or, if the subject is unwilling, evaded. Even
with railways it takes time to convey men, and food, and stores: and in
thinly populated provinces it is not always possible to establish rail-
ways: often even highways are wanting.
Hence, an extension of territory does not always mean an increase
of power. A State may be weakened by its conquests, if the smaller
territory was easier to govern.
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points, but it is hard to gain any permanent success against it. The en-
emy can traverse wide tracts unopposed, but they will find it difficult to
maintain themselves. Their only chance is to attack and defeat the con-
centrated power of the State. This assertion is confirmed by the recent
wars in Russia and North America. But while great size in a State
maymake it helpless and cumbrous, it has its advantages. A large State
has command of vast resources, which are not exhausted in a moment:
hence, in a dangerous crisis it can afford to wait and watch the turn of
events: it can seldom be conquered at a blow. The size of a State also
has an influence on the form of its constitution. Direct democracy is
only possible in a small country, where men can meet frequently in the
assembly. Constitutional monarchy requires a larger area for its repre-
sentative system. The vast extent of the Roman Empire was a main
reason of the decay of the Republic and the concentration of authority in
an absolute Emperor. In Russia too the absolute power of the Czar is
partly due to the vast mass of its territory, and even England does not
propose to give India parliamentary institutions.
Accordingly the constitutional policy (die Verfassungspolitik) of a
State must consider the character and extent of its territory, and adapt
itself to it.
The territorial limits of a State are not eternal or unalterable. They
depend on the growth or decay of national forces. But still they are more
fixed and permanent than the limits of its population, and are only al-
tered from time to time by great events.
The boundaries of a State may either divide it from a foreign State,
or from a part of the earth which belongs to no State. In the first case the
boundary is regarded as a fixed line, and is marked by stones, trenches,
walls, etc. In the latter case there is no need to draw a strict line: the
boundaries may be advanced or withdrawn without complications with
other States. To the first class belong:—
(a) Rivers and streams, although these are not so absolutely fixed as
land boundaries. The strict frontier between the two governments is fixed
either at the middle of the river, or in the bed of the river proper (Thal-
weg), i.e., the channel which it takes at its lowest; but as the mid-chan-
nel is that chiefly used for navigation and commerce, it is considered as
common to both States for these purposes. But both these boundaries
may be altered by the alluvial or denuding action of the water on the
banks, or the alteration of the course of the stream.
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life: communication is rare, and only by single passes. As a rule the
highest ridge of the mountain, or the waterway is regarded as the natu-
ral boundary.
To the second class belong:—
(a) Seas and large lakes, which are naturally subject to no State,
and are open to the common use of all the world.
(b) Deserts and steppes, and sometimes forests and savage moun-
tains. But these regions are appropriated as civilisation advances. Fur-
ther definition of boundaries belongs to International law.
Sometimes several countries are united to form a new and larger
whole, an Empire (Reich). This may happen in various ways.
(a) The countries united retain their existence, and on a footing of
equality: e.g., the United States of America, the German Empire.
(b) The countries exist separately, but on an unequal footing, one
being regarded as imperial (Hauptland), the others as dependent
(Nebenländer): e.g., Great Britain with its colonies and dependencies,
France with Algiers.
(c) The previous countries become provinces of one Empire: e.g.,
the spread of Russia. But as the ideal basis of the perfect State is not the
nation, but humanity, so its ideal territory is the whole earth, uniting in
one harmonious whole the diverse qualities of different countries, so as
to complete and enrich one another. But the practical principle for present
politics, which are still far from the goal of the ideal, is this: that a
varied territory is the best for a State: one where there are mountains
and valleys, rivers and lakes, seaboard and plains; not that such coun-
tries are more fertile, for in some parts the difference of level makes
cultivation impossible, but because the various faculties of the inhabit-
ants are thus stimulated and developed to the utmost. On the other hand,
the worst is an inland territory of wide and desolate steppes: that is why
these regions have always been the home of nomad tribes which fall
short of political life.Chapter V: Territorial Sovereignty
The sovereign rights of a State over its whole territory are often called
‘State property’ (Statseigenthum). But the name, though not inappro-
priate to the early States of Asia, or to the feudal State, is incompatible
with modern political ideas.
In the old Jewish State Jehovah, in Egypt the Pharaohs were re-
garded as sole proprietors of the soil, and private persons only enjoyed
a transitory use of it: in the Roman Empire, again, the land of the con-
quered provinces was regarded formally as the property of the Roman
nation or Emperor, and the provincials only enjoyed an inferior though
actual property (in bonis) in the land. In some mediaeval States, e.g., in
England after the Norman Conquest, the king was the supreme propri-
etor and feudal lord of the whole land, and his subjects only occupied
their estates as fiefs. In all these cases the idea of State-property natu-
rally arose from the fusion of the idea of private property with that of
political sovereignty. But it becomes untenable now that private and
public law are entirely distinct.
We must distinguish then the sovereign rights of the State in its
territory (Gebietshoheit, imperium) from the property (dominium) of
the State. Property is a matter of private law, even when it belongs to the
State: sovereignty is essentially political, and can only belong to the
State, or the head of the State.166
1. On its positive side this sovereignty means that the State has
complete power over all its territory, to enforce its laws, execute its
decrees, and exercise its jurisdiction. Its power extends not only over
persons but over land and things; but this power belongs to the StateThe Theory of the State/203
alone, and is outside the sphere of private law.
2. On the negative side, the State has the right of excluding every
other State or power from sovereignty in, or interference with, its terri-
tory. Hence the modern State does not allow any foreign power to exer-
cise jurisdiction or police in its territory. Alienation of the whole or part
of a country is incompatible with this political conception of territorial
sovereignty. It is no longer possible to do as the mediaeval princes did,
who sold, or pawned, or partitioned167 their domains as pieces of private
property.
Modern public law adheres to the principle that the territory of a
State is inalienable and indivisible.168
Alienation is only possible (exceptionally) under the forms of pub-
lic law, in virtue either of a law or of international contracts, including
treaties of peace.169
Grotius further demands as a consequence of natural right, that if
part of a country is to be alienated, the consent of the inhabitants of that
part must be given, as well as that of the whole State. This demand is a
just one, because their whole political existence is at stake, and the leg-
islature cannot be supposed to represent them properly when it is bent
on dissolving the union of the State. But in most cases necessity will
prove too strong for natural rights.170
Limitations on the sovereignty of the State in favour of other States
(statsrechtliche Dienstbarkeiten) are possible, and are analogous to the
‘servitudes’ of private law. But they must have their basis in public law,
and their purpose must be a public one. For instance, a State may allow
a neighbour the use of a military rood across its territory, or of its postal
system, or may open its, ports But freedom of sovereignty must be
guarded against encroachment, even more jealously than freedom of
property in private law: for any permanent limitation is a disastrous
injury to the unity and harmony of the State, and to the free development
of its institutions in the interest of public welfare.171
Notes—1. The change off the title of the French kings from Roi de
France to Roi des Français, after the Revolution, was a protest against
the earlier idea that France was a patrimonium regis, and so far marks
an advance in political thought. [The title of Roi des Français was in-
troduced into the constitution of 1791, and it was given to Louis Philippe
by the French Chambers in 1830. But it was not held by Louis XVIII
and Charles X, who, like their predecessors, were Rois de France.] But
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not matter which form is used. Stahl (Statslehre, ii. p. 38) goes too far
when he calls the national title barbaric. Roman and German Emperors
have preferred it: and it is nobler than a territorial title in as much as a
nation is greater than a country.
2. Rectification of frontier is not included under alienation, as it
merely defines the existing boundaries. But it is not mere rectification
when whole tracts of inhabited country are cut off and exchanged by a
State to round off its frontiers.
[On the conception of territorial sovereignty see Maine, Ancient
Law, p. 103ff.]Chapter VI: Division of the Country
Generally, the territory of a State is so large that it has to be divided for
purposes of government. There are four chief kinds of division:—
1. Provinces. The provinces of the Roman Empire were originally
independent States, which had been made subject to Rome. Modern
provinces also often represent earlier States, which have been merged in
a larger whole: but sometimes they have been created by the State to
which they belong: and often, as in the German Empire, the provinces
(duchies) have given rise to new countries.
The characteristic feature of provinces is their comparative inde-
pendence. Their government is subordinate to the general government,
but has comparatively extensive independent powers. Further, in repre-
sentative constitutions they sometimes have a legislative body for the
conduct of their own affairs, a provincial parliament. The modern ten-
dency to unity is unfavourable to this division. The separate legislative
powers of the provinces have been abolished in France, Spain, and En-
gland, and in the ‘Crown-territories’ (Kronländer) of Austria limited to
the sphere of economics and education. But though thorough unity of
organization is to the advantage of a State, the complete abolition of
provincial freedom, ignoring, as it does, the special wants and charac-
teristics of different districts, may injure healthy and fruitful elements in
the national life. The Teutonic nations feel the want of provincial inde-
pendence more keenly than the Romance nations.
2. Circles (Kreise) are large political districts, hut have no claim to
be considered as separate countries. In the old Frankish and German
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inces, the cantons (Gaue) to circles. Under the same head come the
counties of England and the United States, the German Kreise, the French
départements, and the Prussian Regierungsbezirke.
This division is founded not on local or tribal differences, but on the
necessity of an organised administration. But still the historical associa-
tions of the district and its natural means of communication have to be
taken into account. Provinces may be compared with the different build-
ings of a castle, Circles with the storeys of a house. They generally have
some central power of administration and superior jurisdiction. Further,
there is now a tendency for the population of a Circle to attend to its
own special interests, and to organise common institutions, e.g., roads,
magazines, hospitals, schools, poor-houses, prisons. This opens up a
fruitful field for self-government and representative institutions.172
3. Districts (Bezirke) are generally subdivisions of Circles, and have
a subordinate administration and jurisdiction. These, again, may be
recognised as corporate bodies, with property and institutions of their
own.173
Such was the position of the Teutonic hundreds (Centenen, Huntari),
the provincial courts (Landgerichte), and bailiwicks (Oberamteien) of
Germany, the Cantons of France, and the Kreise of Prussia.
Mere electoral districts do not belong to this category, as they are
only temporary, and form no organic part of the State. Such inorganic
divisions have little to recommend them.
4. Communes (Gemeinden) in town and country. These form the
simplest division in the State, but they are of vital importance. The
personality of the commune (die personliche Gemeinde) is to its district
what the organised nation is to its country. It inspires it with its common
life; not, indeed, a life of political activity, but of common social and
economical interests.
Large cities are equivalent to districts, great capitals to circles, or
even to provinces (e.g., Berlin).
Alterations in the political divisions of a country are a question of
law. In all these grades the State has to guard its common interests and
the harmony of its organization. But in the higher grades the influence
of public interests is greater, and the State has more freedom in deter-
mining the divisions. The commune, on the other hand, is naturally so
intimately bound up with existing corporations, that their wishes have
to be considered.
The chief considerations which determine the State in these arrange-The Theory of the State/207
ments are:—
(a) The political purpose of the division.
(b) Natural influences, such as the connection of river valleys.
(c) The history of the inhabitants.
(d) Commercial relations.
Mathematical considerations of number or area are subordinate to
all these.Chapter VII: The Relation of The State to Private
Property
Private property, i.e., the command of man over wealth, is as old as
man.174 When primitive men plucked the fruits for their food, or chose a
cave for their home, or even when they clothed themselves with leaves
or skins, they were acquiring property.
Property is not primarily a product of the State. In its earliest, and
incomplete, and insecure form, it is the work of individual life, a sort of
extension of the physical existence of individuals. A man gains posses-
sion of things which lie around and come into his power, he turns them
to his own use and service, appropriates them. When to this he adds a
consciousness of his right to possess them, the idea of property is com-
plete. Even the nomad, who has no fixed political bond, has property in
his clothes, his arms, his flocks, and his furniture. Even Robinson Crusoe,
on his desert island, extended his property.
Communism, which denies the justice of private property and de-
clares it to be robbery,175 conflicts with the nature of man as created by
God: ‘Let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl
of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth;’ Gen. i. 26. It is also
at variance with the whole history of mankind, which recognises prop-
erty among all nations and at all times, and is still engaged in developing
it.
The abolition of property, which communists propose, would mean
the death of individual freedom, the destruction of civilization, and of
the family; in a word, a barbarism worse than that of the rudest soci-
ety.176The Theory of the State/209
The doctrine of the socialists is more temperate and humane, but
equally absurd, and less consistent. Fröbel may be taken as representa-
tive of this view. Property is a ‘fief held from society by the occupant:‘
the right of the individual is a ‘consequence of a common will
(Gesammtwille) recognized by a number of men who form a sovereign
society.’177 This doctrine is no less false than communism to the indi-
vidual nature and freedom of man: recognizing, as it does, only deriva-
tive and transitory possession, it proposes to replace free property by an
exaggerated parody of medieval feudalism, i.e., to return to a lower
stage of civilisation: for it is only dressing up in democratic phrases the
same theory of servitude which in the dark ages produced an abject
flattery of arbitrary despotism.
The State has no absolute power over private property, which lies
indeed, as such, outside the range of public law. The State does not
create or preserve it, and therefore cannot take it away. It simply pro-
tects it, as it protects all individual rights, and has the same authority
over it as over its inhabitants. The main principles governing the rela-
tion of the State to private property are accordingly—
1. The State guarantees the security and freedom of property.178
2. The State has no arbitrary power of disposing of property.
3. The State has a right to tax property for public purposes.
This does not exhaust the relations of the State to private property.
Its rights are extended by certain limitations on the freedom of private
property.
1. Certain things are naturally unfitted to become private property,
and are reserved for general use. Such res publicae are rivers, sea-coasts,
harbours.179
Under this head come the unproductive regions of snow and gla-
ciers, impassable gorges, and moors, etc. But glacier-ice may become
an article of commerce, and hotels have been built on Alpine peaks. In
such cases the ownership is derived from the State. By the side of such
natural gifts come such works of the civilised State as are devoted to
public service, especially public roads and canals, public spaces, etc.
All these are res publicae (domaine public), and so long as they remain
such, cannot be owned as private property even by the State, though the
control of the State over them is sometimes termed property.
2. There are other things, which, though naturally capable of being
held as private property, are reserved because they have a close connec-
tion with the public welfare, or because their management demands more210/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
extensive resources than private owners can usually control. To this
class belong mines, salt-works, and other monopolies.
3. Distinct from public property in the narrow sense, are things set
apart for particular public uses, especially public buildings, official resi-
dences, fortresses, arsenals, barracks, etc. Such things may fitly be spo-
ken of as property, but their employment in the public service removes
them from the sphere of private property and exchange. They must re-
main under control of the State (domaine public relatif) in order to be
available for public purposes.
4. The fact that most real property was originally derived from the
State, which divided the conquered land among the warriors or families
of the tribe, has this consequence in many States—that when property
in land is extinguished by emigration or death of a family, the land re-
verts to the State. Even still, English and American law hold that land in
new colonies belongs to the States and must be bought from it by the
colonists. This treatment of land, which is not yet, or has ceased to be
private property, is justified by the principle of territorial sovereignty,
which regulates private ownership, and exercises full authority in its
absence.180 Vacant inheritances revert in the same way; here, occupa-
tion by the first comer would produce great confusion.
But only a false conception of the State could lead to the idea that
the State has a natural right to property in everything in its territory
which is without an owner, to the exclusion of all aliens.
Roman law took a truer view: the State had no more right to ‘res
nullius’ than any private person. Alien or citizen might occupy them,
and became owner by this occupation.181 On the other hand, in the middle
ages the notion of feudal sovereignty favoured the extension of State-
ownership to objects of private law, and this view has survived in many
modern systems.
(a) Prussian law gives the State a prior right of occupation in the
case of certain unclaimed or abandoned property, especially land, cattle,
etc.; and no one can occupy without the State’s permission. But in other
things it allows a free right of occupation.182
(b) English law makes the king owner of most unclaimed prop-
erty:183 but it still recognises a free right of occupancy for certain
moveables.184
(c) French law is like the English. It states the general principle,
‘Les biens qui n’ont pas de maître appartiennent à l’État.’185
(d) Austrian law adopts the view that things without ownerThe Theory of the State/211
(freistehende Sachen) may be freely appropriated.186
5. Limitations arising from the supreme sovereignty of the State
over land and people, and its obligation to protect the continuous and
successive existence of members of the State. To this belong taxation
and all police regulation of private property.
6. Limitations arising from the right of expropriation (Enteignung).
It is generally assumed that the right of expropriation was not recognised
by the Romans, and that, therefore, freedom of property was uncondi-
tionally protected even where the public advantage demanded the ces-
sion of property. It is quite certain that they did not admit any universal
right of cession (Abtretungsrecht). But still, their great canals, their
straight military roads, their aqueducts and fortresses, would be inex-
plicable if the State had not had the power to enforce cession in indi-
vidual cases. Probably they did as the English to now—passed a special
law for the particular case. An Act of Parliament is necessary in En-
gland if owners are to be forced to resign their properties for public
undertakings.187
On the continent the right of expropriation has been generally adopted
and regulated. Many modern constitutions include the principle that the
State has a right to enforce cession of property for purposes of public
welfare if it pays full compensation.188
This principle is completely justified by the consideration that where
the private rights of individuals and the general rights of the public
conflict with one another, the latter ought to prevail, but only so far as
circumstances demand. The opposing interests are reconciled by ces-
sion on the one side and compensation on the other.
The question whether public interest demands expropriation in any
particular case belongs to public law, and ought, therefore, to be settled
not by a civil court, but by the organs of the government proper, either
by the legislature as in England and the United States, or by the actual
executive, as is usual in Germany, or by administrative courts. The lat-
ter procedure is fairer, for it is the business of government to settle in
each case what the public good demands, and it is best fitted for estimat-
ing the means proposed. But the procedure must be such that no arbi-
trary caprice be allowed to encroach on private rights.189
The right to enforce cession belongs only to the State, or, in the
narrow circle, to the Commune; never to private persons. But the State
may empower individuals or societies to demand cession for special
undertakings: railway companies in England and America frequently212/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
receive these powers.
Many legislatures restrict the right to the case of real property and
specially named objects. But the same principle applies equally to per-
sonal property and to any public purposes which may be suggested by
new discoveries or advance in civilization.
On the other hand, the assessment of compensation is entirely a
question of private law, and must be decided either by agreement or by
the civil courts. The State is of course bound to give full compensation,
that is to say, not merely the ordinary price, but an augmented price
sufficient to repay the proprietor for his indirect, as well as his direct
interest, but not a merely fancy price.
Some laws allow the indirect advantage which the proprietor gains
by the change to be set against the indirect damage:190 others, again,
refuse to take this into account. The first system, as limited by the Zürich
law, is fairer, because it corresponds more nearly with the real relations
of value and damage.
[Note—On the whole subject, see Mill, Political Economy, Book
II. Chs i, ii; Laveleye, Le Socialisme Contemporain; Rae, Contemorary
Socialism.]Book IV: The Rise and Fall of the StateChapter I: Introduction
The question about the rise of the State may be considered from two
different points of view. Our intention may be either to examine the
conditions and circumstances from which actual States have arisen; or
to discover the necessary cause which lies at the basis of all States—the
basis of the State in law and justice (Rechtsgrund). The first question is
one for history to answer, the other for speculation. History distinguishes
the different forms in which the State arises according to the manifold
events which it considers. Speculation, starting with the unity of the
conception of the State, requires also a unity of origin.
Let us refer first to history and not enter upon philosophical consid-
eration until we know the experience of nations.
The rise of the first states took place farther back than our knowl-
edge of history extends. There was no consciousness of history until
there were already many states upon earth. Even the ancient sacred books
of the Jews, which inform us of the first rise of the Jewish state, presup-
pose the Egyptian state, without telling us anything of its origin. Per-
haps the Indian state served as a model for the Egyptian; but the sacred
writings of the Indians give us no light on the subject.
History since then has seen the beginning and the end of very many
states, and thus tells us much more of their rise and fall than mere specu-
lation. All the ancient European states have perished centuries ago, and
almost all the Asiatic. Most of the states which exist at present had their
birth within a period known to history. Many of them are still quite
young. The circumstances and the influences which have brought them
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and physical creation, the creative power itself remains hid as if by
divine mystery. The manner of the rise of a State is however not merely
a phenomenon of great psychological and historical interest: it exercises
a continued influence on the whole life of the State, and determines
likewise in great measure its relation to other States.191
Thus it is even more important for the study of public law to con-
sider the different origins of States, than it is for private law to examine
the diverse forms of acquisition of property; yet the moderns have al-
most completely neglected the former enquiry while carefully consider-
ing the latter.
We may distinguish three different groups:—
1. The original formation of the State, when it takes its beginning
among the people and in the country without being derived from already
existing States.
2. The secondary forms, when the State is produced from within,
out of the people, but yet in dependence upon already existing States,
which either unite themselves into one, or divide themselves into sev-
eral.
3. The derived formation of the State, which receives its impulse
and direction not from within but from without.
The formation of a new State, of which alone we are here speaking,
must not be confounded with mere changes in constitution—a distinc-
tion to which Bodin192 rightly called attention. The change of the old
Roman Monarchy into a Republic brought no new State into existence,
nor again did the overthrow of the Republic and the introduction of the
Empire. These changes in the form of government mark different peri-
ods of life in the same State, they are not the beginning of different
States.Chapter II: Historical Formations
I. Original
The most original of all the many ways in which a State can arise is
represented in the legend of the foundation of Rome. Here everything is
new: the people gathers itself round common leaders out of fragments of
many different races, and becomes a united Roman people: uncultivated
and unclaimed territory is taken possession of, and becomes the site of
the eternal city. In this legend we find the idea of a completely anew
creation. The organisation of a multitude into a nation does not precede
their establishment in a territory: they are connected with the city from
the first. Both elements coincide, and the foundation of the State is
straightway consecrated by prayers for the blessing of the gods, and
legally established by the statutes given by the new king to the people,
and approved by them. The creative spirit of the king and the political
will of the people meet together in the law of the State, as in a single
act,193 and the State is the free work of the conscious national will.
We may well doubt whether this form of a political ‘creative act’
ever really took place. But it corresponds most completely to the idea of
the State which comes into life fully formed like Athene from the head
of Zeus.
Secondly, the territory and people may be already there, but the
people may not yet have attained to the consciousness of political coher-
ence. Here that which creates the State is the organization of the people.
We find a celebrated model for this also in ancient legend. The Athe-
nians are the children of Attica (aÙtÒcqonej), which they inhabited cen-
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Cecrops, who first taught reverence for the gods among the rude inhab-
itants, instituted the family, introduced agriculture and the planting of
the olive, arranged the people in tribes or castes, and established gov-
ernment and justice. According to another story, all this is ascribed to
king Theseus, who united the scattered communities of the country in a
single State and concentrated the government in Athens,194 According to
either version it is the organisation of the people to whom the land be-
longed which brought the State into being.
The foundation of the Republic of Iceland is a well-known histori-
cal example of this formation of the State by an organization of a people
in a definite country.195 At first there were only isolated settlements of
numerous chiefs (Goden), seignories of independent Godorde and
Dingstätten. But on the proposition of Ulfljot, with the assent of the
Godes, a common Allding was formed for the whole population of the
island, and for legislation and administration of justice a common organ
has provided, to which all Godorde were subject. Thus the population
of the island became a nation.
The foundation of the State of California, which has taken place
before the eyes of our contemporaries, is an example of a new people
voluntarily constituting itself in a territory belonging to the United States
of North America. The thirst for gold had brought together from the
whole world an incoherent mass of all sorts of individuals: on the 1st
September, 1849, they elected representatives to a constituent assem-
bly, and on the 13th October the projected constitution of the new State
was laid before the people for their approval. All history hardly presents
us with an example which could serve better than this to prove the pos-
sibility of forming a State by the free adherence of individuals; and yet,
if we consider this case more closely, it is clear that the decision did not
depend upon a contract of all individuals,196 but upon the will of the
majority, and that the unity of the community was necessarily presup-
posed. The constitution was created not by the wills of individuals, but
by the common will of the whole population.
The formations which are produced at the present day within the
United States of America have always this character. First, a ‘Territory’
is measured off and opened up to colonists. This is at first treated as a
province of the union, and the federal government provides for its ad-
ministration; when the population has increased they receive a new con-
stitution, and the Territory is recognized by Congress as a new State.
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afterwards take possession of the land as the second indispensable ele-
ment for the existence of a State. This may be called occupation of
territory.
It very frequently takes the form of conquest of an inhabited coun-
try. This was the case with the old Jewish State, with the Dorian Greeks,
and with the Teutonic races in the Roman provinces and in Slavonic
countries. Here the military supremacy of the people is asserted over the
inhabitants of the conquered territory. War is indeed a destructive agency,
but has also a direct influence in the creation of States. It furthers the
political qualities of subordination and manly authority, and a victori-
ous people are especially capable of forming a new State in a conquered
country.
States which have arisen in this way have at the beginning of their
existence to overcome great internal as well as external difficulties. Even
if the contest of arms is not renewed, there commonly begins a struggle
of civilizations between conquerors and conquered, and this continues
until the political unity of the mixed people is complete. In order to
guard his newly-organised nation against this danger, Moses commanded
the Jews to exterminate with fire and sword the inhabitants of the Holy
Land which Jehovah had given them. Many victorious peoples have
succumbed to this danger, having been again subdued by the higher
civilization of the conquered race. Conquest, although in the form of
force, has always among all nations been looked upon as a source of
political right. The saying of Alexander the Great,197 that the conqueror
gives the law and the conquered receives it, is still true to-day.
Certainly the system of rights (Rechtszustand) is still in an imma-
ture condition where external force exercises so supreme an influence
on the production of new and the destruction of ancient rights; but rude
as is the form of conquest, it yet contains a moral significance which
explains its importance in the formation of law. Ancient peoples, and
especially the Teutonic, regarded war as a great international law-suit,
and victory as the judgment of God in favour of the victor.198 Thus
conquest appeared not as mere physical superiority, but as a confirma-
tion of the moral power which justifies political authority. This is not
out of harmony with the modern view of the State which seeks to com-
prehend it as a human institution. Not every victory indeed is recognised
as a proof of right, nor every defeat as a sign of wrong. Superiority in
the weapons of war cannot any longer be regarded as a ground of right.
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time brings to rest the strife of contending peoples, is regarded as a
decision of nature and time in the great national and political process,
and since moral elements are at work in it, it has the significance of a
world-historical judgment. ‘History judges the world.’199 The subsequent
recognition of the new situation as a necessity, whether by a treaty of
peace or by voluntary submission of the inhabitants, makes good the
legal defects of the original occupation.200
Another and more peaceful form of territorial acquisition is the settle-
ment of political communities in an uninhabited or scarcely cultivated
country, with the intention of founding a new State there. This is the
character of many European colonies in other parts of the world. If the
colonization is directed by the mother State, then we have an example of
the derivative form of origin (chap. iv. I). But if the colonists, already
constituting an organised society, like the ‘Pilgrim Fathers’ in New En-
gland, by their own efforts and at their own risk form a new community
on soil which has hitherto belonged to no State, this is the formation of
an essentially original State. If the barbaric natives remain in the terri-
tory of the new colony, the difficulty of arranging the relations of the
two populations is almost as great as in a conquered country. But the
superiority of a civilised over a barbarous people necessarily leads to
the dominion of the former.Chapter III: II. Secondary Formations
Two or more States feeling too weak in isolation, or desiring to attain a
national unity, may join together in a new and larger Federal State (Bund).
This is not founded by the contract of individuals, but it is either founded
or at least prepared for by a contract between States. But a new collec-
tive State does not come into existence until a federal constitution has
been made.
Examples of this new form of State are the old Greek confederation
of Boeotia, the unsuccessful attempt of Epaminondas to unite the
Arcadians, the Peloponnesian alliance under the leadership of Sparta,
the Ætolian and Achaean leagues; the Samnite league in Italy; and in
the later middle ages the leagues of the German Hanse-towns, of the
Swiss confederates, and of the United Provinces (Holland).
The State so produced is not simple but complex, since the various
States which form it still remain, and are only united in a new associa-
tion. Since this association depends at first upon State contract rather
than upon State law, succeeding generations inherit the contradiction of
several States essentially independent, and yet in other respects not less
essentially dependent on the complex State. There results from this a
perpetual action and reaction, and frequently a conflict between the par-
ticular and the general spirit.
If the feeling of unity becomes stronger, and the common organiza-
tion more developed, then the form of State contract gives place to that
of constitutional law. On this distinction are based the two chief forms
of union between States: Confederation (Statenbund) and Federation
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ferent from mere alliances which form no new State; but the first retains
the character of a contractual combination of States, the second implies
the advance to the formation of a collective State or union.
A Confederation, by joining several States in a political associa-
tion, presents at least externally the appearance of one State, of an inter-
national personality, but yet is not organised into one central State, dis-
tinct from the particular States: the management of the collective State
is left either to some particular State as president (»gemèn, Vorort), or
to an assembly of delegates and representatives of all the several States.
The former was the case with the Greek leagues under the Hegemony of
Sparta and Athens, the latter with the Swiss Confederation up to 1848,
and with the German Confederation of 1815.
In a Federation, on the other hand, there are not merely completely
organised particular States, but there is an into dependently organised
common or central State. The power of the Federation is not left to one
of the particular States nor entrusted to the assembly of them. It has
produced its own Federal or National organs which belong only to the
collective body. The Achaean league with its common assembly of the
people as a legislative body, with its Federal general as chief of the
league, with its Federal council and tribunal, was already in some mea-
sure such a Federal State. This form of State first appears in modern
times in the United States of North America, but not until the act of
union of 1787. It was afterwards imitated by Switzerland in the Federal
constitution of 1848. Both constitutions depend no longer on a contract
between States, but imply the existence of a common nation and a com-
mon State, whose one will makes the constitution and demands obedi-
ence from the minority, even of particular States. Thus the preliminary
stage of Confederation is passed over, and the higher stage of Federa-
tion or Union is reached.202
Both forms of composite State are better adapted for Republics
than for Monarchies. This may be clearly seen if we compare the his-
tory of the North American and of the Swiss constitutions with the
struggles about the reform of the German Confederation.
The constitution of the North German Confederation of 1867, and
that of the German Empire of 1871, do indeed, both in fact and in law,
unite the different political powers and forces of Germany in common
national action; but if we consider principles, this constitution is like a
butterfly, not yet quite emerged from the chrysalis. The form of its ori-
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(princes and chambers); but the constitution, as a matter of fact, came
into existence by the guiding will of the Prussian government in connexion
with the labours of the imperial Diet (Retchstag) as the representative
of the German nation. Contract and law are here united in a remarkable
way, but the representation of the united governments in the Federal
Council (Bendesrath) still recalls the earlier Confederate German Diet
(Bundestag). The original designation of Bundespräsidium (Federal
Presidency), which was ascribed to the royal crown of Prussia, had
likewise the same Confederate character. But if we consider the actual
powers of the President, and his constitutional authority, especially as
Generalissimo, there stands clearly before us the chief of the German
Empire. And the constitution of the Empire has now recognised this by
the majestic name of German Emperor. The institution of the Imperial
Diet, has in conception, as well as in fact, more unity than even the
North American Congress or the Swiss Federal Assembly.
The constitution of the German Empire differs from Republican
Federations, mainly in the following respects:—
(a) Many directing organs of the whole State are necessarily, or in
fact, united with the authorities of the particular States which compose
it: thus the German Emperor is the King of Prussia, the members of the
Federal Council are identical with the rulers of the particular States, the
Imperial Chancellor and a great part of the higher officials of the Em-
pire are Prussian ministers. In Federal States, on the other hand, the two
organisms are completely separated.
(b) In Federations the different States are indeed unlike in power
and size, but are together weak in comparison with the union, and so far
like one another, but in the German Empire the kingdom of Prussia is
much more powerful than all the other States taken together, and there-
fore must be considered as the chief and presiding authority upon which
the power of the Empire mainly depends, without which it is nothing,
and round which the remaining German States are grouped.
(c) The constitution of the Empire, and of most of the particular
States, is monarchical.
These differences are so great that it is better not to include the new
German constitution under the already existing notion of a Federal State,
but to give it the name ‘Federal Empire,’ and to regard it as a new and
parallel form.
Allied to the form we have been discussing is the Union (in a special
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single new State. Of this there are various kinds and degrees. The union
is always imperfect when it is merely personal. This may be merely
transitory if the same person happens to succeed to the thrones of two
different States, and may afterwards cease if the succession falls again
to two different persons. Of this sort was the union of the German Em-
pire and Spain under Charles V, of Poland and Saxony under Augustus
II and III, of England and Hanover under the male rulers of the Brunswick
line, of Schleswig-Holstein and Denmark according to the treaty of 1620.
This form of union is the lowest of all. It does not produce a new united
State, but only brings two independent States into a mere external rela-
tion under the authority of the same prince.
This Personal Union is permanent when the crown of two States
belongs to the same dynasty and devolves according to the same laws of
succession. We have examples in the ‘Pragmatic Sanction’ of 1713 for
the States united under the Austrian sceptre, which was accepted in it
by the Hungarian diet for the kingdom of Hungary; in the acquisition of
the principality of Neuchatel by the King of Prussia in 1707; in the
union of Norway and Sweden since 1814; in the agreement between the
kingdom of Hungary and Austria since 1867.
This permanent dynastic union may indeed found a new composite
State, but the unity is very imperfect, and usually has no practical im-
portance unless absolute power is really concentrated in the person of
the ruler. In all other cases there is in reality something contradictory
and discordant in the situation—on the one hand, two States with con-
flicting interests and opinions; on the other, a common prince who may
even, as sovereign of the one State, be obliged to declare war against
then other. This form of personal union cannot therefore well be com-
bined with representative government.
A higher unity is to be found in the so-called Real Union, which is
related to Federation, as Personal Union is to Confederation. In this not
merely is the person of the ruler the same, but the supreme government
even in legislation and administration.203 The united States may indeed
have a relative independence, within certain limits they may have spe-
cial legislatures and executives, but the whole State is one organism,
and its highest interests are concentrated in the same hands. Examples
are the union of Norway with the kingdom of Denmark by the imperial
law of 1536; the union of Castile and Aragon, if not at first (1479), yet
afterwards under Hapsburg princes; above all, the Austrian monarchy
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ary 1861.
The constitution of Austro-Hungary since 1867 approaches the forms
of Personal Union in the dualism of the two chief States, but there are
elements of Real Union in the institutions of a common ministry for
foreign affairs, of the imperial army and finances, as well as in the
common delegation of the two representative bodies of Austria and
Hungary. Each of these chief States themselves began as personal unions,
but have now become real unions.
Complete Union puts an end to the separateness of the united States,
and forms not a composite but a single State.
England and Scotland were originally bound together by a mere
personal union, but their Union into Great Britain in 1707, and the later
Union between Great Britain and Ireland in 1800, make them examples
of a Complete Union. Their separate Parliaments came to an end, and
there is one Parliament for the whole realm. More recent examples are
to be found in the incorporation of the principalities of Hohenzollern
with Prussia in 1849; the annexation of the Italian duchies and of the
kingdom of Naples to Piedmont in order to form the new kingdom of
Italy in 1860–1861; above all, the transformation into Prussian prov-
inces of the kingdom of Hanover, the principalities of electoral Hesse,
Nassau, Schleswig and Holstein, and of the free city of Frankfurt.
Public law was formerly inclined to regard these unions and changes
exclusively from a dynastic point of view, as if the matter in hand were
only the acquisition or inheritance of several pieces of ground by the
same private person. The forms which private law provides for alien-
ation among living persons as well as at death (testament, inheritance)
were recognised, as if a nation and a country were a bequest with which
an individual man could deal as he chose. Modern public law rejects
this view, which conflicts with our conception of the State, and insists
that such changes, as they essentially concern the public constitution of
the nation, must not be arranged without the assent of the people’s rep-
resentatives.
The opposite of union is the division or separation of a greater State
into two or more new States.
National division is apt to occur especially where different peoples,
separated by their very territories, have been externally united in one
State without becoming really one. If the power of concentration which
has hitherto held them together is diminished, the natural differences
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existing whole into a number of new and independent States. Thus the
great world-monarchy, which had been for a moment welded together
by the genius of Alexander, went to pieces immediately after his death.
The Frankish monarchy of the ninth century broke up according to na-
tionalities; but this result was partly due to dynastic differences. The
fall of the Napoleonic Empire, with its creations of dependent king-
doms, may be explained to a great extent in the same way: and so too the
separation of Belgium from Holland in 1830.
During the middle ages a State was frequently divided among sev-
eral sons of the deceased ruler, just as an inheritance is among several
heirs. This procedure, which follows the principles of private law, is
quite incompatible with the unity and welfare of a State, and has only
been abolished by the recognition of the modern principle of political
indivisibility.
Another form appears when one part of the State declares itself
independent and becomes constituted into a separate State.
As a rule the part as such is not justified in rising against the whole
and separating itself by force. History has given examples of warning in
many unjustified and unfortunate attempts at separation. At the same
time there are declarations of independence which have obtained full
recognition, and have sufficiently justified themselves. We may recall
the separation of the United Provinces from Spain in 1579, the Declara-
tion of Independence of the North American States in 1776, the libera-
tion of Greece from Turkish dominion in our own days. The principle
needs a limitation which may be put as follows: the part is, exception-
ally, justified in seceding, if its lasting and important interests are not
protected or satisfied by the whole to which it belongs, and if at the
same time it is capable of taking care of itself and maintaining its inde-
pendent position. Only real necessity and intolerable suffering give suf-
ficient ground for the secession, and only the moral force which proves
itself victorious, and overcomes all difficulties, gives a claim to recogni-
tion. Under these two presuppositions, this recognition will be accorded
by the judgment of history.204Chapter IV: III. Derived Formations
The colonization of the Greeks, which covered the coasts of the Medi-
terranean in Asia Minor, Italy, Sicily and the Islands of the Archipelago
with new cities and States, was a conscious formation of new States.
The colony proceeded from the mother city like the son who goes out
from the family of his father to set up a household of his own. It became
immediately a new State independent of the mother city, but bound to it
by the ties of descent, manners, law, religion. The young city took the
holy fire from the Prytaneum of the mother city, and the ancestral gods
were transferred to the new dwelling-place.205 The Greeks founded no
great Empire, but their scattered colonies Hellenised the East.206
It was otherwise with the colonies of Rome.207 They were intended
to secure and extend Roman dominion, and they, remained therefore in
a relation of strict dependence on the capital. They were not the founda-
tion of new States, but only an extension of the existing one State.
Different again is modern colonization. If we consider the origin of
modern colonies founded by European States, especially those in
America, there is, as a rule, no direct foundation of new States: the
intention is rather to extend the dominion and civilization of the old
country or to obtain a new economic existence, or, sometimes, to escape
persecution at home. In South America the dependence of the colonies
on the Romance States of Europe was greater than in the North, where
the Teutonic feeling of freedom and tendency to form corporations caused
or at least favoured a considerable degree of colonial independence.
But if one looks to the later development and history of these colo-
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thus separated themselves from European rule and become independent
States. This sort of colonisation may be rather compared with the birth
of a child, who increases the family as a dependent member, but after he
has grown up in body and mind goes off and founds a new family.
Another derived formation of the State often took place in the middle
ages in the form of a concession of sovereign, rights to particular parts
of the State. A whole series, especially of German districts, principali-
ties, dominions, imperial cities, became independent States by obtaining
particular sovereign rights from the king, and gradually increasing these
until at last the king retained only an appearance of supremacy without
any real power. Thus what had previously been parts of one State, be-
came in the course of centuries independent States. The outward form
of such concession was frequently that of private acquisition by pur-
chase or loan, and is thus not adapted for the modern state. Even in the
middle ages, however, that was not essential, and thus at the present day
it is practically possible that a State with clear consciousness should
train up a part of its dominions and confer on it sovereign rights. En-
gland proceeds in this manner towards Canada and other of her depen-
dencies.
Finally, there is the institution of a new State by a foreign ruler,
especially by a conqueror whose fiat destroys old States and calls forth
new ones. Europe saw, in the years of the Napoleonic rule, a number of
States destroyed and others set up by the will of the Emperor. But these
arbitrary creations of momentary power attained to no real living force,
and had scarcely been called into being when they died off or were de-
stroyed—an eloquent proof that of all forms of State formation, this is
the most imperfect and the least secure.Chapter V: Fall of States
All the past history of the world testifies against the immortality of the
State, and the earth is covered with the ruins of the fallen. The occasions
and the forms of this fall are different, as are the causes of death in the
individual. But from the fact that all States perish, we may perhaps
infer a common cause of their mortality. This cause cannot be found in
national demoralization; for demoralization is not necessary, and not
always present, and on the other hand history teaches us that even de-
moralized peoples may live a long time, just as immoral men may some-
times attain a great age. Nor again in bad government: many a State has
outlined several generations of bad rulers. Nor again, as has recently
been maintained by Gobineau, in the mixture and degeneracy of race.
Many States have become great and powerful by this mixture of blood,
and have continued to flourish, although the national race has been es-
sentially altered, e.g., Rome, England, the United States of North
America. The true cause is to be found in the great law of all organic
life, that it is developed by history and consumed by it. The life of a
nation unfolds itself, and in gradually revealing what is in it fulfils its
destiny and dies, overtaken and left behind by the unwearied advance of
time with which it cannot keep pace.
Progressive humanity finds no complete satisfaction in any particu-
lar State, and swallows them all up. If there ever comes into being a
world-empire on the broad basis of the whole human race, then may we
hope that this State will endure as long as mankind itself.
The special forms of the fall of States correspond in great measure
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when new are founded. The death of one State is often immediately
followed by the birth of the other.
The opposite of the organization of the nation is its disorganisation
or dissolution. A particular form of dissolution is anarchy. If authority
is no longer regarded, if every one does that which is right in his own
eyes, and no one cares any more for the community, nor sacrifices any-
thing to it, then the organised nation sinks to a chaotic mass. Anarchy
destroys the very principle, and not merely the existing form, of the
State; but complete and lasting anarchy is very seldom to be found in
the history of the world: more frequently anarchical conditions are only
passing and transitory crises which threaten the life of the State, but
often only prepare a new arrangement of the constitution. It is just in
these times of violent convulsions that the political character of the Aryan
race shows itself in a remarkable way. Even at the very moment in which
they overthrow the political order with the rage of hatred, they yet sub-
mit themselves to the necessary forms of political existence, and whilst
in confusion of ideas they are enthusiastic for anarchy, they obey blindly
those leaders who are wildest and strictest. Behind the triumph of the
disenthralled masses, intoxicated with freedom, appear the cold iron
features of the dictator, and on the ruins of the old constitution the people
creates for itself a new, perhaps a worse, political habitation. Even the
nations of the great Aryan families are not immortal, but, so long as
their life lasts, they cannot dispense with the political form of their ex-
istence any more than the fish can do without water, or the bird without
air. There is no single example in history of an Aryan people perma-
nently separating itself from the bonds of the State, or even sinking back
into the condition of Nomads. In the sixteenth century the Anabaptists
completely rejected the idea of the State, like the Communists of the
present day. But when they had the opportunity of making an attempt to
introduce their non-political community, they set up a caricature of the
State.
The State perishes by the migration of a people from the land of
their fathers, such as that which the Helvetii attempted in Caesar’s time,
or by the expulsion of a people from their home, as frequently happened
in the barbarian migrations at the fall of the Roman Empire; and it is
generally uncertain whether the migrating people are to succeed in ob-
taining a firm rule over another country, and thus founding a new State.
The conquest of a country, and the subjection of a hitherto indepen-
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than the creation of a new State: the consequence is generally only the
further extension of the victorious State. In this way Rome swallowed
up many States and extended her dominion over their territory and popu-
lation The submission (deditio) of the weaker people is indeed volun-
tary in appearance, but as a rule it is the work of necessity and compul-
sion, and is thus only a form of subjection.
Complete union brings with it the extinction of the particular States,
but, as it creates at the same time a new larger State out of the same
nation, it may be regarded as a voluntary renunciation on the part of the
particular States of their previous separate existence.
The opposite of the absorption of smaller States in a larger common
State is the division of an empire into several States, or the partition of
one State among several foreign States. The former may occur organi-
cally without external compulsion by the different parts affirming their
particularism more and more and then separating; but the latter is com-
monly the work of foreign force. The partitions of Poland (1772, 1793,
1795) are terrible examples of such unjust force, in an age which prided
itself on its enlightenment and humanity.
As the concession of sovereign rights forms new States, so by the
withdrawal or renunciation of sovereign rights, previously independent
States may gradually lose their political existence. The history of the
German Empire offers examples of this mode of formation, the history
of France of this mode of extinction. The centralization of France, espe-
cially since Louis XI, has thus by degrees abolished a number of ‘sover-
eign seigniories’; but Germany too, since the Revolution, has shown a
similar tendency in its mediatisations.Chapter VI: Speculative Theories
I. The State of Nature
Philosophical speculation is fond of imagining a primitive condition in
which men lived without government, and then asking how from that
condition mankind has arrived at the State. The popular imagination
has often decked out this primitive condition with smiling pictures of
innocence and abundance of natural enjoyments, and dreamed of a golden
age of Paradise, in which there were as yet no evils and no injustice,
while all enjoyed themselves in the unlimited freedom and happiness of
their peaceful existence. In this primeval condition there was supposed
to be no property, since the superabundance of nature gave to every one
in sufficiency all that his unsophisticated and uncorrupted tastes could
require. As yet there was no difference of ranks, nor even of callings.
Every one was like another. Then too there was neither ruler nor sub-
ject, nor magistrate, nor judge, nor army, nor taxes.208
In comparison with such an ideal the later political condition of
man must appear perversion and decline. Only when men encountered
previously unknown plagues, when passions were aroused in their breasts,
and new dangers appeared, and guilt destroyed the peace of their souls,
was there needed a power to terrify and to punish the wicked, and to
secure the enjoyments of all against disturbance. Thus the State was
thought of as a necessary evil, or at least as an institution of compulsion
and constraint to avoid greater evils.
In opposition to this childish and cheerful idea of Paradise, other
and sometimes morose philosophers imagined the non-political condi-
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hate and war of all against all: and if even they thought the State an evil,
yet this evil was more endurable and less than the original ‘state of
nature’ in which men were like wild beasts.209 This philosophical idea
found a welcome confirmation in the theological speculation which re-
garded the State not as the organization of Paradise, but of fallen hu-
manity.
Both these views overlook the political nature of man, both ignore
the truth210 which Aristotle expressed so well, that man is ‘a political
animal.’ We may imagine a condition of man which preceded the rise of
the State, but this condition could never have satisfied his higher needs,211
and it was an immeasurable advance in his development when the germ
of political capacity unfolded itself and came to light.Chapter VII: II. The State as a Divine Institution
In antiquity as well as during the middle ages the belief in the divine
institution of the State was more extended and more intense than at the
present day. But even then this divine foundation of the State was un-
derstood in very different senses.
2 According to one view, the State was the immediate work of God,
the direct revelation upon earth of the divine government. This view lay
at the basis of the Jewish theocracy, and its logical consequence is al-
ways the theocratical form of the State to which alone it is adapted. If
God has founded the State directly, it is natural that He should maintain
and govern it directly.
According to another view, the State is only indirectly founded by
God, and is only indirectly governed by God.212 This view was shared
by the Greeks and Romans. Their States were by no means theocratic
but thoroughly human, yet no public business of any importance was
undertaken in antiquity without prayer and sacrifice preceding, and the
care of the auspices, by which the will of the gods was discovered,
occupied a great place in the public law of the Romans. They united a
consciousness of human freedom and self-determination with the belief
in a divine direction of human affairs; and if even in the destiny of the
individual the power of the gods was felt, it appeared to them still clearer
that the destiny of that great moral community, which we call the State,
could not be separated from the will and working of deity.213 Were they
mistaken?
It is self-evident that Christianity cannot regard the State as outside
the divine ordering and government of the world. It is significant for the234/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
Christian conception that the apostle Paul, at a time when the Emperor
Nero was persecuting the Christians, addressed these heinous words to
the Romans (xiii. 1): ‘Let every soul be in subjection to the higher pow-
ers: for there is no power but of God; and the powers that be are or-
dained of God.’ Thus it is natural enough that during the whole middle
ages, in all Christian States, the sovereign authority was derived from
God, and the highest authority, that of the Emperor, immediately and
directly.214
Grand as is the view which connects the rise and fall of States with
the divine government of the world, and high as its moral significance is
always to be accounted, we must not overlook that this is essentially
religious, and not political; and thus this idea, if made a political and
legal principle, causes and palliates errors and abuses. Thus—
1. God has indeed made man a political being, but at the same time
has made him free to realise the implanted idea of the State by his own
exertions and according to his own judgment, and in the forms which
seem suited to him. It is a profound error to reject particular forms of
the State, for instance the republican, because God rules the world as a
king.
2. Authority is indeed in principle and in fact dependent on God, but
not in the sense that God has exalted particular privileged persons above
the limitations of human nature, set them nearer to Himself and made
them demigods, nor in the sense that God has named human rulers as
His personal representatives, identical with Himself so far as their au-
thority extends.215 Such theocratical ideas contradict the human nature
of those to whom the government of the State is entrusted. The proud
words of Louis XIV, ‘We princes are the living images of Him who is all
holy and all powerful,’216 are a blasphemy towards God, and an insult
towards his subjects—men as much as he.
3. Many understand the authority, distinct from the persons who
exercise it, as superhuman and politico-divine. Stahl says,217 ‘The au-
thority of the State is of God, not only in the sense that all rights are of
God, property, marriage, paternal authority, but in the quite specific
sense, that it is the work of God which He regulates. The State rules, not
merely in virtue of the rights which God has given it, as a father does
over his children, but it rules in the name of God, therefore it is that the
State is clothed with majesty.’ But this is to come back to an objective
theocracy, which would practically lead to the ruler being considered
the personal representative of God—a view which Stahl himself rejects—The Theory of the State/235
and would introduce again all the assumptions and abuses bound up
with it. Christ himself by his saying, ‘Render unto Caesar the things
that are Caesar’s, and unto God the things that are God’s,’ has clearly
and decidedly pointed out the human character of the State, and rejected
every identification of political authority with specifically divine rule.
Therefore political science does well in considering the existence and
institutions of the State from the human point of view.
4. Not infrequently the immutability of the existing constitution,
and especially of the person of the ruler or of his dynasty, has been
defended by the principle that the ‘powers that be are ordained of God.’
But that the immutability of the external forms and of personal relations
is no necessary part of the divine government of the world, is shown by
the whole of history; and Paul’s very advice, to obey ‘the powers that
be,’ recognises indirectly the mutability of political institutions. In the
seventeenth century, indeed, that precept might cause many pious En-
glishmen to have sincere scruples whether it was right to resist the tyr-
anny of James II, and to deprive him of his throne; but after William of
Orange was recognised as king by the nation and the parliament, even
the most scrupulous and conscientious religious Tory could honour in
him ‘the power ordained of God.’218
5. It is the same with the question of responsibility. That statesmen
to whom much is entrusted, and that princes who have power conferred
on them, are responsible to God for what they do or omit, follows from
the previous principle; but that does not decide on the further question,
whether and how far they are also responsible to a human judge. Irre-
sponsibility to human judges is claimed for the highest authority in the
State, not because it is specially divine, but simply because it is the
highest.
The statesman must not, in the belief that God determines the des-
tiny of nations and States, and in the confidence that God will govern
well, tempt God and shirk his own responsibility. Rather, he is not freed
from his own responsibility, until he has conscientiously fulfilled the
task entrusted to him to the best of his power.219
Note. The history of the expression ‘by the grace of God,’ which is
added to the title of kings, deserves attention. At different periods it has
had different senses.
(a) The expression was especially used in the middle ages. The old
Franks kings used indifferently the forms, ‘gratis Dei,’ ‘divina ordinante
providertia,’ ‘divina favente gratia,’ ‘divina favente elmentia,’ ‘per236/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
Dei misericordiam.’ At that time the expression signified merely the
humble reverence and religious gratitude of the king towards God, to
whom he ascribed his personal elevation; but it was used by elected as
well as hereditary princes. King Pipin, who owed his elevation to a
revolution, used the formula as readily as his son Charles the Great. In
the Frankish period it expressed no sovereign power. Bishops and ab-
bots, although legally chosen or appointed by kings, and temporal counts,
although royal officials, added this formula to their titles.
(b) In the German-Roman Empire the expression at first continued
in the same way. Not only elected kings, but dukes, counts who held
offices under the king, and bishops and abbots recognised in the same
way the grace of God. Sometimes temporal magnates add to the grace
of God the grace of the emperor, and spiritual princes the grace of the
pope ‘Dei et imperiali gratis,’ ‘Dei et apostolical sedis gratia.’
Gradually, however, the exclusive use of the phrase ‘Grace of God’
comes to signify immediate or direct authority; as opposed to the de-
rived authority of a vassal. The expression corresponded above all to
the mediaeval tendency to derive all power from God.
(c) After the Reformation the Lutheran theologians began to pro-
claim the saying of Paul, ‘the powers that be, are ordained of God,’ as a
Christian dogma, and to declare those in authority the anointed repre-
sentatives of God. Luther himself was less narrow: he once wrote to
King Henry VIII of England: ‘I, Martin Luther, by the grace of God
ecclesiastes, to Henry, by the ungrace of God King of England.’... The
theologians who held by the letter did not consider that the apostle Paul
expressly applied that saying to the Roman Emperor Nero, who had
received his power from the Roman people, and meant to oppose the
theocratically minded Jewish Christians who contemned the heathen
emperor. They overlooked the fact that the apostle Peter had quite the
same intention, when he recommended to the Christians obedience to
human government (I Peter ii. 13). They gloried in being the defenders
of the divine right of temporal princes.
(d) Still more decidedly Louis XIV of France and James II of En-
gland attempted to make ‘the grace of God’ a new political dogma, and
thereby to obtain a higher sanction for the absolutism of the king. Un-
like all the other human rights of property, family, parliament, the right
of the king was to be specifically divine, that is to say, absolute. He was
to be raised above the sphere of human law. Meantime the French es-
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resisted still more vigorously. The English Revolution of 1688 and the
French Revolution of 1789 definitely rejected this theocratical principle.
(e) The most decided adversaries of this principle were the German
publicists, Puffendorff and Thomasius, but above all, Frederick the Great,
who saw in it the fundamental error of European politics.
(f) Stahl has recently attempted to give a new acceptance to the
false idea, and to smuggle it anew into the theory of the State in the form
of an objective divine right of authority, as distinct from the personal
deification of the absolute king. In vain: the modern world cannot be
bewitched by this abortive product of a diseased imagination.Chapter VIII: III. The Theory of Force
‘The State is the work of violent domination, it is based on the right of
the stronger.’ Thus we are assured by certain philosophers, but still
oftener by despots.
This doctrine is favourable to despotism, for it justifies every act of
violence; but it may also serve the purpose of revolutionaries as soon as
they are strong enough to exercise force openly. It is ordinarily invoked
by the brutal might which violates right. It is a sophism attractive only
for the strong, more likely to crush than to deceive the weak: it may
deceive the man who holds it, but not others.
It has been said that history proves the truth of this opinion. Cer-
tainly, force shows itself more often in the foundation of States than
contract, but only very seldom has brute force alone arbitrarily pro-
duced States, and never great and lasting States. As a rule, if force,
especially in the form of war, has had its share in the foundation of new
States, the force was still only the servant of real claims of right. It was
not the source of right, but only broke through the obstacles which pre-
vented it flowing in its proper channels. Might did not create right, but
supported it, and compelled recognition for it. Wherever in history force
appears in its nakedness, there it is not an instrument of creation, but of
destruction and death.
This doctrine is a most flagrant contradiction of the conception of
personal freedom. It recognizes only masters and slaves. By free men
(liberi) it understands freed men (libertini). It equally contradicts the
idea of Right or Law, which manifestly has a spiritual and moral signifi-
cance: mere physical force ought to serve right and, if it pretends to beThe Theory of the State/239
right, it has risen against its proper master.220
However, even the errors of this doctrine contain a residuum of
truth. It makes prominent one element which is indispensable to the
State, namely force (Macht), and has a certain justification as against
the opposed theory which bases the State upon the arbitrary will of
individuals, and leads logically to political impotence. It lays emphasis
on realities and on facts, and warns us against vain attempts at realising
the dreams of mere speculation, where natural forces resist.
Without force a State can neither come into being nor continue.
Force is required within, as well as without; where force has produced
firm and enduring results, it seeks and commonly obtains a connection
with right, that is a recognition and purification by means of right. With-
out right the might of the stronger is brutal, it is the wolf that devours
the lamb. United with right, it becomes worthy of the moral nature of
man.Chapter IX: IV. The Theory of Contract
Especially since the time of Rousseau, the doctrine that the State is a
free work of contract, of convention between its citizens, has enjoyed
great and wide-spread popularity. It flattered men’s self-complacency;
for every one might fancy himself a founder of the State: and it ap-
peared to suit the wishes of all; for every one might interpret the terms
of the contract as he chose. This theory obtained a fatal authority at the
time of the French Revolution. By the help of it the old political forms
were torn down, and manifold but unsuccessful attempts were made to
erect on the ruins a new edifice which should please everybody. But,
although this theory found especial acceptance as the justification of
revolution, it had served before to defend the legitimacy of absolute
ruler.221
What was said of the theory of force applies conversely in this case.
The theory of force, as a rule, favours despotism, but may, exception-
ally, excuse the results of revolution. The theory of contract is espe-
cially favourable to anarchy, but exceptionally defends the oppression
of minorities by arbitrary majorities, or the tyranny of a conqueror over
those who have surrendered to him.
This theory claims universal validity. It makes the rise, and in a
certain sense also the continuance, of all States depend on contract. But
history does not afford a single instance in which a State has really been
brought about by contract between individuals. There are indeed par-
ticular cases of contracts between two or more States which have pro-
duced a new State: there are also some cases in which princes and chiefs
have, by a contract with particular classes or estates of the people, pro-The Theory of the State/241
duced new constitutions: but there is no instance in which a State has
been formed like a trading or an insurance company by its ‘equal’ citi-
zens. The opinion that the continuance of States depends upon a per-
petual renewal of contract between individuals, receives as little sup-
port from history. Rather do we find that the individual is born as a
member of the State, and is begotten, born and educated with the par-
ticular characteristics of his nation and his country before he is in a
position to have and to express a will of his own.
The evidence of history is thus absolutely opposed to this theory.
Even at the time when the doctrine of social contract was most widely
accepted and exercised most influence, it was contradicted by manifest
facts. The people was broken up into ‘free and equal citizens,’ but even
in the primary assemblies the minorities did not contract with the ma-
jorities, who carried out their will as if it had a superiority and validity
of its own. The Constituent Assembly eras indeed regarded as a selec-
tion and a representation of all the citizens, and had as its appointed task
to agree upon a constitution; but even here the form of procedure was
that of a decision of one united body, rather than of a contract between
a number of individuals. People adopted a fiction of contract, and de-
ceived themselves and others by speaking of the consent of individuals,
where the majority, as organ of the whole, was exercising an authority
which was often an intolerable tyranny.222
This theory may be disproved not only by history but by logical
criticism. It assumes the freedom and the equality of the individuals
who conclude the contract; but political freedom, which is here presup-
posed, is only conceivable in the State, and not outside it. Man has
indeed the aptitude for this freedom, just as he has the impulse to, and
the need for, the State, but this freedom can never be realised, except in
the organic freedom of the State. Further, if individuals were only equal,
a State could never come into being, for it implies as a necessary condi-
tion political inequality, without which there is neither ruler nor ruled.223
The main error lies in representing individuals as contracting. If
individuals make contracts, private rights are created, but not public
rights. What belongs to the individual as such, is his private property,
his individual possessions. With that he can deal, one like another can
make contracts about it. But contracts cannot have a political character
unless there is already a community above the individuals; for a con-
tract, if political, does not deal with the private good of individuals, but
with the public good of the community.242/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
Thus, neither a nation nor a State can arise out of contract between
individuals. A sum of individual wills does not produce a common will.
The renunciation of any number of private rights does not produce any
public right.
For practical politics this doctrine is in the highest degree: danger-
ous, since it makes the State and its institutions the produce of indi-
vidual caprice, and declares it to be changeable according to the will of
the individuals then living. It destroys the conception of public law,
instigates the citizens to unconstitutional movements, and exposes the
State to the uttermost insecurity and confusion. It is to be considered,
therefore, a theory of anarchy rather than a political doctrine.
Nevertheless, it contains an element of truth. In opposition to the
theory which sees in the State a mere product of nature, it accentuates
the truth that the human will can determine and influence the formation
of the State; and in contradiction to a thoughtless empiricism, it vindi-
cates the rights of human freedom and the rationality of the State.
Notes—l. The famous sentence of Aristotle (Pol. i. 2, §12), that the
State is prior to the individual citizen as the whole is prior to the part,
contradicts the idea that the State can be made out of individuals. The
political individual, the citizen, is only a member in the body of the
State, and can have no separate existence apart from his connection
with it.
2. The error of founding the State upon individual will is connected
with the more widely accepted error of supposing that Right or Law
(Recht) is the product of Will. Certainly the free will of man is able to
affect and alter in many ways what is right and just, but the greatest part
of this has been fixed from everlasting by the order of the world and the
nature of men and circumstances, and is altogether independent of the
will of men. Most Right is not invented, but discovered arid recognised,
found not formed. ‘Thou shalt’ has greater influence in the production
of law than ‘we will.’ Even Hegel, who derives Right, not from ‘the
particular individual will,’ but from ‘the true will,’ which is ‘in and for
itself,’ has not properly comprehended the nature of Right, although he
has completely seen the error of the theory of contract. Compare
Philosophie des Rechts, §258.
3. The Genevese citizen J. J. Rousseau by his brilliant dialectic
obtained the victory for the theory of contract in public opinion. An-
other Swiss, the Bernese patrician, Ludwig von Haller, attacked the
prevalent doctrine of the law of nature with great energy, and thoroughlyThe Theory of the State/243
refuted the theory of contract. He was less successful in the positive
part of his system, which he celled ‘Restoration.’ His doctrine ought not
to be confounded with the theory of force: but he is the teacher of reac-
tion, as Rousseau was of revolution.
Haller founds the State upon ‘the natural law that the stronger rules.’
In the superiority of the one, and in the need of the other, be recognises
the basis of all rule, and of all dependence. He calls it an external, unal-
terable ordinance of God, but this shows that by might he does not mean
the same thing as force, and he carries out the opposition between them.
‘Power is limited by duty, by the moral law which God has written on
the hearts of men, which reveals itself in the conscience of children, and
in all times among all peoples: ‘Shun evil and do good,’ and ‘Injure no
one and leave to every one his own.’ The law of justice and the law of
love guard against power (potentia) degenerating into violence (vis).
These two laws are implanted by God in man, they are innate, they are
universal and necessary, eternal and unalterable, they are intelligible to
every one, and the highest and mightiest, to whom all other human laws
must submit, cannot be dispensed from the observance of them by any
one. They are also the mildest and most loving, their yoke is easy and
their burden is light. Not the will of the whole people, not the common
good, not even the fear of man’s violence, but the will of God alone is
the basis of this law of duty. Thus it is valid even for the powerful, every
transgression of it is a forbidden misuse of force, whether committed by
the meanest head of a house or the greatest potentate—a want of justice
or a want of love. Justice must be demanded from the strong as from the
weak. Love and benevolence must be expected from the better part of
the human heart. Against the possible misuse of the highest power there
is no help to be found in human arrangements. There is no human judge
over the sovereign. There is no help except in God. ‘The belief in God,’
as Plutarch says, ‘is the bond and cement of all human society, and the
support of justice.’ Religion alone can keep power in its limits, and
strengthen the weak.
We have reproduced the chief points in Haller’s doctrines in his
own words. It is obvious that he derives Right and the State, not from
justice but from power, and regards the former only as a limit of the
latter. Might and might alone produces right. The greater the might, the
higher the right. Whereas, in truth, might alone is only de facto and not
de jure. This train of thought pervades the whole system. Reverence for
actual power often prevents him seeing the ideal moral character of244/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
Law; the desire to secure the highest power, and the right of the sover-
eign against every infringement sometimes becomes contempt and ha-
tred towards every endeavour to secure the rights of subjects against
misuse of supreme power, and to limit its exercise—as if it were a crime
to protect the divine law of duty by human arrangements against human
violation. He is therefore a declared opponent of the whole constitu-
tional system, and he works out in an extreme manner the medieval idea
that sovereignty is a property.
[For a criticism of this chapter of Bluntschli’s see A. Fouillée, La
Science Sociale Contemporaine, ch. i. M. Fouillée defends the theory
of Social Contract as an expression of the ideal of the state.]Chapter X: V. The Natural Sociability and Political
Consciousness of Man
It is not enough to refute the current speculative theories. We have still
to discover the one common cause of the rise of States, as distinct from
the manifold forms in which they appear. This we find in human nature,
which besides its individual diversity has in it the tendencies of commu-
nity and unity. These tendencies are developed, and peoples feel them-
selves to be nations, and seek a corresponding outward form. Thus the
inward impulse to Society (Statstrich224) produces external organiza-
tion of common life in the form of manly self government, that is, in the
form of the State.
This social tendency works at first instinctively and unconsciously.
The many look up, half with trust and half with fear, to a leader by
whose courage and genius they are impressed, and whom they honour
as the supreme expression of their community. They arrange themselves
under him, and obey his commands. Gradually, however, with advanc-
ing civilisation and experience, the hidden impulse reveals itself, and
there is formed a consciousness and a will of the State, first of all, as is
natural, in the leaders and chiefs of the people: in them it becomes an
active consciousness and an ordering and effective will of the State,
while the mass of the governed does not as yet advance beyond a pas-
sive consciousness of the State. Gradually this consciousness extends
itself among the higher, and at last also among the lower classes and
orders of Society, and becomes even among them active and effective.
This assumption of a political tendency in human nature at first
unconscious, but afterwards conscious, does not contradict the histori-246/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
cal origin of States, but explains them.
Among the powerful it rises to the passion of domination, among
the weak it becomes servile submission, but among the free it is enlight-
ened by understanding and filled by that moral self-consciousness which
is in harmony with the moral common consciousness. Only the free
State is a true State, for only in it is there a common political spirit
(Statsgeist) permeating all classes of the people.
This view, which had already been expressed by the ancients,225
contains all that is true in the false speculative theories, without the
accompanying errors. The State is indirectly divine, since God has im-
planted the social impulse in human nature, and has, in this way, willed
the realisation of the State. Sound religious feeling is thus not injured by
our declaring the State to be, in the first place, the appointed work of
man. Again, our view recognises the significance of the real force which
is indispensable for the formation of the State; for the essential power
depends upon the common impulses of human nature. Finally, the ele-
ment of free will has its rights accorded to it; but instead of scattered
individual wills, we recognise the common will of the nation or the State.
This general will exists in germ among a people as naturally as the
tendency to union and organization, which we call the political tendency.
This common will, in manifesting itself, becomes the will of the State,
whereas mere individual will remains individual even if two individuals
make a contract between them. Thus the proper expression of the com-
mon will not a Contract, but a Law (Gesetz) in the case of permanent
regulations, an Order (Befehl) in the case of administrative police, a
Judgment (Urtheil) in the administration of justice. The State has in
itself organs which enable the common will to become conscious of
itself, to resolve, and to carry out its resolutions.
The State is thus not an arrangement only for the purpose of taming
evil passions. It is not a necessary evil, but a necessary good. Only by
the realisation of the State can peoples and humanity, taken collectively,
manifest their real inward unity and attain to a free corporate existence.
The State is the fulfilment of common order, and the organisation for
the perfection of common life in all public matters.
Thus understood, the State is in the first place a human and terres-
trial formation; but nothing prevents us from placing alongside of the
religious ideal of an invisible Church, which is a community of spirits
united by religion, the political ideal of an invisible State which is a
community of spirits united politically. Theologians speak of a moreThe Theory of the State/247
perfect Church in heaven, and so the statesman may consider the earthly
State as only a preparation for the heavenly.
But the actual State is that in which we live and work. Political
science has to do with it alone, and such a State is to be completely
explained and understood from a consideration of human nature.Book V: The End of The StateChapter I: The State an End or a Means? How
Far Is it End or Means?
The question is often raised whether the State is an end or a means? i.e.,
whether the State has an end in itself (Selbstsweck), or simply serves as
a means to enable individuals to attain their ends?
The ancient theory of the State, especially that of the Greeks, re-
garded the State as the highest aim of human life, as perfect humanity,
and was therefore inclined to regard a the State as an end an itself. As
compared with the State, individual men appeared only as parts, not as
beings with separate personal rights. The State did not serve the indi-
vidual, but the individual the State, as the member serves the body. The
welfare of private men was therefore unhesitatingly sacrificed to that of
the State, and in fact the former was only so far justified and valuable as
it was serviceable to the welfare of the State. In the same way individual
freedom was only regarded as a part of national freedom, and met with
neither encouragement nor protection when it sought to go its own way
in opposition to the general welfare of the nation and the State.
In complete opposition to this fundamental theory of the ancients is
the opinion, which has been often maintained by English and American
writers, that the State is not an end in itself, but is simply a means to
secure the welfare of individuals. Macaulay repeatedly throughout his
works226 maintains that the chief defect of ancient politicians and of
Machiavelli lies in the fact that they do not, like the moderns, recognise
the great principle that ‘societies and laws exist only for the object of
increasing the sum of private happiness.’ This modern school regards
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security for their life, their property, and their personal freedom, or at
most as an artificial creation designed to raise and promote the welfare
and happiness of all individuals, or at any rate of the greater number.
Since the time of Bacon this opinion has been zealously defended by
many politicians, and even by theorists. No one can really deny it who
sees in the State only a collection of individuals. Macaulay believes that
the improvement in the conduct of public affairs in recent times is chiefly
due to the influence of this theory. Robert von Mohl considers it prepos-
terous to attribute equal importance to men and to a mere institution for
their welfare.
It seems to me that both the ancient and the modern view contain a
germ of truth; but both commit the error of regarding only one side of
the matter and of overlooking or denying the other side.
The form of the question itself, whether the State is a means or an
end, leads to this one-sidedness and therefore to error. From one point of
view a thing may be regarded as a means for obtaining other ends, from
another as containing Its end in itself. A picture is often a means of
obtaining a livelihood for the artist or a profit for the picture-dealer. Yet
a true work of art is to the artist the aim of his highest effort; he sees in
it the expression of his most vivid feelings, the embodiment of his ideal.
In this way it has its end in itself. So, too, marriage serves undoubtedly
as a means for husband and wife to satisfy their individual needs, and to
open to both a more happy existence. But marriage is also the union of
two sexes separated by nature, and on this union is founded the family,
i.e., a higher collective unit, to which the individual existence of all its
members is subordinate. Each member of the family is willing to sacri-
fice a part of his personal interests and will to the higher end which is
involved in marriage and the family.
The same is true of the State. On the one hand it is a means for the
advantage of the individuals who compose it. From another point of
view it has an end in itself, and for its sake the individuals are subordi-
nate, and bound to serve it.
The one-sided view of the ancients, which overlooked the individual
in the nation, seriously endangered his liberty and his welfare, and led
up directly to the conception of the omnipotence, which easily degener-
ated into the tyranny, of the State.
The equally one-sided view of the moderns, which is unable to see
the wood for the trees, fails to recognise the majesty of the State, and
thus tends to dissolve it into a confused mob of individuals and to en-252/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
courage anarchy.
The ancients failed to give sufficient attention to an important task
of the State, viz., the protection of personal freedom and the promotion
of the personal welfare of the majority. Modern politics can claim the
merit of having recognised this function of the State, and of having
brought it into more general practice than the ancients did. In the present
day a policy is justly regarded as contemptible and hateful which treats
the welfare of individuals as a ball to be tossed about at the caprice of
rulers, or dropped altogether at the dictation of circumstances. It is ac-
knowledged now that law and its administrators do not merely exercise
rule over individuals, but render very essential and important services
to them. A large number of useful and beneficent public institutions in
the present day owe their origin to this view. It is to it that we must trace
the modern development of personal freedom, and especially of freedom
of opinion. It has been applied by Christianity to the religious life, and
by the Teutonic sense of law to the whole legal existence of the indi-
vidual.
But in spite of this it is a logical and political error to maintain that
the State exists only for the sake of private individuals, and that the
administration has no object but to care for their welfare. Such a con-
tention would destroy the very essence of the State, and would reduce
Public Law (Statsrecht) into a mere preliminary condition of Private
Law (Privatrecht). In all nations of a manly spirit there are thousands
of men who, when the State is in danger or need, will undertake heavy
burdens, and will endanger both the peace of their families and their
own lives. This spirit of self-sacrifice can only be explained on the sup-
position that these men prefer the safety and welfare of their State and
nation to their own. The deeds of ancient heroes would be the folly of
idle fanaticism if the State were only a means of serving individual in-
terests, if the collective life of the nation had not a higher value than the
life of many individuals. In the great dangers and crises of the national
life it becomes clear to men that the State is something better and higher
than a mutual assurance society. When the love of fatherland is kindled,
it melts the selfish ambition of the individual, and when once the sense
of duty towards the State is awakened in the masses it inspires and
elevates them.
Just as the nation is something more than the sum of persons be-
longing to it, so the national welfare is not the same as the sum of indi-
vidual welfare. It is true that a close relationship exists between the two,The Theory of the State/253
and that they usually rise and fall together. If the individual welfare of
the majority is diminished, that of the State is usually, suffering from
serious evils. But the lines and direction of the two are not always par-
allel. Sometimes they cross each other, and sometimes they are alto-
gether separate. Every now and then the State is compelled, either for its
own preservation, or in the interest of future generations, to make heavy
demands from its present members, and to impose weighty burdens upon
them. It sometimes happens, also, that the needs of individual welfare
call for extra ordinary aid and support from the State, which thus incurs
serious obligations.
It follows from this that we must examine more closely under what
conditions the State is a means for individual interests, and under what
conditions and within what limits the State, as an end in itself, is justi-
fied in demanding the subordination of its individual members.
[Cp. Fouillée. Science Sociale Contemporaine, p. 253: ‘En un sens,
la societé humaine n’est qu’un moyen; en un autre, elle est une fin,
parce qu’en derrière analyse elle se résout en une multiplicité innombrable
d’individus qui travaillent chacun pour le bien de tous et tous pour le
bien de chacun.’]Chapter II: False Views of The End of The State
It has often been asserted in theory, and still more often in practice, that
the real end of the State is the rule of the supreme power, especially of
princes over their subjects.
If the maintenance of this rule were the end of the State, the logical
conclusion must be that the ideal State should be as absolute and as
extensive as possible, so that the final aim of political effort would be
absolute universal monarchy, or rather universal despotism. This would
make it impossible to reconcile national freedom with the development
of human powers.
The whole conception has its origin, not in human nature, nor in the
social impulses which nature has implanted in mankind, but in the am-
bition of rulers and their haughty desire to exalt themselves.
Aristotle long ago condemned this opinion in the famous dictum,227
‘All constitutions which regard only the private good of the rulers are
corruptions or perversions of the normal constitutions.’ It is forgotten
that a nation exists within the State; that the subjects are men like their
rulers, and possess the same human capacities, feelings and powers;
that it is therefore preposterous to regard the one class as the sole pos-
sessors of political rights, and the others as simple objects of their rule,
as things. All the arguments against slavery are equally valid against
this sort of despotism.
Rule is unquestionably an attribute of the power of the State, but it
is not the end of the State; on the contrary it is a means to realise the end
of the State. It is rather a duty towards the nation than a right to be
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Rule therefore requires to be limited and defined by the constitu-
tion. The ideal of a State which approaches as nearly as possible to
perfection does not consist in absolute, but in constitutional, i.e., rela-
tive rule. It often happens that some form of government, originally
founded with good intentions, ceases in time to suit the altered condi-
tions of a nation. In such a case it cannot be the duty of a healthy policy
to leave this system unaltered just as it was inherited from previous
generations: on the contrary, one’s aim should be to improve the now
useless system, and to restore harmony with the other conditions of the
national life.
According to the theocratic theory, the end of the State is the
realisation of God’s kingdom upon earth. Stahl228 says: ‘The duty of
the State depends upon the service of God. It should establish the rule of
God, and maintain justice, discipline, and morality, which are God’s
commands for social life.’ In the middle ages this conception was gener-
ally believed both by Christians and Mohammedans. But the modern
world, while granting the religious importance of this view, and fully
comprehending how the whole machinery of the world was revealed to
the pious spirit by the light of the divine administration, utterly rejects
the erroneous and fatal way in which divine rule was applied to direct
the conduct of human affairs.
The comparison on which the idea of theocracy rests, that the prince
rules over a nation as God rules over the world, is obviously false. God’s
rule over the world is the rule of an absolute over relative beings, of the
creator over his creatures: we cannot discover his origin, nor can we
define its methods or its objects. The rule of a prince over a nation is the
rule of a man over men, i.e., similar beings; the prince’s life is guided
and his qualities limited just as those of his subjects, and the latter are
fully capable of criticising him from a human standpoint.
The comparison of a prince with God is therefore false from every
point of view, and, as it leads to pride and excessive self-esteem, it is
also harmful. The end of the State must be recognizable by men, it must
be determined by human nature, and it must be at any rate nearly attain-
able by human effort.
It is altogether erroneous to place the end of the State outside the
people and country which form it, so that it becomes merely a means to
secure external objects.
The clerical party has been accustomed to prove the necessity of the
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ity of the Roman Catholic Church require a Pope who shall be at the
same time sovereign ruler in Rome. They fail to perceive that this argu-
ment clearly tells against the temporal power. For by it they deny the
independence of the Papal States, and with it their character as a State,
because no State can exist as the slave, wanting both will and legal
rights, of some external power, even though this latter be the Roman
Catholic Church. They presume that the Roman people who compose
this State have submitted to a political serfdom in the interests of a
religious and non-political community, a presumption which is equally
opposed to the character of the people and to the religious nature of the
Church.
History has declared its judgment upon this enormity. Rome now
belongs, not to Catholic Christendom, which is divided into many States,
but to the Roman, or rather to the Italian, nation, of which the Romans
are members.
But even in the present day there are several examples of the same
error. The principality of Lichtenstein obviously does not exist for the
sake of the small village of Lichtenstein and its scanty population. It
serves only for an external object, viz., to support the rank and dignity
of the princely dynasty which lives outside the country at the imperial
court of Austria. This is obviously a State which has not its end in itself.Chapter III: Insufficient or Exaggerated Views of
The End of The State
After Kant and Fichte the opinion long prevailed in Germany that the
true end of the State was merely the assurance of rights, and especially
those of person and property.
Kant (Rechtslehre, §§ 47–49) expressly declared that ‘the safety
(i.e., the end) of the State does not consist in the welfare or happiness of
the citizens, but in the agreement of the constitution with the principles
of law.’ Fichte (Naturrecht, in his Works, iii. 152) maintains that ‘the
assurance of the rights of all men is the only general will’ (i.e.. the will
of the State). Starting from this view of Kant, Wilhelm von Humboldt
assigns very narrow limits to the activity of the State, and defines its end
as ‘the maintenance of security against both external enemies and inter-
nal dissensions.’229 Even in our own century, when the idea of national-
ity is so strong, Eötvös (Moderne Ideen, ii, 91) maintains that ‘the end
of the State is the security of the individual.’ This opinion arose in the
latter half of the eighteenth century.230 In those days men sought to find
some fundamental limitation to the over-government of that enlightened
despotism which, benevolent as it was, proved oppressive and destruc-
tive of personal freedom, and which was accustomed to justify every
interference with family life, with the free choice of a career, and with
the administration of private revenues, by a professed regard for the
general welfare. The definition of the end of the State as the mainte-
nance of legal security seemed to offer a convenient weapon for oppos-
ing this over-government successfully, and the State thus limited was
termed a Rechtsstat (Legal State), in opposition to the detested Polizeistat258/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
(Police State).231
This narrowing of public life by restricting the end of the State
failed to satisfy either the instincts or the necessities of modern nations.
No one doubted that the maintenance of legal security is one of the
duties of the State, but no modern nation or government could allow its
political activity to be limited to so narrow a domain. Even the champi-
ons of the opinion were compelled by their personal experience to break
through these limits, and to direct their policy to higher ends. Fichte
began by asserting that the ‘protection of property’ was the chief end of
the State, but in the great struggle against the universal despotism of
Napoleon, which was willing enough to protect property, he rose to the
conception of a national State, which should serve as the organ of the
national spirit. As a Prussian minister, Wilhelm von Humboldt strove to
effect the intellectual advancement of the Prussian nation by means of
State-schools, though in his theory he had condemned them, and to ex-
tend the power of the Prussian State, though it was already amply suffi-
cient to enforce civil and criminal law.
In fact this formula about legal security does not exhaust the end of
the State, and especially of the civilised State of modern times: it would
correspond much more to the views of the middle ages, which did not
advance far beyond the conception of private law.
The sense of law (Rechtssinn) is not the only active force in a na-
tion. It has also a number of economic necessities, which have nothing
to do with legal security, such as roads, canals, railways, posts and
telegraphs. The State alone can satisfy these needs, and it would not
venture to do so if its sole end was the assurance of rights. Again, the
nation has important intellectual interests, national schools, schools of
science and art, technical schools. For these the care of the State is
indispensable; it is impossible to leave them to the chance of private
caprice or to the calculating authority of the Church, which is always
seeking to bring the State under its own control. The middle ages ne-
glected these interests because they adopted this narrow view of the
State as an institution for maintaining legal security.
Moreover, the nation is a political being, which is concerned not
only with the making and administration of laws for the security of
private rights, but in a far higher degree with political government and
the development of its liberties. This insufficient definition of the end of
the State, when practically applied, has the following results:—
(a) The neglect of economic interests.The Theory of the State/259
(b) The neglect of common intellectual interests.
(c) The paralysis and death of public spirit in the nation, and thus
the weakening of the power of the State.
(d) The encouragement of a petty and pedantic system of law, the
result of which is a litigious temper fatal to the authority of the State.
Another equally prevalent view, that the general happiness is the
true end of the State, is as much too wide as the former is too narrow.
The happiness of men is for the most part independent of the State. Even
most of the material goods on which human welfare is dependent, e.g.,
dwelling, food, clothing and income, are acquired, not through the State,
but by the labour and saving of individuals. Still more is this true of the
spiritual goods, on which the ideal wealth and happiness of mankind are
founded. It is not the State which endows men with their talents and
capacities; these are the gift of nature, and they differ in individual cases
instead of being common to all. The State can confer on no one the
delights of friendship and love, the charm of scientific study or of poeti-
cal and artistic creation, the consolations of religion, or the purity and
sanctification of the soul united with God.
Men are not citizens in their whole life and being; they have their
own natural endowments and their special duties. The State rests upon
the community of the nation, not upon the differences of individuals; its
end therefore cannot embrace all the ends of private life.
This error, like the other, has serious and handful results when practi-
cally applied:—
(a) The State is led to encroach upon departments which do not
belong to its rule, and to exercise tyranny when it ought to restrict itself
to the protection of private freedom.
(b) The State being really incapable of managing these departments
of private life, will by unskilful handling do harm and obstruct the natu-
ral development, in spite of its desire to increase the sum total of private
happiness.
(c) As the State strives after unattainable objects and squanders its
forces in a false direction, it will be led away from its true aims, and will
lose part of its power to accomplish those duties that lie to its hand. This
error proved a source of serious evil to the political life of antiquity; but
the party of enlightenment in the eighteenth century went astray in the
same manner. The end of the State in modern politics must be more
accurately defined and limited.Chapter IV: The True End of the State
There is only one conception of the State, although it is realised in very
various ways among different nations and in different lands and peri-
ods. Logic, therefore, compels us to accept also one general view of the
end of the State, in spite of the fact that in history the different nations
who form States strive after very various objects. The unity of the com-
mon end admits of these special differences, but it combines and
harmonises them. Robert von Mohl (Encyclopädie, p. 73) was right in
asserting that each nation has to pursue various objects according to its
special character and needs; but his theory wanted that unity of concep-
tion which is necessary to prevent hopeless diversity and deviations in
the conduct of the State. On the other hand, von Holtzendorff (Politik,
B. iii), who has treated this subject with special attention, gives the
name of ‘harmony of the ends of the State’ to what we call the unity of
the end.
The question now arises, how is this single and supreme end of the
State to be formulated? Many say that it is justice, the realization of
law. This definition seems to us too narrow, and it is erroneous if law is
held to include both public and international law, and is not limited to
the legal security of individuals (comp. Chapter III). Law is rather a
condition of politics than its end: justitia fundamertum regni. And the
life of nations is not only a judicial life; there is also the economical and
intellectual life, and the life of the national power. Even the legal-minded
Romans did not consider jus to be the supreme end of the State.
Hegel, as Plato long before him, says that the end of the State is
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powers which determine and condition the moral life, viz., the spirit of
God and the spirit of the individual man, are both outside the control of
the State. The domain of morality is far more comprehensive than the
domain of politics; and if the State attempts its control it oversteps its
proper limits, and exerts a harmful influence upon morality.
The Romans saw the real function of the State in the public welfare.
Their two expressions, res publica and salus publica, are logically as
well as verbally connected; they are, in fact, as substance and quality, as
potentiality and realization.
This formula of the end of the State has been frequently misunder-
stood, mainly because attention has been given, not to the community
(the res publica), but to the crowd of individuals, or to the wiles of
rulers. It has been used too often to excuse the arbitrary despotism ei-
ther of princes or of majorities, and it has been completely discredited
by the horrors of the Parisian Committee of Public Safety (1793–5).
But the expression is really above criticism, if one regards the natu-
ral limits of the State, and especially the judicial order and administra-
tion, and if one avoids trespassing upon matters outside those limits,
such as the free life of the individual and of religious communities. To
every statesman the welfare of his nation has been the first object to
strive for, and every patriotic citizen is enthusiastic for the safety of his
fatherland. The public welfare is therefore an indispensable object of
policy, and its promotion is undoubtedly the chief duty of the State. This
definition of the end of the State includes also the development and
perfecting of law, and generally the improvement of all common rela-
tions and conditions of life. It includes also the administration of law,
which is necessary to secure the peaceful course of the common life, and
which prevents or punishes wrongs by which the community is harmed.
This political principle of the Romans, salus populi suprema lex esto,
does not err in being too narrow, but rather in straining the power of the
State, and extending it to alien matters.
Still, from one point of view, the expression is insufficient. Although
in ordinary times policy aims at securing the national welfare, yet there
are moments in a nation’s life when it has to face extraordinary duties.
There are circumstances in which the State, like an individual, must risk
its existence, and with it the national welfare. At such a time it may be a
patriotic duty to resign a life which cannot be prolonged with honour.
Suppose that an enemy of overwhelming power offers to a small nation
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peace, or a better administration. A simple regard for the public welfare
would dictate the acceptance of the offer, while its rejection might bring
disaster or even ruin upon the State. Nevertheless it might be a fatal
duty to prefer death with honour rather than voluntary submission to the
foreigner; and it is possible that a heroic and desperate struggle may
secure a subsequent revival of the State. A splendid example of this was
given by the Athenians in the time of Themistocles. Sometimes ruin is
the necessary and worthy termination of an existence that is no longer
possible. The tragic fate of Carthage or of Jerusalem may be deplored,
but in both cases it was inevitable. Sometimes, too, a small State must
perish because its people are no longer capable of maintaining their
independence, and because it is called upon to enter into the higher col-
lective life of a nation. No unprejudiced German or Italian would de-
plore the destruction of those petty States which had become useless
and impotent, but would rather glory in their fusion into a larger and
more important whole. In such cases our formula about the public wel-
fare is insufficient, unless it is applied to the new community.
But all these objections are avoided if we formulate the proper and
direct end of the State as the development of the national capacities,
the perfecting of the national life, and, finally, its completion; provided,
of course, that the process of moral and political development shall not
be opposed to the destiny of humanity. This formula includes everything
that can be regarded as a proper function of the State, and excludes
everything that lies outside the State’s range. It regards the idiosyncra-
sies and the special needs of different nations, and thus, while it firmly
maintains the unity of the end of the State, it secures the variety of its
development. The life-task of every individual is to develop his capaci-
ties and to manifest his essence. So, too, the duty of the State person is
to develop the latent powers of the nation, and to manifest its capacities.
Thus the State has a double function. Firstly, the maintenance of the
national powers; and, secondly, their development. It must secure the
conquests of the past, and it must extend them in the future.
Within this common end are included certain special tendencies.
Very often these are pursued singly, and justification is sought in the
peculiar character of some given nation, but this conduct is fraught with
danger to the State as a whole. As illustrations may he mentioned:—
(1) The development of the national power (Macht). The State must
have power in order to maintain its independence and to enforce its
decrees. It is only as possessing power that a State can exist and live.The Theory of the State/263
But States vary very much according to the kind and degree of this
power.
(a) World-powers ( Weltmächte) are States whose importance and
activity extend far beyond their own domain: they play a decisive part in
the politics of two continents or of the whole world, and therefore they
are specially bound to care for the peace and order of the world (i.e.,
international law).
(b) Great powers (Grossmächte) are not necessarily world-powers,
though every world-power is of course a great power. The world-power
must be a maritime power, because it cannot exert its influence on the
destinies of the world without the connexion given by the sea. But a
great power may be simply a land-power, e.g., Prussia before the for-
mation of the German Empire. So, too, both then and now, Austro-
Hungary is rather a great than a world power. A great power also exerts
an extensive influence far beyond the limits of its own country: it cannot
be overlooked, nor can its voice be disregarded without danger when the
relations of its own continent undergo important alterations. If at any
time either of these powers abuses its strength to oppress other rightful
States, the other powers are justified in resisting. Even a man of great
genius, like Napoleon I, was unable to raise the great power of the French
nation into a European supremacy, and the failure of this attempt led to
his overthrow. So, too, Russia was not strong enough to subdue Turkey.
Austria could not maintain its rule over Italy. The maritime supremacy
of England has been at last compelled to admit the rivalry of other na-
tions.
(c) Intermediate and peaceful powers (neutral States) are not strong
enough to play a great part in foreign politics, and are mostly absorbed
in domestic affairs. The policy of these States, modest as it is, has very
great importance, not only for their own inhabitants, but also because it
limits and moderates the dangerous currents of la grande politique.
(d) Real petty States have only a very dubious and insecure exist-
ence in our epoch, which prefers the formation of greater and stronger
States. They can only secure themselves by seeking the protection of the
great powers, or by attaching themselves to some stronger State. But in
the middle ages the opposite tendency prevailed, and the peoples of Eu-
rope, especially the Germans and Italians, were inclined to favour the
very smallest political units.
A State has two chief means for increasing its power in relation to
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regards as its chief function the maintenance of its military strength, of
the warlike courage of its members, and its armament, is called a mili-
tary State. Examples of such a State are Sparta among the Greeks, and
the kingdom of Prussia before the foundation of the German Empire.
When a State is threatened from without, or is growing to its necessary
limits, this extraordinary strain of its military forces is inevitable. But in
a normal State which has reached its full development, it must never be
forgotten that military power is only a means, and not an end of policy,
and that undue straining of this power will be harmful to the true ends of
the State.
(2) Sometimes also it is economic interests which are specially promi-
nent. Thus we speak of pastoral, agricultural, industrial, and mercantile
States.
It is true that these interests are mainly those of private individuals,
and only in a lesser degree interests of the whole nation. But on this very
account, an exclusive or undue devotion to them leads to the neglect of
the other functions of the State, and damages all other interests. More-
over, the public spirit of such nations is never fully developed, but is
corrupted by the selfish and narrow devotion to private interests. In a
pastoral State the nation will remain poor and ignorant; in an agricul-
tural State men look with mistrust and disfavour upon the higher cul-
ture, because rude manners are the natural accompaniment of their primi-
tive pursuits. To an industrial State the chief dangers lie in disturbances
among the artisans and the exclusion of foreign commodities, while a
mercantile State may be easily led astray by a shop-keeping spirit.
(3) The life of a nation may also be chiefly directed by intellectual
interests, and thus arises what we may call an intellectual State
(Culturstat). The military State of Sparta was opposed, in the time of
Pericles, by the intellectual State of Athens, which has bequeathed to
posterity undying proofs of its love of art and of the capacity of the
Athenians for acquiring knowledge. Florence, Venice, and Antwerp have
had periods in which intellectual interests have surpassed all others.
The Chinese State in the present day is another example, although its
culture is stationary rather than progressive; and both Zürich and Geneva
pride themselves on giving special attention to their public schools.
Noble as these objects are their excessive promotion, to the detri-
ment of the other powers of the nation, is the sign of an unhealthy policy.
(4) In some States the chief function is considered to be the develop-
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thus arise free legal States (freie Rechtsstaten), as notably the Swiss
Cantons and the States of North America. This formula of the end of the
State lies, even more than those discussed above, at the heart of the
general conception of that end.
(5) Finally, when the consciousness of nationality gives the chief
impulse to public life, when the manifestation of national unity seems to
be the chief end of the State, we have national States. Such was France
in former times, and such are in our own day the kingdom of Italy and
the German Empire.
Besides the proper and direct end of the State, which relates to the
nation itself, we must consider all the indirect functions of the State,
which relate merely to private life.
Here it is especially important to find some accurate definition of
the limits of State action.
The duties of an individual may be formulated, like those of the
State, as the development and manifestation of his individual character
and capacity; but again, this must be in harmony with the ends of the
family, of the nation, and of humanity. To fulfil these duties, private
freedom is essential. It is, in the first place, the duty of the State to
protect this private freedom against unjust attack, and especially to avoid
any attempt on its own part to restrict or oppress it.
A preliminary necessity is to form a clear conception of the way in
which the State is limited by its own nature.
(1) The State is an external organization of the common life. It has
organs, therefore, only for things which are externally perceptible, and
not for the inner spiritual life which has never manifested itself in words
or deeds. It is therefore impossible for the State to embrace all the ends
of individual life, because many, and those the most important, sides of
that life are concealed from its view and inaccessible to its power. The
natural gifts of individuals are wholly independent of the State, which
can give neither intelligence to the fool. nor courage to the coward, nor
sight to the blind. The State has no share in kindling love within the
heart; it cannot follow the thought of the student, nor correct the errors
of tradition. As soon as questions arise about the life, and especially the
spiritual life, of individuals the State finds both its insight and its power
hemmed in by limits which it cannot pass.
(2) The State is wholly based upon the common nature of men, and
especially of its own people. Therefore it cannot control private life in
what is essentially individual, but only so far as that life is affected by266/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
the common nature of all men and by common necessities. For example,
the State can secure to all men equally the possession of a corporeal
thing, which we call property, but it must leave to the individual the
disposal and management of this property. The property of Paganini in
his violin, of Liszt in his pianoforte, or of Kaulbach in his crayons, is a
wholly different thing from the property of an unskilled person in those
instruments. With this more subtle form of ownership the State has noth-
ing to do, because it is individual and not common. So, too, the State
can regulate in a rough and general way the conditions of marriage and
the rights of married persons: in fact, it is bound to do so, because upon
these depends the security of the family and the moral health of the
nation. But the manner in which any particular marriage is completed,
and the more delicate forms of family life, lie outside the control of the
State. Wilhelm von Humboldt saw this, and was led astray into a desire
to withdraw the institution of marriage from legal regulation, and to
leave it altogether to private freedom. The Canon Law fell into the op-
posite error, and endeavoured to impose loyal regulations upon matters
which pertained to private freedom. When the State punished heresy as
a crime, it overstepped its natural limits and encroached unduly upon
personal freedom.
(3) The rule of the State extends no further than that of law, because
every rule which has the power of compulsion rests upon the foundation
of law. But law in its turn is limited,
(a) By the necessity of the peaceful co-existence of individuals, or
by the recognition of the necessary conditions of common life (private
law, criminal law); and
(b) By the existence and development of the nation, to which the
private life of individuals is subordinated so far as the security and
welfare of the former demand (taxation, military obligations, constitu-
tional and administrative law).
So far as law is in question, the State is the supreme authority,
because the making and administering of law belong by their very es-
sence to the State.
(4) The State can extend its administrative care, and therefore its
influence, beyond the domain of judicial organisation, but it has then no
power of compulsion, and its functions are limited to the support and
encouragement of important social objects for which State help is needed
(economical and educational measures of the State). The care of the
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fare of society, but only because the latter is in need of assistance.
[Note—Besides the works of Mill and Spencer already referred to
above, ch. iii, the following books in English may be mentioned as deal-
ing from different points of view, with the limits of State action:—Bur-
gess, Political Science, Part I. Book II. ch. iv; Cunningham, Politics
and Economics; Donisthorpe, Individualism; Green, Lectures On Po-
litical Obligation in Works, ii, and Lecture on Liberal Legislations and
Freedom of Contract in Works, iii; Goschen, Address to the Edinburgh
Philosophical Institution on Laissez-Faire and Government Interfer-
ence; Farrer, The State in Relation to Trade; Jevons, The State in rela-
tion to Labour (these two last both in ‘The English Citizen’ series);
Mackay (editor), A Plea for Liberty (with introduction by H. Spencer);
Montague, Limits of Individual Liberty; Ritchie, Principles of State
Interference; Sidgwick, Political Economy, Book III; Elements of Poli-
tics, Part I; J. F. Stephen, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity; Woolsey, Po-
litical Science, Part II. ch. v.]Book VI: The Forms of The StateChapter I: The Division of Aristotle
More than two thousand years ago Aristotle laid down a division of the
forms of the State which must be regarded as the accepted view even in
the present day. In making this division he started from the conception
of sovereignty, or rather of governmental authority. In every State there
is a supreme organ,232 in which power is concentrated and to which all
other organs are subordinate. The form of this organ stamps a peculiar
mark upon the State, and it is natural therefore to make it the basis of a
division of States. Aristotle calls all those States which regard the good
of the community normal (Ñrqai), while those which regard only the
good of the rulers he calls perversions (parekbaseij) of the normal
State.233
Starting from this conception, he finds three normal forms, each of
which is accompanied by its corresponding perversion. ‘The supreme
power,’ he says, ‘must be vested either in an individual, or in a few (the
minority), or in the many (the majority).’ From this he derives the fol-
lowing normal forms:—
1. Kingship (basilea), as Aristotle calls it, or Monarchy, the more
common name now—the rule of an individual.
2. Aristocracy, the rule of a minority consisting of the best citizens
(or exercised for the best interests of the State).
3. The rule of the majority, of the masses, is called by Aristotle
‘Polity.’234 In his day the democracy of the Greek cities, especially of
Athens, had degenerated, and therefore he avoids the term Democracy
for the rule of the majority exercised for the common interests, and
restricts it to the perversion of that rule. But in later times DemocracyThe Theory of the State/271
has become again the usual term for this third form of the State, and we
shall employ it in that sense. The three perversions are thus designated
by Aristotle:—
1. Tyranny or Despotism, the rule of an individual exercised prima-
rily in his own interests.
2. Oligarchy, the rule of the rich for their own advantage.
3. Democracy,235 in Aristotle’s phrase, or, as we prefer to call it,
Ochlocracy,236 the arbitrary rule of the poor (and, we may add, the un-
educated) masses.
In making this division, Aristotle seems to have laid the chief stress
upon the number of persons who share the supreme authority, just as in
the Linnean system the number of stamens determines the genus of a
plant. But this runs counter to his own fundamental principle, that the
form of a State depends upon the quality, and not the quantity, of the
ruling organ. Aristotle himself237 saw the risk of this misconception, and
therefore pointed out that the difference of number is naturally con-
nected with a difference of character in the ruling power, and that it is
the latter which is the ultimate criterion. Nevertheless, he has not ex-
pressed himself definitely enough about the principles of quality.
There is another point in which Aristotle’s division requires correc-
tion. It is incomplete, because history shows us a number of States which
do not come under any of his three normal forms. In all of them the
supreme power belongs to men, whether it is to one man, or to the best,
or to the people. But there have been States in which no human author-
ity has been recognised, in which the supreme power has been attributed
either to God, or to a god, or some other superhuman being, or to an
Idea. The men who exercised rule were not regarded as its possessors,
but as the servants and vicegerents of an unseen ruler, free from the
weakness of human nature.
This fourth form of State, when directed to the welfare of the sub-
jects, may be designated by the general term of Ideocracy (Theocracy);
and its perversion may be called Idolocracy.
Note—Schleiermacher (Abhandlungen der Berl. Akademie der
Wissensch. 1814, Ueber die Begriffe der verschiedenen Statsformen)
has maintained that the three ancient divisions, monarchy, aristocracy,
and democracy, ‘are always running into each other.’ For example, in a
democracy the leading men may resemble an aristocracy; and some-
times an individual, e.g., Pericles, may rule like a monarch. The same
truth applies to a monarchy, and Mirabeau was right in saying (Speech272/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
of 1790 in his Works, viii. 139), ‘In a certain sense republics are monar-
chical, and again in a certain sense monarchies are republics.’ Never-
theless, the old division is by no means an empty one, and it is perfectly
true that the form of the supreme power does give a definite stamp to the
whole constitution of the State, and that the most important political
principles stand in the closest relations to it.Chapter II: The So-called Mixed State
Even in ancient times the attempt was made to add to Aristotle’s divi-
sion a fourth form, called the Mixed State.238 Cicero especially declared
the Roman State to be a model of this fourth form, a mixture of monar-
chy, aristocracy, and democracy, and maintained this form to be the best
of the four.239
By a Mixed State may be understood one in which monarchy, aris-
tocracy, or democracy are moderated or limited by other political fac-
tors, e.g., a monarchy may be limited by the formation of an aristocratic
Senate or Upper House, and of a primary or representative Assembly of
the people. In that case it is true that such a divided constitution is better
than when an individual, or a few, or the majority rule absolutely and
without restraint. But such a mixture as this does not create a new form
of State, for the supreme governing power is still concentrated in the
hands of the monarch, or of the aristocracy, or of the people.
On the other hand, if it is understood that the supreme governing
power is itself divided between the monarch, the aristocracy, and the
people, so that two supreme governments exist side by side, each inde-
pendent of the other, then Tacitus is right in rejecting the idea of a Mixed
State, and in maintaining that its existence, or at any rate, its continu-
ance, is impossible.240
In later times men have considered England to be a mixed State of
this kind, in which rule is divided between three supreme powers, King,
Lords, and Commons, and they have asserted that the English Constitu-
tion is perfect, just because it is the ideal realization of this mixed form.
But it is an error to suppose that the English Constitution has arisen241274/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
from a division of the supreme governing power. It was the monarchy
which, in old times, gave to the State its special form, and the monarchy
has been gradually limited, first by a powerful aristocracy, and later by
the admission of democratic elements. The external form of the State
has always been monarchical, and to the sovereign is attributed not only
the supreme governing power (the executive), but also the highest place
in the legislative bodies or parliament.242
Moreover, it is generally forgotten that the principle of Aristotle’s
division does not rest on the nature and composition of the legislative
power; for in any advanced State this is usually representative of the
chief elements of the whole nation. On the contrary, it depends on the
antithesis between the government and the governed, and upon the ques-
tion to whom the supreme administrative power belongs. This latter
cannot be divided, not even between a king and his ministers, for this
would create a dyarchy or triarchy, and would be opposed to the essen-
tial character of a State, which, as a living organism, requires unity. In
all living beings there is a variety of powers and organs, but in this
variety there is unity. Some organs are superior and others inferior, but
there is always one supreme organ, in which the directing power is con-
centrated. The head and the body have no separate and independent life,
but they are not equal. So also for the State, a supreme organ is a neces-
sary condition of its existence, and this cannot be split into parts, if the
State itself is to retain its unity.
There is not, therefore, any such fourth form of State as has been
called a Mixed State; and so far as mixture is possible, it is amply
treated in a consideration of the three simple States enumerated above.
Note—In our days there has been much talk of ‘democratic monar-
chy,’ and the formation of such States has been designated as the work
of the age. If the expression implies that monarchy must now-a-days
base itself upon the masses (the demos) and must stand in close connexion
with them, it is correct, but such a State is a pure monarchy, and not in
any sense mixed. If, again, it implies a monarchy limited by democratic
institutions or, like the July-monarchy of 1830 in France, ‘surrounded
by republican institutions,’ it has also a certain meaning; but in this
case, as history shows, there is a danger that the principles of the two
institutions may come into conflict, arid that monarchy may be over-
thrown by the rising democracy or republic. But if it implies a mixing or
division of the supreme executive power, so that it is half monarchical
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constituted could not possibly endure. The French Constituent Assem-
bly of 1789 believed, with Rousseau, in the possibility of such a divi-
sion of the sovereignty between two equal powers, one of which should
belong to the nation, and the other to the king But as soon as it was
practically tried, the system showed itself inconsistent and unmanage-
able. Pinheiro-Ferreira (Principes de droit public, §475) declares that
monarchy to be democratic in which there are no privileges; but he in-
cludes under privileges any aristocratic distinction To him, therefore,
the expression merely implies a monarchy in which there are democratic
but no aristocratic organisms, i.e., an incomplete state in which the aris-
tocratic elements are disregarded or suppressed. Compare below, Chap-
ter XVII, on Constitutional Monarchy.Chapter III: Later Developments of Aristotle’s
Theory
Montesquieu, while following in essentials the division of Aristotle, made
a distinct scientific advance in seeking for each of the three forms—
monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy—a spiritual or moral principle,
apart from the number of the ruling power. Whether he succeeded is
another matter. In his view virtue is the principle of democracy, modera-
tion of aristocracy, honour of monarchy, and fear of despotism. He thus
made despotism a fourth kind of State, but it is better treated by Aristotle
as a perversion of the normal polity.
Schleiermacher243 made a notable attempt to classify the various
States according to different stages in the development of political con-
sciousness. A State originates when the people acquire the conscious-
ness of the ‘necessary distinction (Gegensatz) between the government
and the subject.’ The first step is when a small people or tribe acquires
this consciousness, and the new sentiment usually seizes ‘equally upon
the whole mass which is ripe for political life.’ Then the sense of this
distinction develops among all; they unite to form the government, and
then separate again to become subjects. This is democracy, in which the
opposition between public spirit and private interests is only slightly
apparent. Or it may happen that, although the whole mass is ripe for
political life, the impulse to form a State may affect it unequally: the
political consciousness may develop first in an individual or a few. This
creates inequality, which leads either to monarchy or aristocracy. In this
stage, while the State is still small, the three forms are very similar, andThe Theory of the State/277
are readily interchanged; but the natural inclination is always towards
democracy, because the masses speedily overtake the individual or the
few who were the first to acquire political consciousness.
In the second stage, which unites several of these small tribes, one
exercises rule over others. This form of State is essentially aristocratic,
as in the earlier stage it is essentially democratic. It cannot be demo-
cratic, because the majority of the tribes are subject to the ruling one,
and therefore unequal. Externally it may assume the form of monarchy,
but the king must belong to the ruling tribe, and is therefore only an
aristocratic king.
The third and final stage, to which the latter is an intermediate step,
is reached when a great people becomes fully conscious of national unity.
The democratic character of the first stage could not fully develop the
political distinction of government and subjects, nor could it reach the
dimensions of a great nation. In the aristocracy of the second stage the
ruling tribe had always its separate interests, and national unity was not
the principle of the State. It is in the third stage that true Monarchy is
fully developed, and the monarch represents the unity of the State, and
government in its full power.
This view of Schleiermacher gives an intellectual basis to the three
recognised forms of States, and connects them with the stages in the
development of the political idea. Democracy appears as the lowest,
and monarchy as the highest, stage. Although no new principle of divi-
sion is introduced, yet a deeper insight is obtained into the spirit of the
different forms.
But the course of history by no means corresponds with this logical
development of Schleiermacher; in fact, the historical order is often the
reverse—monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. This is really the more
natural order, because the active political consciousness is usually de-
veloped first in the upper classes of society, who live under more
favourable conditions, and then is gradually extended to wider and lower
circles.Chapter IV: The Principle of the Four
Fundamental Forms of the State
The different forms of State are specifically divided, as Aristotle recog-
nized, by the different conceptions of the distinction between govern-
ment and subjects, especially by the quality (not the quantity) of the
ruler (Herrscher).
1. The first form is Ideocracy, of which the highest type is Theoc-
racy. Here the people regard their ruler as a superhuman being, who is
raised above them by nature: God Himself is regarded as the true gover-
nor of the State.
2. In direct opposition to Ideocracy is Democracy. In the former the
people are subjected to an external power outside and above themselves;
in the latter the people govern themselves, i.e., collectively they form the
government, but as individuals they are subjects.
3. In Aristocracy the distinction between government and subject is
human, and within the limits of the nation: an upper class or tribe be-
comes the government, while the other classes and tribes are subjects.
But while the latter have nothing to do with the government, the indi-
vidual members of the ruling class are also subjects.
4. In Monarchy the distinction between government and subjects is
complete, but it is again human. The government is concentrated in an
individual, who is merely a ruler, and not at the same time a subject, but
who belongs altogether to the State, and personifies the unity of the
nation.
In each of these tour fundamental forms an original type (Urtypus)
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Theocracy represents the rule of God over the world, but a rule
which is exerted directly, and in a way harshly and despotically.
Monarchy glorifies the unity of humanity in ‘Man’ as an individual:
the ruler represents the collective State, the national unity is personified
in its prince.
Democracy expresses the idea of the community of the nation, or of
all individuals, and presents to us the State as a parish or commune
(Gemeinde).
Aristocracy embodies the distinction between the noble and the lower
elements of the nation, and gives the rule to the former. Its type is the
nobility of higher race and quality, just as the commune is the type of
Democracy. From one point of view Theocracy and Monarchy stand in
contrast to Aristocracy and Democracy. In the two former, the supreme
power and majesty of government are so concentrated that the ruler is
not also a subject, and that he represents no private interests, but only
the interest of the State. In Theocracy, this elevation of the government
is divine, and therefore absolute; in Monarchy it is human, and there-
fore relative. On the other hand, in Aristocracy and Democracy the dis-
tinction between government and subject is not so clearly marked: the
same men at one moment rule and at another obey; they have both pub-
lic and private interests. Hence it is that both are often classed under the
common name of Republic. In Democracy this mixture of functions
extends to the whole people: in Aristocracy it is limited to the ruling
class. The latter, in relation to the other members of the nation, are
merely rulers, but among themselves they are usually organised demo-
cratically, and thus both govern and are governed at the same time.
Thus Aristocracy appears to be an intermediate stage between Democ-
racy and Monarchy.
But, from another point of view, it is Monarchy and Aristocracy
which are connected, and stand in contrast to the other two forms. In
them the distinction between government and subject is humanly
organised in such a way that the rulers feel and know themselves to be
independent. they are so regarded be the people; they govern in their
own native and by independent right, though of course this is more com-
pletely the case in monarchy than in aristocracy. On the other hand,
whether God or the people be regarded as ruler, their authority must be
exercised by some intermediate persons. either priests or magistrates.
These latter belong personally to the class of subjects, and they exercise
only delegated authority as the servants of God or of the people. They280/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
cannot therefore be regarded as real rulers; they only administer the
government for the real rulers, who are unable to act in person. They are
constantly forced to refer to a superior power, which itself rules them,
and which confers upon them an authority that they do not possess in
themselves.
The distinction of States according to the forms of government is
the foundation of constitutional law, and belongs to the domain of pub-
lic law (Statsrecht). The same distinction is to be found in the tenden-
cies of their political life, even in opposition to the form of their consti-
tution. A State may be ruled in a spirit tending to theocracy
(theokratisrender Geist), although it recognises some human ruler, e g.,
an ecclesiastical prince or a priestly caste. So too a State may tend to
aristocracy, although its public law recognises no aristocracy, e.g.. the
English State, where the monarchical form is modified by an aristo-
cratic spirit. There are also States tending to democracy, though they
are not democracies, e.g., Norway; and others tending to monarchy which
have no real monarch, e.g., the French Republic.
Note—F. Rohmer (Lehre von den politischen Parteien. §219 sq.)
divides States according to the four ages of human life, and in making
this division he regards, not the form of the State, but its political spirit,
i.e., its party-character. His four divisions are:—
Idolstat, in which the political spirit is Radical.
Individualstatt in which the political spirit is Liberal.
Rassestat (race state) in which the political spirit is Conservative.
Formenstat in which the political spirit is Absolutist.
A monarchy, for example, may pass through all these phases of the
political spirit in order. R. v. Mohl’s objection (Statwissenschaft, I. p.
262), that a nation can be neither young nor old because children and
old men live in it side by side, rests upon a misconception of the theory
which he opposes. The ancients perceived clearly that nations as or-
ganic units, pass through successive ages analogous to the youth and
age of individuals, and Savigny has made the idea familiar to the legal
circles of Germany. But in addition to this succession of periods in a
nations history, one must also consider that a nation has an innate char-
acter of its own. Just as some individuals are by nature childlike or even
childish, and remain so in the prime of life, while others have an elderly
and staid character even in youth, so there are nations which are child-
ish and elderly by nature. This is most evident in the great race-divi-
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dians have for centuries displayed the characteristics of age. In Europe,
the continent of manly nations, the Spaniards—quite apart from the
period they have reached—represent the elderly, as the Germans the
youthful, spirit. Whether young or old, and whether this youth or age is
due to natural character or to the period of its history, the people trans-
fer their spirit to the State in which they live. The manly forms of consti-
tutional monarchy become a simple farce among the childish people of
Haiti.Chapter V: The Principle of The Secondary
Forms of The State
The quality of the head of the State determines the form of the whole
body. But it is necessary to consider in the second place the rights of the
subjects, in order to fully determine the legal character of the constitu-
tion, and to complete the Aristotelian division.
As in considering the government one looks at the ruling organ, so
in considering the subjects, i.e., the nation in its narrow sense, one looks
at their control over the government and their share in legislation.
By following this method of classification we arrive at the follow-
ing three secondary forms of States.
1. The subjects are treated merely as a passive mass, bound to un-
conditional obedience to the governing power. They have no right of
control nor any share in legislation. Such a State is absolutely governed,
and we may call it the unfree form. And it is not only unfree when it is
exposed to the arbitrary caprice of a despot (Despotism), but in a politi-
cal sense it is equally unfree when the ruler recognises the restraints of
law and protects personal property and freedom (Absolute Government).
2. Some of the subjects, i.e., the upper classes, have the right of
control and a share in public business, and thus limit the government.
But the rest of the people, and especially the lower classes, have no
political rights or freedom. These States are half free; and may be illus-
trated by the medieval States which were organised upon feudal prin-
ciples or upon class privileges (Lehens- und Ständestaten).
3. All classes have political rights. The whole country or nation
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States, or republics in the widest sense of the word (or national States,
Volksstaten).
This control or share in the government is exercised either (a) di-
rectly through the assembly of citizens, as was usual in ancient times
(Ancient Republics), or (b) indirectly through committees and represen-
tatives, the system of the present day (Modern Representative States).
If we now bring together the fundamental and the secondary divi-
sions, we obtain the following results:—
1. Theocracy tends, by its principle, to the class of unfree States.
But it is not necessarily despotic, for the ruling God, or the priesthood
inspired by Him, may recognise and respect a law of the community. It
may therefore approach to the second or to the third class, so far as the
exercise of the divine rule is influenced by the cooperation of aristo-
cratic classes or of a national assembly. In this sense the Jewish theoc-
racy was republican.
2. Aristocracy gravitates towards the second class, the half-free
States. But it may be regarded as unfree when the demos is wholly
without political rights; or it may rise to be a free national State (Volksstat)
if the demos is allowed, as in Rome, to have a real representation.
3. Democracy naturally belongs to the third class, the free States.
But it may become a despotism to the minority, or an absolute govern-
ment as regards individual citizens: and again, in relation to a servile
class (e.g., the slaves and helots of antiquity or the negroes in America),
it may appear as a half-free State.
4. Monarchy, the most various of all kinds of State, forms plunder-
ous combinations with these three classes. The despotisms of the East
and the absolute governments of the West are obviously unfree; the king-
doms and principalities of the middle ages, restricted by the clergy and
the secular nobles, were half-free; the Roman kingdom as organised by
Servius Tullius, the kingdom of the old Franks and the modern Norwe-
gians, all of which have given to the national assembly a distinct share
in the government, may serve as examples of free monarchies: and fi-
nally, the constitutional monarchy of the present day is the nearest ap-
proach which monarchy has yet made to a free State with a representa-
tive constitution.
When Aristotle’s division, which rightly starts from the summit, is
thus completed by a consideration of the base, the chief objections to it
are removed. It is no longer possible to maintain that it wants precision,
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modern representative democracy and constitutional monarchy, or the
essential difference between absolute monarchy and medieval monar-
chy limited by class privileges (ständisch beschränkte Monarchie).
Note—This analysis of the secondary forms of States was suggested
by the very interesting study by Georg Waitz of the difference of State
forms (Politik, p. 107 sq.). Waitz gives the name of Republic to a state
in which the government rests either with the nation or its delegated
representatives. On the other hand a Kingdom exists when an individual
governs by his own power and in complete independence of the people.
In his view the Aristotelian division is secondary, and his own is pri-
mary. According to him the Roman Empire becomes a Republic and the
German Empire a Kingdom: the old Roman Patriciate is a Kingdom, the
Napoleonic Empire a Republic. But this method brings confusion rather
than order into the two divisions. The arrangement given above and
based both upon the quality of the ruler and the rights of the subjects, is
logically clear and necessary to complete the division of Aristotle. It
also explains satisfactorily why it is that constitutional monarchy is
more closely related to representative democracy than it is to absolute
monarchy.Chapter VI: Theocracy or Ideocracy
Theocracy is a form of state which belongs to the infancy of the human
race. The earliest political development took place in Asia and Northern
Africa, and here the first states are theocratic.
In the early youth of humanity the sense of dependence upon the
divine being and upon the mysterious forces of nature was extremely
vivid, and the influence of God or nature upon the life and education of
men was more direct and powerful than it has since been. All ancient
sagas and myths represent one or more gods as holding personal inter-
course with mankind. Plato’s account of the original condition of the
Hellenic race agrees with the belief of all early peoples. He tells how
Kronos, reflecting on the weakness and incapacity of the men of that
time ‘placed as kings and princes not men but demons (damonej), be-
ings of superior and divine origin.’ Plato was himself in favour of this
theocratic conception, and in his theory of the State he employs artifices
to allure men back to the old belief in divine rule.244
In this belief in gods and demons245 as the true heads of the State
was inevitably involved the preponderant influence of the priests, the
chosen mortals who were vowed to the service of the gods and who
alone could understand their will and their utterances. Among such
peoples therefore the priests have supreme rank. In some the priests rule
directly in the name of one or more gods. In others kings are at the head
of the State, but they rule only as representatives and organs of the
gods, and either are themselves high-priests or are under the influence
and control of the priesthood. The former may be called pure, the latter
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form the stage of transition from Theocracy to Monarchy.
A pure Priest-state was that of the Ethiopians in Meroë. The priestly
caste was supreme: from their own body they nominated some of the
best, and of these God chose one in a solemn ceremony: the people
immediately did obeisance to the divine nominee and revered in him the
representative of God. But the power of this chief was restricted on
every side by the divine laws and by the continued manifestations of
God’s will in the oracles communicated through the priests. A strict
ceremonial ordered all his movements and left no room for free deci-
sion; everywhere the priests accompanied him and co-operated with him.
Even his life was not secure: if he displeased God, this was revealed to
the priests, they announced to him the message of divine wrath, and
nothing remained for him but to appease the offended deity by a volun-
tary death.246
Of the mixed priest-state we see an example in Egypt. According to
popular tradition the gods originally ruled directly. Some centuries later
human kings are found, but they were regarded either as gods or as the
descendants of gods, and their power was limited by the divine law, by
a strict etiquette, and by the influence of the supreme priestly caste. The
divine precepts regulated such minute details that the king could not
even choose his own food, but his frugal meals were fixed for all time.247
It is true that the priests did not dare to bring him to trial during his
lifetime, but after his death they formed a solemn public tribunal and
issued a judgment on which defended his honour among posterity, the
reception of his soul in the lower world, and even his resurrection. The
Egyptians believed so strongly in the life after death that they took the
greatest pains to preserve the body from corruption, to adorn it with
extravagance, and to build for its reception palaces which suggested all
the needs of life. It is obvious therefore what hopes and fears must have
been based on this judgment and what tremendous power it placed in the
hands of the priests.
The old Indian state resembled the Egyptian, and was also mainly
Ideocratic. In the order of castes the king stood below the Brahmins. A
Brahmin would consider himself and his daughter degraded if he gave
her in marriage to the king. Yet the royal dignity was so highly esteemed
that a certain divinity was considered to pertain to it. According to the
laws of Manu the king’s body is pure and holy, being composed of
elements which have their origin in the eight divine guardians of the
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dare look him in the face. God has created him for the preservation of all
beings. No one may scorn him even in infancy and say “he is a simple
mortal,” for a great divine force dwells within him.’248
The Indian king was also surrounded by priests. He must be conse-
crated by them on his accession. The seven or eight ministers, whose
advice he must take on all matters, were mostly Brahmins. He could
take no important step without first consulting a council of conscience
composed of Brahmins. He was bound by the strictest ceremonial, and
the laws of Manu reminded him in the gravest terms of his responsibil-
ity, though they did not define it very precisely. ‘Fine foolish monarch
who oppresses his subjects with injustice will speedily lose both king-
dom and life, he and his whole family.’249
The Indian state, being of Aryan origin, was freer than the preced-
ing: the royal dignity and power were more fully developed than in the
more sombre states of Meroe and Egypt. But in all we find a rigid sys-
tem of caste and great privileges in the hands of the priests, who had
absolute mastery over the intellectual life of the nation, and were richly
endowed with earthly goods. In Egypt they held a third of the land,250
and according to the Indian law ‘a king, even though he be dying of
want, may not levy a tax on a Brahmin well-read in the sacred books,
nor allow such a Brahmin to starve.’251 The lower classes were op-
pressed and despised, and there was no prospect of individual advance-
ment to brighten their hard lot. The Egyptian peasants were simple serfs
who cultivated the property of the priests, the kings, or the warriors The
shepherds and artisans were bound by birth to their occupation, were
subject to arbitrary taxation, and had no active part in political institu-
tions. Compulsory labour of all kinds was common in these countries.
For centuries this theocratic character has prevailed in the states of
Asia, and it is still visible in the eastern empires. It is true that as the
secular ruler has increased his power by the conquest of vast territories,
the authority of the priesthood has been obscured and driven into the
background. But the rulers themselves have become gods, and thus the
theocratic character of the state has been maintained, though not in the
old form. First the ruler was God in person, and kings and priests were
His instruments; then the rule passed more and more into the hands of
the priesthood, headed by a priestly, or later by a military, king; finally
the king himself was venerated as a god, and a superhuman despotism
arose. This was the case in the Persian empire, as in the later rule of
Mohammedan Sultans and the Emperors of China.288/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
Vitaçpa, the king of Iran about the year 1000 B. C., in whose time
Zarathustra (Zoroaster, Serduscht) appeared as a prophet, called him-
self priest-king, and in the Persian sacred books (the Zend-Avesta) the
king is placed, not in the caste of warriors as in India, but in that of
priests (the ‘learned in law and in god.’252) The whole political system
was religious, there was no distinction between law and morality, the
invisible world of good and evil spirits was regarded as in constant
connection with the visible world of humanity. But when kings arose in
Persia outside the priestly class, the state became more and more a des-
potism, and the influence of the Magi, though still considerable, was far
less than in earlier times. The king became as all-powerful as the god
who had raised him to rule; his court was the earthly copy of the heav-
enly court of Ahuramasda, the good spirit. Divine honours were paid to
him: he sat upon his lofty throne of gold, adorned with purple robe, tiara
on his head, the golden staff in his hand, the sword by his side, ‘glitter-
ing like the sun in the shining firmament,’ and before him foreign en-
voys prostrated themselves in the dust, like slaves before their lord, or
worshippers before their god. Gifts were offered to him like sacrifices to
a god, and when he died he was carried to the gorgeous mausoleum in
Persepolis, there to continue the life of the blest. He was honoured with
a solemn ceremonial and symbolic rites.253 In reality this ceremonial
enclosed him like a golden net, deprived him of all freedom of will, and
mocked his boasted omnipotence.
Nevertheless, this change from priestly rule to despotism marks a
distinct step in advance. It overthrew the rigid rule of a revelation which
the priests read in the stars and which was deemed divine, and it broke
through the innumerable forms which were imposed upon the whole
political life by the observance of fixed supernatural laws. A free hu-
man will, despotic though it was, began to express itself in public af-
fairs, and could give attention to changes of political conditions and to
the new needs of the people. Thus the iron system of caste was early
broken up in Persia.
The most notable of ancient theocracies was that of the Jews in the
Mosaic dispensation. It was based on the firm foundation of a pure
religion, and of a vivid belief in a single God, the creator and preserver
of the world.
Among the Jews the king was God himself, Jahvé or Jehovah. He
was the immortal lord of a mortal but chosen people. He was both leg-
islator and ruler. The whole system of law, which we call Mosaic, wasThe Theory of the State/289
regarded as the revelation of God, with whom Moses spoke in the soli-
tude of the mountain-top, whose will he received with fear and trem-
bling and announced to the people with loyal truth. Thunder and light-
ning manifested the presence of God upon Mount Sinai.
The whole people was elevated by His divine rule. In Egypt they
had been despised and regarded as outcasts with whom intercourse was
degrading. Now they were filled with the lofty thought that they were
the nation chosen and preferred by God. Although they were divided
into hereditary tribes, and had one special priestly tribe (that of Levi),
yet all were descendants of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, they formed as
it were a ‘nation of priests.’ Thus their ruling principle was not that of
rigid caste distinctions but the brotherhood of the tribes.
The divine law was preserved in an Ark overlaid with gold, over
which rose the golden mercy-seat, guarded by two cherubim and re-
vered as the seat of divine revelation. The ark and the mercy-seat were
both concealed behind a curtain in the Holy of Holies within the taber-
nacle which was God’s residence, and was carefully guarded by the
priests. There the High Priest received the commands of Jehovah and
announced them to the people. The High Priest, descended from Moses’
brother Aaron, was the natural organ of the divine will, and also the
representative of the people before their Lord. In exceptional and criti-
cal times Jehovah sent inspired individuals, or prophets, to restore His
neglected authority, to awaken the conscience of kings or people, to
punish backsliding, to urge repentance and amendment, and to reveal
the future destiny of the nation. The judges who were placed at the head
of the tribes to administer the law, did so in the name of Jehovah, ‘for
the judgment is God’s.’ Therefore they shall ‘not respect persons in
judgment, but shall hear the small as well as the great, and not be afraid
of the face of man.’ If any cause was too hard for them, they were to
demand God’s judgment through the Levites, and this judgment they
must carry out or die.254
The whole soil of the Promised Land was the property of Jehovah,
and the various families only held it as tenants. In recognition of the
divine ownership a tenth of the produce of land and flocks had to be
given to the tabernacle for the maintenance of the priests. Every seventh
year was a year of rest, even for the land which was not tilled, just as the
seventh day of the week was a day of rest for men; and after seven times
seven years came the year of jubilee, in which the original division of
the soil was renewed, so that impoverished families recovered their lands,290/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
while those who had grown rich had to resign their surplus. A Jew could
never be a slave; if poverty compelled him to sell himself he was treated
as ‘a hired servant and a sojourner,’ and was released in the year of
jubilee. A slave among the Jews was always of foreign blood.255
When the Jews afterwards demanded a king, that they might be
‘like other nations,’ Jehovah granted their wish through the mouth of
their judge, Samuel, but He consoled the latter by saying, ‘Hearken
unto the voice of the people in all that they say unto thee: for they have
not rejected thee, but they have rejected me, that I should not reign over
them.’256 So the state passed from pure theocracy to monarchy, but the
monarchy was always partly theocratic, and influenced by the religious
character and mission of the Jewish people.
In Europe we find only isolated and feeble echoes of the old theoc-
racy. Caligula appearing in public as Jupiter with golden beard and
lightning; Heliogabalus sacrificing as a priest to the sun; Gessler in the
Swiss legend bidding the free mountaineers to revere the emperor’s hat:
all these are only caricatures of a form of state which had perished, and
which had no claim to permanence. But there are a few relics of theoc-
racy in the Roman empire, e.g., in the statues and temples to living
emperors, the name of Davus given to them after death, and the ceremo-
nial of the later Byzantine court.
In the middle ages the influence of the clergy, always devoted to the
theory of theocracy, gave to the Christian states a theocratic colouring.
This is apparent in secular as well as in ecclesiastical principalities,
though naturally more so in the latter. Thus the Emperor has to receive
priestly consecration.257 But however fond men were in the middle ages
of deriving all right and power from God, they never regarded their
rulers as anything but men, and they imposed manifold human restraints
upon their power.
The only real theocracy in Europe is the Christian Church, the hier-
archy of the clergy. Secular princes and govern meets are always being
reminded of their human origin by the Church. The fundamental forms
of the medieval state are rather aristocracy or monarchy than theocracy.
On the other hand, the Mohammedan states which arose in the middle
ages must be regarded as theocratic in character. It is true that the Mo-
hammedans did not, like the Jews, believe in a direct and regular gov-
ernment by God; Mohammed did not restore the theocracy of Moses.
But the Koran teaches that God confers rule upon whom He will, and
treats the human head of the State as the representative vicegerent andThe Theory of the State/291
vassal of God. In the Caliphate, the ideal of the political system of Is-
lam, are combined the functions of high-priest and of king. The Caliph
is Emperor and Pope in one. There is no valid distinction between reli-
gion and law, theology and jurisprudence; theologians are also lawyers.
Islam has much more in common with theocracy than Christendom has.258
The modern world is obviously hostile to the theocratic form of
State, and to everything that suggests it: witness the disappearance of
ecclesiastical principalities, and the abolition of the Pope’s temporal
power in 1870.259 The following are the ordinary characteristics of theo-
cratic States:—
1. There is a close intermixture of religion and law, of ecclesiastical
and political institutions and maxims, with a preponderance in favour
of the religious elements. The prospect of the life after death so domi-
nates over the earthly life that it obstructs its free development.
2. The principle of authority is exalted to a superhuman height, and
becomes by its nature absolute. All civil and political life is dependent
upon it. The subjects do not stand in any human relation to their chief,
they are not connected with him by common patriotism, common na-
tionality, or common race. The ruler is raised to an inaccessible height
and becomes omnipotent.
3. So far as this divine authority is based upon a revelation made
long ago and no longer continued, as among the Jews upon the Mosaic
dispensation, and among the Mohammedans upon the Koran, it founds
a firm unchangeable organization.
If, on the other hand, the deity is supposed to issue new decrees to
suit changing circumstances and momentary needs, then there are only
two ways in which its human representatives can learn the divine will.
Either there are definite external forms for its manifestation, or it must
be known by internal inspiration. The first method was employed by the
Chaldeans who read the stars, by the Jews who watched the aspect of
the rising sun, by the Roman augurs and haruspices who scrutinized the
entrails of the sacrifices and the flight of birds, by the Greeks who ques-
tioned the oracles, and by the Germans who cast the dice. It leads al-
ways to superstition and fraud. A belief in inspiration, on the other hand,
leads to a passive surrender of the intellectual powers that were given
for active use, and to a passionate confidence in the expected impulse
from above.
Thus in a theocracy the human organs which are indispensable for
deciding matters of legislation and government, are very imperfectly292/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
developed and can never be relied upon.
4. The secular magistrates are subordinate to the priests, who re-
gard themselves as nearer to God. If they rule directly, the State is obvi-
ously a priest-state, while if a secular sovereignty co-exists with them,
their supremacy still remains beneath the surface, and it is a latent priest-
state.
In every priesthood there is something effeminate, so that in a priest-
state the manly qualities are subordinate to the feminine, and self-confi-
dence and freedom never reach full development. Under clerical rule
laymen must always be obstructed and kept in the background.
5. There is a harsh criminal jurisdiction and cruel punishments.260
Human justice represents the wrath of God, the free movement of the
individual intellect is condemned as impious, and a slight offence is
treated as an insult to the divine majesty.
6. The education of the people falls wholly into the hands of the
priests. Schools become instruments for the attainment of clerical ob-
jects. Science, art, and all kinds of skill are only encouraged so far as
they serve these objects; as a rule they are distrusted and neglected, and
if they seem to threaten any danger to religious authority they are sup-
pressed and persecuted. They are regarded, not as having any value in
themselves, not as free creations of the human intellect, but merely as
slaves of the Church.Chapter VII: The Chief Kinds of Monarchy
Monarchy is the most widely recognised form of State in the world. It is
found in all continents, in Asia and Europe it is almost universal, and it
has been so from the beginning of history to the present day. But monar-
chies differ so much both in idea and in form that it is difficult to clas-
sify their main divisions.
1. The transition from theocracy to human kingship forms Despo-
tism, of the kind which mainly prevailed in Asia. The distinguishing
mark of Despotism is the concentration of all rights in the monarch, so
that no one has any right apart from or in opposition to him. He may
recognise the restrictions of religious or moral duty, or of his responsi-
bility to God, but his power is not limited by the rights of his subjects,
who are mere slaves and dependent upon his arbitrary grace and favour.
Such a despotism must seek some justification for itself by appeal-
ing to the divine omnipotence. The despot must be revered as the
vicegerent of God, his power is unlimited because it comes from above.
Thus despotism is closely allied to theocracy, and shares its defects, in
spite of the human character of the ruler. The Mohammedan States of
the middle ages had this tendency towards despotism, and it is only in
our own day that they have approximated more nearly to the human
monarchy of the rest of Europe.
2. Despotism may be regarded as the barbarous form of monarchy.
The peoples of Aryan origin rejected it long ago as degrading, and
recognised the rights of classes and individuals apart from those of kings
and princes. The subjects have regarded themselves as freemen, not as
slaves. Whenever the monarchical power has been strained so as to294/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
verge upon despotism, they have regarded it as an injustice, and have
seized the first opportunity to compel the ruler to respect their rights.
Civilised monarchy, therefore, is always conditioned and limited by a
judicial organization to secure common rights. The position and power
of the monarch is raised rather than lowered by this, for it is a nobler
task to guide the political forces of a free people, than to direct the
stupid obedience of a servile mass. The more a State can combine the
unity and energy of the whole with the freest development of the mem-
bers, the more perfect is its organization. This is possible in a civilised
monarchy, in a despotism it is impossible.
The human intellect has made many attempts in different periods
and among different nations to find the exact measure of the limitations
that should be imposed upon monarchy.
One of the earliest forms is the Kingship of the Family, or Patriar-
chy (Geschlechtskönigthum, Patriarchie). The king is regarded as the
head of the chief family, as the elder and father of the race. This early
and artless institution, which is found in the Vizpati of the Indian races
and the Kunig of the German tribes, is regulated by the relations and
spirit of the family.
Equally bound up with the institutions of personal property and
security is the patrimonial principality of the middle ages, whether in
the form of the feudal State (Lehensstat) or of a simple territorial lord-
ship (Landesherrschaft, dominium terrae). This, too, is influenced by
family rights and dynastic conceptions, but it also confounds the State
with the ownership of the soil, and treats the function of the ruler as a
right over property.
These two forms, in which political consciousness is as yet unde-
veloped, may be termed immature phases of monarchy.
3. When the political consciousness is only partially awakened, and
is directed only to a single function of the ruling power, we have one-
sided (einseitige) forms of monarchy. Such are military principalities in
which the military function is primarily regarded, or judicial principali-
ties (Gerichtsherrschaft) in which the judge is the ruler. The former is
more absolute and energetic, the latter more limited and peaceful.
4. When the political consciousness is excessively developed in the
prince, the central power obtains decisive preponderance in his hands,
and the people have no political rights. This absolute monarchy is the
civilised form corresponding to the barbarous form of despotism, but it
differs from it in that the monarch recognizes a judicial organisation,The Theory of the State/295
and is willing, at any rate as a rule, to respect it. In the Roman Empire
this power was more absolute than in modern states, in which it has
been restricted even in the middle ages by Christianity and by the devel-
opment of freedom.
5. Limited monarchy is at once more noble and better proportioned.
It retains the unity and supremacy of the central power, and seeks to
combine with these the liberty of all classes and individuals of the na-
tion. In the middle ages such a monarchy was restricted by the privi-
leges of nobles or of estates, as in modern times by representative and
constitutional forms.
6. In treating of monarchy it is necessary to notice the distinction
between Kingship and Empire (Kaiserthum), a distinction which is found
in all stages of development, in the rude despotisms of Asia, and in the
civilised states of Europe.
The idea of Kingship refers to the nation. that of Empire to human-
ity. Kingship is the supreme institution of the single national State, Empire
is the crown of the world. The emperor is raised above kings as human-
ity above the separate nations. The rulers of Oriental empires are al-
ways kings of kings. Julius Caesar conceived the thought of the univer-
sal rule of Rome. and history has given his name to this lofty conception
of the State. But this idea can never be fully realised until the world has
advanced to a universal organization of humanity. Till that time all at-
tempts to restore the Empire must be, like those in the past, partial and
imperfect.261Chapter VIII: I. Family Kingship among the
Greeks and Germans
The conception of kingship among the tribes and states of early Greece
and Germany is remarkably similar, while that which prevailed among
the ancient Romans, who come between them in point of time, differed
in important respects from both.
The kingship of the Greeks and Germans is the transition from the
ideocratic form of single rule in the east to a human and political insti-
tution. The kings were believed by the people to derive their descent
from the gods, from Zeus or Woden,262 but they were not themselves
regarded as gods, and they were subject to human restraints. Therefore,
the honours paid to the king were greater than his power. He represented
the nation in its relations with the gods, and officiated as intermediary
between the two in sacrifice and prayer,263 when these were not per-
formed by a special priesthood. Thus in Athens, after the monarchy had
been abolished, the sacrificing archon retained the title of king.
Their pecuniary estimation was much higher than that of the other
members of the State. The wergild of the king in Germany was usually
many times as great as that of the noble. They were also very superior to
their subjects in wealth, the greater part of the land was their domain,
and they received the largest share of conquered territory.264 Their resi-
dence, or palace, was larger and more richly adorned than the other
houses.265 Their treasuries, or hoards, were rich in ornaments and pre-
cious stones. They had external ensigns of their royal rank, the sceptre,266
the throne, and the announcement of their approach by heralds. Their
dress was always conspicuously brilliant. The ancient kings of IndiaThe Theory of the State/297
and China always appeared in a long robe worked in gold thread, and
with a yellow umbrella.267
The existence of royal families and their supposed descent from the
gods prove that ancient monarchy was hereditary. Yet there were no
fixed rules of succession. Among the Greeks regard was paid to per-
sonal courage and capacity. Women and children were almost always
excluded, and as acknowledgment by the nobles and people was neces-
sary, it sometimes happened that the hereditary succession was broken
through.268 Among the Germans the practice prevailed of election by the
nobles and recognition by the people, but as a rule the succession was
hereditary, and children obtained the crown more often than in Greece.
There was nothing, however, to prevent the free community from pre-
ferring a more distant member of the royal family if he seemed more
likely to be a capable ruler.269
The political power. of these kings was considerable, but was sub-
ject to important limitations.
1. The king presided over and directed both the council of princes
and the national assembly.270 But in both, according to Tacitus, his au-
thority depended rather on his persuasive influence than on his right of
command.271
2. He was the chief judge, and though he did not pronounce the
decision, he defended and maintained the law.272 His power was not at
all arbitrary, as he was bound to respect the decision of the court.
3. He was the head of the military organization, and usually the
leader of the army.273 It was by war that his power increased.274 But the
Germans, just because they respected hereditary right more than the
Greeks, were often compelled by the minority of the king to appoint
heretogan (duces, dukes) to take the actual command, though the king
was still regarded as the supreme head of the national force (Heerbann).
4. Real government was very little developed among the early Greeks
and Romans, though its germs were concealed under the attributes of
the king which have just been enumerated.
5. In both races the king’s existence and rights were hemmed in by
the rights of gods and men. The Greeks laid special stress upon the
obligation of their kings to respect the divine ordinances and the na-
tional laws and customs, and they pointed to this as distinguishing them
from oriental despots.275 The king was within the judicial organization,
not above it; he was not outside the nation, but at its head. The German
kings were still more limited by the rights of the whole body of free-298/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
men.276
But there was one peculiarity of the German kingship which led to
a great increase in its power. This was the comitatus, a body of men
bound by oath to personal fidelity, whose constant aim was to defend
the king’s honour and power against all opponents. This institution is
the germ from which sprang the later feudal organization, which was
destined to break through and to a great extent to transform the old
constitution.Chapter IX: II. National Monarchy in Ancient
Rome
In some points the kingship of ancient Rome seems closely akin to that
of the Greeks and Germans, but in others it displays such important
differences that we must regard it as a new and more developed form. In
the very appointment of the kings there are two notable points of differ-
ence—hereditary succession is less prominent than nomination or elec-
tion, and popular belief does not attribute divine descent to the kings.
It is true that the founders of Rome were believed to have divine
blood in their veins, and Romulus was placed among the gods after
death. But from his time the gods exerted their influence in the choice of
kings, and in all other matters, only by the signs of the auspices, by the
invisible impulse of the soul, and by the irresistible might of destiny.
Thus, though the idea of divine influence remained, the Roman kingship
was purely human; the insight and will of the individual were more
regarded than descent and the family.277
The Roman king was chosen either by his predecessor or by the
interrex with the help of the senate and the approval of the gods. The
choice was for life only, so that no hereditary dynasty was created, and
it depended more upon individual character than upon descent. The
elected king himself proposed the lex curialis by which the royal au-
thority and the auspices were given to him,278 just as the imperium was
conferred upon the magistrates of the subsequent republic. Thus the
Roman kingship was from the first an individual magistracy.
This conception is obviously quite different from that of the Greeks
and Germans. The character of the kingly power shows an equally im-300/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
portant divergence. In many points it is similar: the king is the high-
priest who sacrifices for the nation; he assembles and guides the Senate
and the Comitia; he is the supreme judge, though in certain cases there
is an appeal from him to the people; he is the rightful head and leader of
the army; he is rich in lands and revenues.279
But his power is stronger and more complete than that of the Greek
kings, though the latter are the hereditary descendants of the gods. The
strong political sense of the Romans is obvious from the first in the
extent of the administrative power which they confer upon their magis-
trates, in order that they may take energetic measures in defence of the
public welfare. The imperium is distinctly Roman in origin, and it is
this which distinguishes their kingship from the previous forms.
The external ensigns of the Roman are quite as imposing as those of
the Greek and German kings, but they also manifest their greater power.
The fasces which the twelve lictors carry before them are not mere sym-
bols, but real instruments of punishment for the disobedient. The impe-
rium and the lictor’s axe are always connected in fact and thought by
the Romans.280
The imperium, which was transferred to the king with the auspices,
gave him the right both of issuing edicts and of laying down the prin-
ciples of law. It must never be forgotten that the Roman State was founded
by a king, and that it was his power which passed by tradition to his
successors. Permanent laws needed the consent of the Senate, and from
the time of Servius Tullius281 the sanction of the people (jussu populi),
but at the same time the royal will was essential and usually decisive.
The king alone could propose a law, and he could prevent any law from
being discussed or voted upon.282 Besides these laws the king could in
his edict lay down, without the counsel and consent of any assembly, the
legal maxims which he intended to follow. This jus edicendi was un-
questionably a right of the kings, though seldom exercised by them: it
was not created for the later magistrates, but was handed on to them
from their predecessors.
Thus the judicial power of the Roman kings was far greater than
that of the German. Both presided, at first in person, over the law-courts,
but the rex was not bound by the decision of the assessors. He not only
directed the course of the trial, but also laid down the principle (jus
dicit) which was to apply to the particular case. In early times he often
gave judgment himself. On him depended almost the whole administra-
tion of civil and criminal law.283The Theory of the State/301
The military power of the Roman kings was very extensive. In the
field he had absolute power of life and death over both officers and
soldiers. Even in republican times we see not only dictators, whose power
was that of the kings undiminished, but also consuls, putting to death
officers against the petition of the army, and even decimating whole
legions.284
The king was the source of all other political and priestly offices.
He nominated the tribunus celerum, the leader of the knights, and the
praefectus urbi, who governed the city in his absence. From him the
augurs and pontiffs derived their powers of divination and their knowl-
edge of the sacred law.285
The essence of the imperium is a strong administrative power which
can act decisively whenever and wherever political needs or momentary
circumstances require, and which can enforce measures for the public
welfare. Such a power was only exercised by the Greek kings to a very
slight extent, and among the Germans was unknown; but in the Roman
state it assumed the greatest importance from the first. As the Romans
loved absolute rule over their family and their property, so their political
imperium was also absolute. Their kings were not only judges in time of
peace, their chief functions, as the name indicates, was that of gover-
nors (rex, regere).
In this way it becomes intelligible that the whole policy of the Ro-
man state in the kingly period should be directed by the royal will, that
all institutions should be referred to the kings, and that they should have
been able to undertake and complete works which appear gigantic even
in the present day. The king had to look after the supply of food and the
cultivation of the soil, to watch over the morals of the citizens, and to
exercise extensive police powers. All the functions which were after-
wards divided among consuls, praetors, censors, and aediles, were origi-
nally combined in the single hand of the king.286
To sum up: Rome was the first state in history to produce a human
and national monarchy with complete concentration of political author-
ity and with almost absolute administrative power.Chapter X: III. The Roman Empire
The Roman Empire, which was founded by Julius Caesar and estab-
lished by Augustus, and which has exercised so great an influence upon
the political development of all later times, was not formed, as has been
sometimes maintained, out of a simple accumulation of republican mag-
istracies. It was really a revival of the old monarchical power on a far
vaster scale and in harmony with the intervening changes.287
It is true that the Emperors assumed a number of functions which
had belonged to republican magistrates: the tribunicia potestas secured
their personal inviolability gave them the right of veto, and enabled them
to pose as champions of the lower classes: the censorial power288 gave
them the supervision of morals and the function of revising at will the
lists of senators and knights: the dignity of pontifex maximus made them
supreme arbiters of the sacred law. From time to time they took the
office of consul. But the conception of their power did not rest upon this
cumulation of offices, but upon the creation of a new centralised gov-
ernment, of a real monarchy. Republican forms might conceal the change
for a time, but it was obvious to clear-sighted men even in the days of
Augustus. At the accession of Tiberius the principle of monarchy was
clearly expressed in the Senate by Asinius Gallus when he asserted that
‘it was impossible to divide the indivisible, that the body of the state
was one, and could therefore only be ruled by the mind of one man.’289
The Emperors assumed only the modest title of Princeps (Senatus)290
but their power was so great that few could resist its temptations, and
most of them were ruined either in intellect or in morals. The Empire
was not hereditary but elective: its first holders were chosen, nominallyThe Theory of the State/303
for ten years, really for life. They were not regarded as of divine origin,
and they recognised the supremacy of the people. Their authority was
conferred upon them by a law of the people.291 But though descent and
family connexion were not in principle regarded in the choice of an
emperor, they usually had great practical influence, and the chosen prince
received in full personal right a power as extensive as that of the Roman
people itself had been under the Republic. And when once that power
had been conferred it could neither be diminished nor withdrawn.
The imperial power, in addition to the special magistracies which
the Emperor usually held may be thus analysed:—
1. The disposal and command of the whole military forces of the
state, and of the praetorian guard in the city. The introduction of stand-
ing armies, which became necessary as the boundaries were extended,
secured the existence of the empire and enforced obedience.292 It was
this function which gave to the emperors the title of imperatores, which
had a different meaning in earlier times.
2. The absolute government of the richest and most important prov-
inces [?], from which the Emperors derived enormous wealth and power.
On the whole, the provinces gained considerably by the change of con-
stitution. Their great men were admitted to the senate and to office by
the Emperors, while the oppressions and exactions of the imperial legati
were far less than those of the ever-changing proconsuls and propraetors
of the Republic. The more permanent interests of the Emperors enjoined
a more merciful and orderly administration.
3. The decision of all questions of foreign policy, the right of peace
and war, and of concluding treaties.293
4. The right of convening the senate, of proposing matters for dis-
cussion, and of giving legal force to its decisions.294 It is well known
how obsequious and submissive the senate was to the Emperors.
5. A decisive voice in the appointment to magistracies and all im-
portant offices. Both the comitia (which retained for a time a formal
existence) and the senate were bound by law to respect the Emperor’s
recommendation of candidates.295
The absolute power of acting for the welfare and honour of the
state, which forms the real essence of the imperial authority.296 It was by
virtue of this power that not only the edicts, but also the decrees and
rescripts of the Emperor obtained the full force of laws, so that he was
able to cover the whole field of legislation.297
To prevent any hostile criticism or resistance, the lex de imperia304/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
definitely announced that it overrode all other laws, whether of the sen-
ate, the populus, or the plebs, and that no one could be brought to ac-
count for breaking the latter in obedience to itself. The irresponsibility
of the Emperor was not confined to himself, but was also extended to all
his ministers and agents—the very opposite of the modern system.298
In fact the imperial power was absolute and unlimited;299 it held the
same position in the state that the right of property and the patria potestas
held in private life. It was the concentration of the Roman world-rule in
the hands of an individual. Its ideal principle, seldom followed in prac-
tice, was the public welfare (salus publica). This great political prin-
ciple of the Romans becomes, in later times at any rate, more important
in all state matters than personal right (jus), though the latter was nobly
developed in the domain of Private Law.
The history of the Roman Empire, magnificent as are its propor-
tions, has bequeathed this lesson to the world—that such excessive power
is beneficial neither to the ruler nor to his subjects.300
The rise of the Empire may be justified by the fatal necessity cre-
ated by general corruption and decay. The Roman aristocracy was de-
generate and impotent to guide so unwieldly a state. From time to time it
strove to restore its former authority, but as a rule it passively yielded to
the force of circumstances.301 The mass of the people, with no claim to
rule, no longer accustomed to arms, devoted to the occupations and joys
of peace, preferred the government of a single Emperor to that of the
senate, and consoled themselves for their own impotence with the hu-
miliation of the nobles. The character of the Roman people decayed
sooner than their ability, and their own slavery was a fitting penalty for
that insatiable lust of rule which had urged them on from conquest to
conquest.Chapter XI: IV. The Frankish Monarchy
The German tribe of the Franks founded a great empire c upon Roman
soil. Their monarchy, a combination of Roman and German elements,
marks the transition from the organization of the ancient world to that
of the middle ages.302 The Frankish king was more powerful than his
purely German predecessors, but less absolute than the Roman emper-
ors. The monarchy that existed in the time of Charles the Great was
formed by the mixture of the German ideas of freedom and law with the
Roman conceptions of the power and supremacy of the state.
Several causes combined to strengthen the power of the Carolingian
kings: a remarkable succession of distinguished and fortunate rulers;
the rapid increase of their territorial empire, which demanded a power-
ful and comprehensive government; the necessity of a strong military
force always ready for action; the victories achieved by this force; and
finally the fact that the majority of their subjects had been brought up
under the Roman Empire, and were accustomed to its conceptions and
its vigorous institutions.
In one point monarchy took a backward step among the Franks.
The hereditary principle, derived from private property, was applied to
the crown, and the old election shrunk up into an almost meaningless
form. This gave rise to the division of the empire among several sons,
which proved the source of serious harm both to the State and the na-
tion.303 The succession to the throne belongs properly to politics and to
public law, which demand unity of the state, but the Frankish practice
treated the function of rule as if it were merely the possession of an
individual or family, and thus conformed in this point to what we have306/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
called above the patrimonial principle.304
The following are the chief changes which the Franks introduced
into the kingly power:—
1. Legislation became much more important in the Frankish empire
than it had been in the narrow circle of a single German tribe, and at the
same time it fell more under the influence of the kings than before. The
Roman maxim that ‘the emperor’s will has the force of law’ was natu-
rally unacceptable to a nation of German origin. But among the Franks
the right of proposing laws, which was generally decisive, passed to the
king and his council. The king’s sanction was needful to give validity to
laws, and they were promulgated in his name.
But it is very important to remember that the counsel and consent of
the assembled nobles, both ecclesiastical and secular,305 was regarded
both by custom and by law as indispensable for legislation. On the other
hand, the approval of the people was of very subordinate importance,
and was usually dispensed with except in matters which concerned the
organization of church and state, or the rights of the people themselves
(Volksrecht).306
In this co-operation of the nobles we see the first step towards that
representation of estates (ständisch) which obtained such great devel-
opment in subsequent centuries, and which has produced the represen-
tative state.
2. Government. The size of the state and the great political changes
that were going on rendered necessary an administrative power which
was unknown to the older Germans. It was no longer merely a matter of
maintaining peace and law, but some regard must be paid to the general
welfare. The idea of the Roman imperium was too foreign to be ac-
cepted, so the Franks found a basis for their new government in the
native mundium or guardianship (mundiburdium, also sermo or ver-
bum regis). This royal guardianship bears the same relation to the Ro-
man imperium as that of the powers of a German father or husband to
the Roman patria potestas. Its power is not at all arbitrary or absolute;
its chief functions are the protection of the rights and the furtherance of
the welfare of the people;307 in fact it indissolubly combines the concep-
tion of duty with that of right. This novel idea is not yet fully clear, but
it contains a healthy germ, which is capable of real political develop-
ment.
In this form of monarchy the king both can and must command. His
commands were issued in the so-called ban, which was both militaryThe Theory of the State/307
and judicial (Heerbann and Gerichtsbann). By the military ban he had
at his disposal the whole armed force of the kingdom, though his power
was limited by custom and by fixed rules of service. But strong kings,
and notably Charles the Great, summoned even for aggressive wars not
only their feudal following, but whole divisions of the people in arms
(Heerbann) and threatened defaulters with the severe penalty of sixty
shillings.308
The judicial ban, so important for the administration of the country,
belonged to the king, but was usually exercised through the counts of
districts (Gaugrafen), whose powers were derived from the king. As the
organization of the state grew stronger, limits were placed upon the old
rights of private war in civil disputes and criminal cases, and through-
out the land the king’s peace, protected by the royal ban, replaced the
old national peace which had been too easily broken.
The revenues of the royal chamber and exchequer, which had in-
creased considerably, were at the king’s absolute disposal. The royal
domains received large additions from the conquest of Roman prov-
inces and the suppression of ancient kingdoms and duchies, and all over
the country were to be found royal residences and palaces surrounded
by vast estates. The old land- and poll-taxes of the provincials were
retained, the Roman duties on commodities were augmented, tribute
was imposed upon the conquered peoples, and large sums exacted from
them by way of indemnity.309
3. The royal power made itself felt in every branch of the adminis-
tration by means of an organised system of officials dependent upon the
king. After the model of the Byzantine court, the most important of
these officials were grouped round the king’s person. Among these were
the comes palatii (Pfalzgraf ), the supreme judge and representative of
the king; the chaplain (apocrisiarius, referendarius), who was at the
head of the court clergy, and had to report about ecclesiastical affairs;
the chancellor (camerarius), who presided over the royal chancery and
conducted diplomatic correspondence; the chamberlain, who organised
the pomp and show of the court; the seneschal, responsible for the ser-
vants and the domestic managements; the cellarer, who received pay-
ments in kind and provided the wine for the royal table; the marshal
(marescalcus, or Rossknecht), the manager of the stables; the house-
steward (mansionarius), whose duty it was to see that the king had a
suitable residence on his journeys; the four chief huntsmen, and the fal-
coner.310308/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
The itinerant officials of the king (missi dominici) were sent out
yearly to visit the different provinces of the kingdom. It was through
them that the king was enabled to see clearly the condition of affairs, to
hear the complaints and wishes of the people, and to act with decision
when it was necessary to enforce obedience to the laws and to protect
public order.311
The counts of districts or shires (Gaugrafen) had supreme judicial
power, while that of the counts of hundreds (Zentgrafen) was limited.
Both derived their jurisdiction, the one directly and the other indirectly,
from the king, as the supreme judge upon earth. Their military powers
sprang from the same source. In the early period of the Frankish monar-
chy the position of count was not hereditary, but was a real office, to
which the king had the right of appointment. Under Charles the Great’s
successors, however, the natural tendency to hereditary succession soon
began to obscure this official character and to create a hereditary right
to the dignity.
Gradually the missi dominici became obsolete, the duchies were
restored, and the offices of the kingdom sank into family property. Thus
the power of the Romano-German monarchy perished, and the aristoc-
racy of princes and lords took its place.
4. There is one other notable point about the Frankish and monar-
chy, and this is its close connexion with the Western Empire—a connexion
established by Charles the Great—and of both with the extension of
Christianity and with the Christian Church.
The state had become Christian, and the monarchy had received
consecration at the hands of a priest.312 The king felt himself bound to
maintain and extend the pure Christian belief in his territories, while his
duty as emperor was to destroy heathenism and heresy as far as his
power reached. This duty was fulfilled by Charles the Great on a large
scale and with great severity.313 Christendom itself was represented as a
single body with two organisations, one sacerdotal and the other monar-
chical, Church and State.314 But though the king was the head only of
the latter, he enforced among the clergy also the recognised Christian
discipline. He summoned synods, superintended the conduct of bishops
and monasteries, and issued many laws and ordinances on ecclesiastical
matters. So too the spirit of the hierarchy exercised a marked influence
upon political institutions and upon the legal principles of the secular
organization.315Chapter XII: Feudal Monarchy and Monarchy
Limited by Class Privileges
A. Feudal Monarchy
The Frankish monarchy contained all the essential conditions of a true
monarchy, and so far it is the beginning of a new development of the
modern state. But the opposing powers and passions were so strong in
the nation, and the traditions of German nobles and freemen were so
hostile to a strong central administration, that it was only possible for
exceptionally powerful rulers to exert to the full their kingly authority
and to bring out the real character of the state. Weak kings were power-
less, and under their rule the tendency was obvious to dissolve the unity
of the state, to limit and discredit the central power, and to give indepen-
dence to local governments.
With the decline and extinction of the Carolings the royal authority
sank into obscurity, and the princes and lords seized the administration
of isolated peoples and territories. The Romano-Germanic universal
monarchy was replaced by the feudal monarchy, which gives to the middle
ages their special political character.
The following are the most notable characteristics of feudal monar-
chy:—
1. Every previous monarchy had been based upon a tribe or a na-
tion or a united people, and might therefore be called a national or popu-
lar (volksthümlich) institution. But the feudal monarchy, although con-
nected with a special nation of which the king is the head, had its essen-
tial basis in the personal bond of fealty between the king, the supreme310/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
lord of the land, and his vassals, who derived from him their power,
rank, and property. The mass of the people, as not being bound by this
feudal tie, were only regarded in a subordinate and indirect way. Thus
the monarchy was rather the institution of a class or estate than of the
nation: it was founded not so much upon the people as upon the feudal
vassals (Gefolgeschaft).
2. Personal fidelity, ennobled and strengthened by the idea of honour,
became now an important political conception.316  All vassals, on re-
ceiving their fiefs from a lord, swore to him the oaths of fealty and
homage.317 These oaths and the whole feudal system may be most clearly
traced in the mixed Saxon and Norman law of the English kingdom.
The tenants in chief took the oath of homage (Mannschaftseid)318 to the
king upon their knees, while they stood to swear the oath of fealty319
with their hand upon the gospels. Bishops and abbots were exceptions,
as they took the latter oath only. The oath of homage was the more
specially and directly connected with the possession of the fief. The
oath of fealty was more general, and could therefore be exacted from
other subjects who were not hound by the feudal tie. Instances of this
are to be found in the Carolingian times, doubtless under the influence
of feudal conceptions.320
The fealty thus sworn was mutual. The lord was equally bound
with the vassal, but the latter alone was bound to homage.321
3. The endeavour on the part of the feudal monarchy to bring all
subjects into the relation of vassalage had a material influence upon the
tenure of land. The Norman kings of England strove to obtain supreme
possession (Obereigenthum) of the whole land, so that not only all fiefs,
but also allodial estates, were regarded as being derived from the king.
Thus the national right of free property in the soil was transformed into
the feudal right of dependent occupation or tenure.322 This is a general
characteristic of feudalism, but it is especially clear in the history of
English law.323
4. By parallel steps all political power came to be regarded as de-
rived from the king. The king received his authority as a grant from
God.324 The lords received their right to rule from the supreme feudal
lord, the king, just as the planets derive their light from the sun.325 But
they ruled, not as mere officials of the state or organs of the government,
but by their own right and for their own ends, in the same way as they
held their fiefs. This combination of political rule with personal inde-
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ity, with certain families and estates, are specially characteristic of the
feudal system. The king cannot refuse to grant authority to his vassals
who have a hereditary right to it, nor can he interfere with the exercise
of that authority, nor define or limit its scope. Every circle of the admin-
istration is essentially distinct and independent.
Thus the unity of the State existed only in form. Any attempt to act
with decision was met by insuperable difficulties. The greater and lesser
vassals thwarted and restricted the central power, instead of acting as
its agents. The national life was split into a variety of individual forms,
and the single state was dissolved into a number of petty sovereignties.
Free scope was given to the will and the inclination of individuals, espe-
cially of the magnates, but no common political action of the whole
body was possible. The aristocracy alone was powerful and free: the
monarchy had dignity without strength: the people found the natural
development of its powers obstructed on all sides. The further the lower
classes were removed from the centre, from the feudal suzerain, the
more oppressive was the arbitrary authority of the intermediate lords.
The two elements of the monarchical power among the Germans,
the military and the judicial ban, were not divided among the numerous
lords and vassals. The executive government was far weaker and more
limited than that of the Frankish kings. The whole constitution had be-
come aristocratic, although monarchy was retained as an ornament.
The kings of the Capet line had little to distinguish them from the great
lords;326 even the German kings were often foiled in internal affairs by
the action of the princes. It was only exceptionally, when circumstances
were specially favourable or dangers specially threatening, that the kings
were enabled to exercise a strong central power. That this was the case
in England after the Norman Conquest was due, partly to the fact that
the Norman nobles saw their own security in a close alliance with the
crown, and partly to the necessity of an energetic government to main-
tain the new dynasty on the throne.
5. Guizot has propounded the question why it is that feudalism was
always hateful to the people, not only at the time of its decay, but when
it was at the zenith of its power. The chief reason for this is thus stated
by him: ‘Feudalism was a confederation of petty sovereigns, of petty
despots, unequal among themselves and bound by duties and rights to
each other, but invested with arbitrary and absolute powers in their own
domains, over their direct and personal subjects.... Of all tyrannies the
worst is that which can thus count its subjects and can see from its seat312/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
the boundaries of its rule. The caprices of human will were there mani-
fested in their intolerable variety and with irresistible promptitude. It
was a system in which the inequality of conditions was most rudely
visible: wealth, power, independence, all the advantages and rights stood
in immediate and visible contrast with misery, weakness, and servitude....
Despotism was as great as in a pure monarchy, privilege was as much
developed as in an organised aristocracy, and both displayed themselves
in the crudest and most offensive form. Despotism was not mitigated by
the distance and elevation of a throne; privilege was not disguised under
the majesty of a great corporation. Both belonged to an individual who
was always present, always alone, and always in close neighbourhood
to his subjects?’327
This description contains some truth, but in its entirety it applies to
France alone among mediaeval states. The feudal system was not every-
where detested, and the attachment even of peasants to their lord was
not rare. Also it was not essential to the system that the lords should
have ‘arbitrary and absolute power’ over their vassals. Where such power
was exercised—as was the case in France and too often in other coun-
tries—it was in direct opposition to the system which established, from
the summit to the base, circles of administration in which the powers
were derived from above and independent. Even the serfs had fixed he-
reditary rights; their duties could not be increased at the lord’s will, and
their persons could only be disposed of according to tradition and cus-
toms. The manorial law (Hofrecht) had the same fixity and sanction for
the lower, as the feudal law for the higher classes.328
But apart from the cases in which the lords exceeded their rights,
there can be no doubt that the small size of the lordships and the diffi-
culty of escaping from oppression, which was so close at hand, were
among the worst characteristics of feudalism.
6. The Feudal State was pre-eminently a legal state (Rechtsstat).
Although the principle of the public welfare was obscured, the various
political rights were clearly limited and defined. Like private and per-
sonal rights, they could be disposed of at will by the ordinary legal
processes of sale, exchange, donation, inheritance, etc. They were pro-
tected either by judicial process or by the admitted right of private war.
On the one hand, there was a definite legal organisation which secured
freedom to individuals and to separate corporations, but not to the na-
tion as a whole: on the other hand, there was a continuous internal war,
an ever-recurring anarchy. These, like the double face of Janus, are theThe Theory of the State/313
two inconsistent appearances presented by the feudal state in the middle
ages.
B. Monarchy limited by Estates or Class Privileges
Before the close of the middle ages feudal monarchy gradually gave
way to a monarchy limited by class privileges (ständisch beschränkte
Monarchie) which is the medieval predecessor of the modern represen-
tative monarchy. From about the year 1250 this form prevailed in most
of the European states, and it lasted for three centuries until in the six-
teenth it was transformed into absolute monarchy.
The king or prince still derived his power from God or from his
suzerain, and regarded this power as the property of himself and his
dynasty. Within the range of his princely authority he felt himself to be
master and endured no opposition to his will. But the range was now
very limited: everywhere the prince was confronted by the rights of
classes, of corporations, and of individuals, which he was bound to
respect as he would have his own rights respected. The possessor of
these rights was prepared to defend them, if necessary, with arms or
with the more peaceful weapons of law.
The king had no legislative power by himself. The counsel and
consent of the national estates (Reichsstande) were necessary for the
edicts of the king, the approval of the provincial estates (Landstände)
for those of the prince.
The administrative power was still very slightly developed and very
limited. There was no body of officials to carry out the will of the cen-
tral government. The tenants in chief to whom the royal rights were
entrusted, exercised them within their domains as their own. The court
offices were held, mostly in hereditary succession, by vassals and min-
isters who served their lord according to traditional forms with more
show than reality. Usage and etiquette, the traditions of classes, and
family spirit were far more influential than the sentiment of duty to the
law and public spirit. The provincial estates, in which the nobles pre-
ponderated, exercised an often oppressive control over the princely gov-
ernment by their complaints and remonstrances. Not infrequently they
attacked the prince’s ministers and called for their dismissal or their
punishment. Sometimes they demanded the guardianship of the prince’s
person, or that their commissioners should be entrusted with a share in
the government.
The king was still regarded as the supreme judge, and occasionally314/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
sat in person to administer justice. But the judgment was pronounced by
the assessors (Schöffen), and the king had only to carry it out. He him-
self was bound by the law and could be called to account for wrong-
doing. It was an old German custom that every lord possessing judicial
rights should, if accused, be tried before his own representative. Thus
the German king, though at the same time he was Roman Emperor and
the secular head of Christendom, could, under certain circumstances, be
compelled to appear before the Count Palatine of the Rhine, and to
submit himself to the judgment of the princes. So, too, the count (Graf )
might be judged by his acting magistrate (Schultheiss).
The police administration was undeveloped and usually combined
with the functions of the judge. There were as yet no gens d’armes, and
the modern police system was nonexistent.
Even the military power of the prince was restricted by the feudal
laws and customs. The vassals owed only a fixed and very limited ser-
vice, and this they regarded as a burden on their land and were eager to
prevent any energetic use of it.
The German kings frequently experienced how difficult it was to
check the defiant independence of the great dukes, and how little the
fealty of the princes of the empire towards their head could be relied
upon.
It was possible for kings and princes to obtain a more submissive
and useful army by employing mercenaries, and this was often done.
But mercenaries had to be paid, and if the estates refused to grant any
taxes for the purpose, their pay had to come out of the king’s personal
revenue, and this often involved him in debt and difficulties. Moreover,
as these mercenaries were often foreigners, they made the prince hateful
to the country which they held in servitude.
The king had no right to raise taxes except when the estates had first
recognised their necessity and approved their levy, which an aristocratic
body was by no means inclined to do. Many of the taxes were gradually
made into charges upon real property, the burden of which fell mostly
on the lands of the peasants, and they thus became fixed and invariable.
In this, as in the other points, it is obvious that both estates and indi-
viduals were wanting in a sense of common duties to the State.Chapter XIII: VI. Modern Absolute Monarchy
The medieval monarchy, limited by privileged classes, was directly fol-
lowed, not by the modern representative monarchy, but by absolute
monarchy, which obtained strength from the struggle with the estates.
Both the mixed German and Romance and the pure German nations of
Europe had to pass through this stage before they could realise the mod-
ern form of state.
Absolutism appeared first and most conspicuously in France and
Spain. Where the German element preponderated in a nation, it was
difficult for the kings to establish despotism, which conflicted with the
legal principles and traditions of the Germans. Roman traditions, on the
other hand, which were now revived both in theory and in practice, were
altogether favourable to monarchy.329
Ever since the twelfth century, when feudalism was at its zenith, the
French lawyers had been striving with united energies to establish the
monarchy upon the old foundations of the imperial law of Rome. The
maxim of their school was that the government must be one, indivisible,
and absolute, qualities which they combined under the expression of a
sovereign power. Starting from this point, they treated the rights of ju-
risdiction and government enjoyed by the feudal nobles as encroach-
ments and abuses, inconsistent with the interests of king and people,
and either to be swept away or to be limited as much as possible. They
represented the French kings as the successors of the Roman emperors,
Roman law as the one true law, the legal usages of feudalism they treated
with disdain. Centuries elapsed before these theories were carried out in
practice and the rule of the nobles was really broken. But the internal316/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
struggle never ceased until the feudal system with its variety of forms
had been annihilated, and absolute monarchy, which had been growing
stronger and stronger, arose upon its ruin.
The maxim of the Roman law, quod principi placuit legis hapet
vigorem, was revived as a principle of politics in the French form, Qui
veut le roi, si veut la roi.330 When once unrestricted power of legislation
was conceded to the king, it was easy for him to remove the obstacles
which feudalism and the rights of the estates had opposed to the devel-
opment of the central power, of the national spirit, and the public wel-
fare. The judicial tribunals, inspired by the study of Roman law, and
especially the Parliaments of Paris and the provinces, helped to give the
victory to this tendency. Public opinion, especially in the towns, which
had preserved Roman traditions and had been to some extent free from
feudal influences, was favourable to the new conception. The citizens
hated the lesser nobles more than they feared the lying, and hoped, by
weakening the former, to secure the progress of their trade and manu-
facture. The peasants also gained rather than lost by the increase of the
royal power over their aggressors.
Monarchy triumphed over feudalists, in France under Louis XI
(1461–1483),331 in Spain under Philip II (1556–1598). In France there
were occasional reactions, but in Spain absolutism was more secure
and showed itself more sombre and cruel. One is horrified to think that
Philip II ventured to condemn as criminals the whole population of the
Low Countries, over which he had received only limited rights of gov-
ernment. It was not till Louis XIV’s reign that the absolute power of the
French monarchy reached its zenith, and from that time it went rapidly
downwards towards the precipice of the Revolution. The German dy-
nasties, great and small, set themselves to copy Louis XIV,332 and in the
eighteenth century a Christian ruler, Joseph I, condemned to death the
whole Bavarian people, which he ruled only by usurpation, and justified
himself by an appeal to his divine right.333
 The political principle of this new absolutism was expressed by
Louis XIV with surprising naiveté in his famous phrase L’etat c’est
moi: The king no longer regarded himself as the head, the highest and
most powerful member of the body politic, but he completely identified
the State with his own person, so that no member of the State except
himself was endowed with political rights. His personal welfare was the
welfare of the State, his individual rights were the rights of the State. He
was all in all, beyond him was nothing.The Theory of the State/317
This identification of the monarchy with the State—quite different
from the personification of the majesty of the State in the king—was the
more important and dangerous because at the same time, in the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries, the theory was developed of the om-
nipotence of the State. In the middle ages the State had been split up into
a number of fixed and independent units, over which it exercised no
decisive power. Now theory had rushed to the opposite extreme, and
there was no political sphere which was free from State control. Even
civil law and personal rights were regarded as a product of the State and
subject to its pleasure.
The political and legal theorists of the day are to a great extent
responsible for the harm that resulted from this idea. The former busied
themselves with finding plausible justification for the royal encroach-
ments, while the latter made none of the opposition that their duty en-
joined upon them. Quite as culpable were the court divines, whether
Jesuits, high-churchmen, or orthodox Lutherans, who distorted the Chris-
tian idea that government has a divine basis, to represent the kings as
the immediate vicegerents of God’s rule upon earth, as in fact earthly
deities. Because God is the supreme ruler of the world, which He has
created and which He has filled and maintained with His Spirit, there-
fore kings are to be the supreme rulers of nations to which they have no
such relations. As the Roman emperors loved to pose as deities, so Louis
XIV delighted to play the part of Jupiter, but the representation was
more suited to Pagan than to Christian times.
At the very period when this omnipotence was ascribed in theory
and often put into practice, we find instances of kings who are com-
pletely powerless, who have sunk to be the passive slaves of ambitious
ministers or greedy mistresses. In such a system everything depended
upon the personal character of the monarch.334 Men of distinguished
ability and energy, like Louis XIV himself before his powers were ex-
hausted by pleasure and old age, could keep up at any rate the appear-
ance of omnipotence, although even they could not remain fixed on so
dizzy a height. But a weak prince, such as Charles II of England,
Ferdinand VII of Spain, or Louis XV of France, handed over to others
the despotic power that in theory was reserved for the Crown. Every-
where the people sank into indescribable misery. Any one who wishes
fully to appreciate the effects of absolutism in civilised Europe should
study the social history of Spain, Italy, or Austria, between 1540 and
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Fortunately so many hostile traditions and institutions survived from
former times as to prevent the complete and permanent development of
a political principle which might be suited to the peoples of Asia, but
was wholly alien to European life. The restored dynasty of the Stuarts
sought to emulate Louis XIV, and James II attacked not only the ancient
and chartered rights of Parliament, hut also the more recent constitution
of the Church. The result was the expulsion of his dynasty from the
throne: and the elevation of William of Orange, the greatest statesman
and prince of his time, led to the firm foundation of the modern repre-
sentative system.
The double and decisive overthrow of absolute monarchy in En-
gland was not immediately fatal to this institution in the rest of Europe.
But all confidence in it was shattered, and it gradually advanced to-
wards ruin. Its principles were by the liberal philosophy of the eigh-
teenth century. In the person of Frederick II, this philosophy ascended
the throne of a rising State, and thence proclaimed the maxim that the
king is not the proprietor of the land, nor the lord of the people or State,
but ‘the first servant of the State.’336 The principle of absolute monar-
chy was fatally weakened before the French Revolution, and was in no
condition to withstand the storm. In spite of numerous fluctuations it
finally perished in all the civilised states of Europe as the people became
conscious of their freedom.
It is only in Russia that absolute monarchy survives to our own
day.337 Religious sentiments are stronger in the East than in the West,
and the immense size of the country and its comparative want of
civilisation require a strong central government. The greatest reforms,
such as the enfranchisement of the serfs by Alexander II, in 1858, could
never have been accomplished except by the decisive will of the em-
peror. They would hardly have been called for by the aristocracy, and a
free and cultivated burgher class does not exist as a political or social
power. The lower classes are not wanting in ability to manage their own
affairs in their villages and business associations, but are incapable of
taking any important part in politics or legislation.Chapter XIV: VII. Constitutional Monarchy: A. Its
Origin and Progress
Constitutional monarchy is the fruit of modern times but its germ is to
be found, as was pointed out by Montesquieu, in ‘the forests of ancient
Germany.’ The first great hut immature step towards the creation of
that form of state which we now call constitutional, was taken when
German princes established themselves upon Roman soil, when Roman
political ideas were brought into contact with German rights.
Then followed the period of feudal monarchy and of the limitation
of the royal power by a strong aristocracy. The unity of the State was
lost, the welfare of the people was neglected, and the king had no power
proportionate to his dignity. Then the national tendency to unity revived,
and the German feudal State was again illuminated and fertilised by the
political principles of Rome. The people began to move at the same
time, but the princes anticipated them, and seized the iron sceptre of
absolute pouter. Classes began to struggle with each other and with the
princes. As the middle ages came to an end the modern constitution of
the State was close at hand. It is the end of a history of more than a
thousand years, the completion of the Romano-Germanic political life,
the true political civilization of Europe.
This form of State was first developed in England, where it had
long been slowly but surely ripening. In no European country did the
monarchy retain so much power in the middle ages as in England, but
nowhere were the rights and liberties of the nobles and the people so
courageously defended and so securely founded.
But the English were not spared the fevers of political strife. Two320/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
great revolutions threatened the whole edifice of the State with ruin. The
first, in the middle of the thirteenth century, was the attempt of the bar-
ons to take the government from the king into their own hands. This was
the object of the Provisions of Oxford in 1258, which were forced upon
Henry III by Simon de Montfort.338 In the second, which arose in the
seventeenth century from Charles I’s struggle with the Long Parliament,
both monarchy and aristocracy were for a time swept away by the fa-
natical party of democratic Puritans.
But on both occasions the disease did not last long enough to per-
manently weaken the body politic, and though the external symptoms
were bad enough, it had not sufficient internal strength to give an alien
direction to the national life. Both times England quickly recovered from
the shock, the connexion with the past was never broken, and the na-
tional development remained organic and normal. Both revolutions re-
sulted in distinct progress. From the first is to be dated the summoning
of town representatives to parliament, the origin of the later House of
Commons. The second was completed by the foundation of the new
constitutional monarchy in 1689, which is henceforth a nations’ institu-
tion.339
Constitutional monarchy is a combination of all other forms of State.
It preserves the greatest variety without sacrificing the harmony and
unity of the whole. While giving free doom to the aristocracy to exercise
its powers, it imposes no restraint upon the democratic tendencies of the
people. In its reverence for the law we can even see an ideocratic ele-
ment. But all these various tendencies are held together in their due
relations by the monarchy, the living head of the State organization.
Constitutional monarchy in England has its stages of development.
The following belong to the time of William of Orange:—
1. Absolute monarchy was rejected as an unconstitutional encroach-
ment, to which resistance was justifiable.
2. In opposition to the mystical conceptions of orthodox theolo-
gians who revered the royal rights as divine, these rights were declared
to be human and limited by the constitution,340 just as much as the rights
of the Lords and Commons in Parliament, or the personal liberties of
every Englishman.
3. The Declaration of Rights (1689) authoritatively formulated and
secured the rights of Parliament and the liberties of the nation. The
union of this declaration with the settlement of the succession made it
impossible for the monarchy in the future to sever itself from these rightsThe Theory of the State/321
and liberties.
4. The irresponsibility of the king was declared to be a rule of the
constitution, but the expulsion of the Stuarts proved clearly that excep-
tions could be made to the rule, if king and people came into
irreconcileable collision.
5. Ministers were made responsible to Parliament, the Commons
having the right of accusing, the Lords of trying them.
Other rights of Parliament were recognised, viz.:
(6) to share in legislation,
(7) to grant taxes and to regulate the royal household,
(8) to control the executive government.
(9) The judicial administration, based upon the Sworn juries se-
lected from the people, was made completely independent and its pow-
ers extended.
(10) Freedom of the press and of political meetings was granted, so
that public opinion could criticise and control the government.
The Hanoverian kings found it difficult to understand these prin-
ciples and their consequences, but circumstances were too strong for
them to refuse their recognition of the free constitution. In our own day
the influence of Prince Albert induced the royal filmily to become unre-
servedly constitutional, and thus the monarchy has lost neither respect
nor power, while it has thrown off the prejudices of dynastic tradition,
and has become a truly national Monarchy (Volkskönigthum).
The English king has realised that he does not represent his own
will, but that of the State. Thus the ministers and—since the English
ministers are kept in power by the confidence of Parliament, or rather of
the House of Commons—the popular representatives have more influ-
ence over the government than in continental states. So far the English
monarchy may be called parliamentary or republican. But the reverence
for the crown is nowhere stronger than in England; and however strong
the aristocratic elements and the Parliament may be, the English consti-
tution has remained a monarchy.341
The second grand effort to introduce a constitutional monarchy was
made by the French. the constitution of 1791 was intended by its au-
thors to be a masterpiece directly deduced from modern political prin-
ciples. But the principles of the Constituent Assembly were rather re-
publican and democratic than monarchical. Its members were influenced,
not so much by the English constitution, as by Rousseau’s theories of
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tutional democracy of America with its three powers, each independent,
but held together by the unity of the sovereign people. The constitution
of 1791 was essentially democratic: its monarchy was alien to the sys-
tem, a survival from the past with which on all other points the Revolu-
tion had completely broken.
Napoleon revived the monarchical power and raised the nation from
the mire into which it had sunk. The central authority was once more
concentrated in his strong hand. The Revolution was still recent, and the
country required a strong dictatorship to carry it through the European
war. But he was too energetic a ruler to give France a new constitutional
monarchy, and the times were not suited to such an experiment. Yet he
allowed some rude approaches to it. He recognised the people as the
source of his power, and he opened to all Frenchmen the way to honour
and advancement. He sought to create in the Senate a new aristocracy
which, as he said, ‘should protect the sovereignty, while the democracy
elevates to the sovereignty.’342 If his dynasty had been peaceably pro-
longed, a national constitutional monarchy might in time have been
founded upon these beginnings. But to Napoleon himself the political
rights of the other corporations were displeasing as limitations upon his
absolute will, and his fall involved all his institutions in the same ruin.
The Charter of Louis XVIII (4 June, 1814) was in its essence a
compromise between the old dynasty which returned from exile and the
French people which had witnessed the Revolution and the rule of Na-
poleon, a compromise between the claims of the old monarchy and the
new principles of government, between legitimacy and the revolution.
In form it was a free gift of the king, and emanated from his exclusive
authority.343 It contained other contradictions besides this, but at the
same time it was better than the previous attempts to realise a constitu-
tional monarchy in France.
While the forms of the English constitution had been apparently
copied, the spirit was altogether different. Greater power was allowed
to the French than to the English king, or rather, as the Charter pro-
fessed to be issued by the absolute authority of the monarch,344 his power
was less limited. But the French monarchy was much less secure than
the English, not only because the character of the people was more un-
stable and prone to change, but because the Revolution had destroyed
the aristocracy and had trained the whole people in democratic opinions
and tendencies.
The peers (pairie), who shared the right of legislation with the crownThe Theory of the State/323
and formed a supreme court for political offenses, were to be ‘a truly
rational institution, uniting the recollections of the past with the hopes
of the future, the old regime with the new.’ But in reality the new nobles
of Napoleon’s time were put too much in the background, and the old
decaying aristocracy was too generously treated. The hereditary peers
were very inferior to the English House of Lords, and could never be
regarded as a permanent or ‘truly national institution.’ The Chamber of
Deputies was to replace ‘the old assemblies of the Champs de Mars as
well as the third estate of the States General.’ But it was really a pure
plutocracy, and was employed for the profit of the official class. The
mass of the citizens, who were wealthy and civilised and had played an
important part in the revolutionary period, could neither elect nor be
elected. The peasants, to whom the Revolution had given free property
and even political rights, were equally excluded, while the lower classes
were wholly disregarded. The demos, now a great political power in
France, was not likely to support a constitution which left it entirely
unrepresented.
The Revolution had strengthened two conflicting tendencies, that
towards centralization and that towards the extension of democracy. If
carried to extremes, the one led back to absolute monarchy, the other to
revolutionary anarchy. The Charter sought to strengthen and control the
former, and thus to restrain the latter tendency.345
The Charter survived the first popular storm, which was roused by
the absolutism of Charles X and by the revolutionary press. The party
cry of Louis Philippe and of the July Revolution of 1830 was that ‘the
Charter should be a reality.’ But the hereditary was replaced by a life
peerage, and the basis of the Chamber of Deputies was enlarged, though
it retained its plutocratic character.346
Then came a second storm, of which no one had foreseen the vio-
lence, and in February, 1848, the whole constitution, though better than
what followed, and though containing in itself the capability of improve-
ment, was overthrown in one day, the majority, being too surprised and
stupefied to resist a desperate minority. For the second time the demos
sought to rule France.
The representative democracy of the first Revolution was restored
with a President of the Republic: but his authority was seriously checked
and limited by the National Assembly, which was divided by bitter party
passions, and wasted its strength in endless debates. The popular in-
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came the conqueror and the heir of the democracy. Louis Napoleon seized
upon the administration, and justified his action by the consent of the
vast majority of Frenchmen.
The constitution of the new Empire (1852) recalled rather the Ro-
man than the English state. In fact, the Napoleonic ideas had a distinctly
Roman character, and thus commended themselves to the Romance ele-
ment of the French.347 Homage was paid to the majesty of the people as
the source of all political power; the constitution vas subject to its con-
sent; the legislative Body depended upon its approval; even the imperial
power was derived from its will,348 and the Emperor was responsible to
the popular voice. Democratic equality. so dear to the masses, was un-
reservedly recognised in the right of universal suffrage. Upon this broad
basis the imperial power was raised to majestic dignity. The initiative in
legislation, the supreme control of politics, diplomacy, the army and the
official body, were placed in the Emperor’s hands. Even the members of
the council of state could be dismissed at his pleasure. The constitution
recognised only two great powers—the majority of the people and the
Emperor. All that stood between them had the merest shadow of inde-
pendence. Ministers were responsible only to the head of the State, but
some of them were merely orators employed to defend the government
in the Chamber, and these men sometimes obtained an influence danger-
ous not only to the representatives but also to the Emperor.349 The power
of the Legislative Body, was negative rather than positive; it might re-
ject but it could not improve a handful or unjust law; it had no initiative,
and could only confer with the Council of State about proposed changes
by means of commissions. The Senate was professedly created to de-
fend popular liberties, to maintain the constitution, and in exceptional
cases to take the initiative in proposing reforms. But it was by its nature
aristocratic, and its members were compelled to adhere to the Emperor,
partly by the fact that they owed their dignity to him, and partly by the
social and party relations of France. The chief object of the government
was to maintain harmony between the Emperor and the masses, and
therefore very scanty liberty was allowed to opposition either in the
chambers or in the press.350
This autocratic constitution failed to satisfy the revived desire for
popular liberty. Napoleon III was compelled to make concessions in the
direction of constitutional monarchy.351 A senatorial decree (Sept. 1869)
granted to both Houses the right of initiation, allowed ministers to be-
come members of them, and made the latter responsible to the Senate.The Theory of the State/325
These changes were submitted to the people, and approved in the
plébiscite of 1870 (20 April) by 7,350,142 votes to 1,538,825.
But these concessions failed to save the constitution in the crisis
which was brought about by the collapse of Napoleon’s policy and of
the French army in the war with Germany. A new revolution in Paris (4
Sept. 1870) abolished the Empire and again tried the experiment of a
Republic.352
The changes experienced by France in the revolutionary period and
afterwards exercised an important influence upon other, and especially
upon the Romance, countries. In Italy the victorious arms of the French
established republics on the model of their own; and afterwards Napo-
leon I erected vassal kingdoms both in Italy and Spain which were cop-
ies of the French empire. It seemed as if the constitution of modern
Europe was to be dictated from Paris, but the fall of Napoleon’s su-
premacy was immediately fatal to his ephemeral creations.
More important in the development of constitutional monarchy,
though also of only short duration, were the constitutions proclaimed in
1812 in Sicily and Spain.
The constitution of Sicily, which was mainly the work of Lord Wil-
liam Bentinck, was naturally modelled upon that of England. At the
same time the aristocratic traditions of the Norman period were made
use of, and the modern theory of the division of powers was more clearly
recognised than in England. The legislative power was given to the Par-
liament, which, however, included only the two Houses without the king.
The king had to confirm laws, not as a part of Parliament but as a
separate and external power.353 The Chamber of Peers consisted of the
Sicilian barons and prelates. The secular peers were hereditary, but the
king could create new peers among nobles who possessed a net revenue
of 6000 francs. The Lower House consisted of representatives, and a
very small income was sufficient qualification for the suffrage or a seat.
The executive power rested with the king, but his ministers and
privy councillors were responsible to Parliament for its exercise. In all
important matters the king was bound to consult his Privet Council, and
in some, e.g., the bringing of troops into Sicily, the appointment of for-
eign officers, the creation of new magistracies, or the granting of pen-
sions for political services, he had to obtain the consent of Parliament.
The judicial power was exercised in the king’s name, but ‘only by
the officials fixed by the law.’ Each Sicilian was allowed to resist any
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ished; feudal rights were suppressed, etc.
It is obvious that this constitution was an imitation of English forms,
with a certain admixture of the theories put forth in the French constitu-
tion of 1791. The republican element preponderated in both, but in Sic-
ily the contrast with monarchical tradition was the more marked be-
cause the absolutist court of the Bourbons could not endure the consti-
tution, and the quarrel between the clericals and the Jacobins was fought
out with all the heat and frenzy of the southern character. When Naples
was restored to the king, he felt himself strong enough to revoke the
constitution which he had sworn to observe, and to restore absolute
government. But this first effort to combine the political forms of En-
gland with the theories of the French Revolution, and thus to form a new
constitutional system, remained a model for many subsequent attempts
in the same direction.
Similar theories about the constitutional State and the division of
the three powers inspired the very complete constitution which was is-
sued by the Spanish Regency (March 19, 1812) at a time when the king
was a prisoner, and great part of the country was in the hands of the
French. It took as its model the French constitution of 1791, and pro-
claimed the principle that the people is sovereign (Art. 3), but at the
same time it allowed very extensive rights to the king. Legislative power
was entrusted to the ‘Cortes combined with the king’ (Art. 15), and the
latter was also charged with the ‘supervision of justice’ (Art. 171). But
reiterated votes on the part of the Cortes could compel the king to sanc-
tion a law. The Spanish constitution differed very essentially from the
English, because it did not admit an intermediate Chamber of Peers, but
placed the king face to face with one assembly of national representa-
tives, the Cortes.354
In spite of its defects and the want of enthusiasm with which it was
received, this constitution became popular after its arbitrary abrogation
by the restored king, Ferdinand VII (May 4, 1814), and several attempts
were made (in 1820 and 1835) to restore it by force. The Estatuto Real
of 1834, which gave Spain a representative government, was insuffi-
cient to satisfy the people. In 1836 the Queen-Regent, Christina, was
compelled to recognise the constitution of 1812, and in the next year the
influence of the progressist party obtained the formal sanction of a new
constitution based upon that of 1812, with partial modifications taken
from the Estatuto Real. This recognised the king’s right to sanction
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ber of deputies.355 A revision of the constitution in 1845 (May 23) by
the moderate party (moderados) brought it nearer to the French Charter
of 1830.356
Even this did not terminate the constitutional struggles, and the coun-
try continued to be tossed alternately by clerical reaction and radical
anarchy, by court intrigues and military dictatorships. The misrule of
the bigoted Queen Isabella brought about a new revolution in 1868,
which expelled both the Bourbons and the Jesuits. For a long time the
monarchical party looked round in vain for a king, until in 1870 the
duke of Aosta, second son of the Italian king Victor Emmanuel, ac-
cepted the offered crown as Amadeo I. For a time there seemed a
favourable prospect for constitutional government, but before long the
king was disgusted by the ceaseless conspiracies, and abdicated of his
own accord (February 11, 1873). Soon afterwards the military party
seized the government, and prepared the way for the restoration of con-
stitutional monarchy with the young Alfonso XII, who was proclaimed
king on the 1st of January, 1875. Meanwhile the Bourbon claimant, Don
Carlos, supported by the priests and the legitimists, had been striving to
assert his hereditary rights in the northern and Basque provinces, with
no result except to increase the misery of the people. In 1876 a Cortes
was summoned to draw up a new constitution, which was approved by
King Alfonso on the 30th of June. According to this the nation was to be
represented by a Senate, of which the members were partly senators by
right, partly nominated by the king, and partly elected (Electoral Law of
February 8, 1877, and by a Chamber of Deputies (Electoral Law of
December 28, 1878).357
The Spanish constitution of 1812 was imitated in the: Portuguese
constitution of 1822, which, however, was never fully recognized. In
1826 Don Pedro, to strengthen the position of his daughter Donna Maria
da Gloria, drew up a new constitution, which better preserved the mo-
narchical principle, and also, following England and the French Char-
ter, added to the Chamber of Deputies a house of hereditary and life
peers. This constitution recognised four powers: (1) the legislative power,
belonging to the Cortes under the sanction of the king; (2) the mediating
power (moderador), held by the king, ‘as the supreme head of the na-
tion, to maintain the balance and harmony of the other political pow-
ers;’ (3) the executive power, in the hands of king and ministers; (4) the
judicial power, entrusted to independent courts.358
Even, for the victory of Don Miguel and the absolutists who would328/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
have nothing to do with either constitution, two parties continued to
strive with varying success, the democrats for the constitution of 1822,
and the ‘chartists’ for the charter of 1826. In 1838 the latter constitution
was revised, and hereditary peerages and the council of state were abol-
ished.359 The mass of the people took little part in these changes of insti-
tutions. nevertheless, under the influence of the modern Coburg dynasts,
political conditions have developed more successfully and peaceably in
Portugal than in Spain.360
Constitutional monarchy made its way from Portugal to Brazil, which
became independent of the mother-country in 1822, and there under-
went the same struggles and the same alternations of fortune, but also
made the same progress, as in Europe. [The monarchy was overthrown
in 1889.]
It took a long struggle to free Italy from the degrading yoke of abso-
lute rule. Although the Napoleonic kingdoms of Italy and Naples had
been nothing more than limited autocracies, the absolutism of the re-
stored Bourbon and Hapsburg princes was endured with impatience by
the people. Secret conspiracies and open revolts struggled against the
cruel reaction, and were only put down with the hells of foreign arms.
When the king of Naples agreed in 1820 to grant his subjects the Span-
ish constitution of 1811, Austrian troops at once stepped in to restore
the old despotism. The movements between 1830 and 1840 were equally
futile, as the massive power of Austria, on which the dynasties leaned
for support, was always ready to suppress any attempt at constitutional
government.
It was only after 1840 that the spirit of reform obtained greater
strength by allying itself with the national desire for freedom from for-
eign rule. In 1847 all Italy was roused, and the movement seemed to
have the support of the new Pope, Pius IX. Even before the outbreak of
the Revolution in Paris, Ferdinand II in Naples, and Charles Albert in
Piedmont, were compelled to establish constitutions. But the former
hastened to destroy the work as soon as he could do so with safety,
although he had sworn to maintain it ‘in the name of the Holy Trin-
ity.’361 The result of his treachery was that, when his son Francis II was
urged by necessity to restore constitutional government in 1860, the
people refused to trust him, and the dynasty was expelled.
In Piedmont matters went better. The House of Savoy adhered with
rare determination to the constitution of the 4th of March, 1848, which
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It is true that Charles Albert failed in his design to form a kingdom of
Italy under his sceptre. The victories of Radetzky checked his ambition,
and perhaps preserved the peninsula from the flood of a premature de-
mocracy. But even in this period of reaction Victor Emmanuel remained
loyal to the promise of his father. His wonderful successes in 1859 and
1860 were to a great extent due to the confidence which the Italians felt
in his loyalty to the constitution and the nation, and in the great states-
man, Cavour, whom he appointed to manage his affairs. French assis-
tance drove the Austrians from Lombardy, the new national kingdom
extended itself over the principalities of central Italy, and the bold cam-
paign of Garibaldi added to it Naples and Sicily. With the help of Prussia
Venice was annexed in 1866, and finally, in 1870, the Franco-German
war compelled the French troops to evacuate Rome, and enabled the
Italians to occupy their old capital. The German victories destroyed the
last ecclesiastical State of Europe. The new Italian monarchy has re-
mained firmly constitutional, and even the republican party followed
the example of Garibaldi in recognising this form of government as best
suited for existing conditions.
Belgium forms the transition from the Romance to the German States.
The Belgian constitution of 1831 was copied from the French Charter
of 1830, but makes greater concessions to the burgher democracy. This
is seen in the assertion that ‘all powers are derived from the people’
(Art. 25: one must remember that Belgium had no native dynasty, and
was compelled to call in a foreign king), in the rejection of class distinc-
tions (Art. 6), and in the wider suffrage. The system of two chambers is
retained, but the Senate is elected only for a period of eight years, and
the electors are the same as for the Chamber of Deputies, the only dis-
tinction being that a higher qualification of age and property is required
for senators (the original plan was to give the nomination of senators to
the kings. lander the wise and statesmanlike rule of Leopold of Coburg,
Belgium was very little affected by the crisis of 1848, and has since
continued to increase in prosperity in spite of the passionate contests
between the ultramontane and liberal parties.362
In Scandinavia the constitutional system has had a peculiar history.
In Sweden, the Diet was composed in the sixteenth century of four es-
tates, each with a separate vote, viz., the nobles and knights, the clergy,
the citizens, and the peasants. The kings were often compelled to rely
Upon the two lower orders for support against the great power of the
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(comprising both the Council of State and the ministers). Gustavus III
was the first to break through this preponderance of the nobles, which
threatened both the existence of the crown and the security of the coun-
try, by opening (1789) political offices, except ‘the highest offices of the
State and the Court,’ to non-nobles.
The Swedish constitution of the 7th of June, 1809,363 is a develop-
ment from the earlier constitution of 1772.364 The functions of the Council
of State and the four secretaries of State are regulated with much greater
care and precision than in other modern constitutions, and the exclusive
pretensions of the nobles to fill these posts are restricted. The estates
remained until recent times four in number, and without their consent
the king could neither change the constitution, issue laws, nor levy new
taxes. As a rule a majority of three estates bound the fourth, but in the
case of constitutional laws all the estates and the king must be unani-
mous.
In many points this constitution recalls the medieval organization of
Germany. Although presenting many advantages it has found, outside
Sweden, little attention and no imitators, mainly because the division of
estates made it difficult to obtain a decisive expression of the national
will. In 1866 the ordinary system of two chambers superseded the four
estates.365
Far more democratic is the Norwegian constitution of the 4th of
November, 1814. The Swedish king (Charles XIII), whom the peace
made king of Norway also, was compelled by circumstances to accept
the constitution which the Norwegians themselves had drawn up in the
spring of 1814, to secure their personal freedom and independence. Leg-
islation is the function of the people and exercised by the Storthing (Art.
49). The king teas the right of sanction, but cannot reject a law which
has been passed three times by the Assembly. The Storthing is chosen
by the people (mostly landed proprietors), and then divides itself into
two chambers, the Lagthing and the Odelsthing. The executive power
belongs to the king, his ministers being responsible. Subsequent efforts
to extend the royal power and to create a political aristocracy have all
failed. The opposition of the free peasants and citizens to both changes
has been the more vigorous because of the jealousy with which Norway
has maintained its independence of Sweden.366
In Denmark the revolution of 1660 was directed against the nobles,
and the assistance of the citizens made the monarchy absolute. It was
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duced, at first in the incomplete form of provincial estates (law of 28th
May, 1831), but made more democratic by the fundamental law of the
5th of June, 1849. The struggles of Danes and Germans have turned
upon the difference of nationality rather than of constitution. In 1866
(28th July) a revision of the constitution was made by the king and the
Rigsdagr (composed of two chambers, Landsthing and Folkething).367
In the modern kingdom of tile Netherlands, which replaced the old
republic of the United Provinces and the later Napoleonic kingdom of
Holland, constitutional monarchy was at once introduced (28th March,
1814, and after the union of Belgium by a new law of 24th August,
1815). The new constitution of the 14th of October, 1848, was an ad-
vance in the same direction, and the constitutional spirit has been lately
strengthened in Holland.
The old ‘Roman Empire of the German people’ had become a pow-
erless dignity in the last century of its nominal existence. All real power
was in the hands of the princes, amongst whom the emperor only re-
tained an influential position as Archduke of Austria and King of Hun-
gary and Bohemia.
But in their own separate territories most of the princes had broken
through the restraints imposed by their estates and had established ab-
solute government. Their power, derived from imperial offices which
had become hereditary, was, after medieval fashion, half theocratic, half
patriarchal. It was extended by the Roman conception of sovereignty,
and acknowledged no restraints except the slight bond of obedience to
the empire and the obligation to appear before the Imperial Chamber
(Reichskammergerickt) and the Aulic Council (Reichshfrath).
The first State to establish this independent absolutism was Prussia.
While Austria grew into a great European power almost outside the
Empire, and became the rival of France, a new State arose in the north,
and rapidly acquired strength in a contest with the medieval empire,
which was waged however in the spirit of German nationality. The Aus-
trian and Catholic houses of Hapsburg and Lorraine rested for support
upon the imperial dignity, traditional rights, the nobles, the clergy, and
an army composed of various races; while the Protestant house of
Hohenzollern became the representative and the champion of the na-
tional liberty and spirit of Germany.
Frederick the Great (1740–1786) deserves to be reverenced as the
father of constitutional monarchy upon the continent. If he had been
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transition from the absolute to the constitutional form of State would
have been much easier to accomplish. No one has more energetically
contended against the doctrine that the king is the lord and master of his
State; no one has more definitely maintained that monarchy is an office
and the king only the chief servant of the State. The whole medieval
theory of divine right and proprietary rule he unhesitatingly rejected.
That he neither revived the old constitution of the estates, nor created
new representative institutions, is easily explicable by the fact that he
was too far ahead of his subjects, who were not yet ripe for a share in
the government. But he prepared the way for constitutional monarchy:
(1) by carrying out the principle that the royal rights are duties to the
State, (2) by his legislation (the Preussische Landrecht), and (3) by
compelling all officials to discharge their political duties with zeal and
fidelity.
The French Revolution led Germany astray from the path marked
out by Frederick, as it made the princes timid and the people radical.
The constitutions which Napoleon’s influence established in the
States of the Confederation of the Rhine may to some extent be regarded
as marking the transition to constitutional monarchy. They cleared away
the last remnants of the old estates, collected the fundamental laws into
a single act, and gave a sort of representation, though despicable and
powerless, to property, industry, and education.
The desperate effort of the War of Liberation freed Germany from
the foreign yoke, and offered a favourable opportunity for introducing
the modern organization in a national and liberal spirit. The few great
statesmen that the country possessed, Stein, Humboldt, and at first
Hardenberg, wished for such a change, and Frederick William III had
publicly expressed himself favourable to it. But the absolutist senti-
ments of the German dynasties and of the noble and official classes
were too strong, the Revolution had inspired an overwhelming mistrust
of all modern ideas, and the political education of the people was still
very immature. Both the German confederation and the sovereign states
which composed it retained absolute government, only slightly limited
by recollections of the provincial estates. The 13th article of the Act
which constituted the confederation, declared that ‘in all States of the
Confederation there shall be a constitution of local estates’
(landständische Verfassung), but the Austrian statesmen expressly pro-
vided against any interpretation of this phrase to imply a ‘representative
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It was quite exceptional when a few states established a kind of
constitutional monarchy in imitation of the French monarchy, but modi-
fied by survivals of the old provincial estates. The lead was taken by the
Duchy of Nassau (2 Sept. 1814), where the constitution was very short-
lived, by Luxemburg (24 August, 1815), and notably by Saxe-Weimar-
Eisenach, which presented the rare spectacle of a prince, Karl August,
personally inclined to free institutions.
More important was the action of the Southern States—Bavaria
(26 May, 1818), Baden (as August, 1818), and Wurtemberg (25 Sep-
tember, 1819)—where the far-sighted government had first to put down
the opposition of the old estates. These States adopted constitutional
government from politic motives, in order to strengthen themselves
against the greater States which were despotically ruled.
Their example was followed by the Kingdom of Hanover (17 Dec.
1819), the Grand Duchy of Hesse (17 Dec. 1820), and Saxe-Meiningen
(23 August, 1829).
All these constitutions gave ample powers and rights to the king. In
fact, monarchy was more secure among the conservative Germans than
in France, and as long as it understood and followed the advance of
liberal ideas, was allowed the management of public affairs with more
confidence than was felt elsewhere.
The arrangement of the chambers was copied from the English and
French models. But the upper chambers, composed for the most part of
the landed nobility (Grundadel), whose claims and ideas belonged to
the past, with the addition of a few officials dependent upon the court,
could never acquire sufficient respect and authority. The lower cham-
bers were less plutocratic than in France, but as they followed the lines
of the old estates, they were often declared to be ‘class rather than rep-
resentative’ institutions. This, however, is unfair. The distinction be-
tween the medieval organization of estates and the modern representa-
tive government is not that the latter does not recognise the difference of
estates among the people, but that it is national, and lays stress rather
upon the unity of the nation and the State than upon the special interests
of the classes that compose the nation. Now this modern principle is
expressly recognised, for example, in the Bavarian Constitution, which
calls upon the deputies to swear that they will ‘consult for the general
welfare of the whole land without regard to separate estates or classes.’
The development of constitutional monarchy was hindered for many
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States of Germany. In Prussia all efforts at reform failed, and instead of
the promised representation of the people, only provincial estates were
granted. The Austrian Government believed that absolute government
was the only means of maintaining the unity of its various provinces.
The German Confederation directed all its activity to maintain the so-
called ‘monarchical principle,’ and to establish a police supervision over
the people.
The French Revolution of 1830 led to new movements in Germany,
and impelled a number of States to introduce the constitutional system.
The electorate of Hesse received a constitution (5 Jan. 1831) which was
devised to protect popular liberties against the despotism of the prince.
In Saxony a constitution was modelled upon that of Bavaria (4 Sept.
1831); and Hanover obtained a new fundamental law (26 Sept. 1833),
which was, however, rejected by the next king, Ernst August, and only
restored in 1840 in a modified form.
Thus, in spite of the hostility of the two great States, constitutional
government steadily advanced in (Germany, although it was often more
formal than real, and suffered much from an officious bureaucracy and
from the conflicts of parties both within and without the assemblies.
At last, on the 3rd of February, 1847, Frederick William IV issued a
patent creating a common Landtag for Prussia on the basis of the old
provincial estates. This assembly received the right of advice in legisla-
tion, of consent to new taxes, and of petitioning about internal affairs.
Thus Prussia stepped from the class of absolute to that of limited mon-
archies, and began to draw nearer to the representative states of Ger-
many. The impulse had been given to the introduction of the modern
system, and the constitution was the stronger for preserving the connexion
with existing relations instead of simply copying the ordinary forms of
constitutional government. Although the rights of the Landtag were
miserably insufficient, progress had become possible, and the defects of
the constitution might be removed as the people advanced in political
education. Unfortunately the government was so hostile to the legiti-
mate wishes of the Landtag that it lost the confidence even of the mod-
erate parties. When Europe was shaken by the political earthquake of
1848, the new edifice collapsed. On the 5th of October, 1848, a new
constitution was drawn up, which was mainly the work of the demo-
cratic and revolutionary party. Six months later the king issued an elec-
toral law (30 May, 1849), which led to the drawing up of the revised
constitution of the 31st of January, 1850.368 Since that date many impor-The Theory of the State/335
tant changes have been made, mostly in the direction of strengthening
the central authority. Although the constitution had many and serious
defects, it has furnished a legal basis for political life in Prussia.
The events of the next few years proved that the spirit of the consti-
tution had not been so generally accepted as the form. Dissatisfaction
was shown by the upper house (Herrenhaus), which was composed of
the representatives of absolutism and of medieval chivalry. The monar-
chy, accustomed to unchecked power, found it hard to accept its altered
position. It was only gradually that the popular representatives (Haus
der Abgeordneten) became conscious of the limits of their power and of
the great gulf which separated the Prussian government from the parlia-
mentary system of England. But during the obstinate and bitter struggles
between reform and reaction, between authority and liberty, the consti-
tution took deeper and deeper root, and hostilities gradually gave way to
the sense of duty towards the State. In the fire of the war of 1866 with
Austria all the elements of opposition were fused into unity.
Austria was also taken unawares by the Revolution of 1848. The
various peoples, who had hitherto been held together by the Hapsburg
dynasty, now struggled for separation, and Vienna was for a moment in
the hands of youthful and inexperienced enthusiasts. Unity disappeared
everywhere except in the army, the last bulwark of the monarchy. The
victories of the army enabled the Austrian statesmen to recover the reins
of government, and under the pressure of internal and external dangers,
they undertook to reconstruct a new and more united State. The consti-
tution which was granted on the 4th of March, 1849, was the first at-
tempt to organise the Austrian empire upon the principles of constitu-
tional monarchy. But the experiment was never put into practice. It
seemed impossible to unite in a single assembly peoples which varied so
completely both in race and in civilization; and the revolt of Hungary
made it more essential than ever to retain a dictatorial and united gov-
ernment. As the ruling dynasty had always been the connecting link
between the Austrian provinces, it was thought best to concentrate all
powers over the State in the hands of the emperor. An imperial patent
(20 August, 1851) declared ministers to be responsible to the sovereign
alone; by a cabinet decree of the same day the imperial council
(Reichsrath) was transformed into a crown council; and by another patent
(31 Dec.) the constitution of 1849 was suppressed. A decree of the cabi-
net (31 Dec.) promised the erection in the crown lands of deliberative
committees composed of the nobles, lesser landowners, and industrial336/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
classes.369 But in reality absolute monarchy was restored with a ma-
chine-like body of officials to carry out its will, with a moral support in
the Catholic clergy, and a material support in the strong army.
After 1858 absolutism suffered a series of defeats in Prussia, Ba-
varia, Baden, Wurtemberg, the electorate of Hesse, etc., and in the Ital-
ian war of 1859 Austria discovered the powerlessness of her three props,
the bureaucracy, the army, and the clergy. Again the imperial govern-
ment saw no way of escaping from its financial and political difficulties
except in granting a representative constitution. In an imperial diploma
of the 20th of October, 1860, this resolve was announced, and an at-
tempt was made to carry it out in the Fundamental Law of the 26th of
February, 1861.
According to the diploma the powers of the monarchy were to be
brought into harmony with ‘the consciousness of historic rights in the
various kingdoms and provinces.’ Each people was to have its own
Landtag with partial autonomy, and at the same time all were to co-
operate in the general Reichstag both in legislation and in controlling
the imperial government. There were to be two Reichstags, one for the
whole monarchy, the other for the western provinces. This constitution,
however, had only a tentative existence, as the Hungarians refused to
send deputies to the Reichstag.
An imperial declaration (20 Sept. 1865) suspended the action of the
Reichstag and again freed the government from its control. But the di-
sasters of 1866 brought about a new change. After the defeat of
Königgrätz [or Sadowa] and the treaty of Prague with Prussia, earnest
negotiations were carried on with Hungary, which steadily refused to
give up its ancient rights, or to exchange them for a Constitution that
was merely a gift from the emperor. At last they agreed to make peace
on condition that the legal continuity of the Hungarian Constitution should
be acknowledged, that the laws of 1848 and the independence of their
kingdom should be preserved, and that all the encroachments that had
been attempted should be declared null. This was virtually the restora-
tion of dualism. Henceforth there is a Reichstag and a ministry for Hun-
gary, and another Reichstag and ministry for the Austrian provinces on
this side of the Leitha. A series of laws from 1867 onwards organised
the responsibility of ministers, the method of representation, the judicial
and civil administration The suspended constitution, so far as it was
applicable, had to be revived. The two Diets appointed a joint assembly
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those of finance, war, and foreign affairs, in arranging a general policy
for the whole empire. It is doubtful whether this compromise will be
permanent, but it is certain that neither Austria, Hungary, nor Bohemia
would tolerate a return to absolutism, and that, though they may differ
as to forms, they are unanimous in the desire for a constitutional monar-
chy which shall secure influence and control to the national representa-
tives.
The attempt to extend constitutional forms from the in individual
states to the German Confederation led to the drawing up of a constitu-
tion (28 March, 1849) which was to embrace all the German states
except Austria. The Prussian kings were to be hereditary emperors; each
state was to be represented in a federal senate (Statenhaus), and the
German people were to send deputies to a national assembly (Volkshaus).
But the scheme was never carried out. Austria prepared for war rather
than accept such a solution of the German question; the king of Prussia
would not accept the imperial crown from the hands of the national
assembly; Bavaria refused its adhesion; and the nation itself was not
sufficiently decided. Dynastic and separatist influences were stronger
than the sense of national unity, and were able to foil all later efforts,
especially those of Prussia, to unite Germany more closely under a con-
stitutional monarchy. The war of 1866 was necessary to overcome the
obstacles interposed by Austria and the ruling dynasties.
The North German Confederation (16 April, 1867) can only be called
a constitutional monarchy with considerable reservations. The direction
of a common policy was entrusted to the Prussian king as hereditary
President and General of the Confederation. He was aided by a Federal
Chancellor, named by himself but responsible, who was the head of a
Chancery for carrying out the administration. The executive power, there-
fore, resembles that in a constitutional monarchy. On the other hand, the
President was checked, not only by the Reichstag, containing represen-
tatives of the German nation, but also by the Federal Council
(Bundesrath), in which the governments of the allied States had seats
and votes. These two bodies exercised the legislative power and con-
trolled the federal administration.
The constitution of the German Empire (16th April, 1871) strength-
ened the monarchical element by the addition of the imperial title. But
even in the present day the Emperor has only a limited right of veto in
the case of certain military and financial measures; he has no indepen-
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is not merely a legislative senate, but a joint ruler of the empire. To
some extent, therefore, there is a collective government of the various
princes and local rulers, and this is more like an aristocracy than a
monarchy. The mixture of principles in the Empire, which Puffendorf
declared to be monstrous two centuries ago, has not yet been fully cleared
up. But in spite of peculiarities and inconsistencies the constitution of
Germany has shown both force and vitality, and if monarchical power
and unity, with the recognition of national rights and liberties, forms the
essence of constitutional monarchy, must certainly be regarded as be-
longing to this class of States.
Looking back over the whole subject we see that the system of rep-
resentative or constitutional monarchy has obtained a most decisive pre-
dominance in Western Europe. Almost every civilised European State
has recognised not only personal rights but the political rights of the
nation and of the classes composing it, and has admitted national repre-
sentatives to a share in legislation. Monarchy is no longer absolute and
unlimited, but has become a supreme legal power (oberste Rechtsmacht)
limited by the rights of the subjects.
But in other points the constitutional forms are very varied. In En-
gland the monarchy is surrounded by a powerful aristocracy, and the
actual conduct of affairs is dependent rather upon the majority in Par-
liament and the ministers who are responsible to it, than upon the indi-
vidual will of the sovereign. On the continent there is no aristocracy
which enjoys such power and respect. There the democratic element is
the most prominent after the monarchy: aristocracy has only a moderat-
ing and mediating influence. The constitutional struggles on the conti-
nent are between monarchy and democracy, which are always striving
to find their proper relations to each other and to the whole State. Each
contends for exclusive rule and the suppression of its rival, but the mo-
mentary defeat of either has always been followed by a sudden revival.
Constitutional monarchy on the continent avowedly strives to assume
an organic form which shall give its proper rights to each part of the
body politic, to the monarchy its full power and majesty, to the aristoc-
racy dignity and influence, and to the demos peace and liberty.
On the continent generally, and especially in France [i.e., before
1870] and Germany, monarchy is the active head of the State, not only
in form but by the whole character of the constitution. Only when it
comes into conflict with national instincts, and with the great current of
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as a rule, is passive and stationary. Except in such a case as this, it is far
stronger than aristocracy, which in Germany is willing to serve the crown
for its own ends, and in France murmurs in impotence; it is stronger
even than the national representatives, who can control the Government
but cannot themselves govern. In France the Bourbon monarchy relied
mainly upon the wealthy burghers, Napoleon III upon the lower classes.
In the separate German States monarchy looks for support partly to the
army and partly to the officials, who in their turn act as the chief re-
straint upon the crown, while in the Empire it relies upon the support of
the masses and the governments of the different States. Nowhere has an
organization been founded which shall satisfy the claims of the demos,
though numerous efforts have been made in this direction. When this
has been accomplished, when the ruling dynasties have laid aside their
medieval prejudices and conformed to the modern ideas, the long struggle
will be over, and full security will have been given to that limited mon-
archy which is destined to combine the unity of the whole with the lib-
erty of every part, and to bring into harmony the political spirit of Rome
and the German sentiment of freedom.
Note—The above subject has been treated by Gustav Zimmermann
in a pamphlet, which attracted great attention at the time it appeared,
entitled Die Vortrefflichkeit der constitutionellen Monarchie für En-
gland und die Unbrauchbarkeit der constitutionellen Monarchie für
die Länder Europäischen Continents, Hannover, 1852. (The excellence
of constitutional monarchy for England and the impossibility of its ap-
plication in continental countries.) This pamphlet is the absolutist re-
joinder to the more fertile radical literature on the subject. Zimmermann,
like most of his opponents, derives his notion of constitutional monar-
chy solely from the external forms and maxims of the English constitu-
tion. He is probably quite right in maintaining that the English system is
not applicable to the continent, because its contradictions and its de-
fects, which at home are corrected and softened down by tradition and
by the interests of the ruling aristocracy, would be made far worse if it
were carried out in a democratic spirit. But the English system is not
identical with constitutional monarchy; it may be the greatest and, in
spite of logical errors, the most successful effort to realise it, but it is not
the sole perfect realisation. To say that conditions on the continent are
unsuited for the English system, is not to say that they are also unsuited
for constitutional monarchy, i.e., for a monarchy which recognizes that
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limited by the constitution and that for legislation especially all parts of
the body politic must work together. An orgasmic monarchy is neces-
sarily constitutional, because the organism itself is the constitution.
Zimmermann’s perpetual designation of the chief authority as the prop-
erty of the prince shows that, in spite of his keen eye for details, he has
no real comprehension of the modern conception of the state. The choice
of this mediaeval standpoint brings him into collision with the whole
current of modern life. For a time he may contrive to dam the flood, but
as the waves rise he must be swept away with his frail edifice. (I leave
this passage as it was written in 1857. It has been confirmed in 1866.) If
there is one principle which is clearly grasped in the present day, it is
that political power is a public duty as well as a public right, that it
belongs to the political existence and life of the whole nation, and that it
can never be regarded as the property or personal right of an individual.Chapter XV: B. False Ideas of Constitutional
Monarchy
Almost all the civilised States of Europe have adopted the system of
constitutional monarchy, hoping to find in it a means of reconciling, not
only the contradiction bequeathed by the middle ages, between absolute
rule on the one hand, and a weak and divided State on the other; but also
the various currents of contemporary politics, and especially those of
monarchy and democracy. It is therefore of direct practical importance
to discuss the foundations of this system. But it is first necessary to
clear away some errors and misconceptions that have prevailed on the
subject.
The French Revolution set itself in the early years to realise the idea
of Rousseau, that the State contains two powers, the will or legislative
power, and physical force or the executive power. ‘The people wills, the
king executes,’ was considered in France to be the essential formula of
constitutional monarchy.370
This idea sets the people in opposition to the king, and in fact sup-
presses monarchy altogether, as it makes the king a mere servant of the
popular will, which is external to him, and formed without his having
any part in it. The fall of Louis XVI, and the proclamation of a Repub-
lic by the Jacobins, were doubtless the result of historical circumstances,
but they were also the natural consequence of this principle of the con-
stitution.
If, on the other hand, the king is regarded as the equal of the legisla-
tive power, instead of being excluded from it as a subordinate, the nec-
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dyarchy,371 a monster with two heads, is created. This must split up the
State, or else must speedily give way to either the monarchical or the
democratic principle.
To avoid this absurdity Sieyès wishes to make the head of the State
purely passive, and regarded this as the basis of the constitutional sys-
tem. Napoleon, a born monarch if ever man was, branded this proposal
with indelible contempt: ‘How can you expect a man of talent and honour
to resign himself to play the part of a hog which is to be fattened upon
two millions?’372
A more common expression is that ‘the king has the right to rude
and govern, but the exercise of this right belongs not to him, but to his
ministers.’ This relation has practically existed at certain times in sev-
eral countries, and may still do so. But if it is recognised as a permanent
political principle, it must lead to the abandonment of monarchy and the
introduction of a republic. For if the person to whom a right is ascribed
is permanently deprived of its exercise, he loses the real substance of the
right, and is certain before long to lose also the empty title, which will
pass to whoever has the exercise of the right. In the middle ages the
vassals and tenants first exercised proprietary rights over the soil, then
they obtained the use or possession, and finally they wrested the com-
plete and formal proprietorship from the former lords. When the Carol-
ing Mayors of the Palace had usurped the royal power from the
Merovings, they were not long in seizing the royal title as well. When
once the real power of government passes from the king to his ministers,
the authority of the latter becomes republican, and the monarchy is an
empty form.373 To keep a mere symbol at the head of the State, instead
of a diving and active individual, may be Ideocracy, but it is not Monar-
chy.
It is therefore absurd to maintain that in constitutional monarchy
the personal character of the king is a matter of indifference, that it does
not matter whether he is distinguished or a nullity, whether he is intelli-
gent or feebleminded, whether he is of noble character or a scamp. Con-
stitutional monarchy tends to provide that the king shall be able not only
to do as little harm, but also to do as much good as possible. It is only in
this sense that his power is limited; he is no mere puppet in the hands of
his ministers. It would be a monstrous system which denied the dignity
and qualities of manhood to the holder of the supreme position in the
State, or which granted the smallest measure of political liberty to the
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towards the monarch be possible, if it was a matter of indifference whether
he was worthy of such sentiments, or whether he was even capable of
understanding and returning them? This principle would lead to the logical
conclusion, that the most imbecile prince, as having the least insight and
will of his own, would be the most constitutional monarch.374 Could
such a form of State satisfy the longing of nations for a well-adjusted
and intelligent organization?
It is customary to justify this conception by appealing to the En-
glish constitution, but in England the personality of the sovereign is not
at all a matter of indifference, but the reverse.375
The famous formula of M. Thiers, le roi règne et ne gouverne pas,
is equally incorrect as a description of constitutional monarchy. The
skilful minister failed in his own attempt to put it into practice. Louis
Philippe certainly did not fall because he attempted to govern as well as
to reign, and his successor, Napoleon III, won the favour of the masses
precisely by undertaking the government himself.
The expression reign implies the formal rights of majesty and dig-
nity, while the word govern refers to the practical direction of the policy
of the State. Both rights belong equally to the head of the State, and to
refuse him the latter or (which is the same thing) to give him the form
without the reality, is to destroy the monarchical power: rex est qua
regit.
Government (regieren) is not to be confounded with administration
(verwalten). It is not the king’s function to apply himself wholly to the
petty details of the latter, nor would such conduct be for the advantage
of the State.
Others, starting from the idea of the sovereignty of the people, have
asserted as the principle of constitutional monarchy that ‘the king is
bound to govern according to the will and the opinion of the majority of
the people.’ This sacrifices the monarchy to democratic ideas. The rule
of the majority is democracy. But one of the great merits of monarchy
lies in the fact that the king is bound to defend the rights and liberties of
the minority against the encroachments of the majority. Monarchy would
cease to exist if the king were simply a delegate and servant of the ma-
jority which really ruled the State. The democracy thus constituted might
keep a phantom and powerless king at its head, but he would remain
there only as long as his masters found it more convenient to disguise
their real power.376Chapter XVI: C. The Monarchical Principle and
the Conception of Constitutional Monarchy
Constitutional monarchy must be a real and not a phantom monarchy.
The essence of Monarchy is the personification of the majesty and sov-
ereignty of the State in an individual. It diners from Theocracy because
it attributes the right of rule to the monarch himself instead of regarding
him as the representative of God who is the real ruler. It differs from
Republics with a doge or president at their head, in the fact that the
latter are compelled to regard themselves as the servants or delegates
either of the aristocratic minority, or of the democratic majority, whereas
the monarch is not the subject of these powers, but the independent
holder of the Government. In a republic, political authority has a collec-
tive, in monarchy an individual, expression. The monarch is, in the su-
preme sense, the personality of the State (Statsperson).
In this conception there are two sides, both of which must be present,
if the name of monarchy is to be preserved:—
I. The personal elevation of the head of the State, as the individual
representative and organ of the supreme power.
II. The substantial concentration in the monarch of the highest dig-
nity and power of the State. The too poles of the prince’s activity are the
initiative and the sanction.
I. With the first principle may be combined—
(1) the checking of the monarch in legislation by the representation
of the other elements of the nation, and
(2) the obligation on the part of the king to exercise his rights and
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of the other members of the body politic, the monarchy stands still higher,
and by providing that the king’s will shall be the will of the State and not
his own personal will, the constitution only lightens his task and pre-
serves his authority from misconception or disaster.
But this principle is inconsistent with the idea—
(1) that the monarch is a mere idol or form, and not a living being;
or
(2) that the monarch is subordinate to the national representatives
or to his ministers, and that he may be compelled by them to express a
will other than his own, or to act in opposition to his own will.
Since the supreme power belongs to his person, he must preserve
the freedom and the rights of his personality.377 His person does not
belong to the State entirely and in all relations, but it does so belong in
a special degree, and more than any other person. He may be also a
husband or father, the member of a Church, or perhaps a scholar or
poet. But in all public affairs the will of the State ought to find expres-
sion in his individual will. In a monarchical State great value is placed
upon the individual care and energy of the monarch, and it would be
monstrous to ascribe to him the highest rights and then on that very
ground to place him under the guardianship of others. It is not the cham-
bers which create a law, public respect for a law is based upon the free
sanction given to it by the king. The ministers do not give their authority
to the king’s decrees; on the contrary, they themselves receive their au-
thority from the king, and serve him as the organs, though it may be the
indispensable organs, of his will. So far as the king is not bound by the
constitution to the consent and co-operation of other members of the
State organism, so far he is completely free to express his own personal
will and to act in accordance with it.
The peculiarity of constitutional as contrasted with other forms of
monarchy, consists in the monarch being unable either to legislate or, as
a rule, to exercise the functions of government by himself alone. For
legislation the consent of the chambers is necessary, while in the work
of government he must admit the co-operation of ministers. But consti-
tutional monarchy does not transfer the centre of gravity in the govern-
ment either to the chambers or to the ministers.
A system in which the majority in the chambers or among the min-
isters could formally and necessarily determine the action of the prince,
would be in contradiction with the monarchical principle, and would
really be a Government of Parliament and ministers.378 Doubtless the346/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
constitutional monarch will in practice often conform to the decisions of
the chambers, or the advice of his ministers, because he will see in them
the expression of the will of the State. But if he wishes to discharge his
duties as king he must reserve to himself the free right of examining
them from the standpoint of the national welfare.
Within these limits the constitutional monarch can move with per-
fect freedom. It is preposterous to think of preventing him from express-
ing his own opinion. Every capable man must utter his real sentiments,379
and though political considerations may often restrain the monarch, no
one has the right to deny him freedom of speech or to impose the neces-
sity of falsehood upon him.380
The monarch ought also to examine into the state of the country
with his own eyes and ears; he should inform himself of the needs of the
people, watch all the manifestations of public life, and when the general
interests and welfare demand it, he should promptly take the initiative in
preparing the necessary laws or measures. This is the way in which the
great monarchs of former times have distinguished themselves.381 Con-
stitutional monarchy also opens a great career in such matters to princes
of ability, and it should be very careful not to close it.
II. The second principle is that the monarch must have the highest
dignity and full power in the State. This principle is accepted even in the
English constitution, which imposes more limitations upon the royal
rights than have been found tolerable by most of the continental monar-
chies. The following conclusions are involved in this principle:—
1. Constitutional monarchy is not an aggregate of isolated rights,
but the unity and fulness of all rights of sovereignty.382 Absolute monar-
chy goes further than this, in that it grants to the other political corpora-
tions neither independent rights nor any necessary share in the exercise
of the royal rights: it claims all rights for itself, and allows to others
only grace.383 Constitutional monarchy, on the other hand, is limited in
that it recognises the rights of other corporations and the liberty of its
subjects.
2. The monarch has a share in legislation which is usually decisive
as regards the substance of a law, and always so as regards its form. He
has the initiative and the sanction of all laws, and they are promulgated
in his name. If this fundamental rule be denied, the monarchical prin-
ciple is encroached upon by republican influences, the supreme author-
ity is given to the chambers, and the king, so far as legislation is con-
cerned, becomes their subject. In a monarchy the rights of the chambersThe Theory of the State/347
can only be concurrent and not exclusive.
3. The whole Government is concentrated in the monarch: it be-
longs to him as of independent right, and is exercised in his name.
In a constitutional monarchy the ministers or other officials cannot
govern in their own name, although at the same time the king cannot
govern without their co-operation and agreement. All their rights and
functions are derived from the royal power, and they cannot employ
these rights, as in the feudal monarchy of the middle ages, for their own
ends, but must use them for the State, and so as to preserve its organic
unity. In relation to the ministers, as in legislation, the king has the
initiative and the sanction: and while the former can and must be exer-
cised by the ministers as well, the latter belongs to the king alone, and
the ministers have only the right of free consent to the royal commands.384
Constitutional monarchy recognises the mediaeval principle that all
authority starts from above and descends to the various lower stages,
that government proceeds from the centre to the circumference, and not
in the reverse direction. But the medieval splitting-up of the Govern-
ment into independent fractions has been avoided in the present day. All
individual organs of the State are subordinate to the monarch, not only
those whose action is entirely dependent upon his will, but also the min-
isters whose consent is necessary before he can express the will of the
State, the judges whose range of action is entirely free from his influ-
ence, and even the chambers which share the legislative power with him
as independent forces in the State. As the head is superior to all other
members of the body, so the monarch occupies the highest place in the
body politic.
Constitutional monarchy is relative and not absolute; it suits itself
to different relations and needs, and varies according to national char-
acter and history. It is therefore misleading to derive the conception of it
from the English constitution alone.
The following characteristics are common to all forms of constitu-
tional monarchy:—
(1) The dignity and power of the monarch are regulated by the con-
stitution. The constitutional prince does not stand outside or above but
in the constitution. It is the regard for the legal organization fixed by the
constitution and binding upon the monarch which gives its name to this
form of government. Whether the constitution should be written or not,
is by no means a matter of indifference, but it is not essential for the
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In England, the mother-country of constitutional monarchy, there are
single constitutional laws and written declarations of the national liberties,
but there is no complete and systematic code of the political organization,
such as is preferred in modern times and usually known as a constitution.
The English laws have arisen gradually as the result of political struggles
and of special needs at different periods of the history of the nation. Modern
constitutions have mostly been elaborated all at once as complete and con-
nected legal systems under the influence of some general theory of the State.
Constitutional monarchy is possible in both forms. But, without con-
testing the importance of unwritten law, the greatest value has always been
placed upon written charters and confirmations of political rights. This is in
harmony with the conditions of modern life: in dater times the conscious-
ness of right has not grown up in direct connexion with custom, and it can
only find the necessary security and clearness in the fixity which is given by
a written document.
(2) The constitutional monarch is bound to respect not only the
letter of the constitution, but also the laws of the State. He can only
expect and demand obedience as regulated by the constitution and the
laws.386
(3) Legislative power only belongs to the king in combination with
the representative chambers. He needs their consent as well as their
counsel in order to promulgate a law.
(4) The financial arrangements and the granting of taxes are also
dependent upon the co-operation and consent of the representative bod-
ies.
(5) In government and administration the co-operation of the minis-
ters is necessary. The king’s ordinances, decrees, and commands are not
legally binding upon a third person until the royal signature has been
countersigned by a minister.
(6) The responsibility of the ministers and of all other officials is
indispensable.
(7) The independence of jurisdiction and the exclusion of the cabi-
net from judicial functions is a necessary clock upon the government
and an important guarantee for the rights of subjects.
(8) Classes and individuals must be regarded as possessing not only
personal and private, but also public rights, and these are no less invio-
lable than the rights of the monarch.
Constitutional monarchy must be understood to be the national king-
ship of a free nation.Chapter XVII: Aristocracy: I. The Greek Form:
Sparta
As Athens was the highest expression of ancient democracy, so Sparta
was among the Greeks the most marked example of aristocracy. In gen-
eral the Greek character was more inclined to democratic than to aristo-
cratic forms, and it was only in relation to foreign barbarians that they
liked to consider themselves a born aristocracy. But the Dorian race, to
which the Spartans belonged, preferred aristocratic forms and tenden-
cies for their domestic institutions as well.
The ideal principle of aristocracy is the rule of the nobler elements
of the nation over the subordinate masses. The nay in which these no-
bler elements are estimated and exalted varies in different states. In
Laconia the ruling race was that of the Spartans, who had conquered the
land with arms and had subjected the old inhabitants, the Perioeci or
Lacedaemonians. Rulers and subjects were divided by birth. The first
conquerors organised the government so as to transmit it to successive
generations of their descendants. Thus hereditary political rights, a char-
acteristic of all ancient aristocracies, had a natural origin in this endeav-
our to maintain acquired power, and became a fundamental principle of
the whole State.
This hereditary rule of the Spartans was not modified by any inter-
mixture of races. The distinction between Spartans and aliens remained
as strict and absolute as a difference of caste, and intermarriage was
forbidden. Only very rarely and exceptionally was an alien admitted to
the full rights of citizenship. The ruling race was never invigorated by
the admission of new families, and the subjects were not consoled by the350/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
prospect that the best of their descendants might rise by merit to be
leaders of the State. This exclusiveness appears the more strange and
oppressive as the Spartans were not very careful in other points to main-
tain the purity of their blood. Spartan wives, whose husbands had fallen
in war, w ere given to the embrace of Helots, that they might give birth
to Spartan children.
But education was all the more carefully organised, and this com-
pleted the advantages of birth. The two together were intended to pre-
serve the supremacy of the Spartans. The State was so careful to give a
political and military education to its youth, that it did not scruple to
sacrifice for this end the unity and the freedom of the family. Nowhere
was individual life so subordinate to public life; nowhere was the om-
nipotence of the State carried to such an extreme as in Sparta. Man was
regarded as existing only for the State.
Among themselves the Spartans were possessed of equal rights: and
democratic equality within the aristocracy was carried so far that
Lycurgus made it a basis of his constitution that all Spartan families
should possess equal property.387 Each family had an equal lot (klÁmoj)
in the division of the land, and was forbidden to alienate it. To prevent
the accumulation of personal property, which might create a distinction
between rich and poor, the use of gold and silver was prohibited. The
Helots, who cultivated the lands of the Spartans, were not the property
of individuals, but belonged, like the lands themselves, to the State; and
their payments in kind were by law equally divided. Even the Syssitia,
or public meals, at which the citizens were divided into separate tables,
were common and equal for all. Thus equality was much more complete
and secure among the aristocratic Spartans than among the democratic
Athenians. But the Spartan rule was by no means exercised in a demo-
cratic form, to which in fact the character both of the State and of the
nation was opposed. A popular assembly (kklhsa or £la) existed in
Sparta, but the real power was in the hands of the Senate (gerousa),
which usually decided all public business.388 Their decisions were in
important matters submitted to the ecclesia, but merely for acceptance
or rejection. In the latter no one could speak except the kings, the ephors
and senators, and no one could vote except men of at least thirty years
of age.
The composition of the State was regulated by aristocratic consid-
erations. The 9000 heads of Spartan families were divided into 30 Oboe,
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nominated the two kings, and each of the other 28 Oboe nominated one
senator, who was to some extent the peer of the kings.389 Thus the senate
was composed of thirty members, and this arrangement prevented the
exclusive preponderance of single families, while it served the dignity
and rights of the different families as a whole. The Spartans paid the
greatest respect to old age, as the essential condition of wisdom. All
senators, except the king, must be at least sixty years old. This exces-
sive regard. for age seems to be a blot on the constitution. Years bring
weakness as well as wisdom: and the conduct of the state requires not
only the experience of age, but also the full productive power and fresh
vigour of manhood. The election was made by the acclamations of the
popular assembly, which had been previously canvassed by the candi-
dates. By canvassing for this high dignity the old men expressed their
conviction that they could still render good service to the State and their
willingness to devote the rest of their life to its service: the acclamation
of the assembly expressed the confidence of the people. The duration of
the office, which was for life, was a security against the capricious
changes of popular favour, but involved the danger that it might be
retained in spite of growing weakness and incompetence.
The Spartan aristocracy was limited, partly by the kingship, which
represented in a more lofty manner the unity and dignity of the State,
and partly by the democratic institution of the ephors, the changing
organs of the people, who controlled the official activity both of the
kings and of the senate, and also exercised an extended jurisdiction in
affairs of State.
The Spartan constitution impresses one as a work of art. Like Plato’s
Republic, it gratifies the sense of external beauty and harmony, but its
interior is so unnatural390 that on the whole it repels rather than attracts.
Its architecture may inspire admiration, but it offers no temptation to
dwell within it. If the Athenians deserve to be blamed for having pre-
ferred the rule of the masses to a well-ordered State, the Spartans may
also be accused of having sacrificed human freedom to political organi-
zation. Their system is more distinguished, but it affords less pleasure
and comfort than the Athenian: the one maintains an even balance of
political capacity, the other offers at once more light and more shade:
the one is too stationary, the other too mobile.
In durability, the Spartan constitution had an immense advantage.
Solon witnessed, without being able to prevent, the victory of tyranny
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aristocratic elements of birth and wealth. After the fall of the tyrants,
pure democracy was introduced at Athens, but it fell into obvious and
hopeless collapse before it had existed a century. On the other hand, the
constitution of Lycurgus maintained the greatness of Sparta for five
centuries. When Sparta did fall it was because that constitution had
been violated by the accumulation of wealth, by the corruption which
was thus introduced, and by the demagogic intrigues of the ephors.391
The durable power of the constitution itself is the more astonishing when
we consider that its provisions were opposed both to human nature and
to the current of events, but it may have been partly due to the ideocratic
belief of the people that its founder was the favourite of Zeus, and him-
self a demi-god.
The similar constitution of Crete, and the equally aristocratic con-
stitution of Carthage, can boast of equal durability.392 In fact, history
proves that aristocracies, by making stability the essential principle of
their organization, can maintain themselves and the State much longer
than democracies can preserve the rule of the demos.Chapter XVIII: II. The Roman Aristocracy
In its essential character, the Roman Republic was as much an aristoc-
racy as Sparta, but of a higher kind. The Romans drew a sharp distinc-
tion between the public rights of the State and the freedom of individu-
als and families. They had also a conspicuous sense of the grandeur an
power of the State which they were eager to increase, but they never
assumed the right of shaping the individual life to suit the State. Thus
they avoided that artificial and narrow exclusion of every foreign ele-
ment which may have preserved the purity of national virtue among the
Spartans, but at the same time made them incapable of maintaining that
prominent position in the outside world to which destiny had called them.
From the beginning the Romans were free from that rigidity of class
distinctions which is found in Sparta. Classes in Rome did not stand
immovably face to face, each paralysing the action of the other, but
contributed by their struggles and varying influences to a higher devel-
opment of political life. The Roman constitution is a work of art like the
Spartan, but on the one hand it is more in conformity with human nature
and the general conditions of the world, and on the other hand it is more
distinguished by its wealth of forms and the grandeur of its relations.
The Roman State impresses one very notably as an organism.
If we consider the principal aspects of the Roman Republic we find
the aristocratic character everywhere prevailing, although modified by
monarchical and democratic institutions. This is manifest in (1) the re-
lations of classes; (2) the national assemblies; (3) the senate; (4) the
magistracies.
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from a single race, but from the Latins and Sabines, and partially from
the Etruscans, just as the English nobles combine Saxon and Norman
blood. From the first this fact must have acted to prevent rigidity and
despotism on the part of the patriciate. And afterwards, though all po-
litical power was for a long time in their hands, it was moderated by the
organization of the plebs with its own magistrates, and by the necessity
of giving an increasing share in the government to the new plebeian
aristocracy. Ultimately from the union of the old with the new aristoc-
racy arose the class of optimates,393 a class which was never exclusive,
but which was of supreme importance in the Roman State.
As long as the Republic lasted, the aristocracy retained the tradi-
tions of government and the familiarity with public affairs. It was dis-
tinguished by birth, education, wealth, power, religious and political
knowledge. At the same time it never ceased to draw to itself new forces
from the plebe. While it advanced to the highest power, and became first
the equal and then the superior of kings, it never ceased to be in com-
plete accord with the people from whom it had sprung.
The Romans were as careful about political education as the Spar-
tans, but they treated it as the business of the family, and not of the
State. Hence came the variety and the hereditary character of political
tendencies, while in Sparta everything was uniform within the aristoc-
racy. Most of the great Roman families were, and remained, conserva-
tive; but some, for example the patrician Valerii and the plebeian Publilii
and Sicinii, were inclined to liberal principles. The Claudii, with rare
exceptions, may be compared with the English Tories.
Of the three Roman assemblies only the youngest, the comitia
tributa,394 had a democratic organization. They were not originally des-
tined to take any part in the government, but only to act as an organ of
the wishes and opinions of the plebeians, and as a limit upon the exces-
sive power of the patriciate. Later, however, they not only became a
factor in legislation, but usurped the whole legislative power. But even
in the later years of the Republic, when the aristocracy was rapidly
declining and monarchy was close at hand, it was only in very excep-
tional cases, and under the influence of some ambitious tribune, that the
comitia of the tribes exercised a really decisive power. As a rule the
encroachments of democracy were hindered, partly by regard for the
immense authority of the senate, and partly by the tribunes themselves,
as they alone could make proposals and each of them could control and
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tributa was to act as a check upon the obstinacy and excessive power of
the aristocracy.
The comitia curiata, which lost all their original importance and
sank into a mere form in the later times of the Republic, were thor-
oughly aristocratic. They formed the assembly of the old patrician aris-
tocracy of birth, arranged by families and curiae, and the senate was
originally only a committee of the heads of these families. If the plebe-
ians were ever admitted to the comitia curiata it was only in a very
subordinate position.
The most important of the assemblies, the comitia centuriata, in
which the whole nation met together, was so organised as to give the
most decisive preponderance to the upper classes.
(a) Great weight was attached to property. The first class alone,
consisting of those who paid the highest rating, contained eighty centu-
ries, and if the eighteen centuries of the knights voted with them, they
had an absolute majority of votes. The same relation of voting power to
property prevailed also in the four other classes: four persons in the
second class were equal to six in the third, twelve in the fourth, and
twenty-four in the fifth class. The numerous proletarii and the still more
numerous capite censi were all crowded into one of the 193 centuries,
and had thus a very slight influence in an assembly where the aristoc-
racy of wealth was so powerful.396
(b) Birth and nobility of profession were also considered. Thus the
eighteen centuries of the knights, which were formed on these principles,
were placed, as the most noble, at the head of the assembly.
(c) Age too had a greater voting power than youth, for the centuries
of the seniores contained by the natural laws of mortality only half as
many members as those of the juniores, though both counted as the
same.
(d) If we put the classes out of sight, it is obvious that the whole
external appearance of the assembly was the reverse of democratic. The
taking of the auspices, the fixed military organization of the whole body,
the presidency of great magistrates, and the rule that they alone had the
right of addressing and treating with the people (jus agendi cum populo),
all gave the assembly a dignified and moderate character. It was not
unnatural that a Roman should look with a certain lofty contempt upon
the chaos and turbulence of a Greek ecclesia.397
This aristocratic organization of the nation was entrusted with the
making of the real laws and with the election of the higher magistrates.356/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
The Senate was also a very important institution of the Roman state
by its composition and its functions. Originally consisting of the heads
of the patrician families, of the principes, and representing mainly the
aristocracy of birth, it became later an assembly of statesmen who had
proved their capacity by holding high office. The history of the senate
shows us the transformation of the patrician nobility, which continued
to be respected as the source of the auspices and the guardian of sacred
traditions, into the later nobility of office. The great magistrates of Rome
might be compared with kings, and the ancients themselves called the
senate, which consisted of men who had held these magistracies, ‘an
assembly of kings’; so high was the position of this political aristocracy.
The censors, as the guardians of morals were entrusted with the
honourable task of forming the list of senators from among the ex-mag-
istrates and of excluding unworthy individuals. The senators sat and
voted according to the rank of the of lice they had held, as having been
consuls, censors, praetors, aediles, or quaestors. Their business was
conducted with the strict formality that characterized Roman rule. It
was opened with prayer and sacrifice, all its proceedings were conducted
by the ruling magistrates, who also brought forward proposals and took
the votes; and the deliberations were preserved from digression or en-
croachment by the intervention of the tribunes or magistrates.
All important state business was either prepared or decided in the
senate. It provided for the worship of the gods and their festivals and
sacrifices. It conducted the negotiations with foreign states and envoys,
and managed all the important diplomacy of Rome. Its criticism of laws
and its approval were usually decisive. In the sphere of administration
its own decrees (senatusconsuita) took the place of laws. It managed all
the finances, granted taxes, and determined the objects and the amount
of expenditure. The levying and arrangement of troops were in its hands,
as were also the granting of powers and instructions to the proconsuls
and proprietors who had received provinces, and the control of the whole
provincial administration. In serious crises the senate could grant to the
consuls that unlimited power which seemed necessary to save the re-
public from harm.
It may be doubted whether the Roman magistracies were monarchi-
cal or aristocratic institutions, but it is certain that they were not demo-
cratic. This is obvious in the external forms that surrounded them, the
purple border of the toga, the raised curule chair, the voluntary band of
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the gods which is expressed in the auspices taken on appointment and
kept up by frequent consultations afterwards. The extensive and in itself
absolute power which lay in the imperium of the magistrates was essen-
tially royal.398 The republican side of their character was visible only in
the short duration of their office, and in the division of their power be-
tween two or more magistrates of equal rank. An aristocratic principle,
which is peculiar to the Roman constitution and is very notable, is seen
in the power of every magistrate to obstruct by his veto any official
action of a magistrate of equal or inferior rank.399 This principle moder-
ated the omnipotence of the imperium, without weakening its activity
when the necessity or the advantage of the State called for its exercise.
The magistrates were chosen by the whole people, but the election
to the higher offices was reserved to the comitia centuriata, in which
the aristocracy of wealth preponderated, and which were managed by
the magistrates and limited by the auspices. Moreover such election was
as a rule open only to those who belonged to the national aristocracy,
either because they belonged to a distinguished family, which gave them
a famous name, a large body of clients, and popular favour, or because
they had great wealth which enabled them to gain over the masses by
public games at their expense, or because they had acquired reputation
and influence as successful generals, or eloquent orators. After the higher
magistracies had been opened to the plebeians, they were no longer lim-
ited to the nobles by birth; but in all but very exceptional cases they
were practically confined to that great political and social aristocracy
into which the patriciate was transformed. Also those who had held
these offices formed the senate.
It must be admitted, therefore, that the Roman republic, in spite of
the influence of monarchical and democratic elements, was essentially
an aristocracy. And it was not an aristocracy of a family, or of a class,
like the numerous forms of the middle ages, but the most magnificent
and powerful national aristocracy that the world has ever seen.Chapter XIX: III. Remarks upon Aristocracy
Montesquieu400 has declared moderation to be the principle of aristoc-
racy, and it is true that moderation is needed for its security as it is
suggested by the consideration that the subject masses are superior in
number and physical force. The feeling that its power has no external
limits may impel a democracy to an immoderate use of that power.
But aristocracy cannot easily free itself from the fear of opposition
and revolt, and is thus induced as a rule to keep its preponderance from
being too oppressive. It knows that its position is insecure without mod-
eration, and therefore its policy is usually conservative.
But this fails to express the essential principle of aristocracy, which
is rather to be found in the moral and intellectual superiority of the
ruling class. It is no true aristocracy unless the best (o ¥ristoi) really
rule.401 Aristocracy loses all real vitality when the ruling class degener-
ates from the qualities which raised it to power, when its character de-
cays, and it becomes weak and vain. It perishes equally, even though its
great qualities remain, when the subject classes attain to equal distinc-
tion, and the old aristocracy is too negligent or too disdainful to com-
plete and strengthen its own forces by their admission. The Roman aris-
tocracy obtained its greatness, and the English aristocracy has preserved
its influence and respect, because both remained in living union with the
life of the people, and constantly derived new vigour by recruiting them-
selves from the classes below them.
Exclusiveness is the cardinal fault of every aristocracy. The privi-
leges of the ruling class are founded upon its qualities, but in the en-
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sion, it has often lost sight of the latter altogether. Such a limited aris-
tocracy may maintain itself upon a small scale, but when its relations
are extended it becomes unequal to the task. Sparta and Venice became
weak when they had made great conquests. Neither the Spartans proper
nor the Venetian nobili were numerous or strong enough to rule exten-
sive territories, and the rest of the people, excluded from political life
and influence, could give but feeble assistance.402 So, too, the aristoc-
racy of Berne was ruined, not so much by the internal degeneration of
the patriciate, as because it failed to recruit itself from the distinguished
men of the city and country.
All aristocracy is based upon the distinction of quality, but the par-
ticular quality chosen depends upon the peculiar character and condi-
tion of the people. If it is birth, as in so many of the mediaeval aristoc-
racies, we have an aristocracy of family, a noblesse (Geschlecter- oder
Adelsaristokratie), in which the rights of families or of classes have a
great influence upon the constitution. The preference of culture and edu-
cation forms an aristocracy of priests or of scholars. If age is regarded
as the qualification for rule, we have an aristocracy of elders
(Aldermänner) or senators; if military distinction, an aristocracy of
knights; if property, either in land or moveables, an aristocracy of land-
owners or capitalists, or in other words a plutocracy, which Cicero de-
clares to be the most hateful of all forms of state.403 The aristocracy of
optimates has a party character, because it combines a number of fami-
lies and persons. An aristocracy of office may be regarded as founded
upon political motives, especially while it remains an elective aristoc-
racy, but less so when, as happened bathe middle ages, it gradually
becomes hereditary, and thus turns into an aristocracy of birth, or no-
blesse. Not infrequently several qualities are combined to form an aris-
tocracy, and this is stronger than one which is based upon a single qual-
ity, because the latter has to face the hostility of all classes and persons
who have other natural claims to aristocratic position.
Aristocracy is eager to make its advantages conspicuous, and there-
fore to display the external grandeur and dignity of the State. It may
dispense with the affection, but never with the respect of its subjects,
and it seeks to impress them by an imposing display of external pomp,
which gives distinction to political forms and also strengthens authority.
This is a marked advantage of aristocracy over democracy, because the
latter may too easily degrade both their magistrates and the State itself
to the level of common life.360/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
But the advantage also involves a danger that the ruling classes
may over-estimate themselves and may pay too little care and attention
to their subjects. Aristocracies have often displayed towards the lower
classes a harshness and cruelty which have been the more intolerable
because accompanied by contempt. Convincing evidence of this is to be
seen in the treatment of the Helots by the Spartans, the oppression of
plebeian debtors by the Roman patricians, the sufferings of Irish colliers
at the hands of English landlords, and the greedy despotism exercised
by English governors over the Hindus of India and the negroes of Ja-
maica.404
As democracy as a rule is too fickle and changeable, so aristocracy
rushes into the opposite fault of excessive fixity and obstinacy. Democ-
racy, conscious that its power is unlimited, easily forgets the conditions
of its maintenance. Aristocracy, full of anxiety to maintain itself, often
falls into the error of thinking that the best way to accomplish this is to
hold fast to the old system and to rigidly exclude every change. As a
matter of fact aristocracies have shown more capacity for a policy of
conservatism than democracies, and their existence has always been
longer. They avoid rash political experiments, they advance by cautious
and measured steps, and it is only when threatened by real danger that
they display decisive energy and copy for a time the characteristics of
monarchy. Within limits this is a good quality and springs from the
natural instinct of self-preservation; but if carried beyond those limits it
becomes a fatal error.
This conservative spirit shows itself also in the natural tendency to
make heredity the fundamental principle of its institutions. In the middle
ages, when the whole of Europe was impressed with an aristocratic
character, this tendency was especially conspicuous. Even the Empire,
although originally founded upon the idea of monarchy, became essen-
tially an aristocracy after the fall of the Hohenstaufen.405 The imperial
dignity itself did not become hereditary, but was filled up by the choice
of the hereditary electors. But the Emperor, in spite of his dignified
position, had very little power. Before deciding any important matters
he had to consult the Diet. The electoral college prepared all laws and
had the first vote in the Diet. The second vote belonged to the other
princes, who had contrived to transform what were originally offices of
State into hereditary sovereignties. After the princes came the college of
the imperial cities, but in these the government was usually held by a
patrician oligarchy, so that their representation was really aristocratic.The Theory of the State/361
The government was exercised by the Emperor and Diet conjointly: the
central authority was everywhere hindered and obstructed by the feudal
independence of the landowning nobles. In all the political and legal
relations of the middle ages, the aristocratic inclination to hereditary
succession is visible. It regulated everything; fiefs, imperial offices and
dignities; all grades of jurisdiction, whether of counts, bailiffs, territo-
rial lords, or even the local assessors; knighthood and court service;
rank and office in towns and villages, and the manorial holdings of the
peasants.
Modern times, on the other hand, have shown a decided aversion to
heredity as a political principle. Both tendencies contain an element of
truth, but both are wrong if carried to excess. In our own day it is right
to struggle against the restraints which rigid heredity imposes upon
modern development and the satisfaction of new needs; it is right to
claim the free recognition of individual worth, and to insist that political
offices, which demand personal ability and subordination to the whole,
shall not be subject to hereditary rules or treated as the property of
particular families. But it is wrong to break off the connexion which
hereditary succession maintains between the present and the past: it is
wrong to introduce loose and frequent change where the stability of
tradition is needed, or to alter, without need, conditions which may serve
as strong pillars of the State, and which may transmit to the future great
moral interests and forces. To do this is to build upon the sand: it in-
volves a breach of the organic nature both of nation and State, for their
life does not vary with each generation, but is prolonged in unbroken
course from century to century.406
Aristocracy sets itself to preserve external order as the security for
its own maintenance. The same motive urges upon it the protection of
law and the careful observance of legal forms. Except when its passions
have been aroused by danger to its existence, aristocracy is entitled to
boast that it has shown more justice than democracy in its treatment
both of its subjects and of its own members. It is no accidental circum-
stance that the greatest development of the science of law was the work
of an eminently aristocratic nation, the Romans. Equal recognition has
been given to the strict but impartial justice of the Venetians, to the wise
law of Berne, and to the strong sense of law which characterises the
aristocratic English. In the middle ages policy itself took the external
form of a legal judgment and its execution.
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of State, that no example has survived the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury. The aristocracy of ancient Rome was first broken by the rise of
democracy and then crushed by the Empire. The mediaeval aristocra-
cies of Italy and Germany were humbled by the growing power of the
princes, and ultimately destroyed by the hostility of the burgher class. In
the modern State, therefore, the aristocratic classes, as a distinct part of
the nation, assume an intermediate and not a sovereign position. Every-
where they are subordinate either to monarchy or democracy, and though
they may moderate the one and ennoble or restrain the other, they can no
longer claim as their right the government of the State.Chapter XX: Democratic Forms of The State: I.
Direct Democracy (Ancient)
There is a great difference between the ancient idea of democracy
(dhmokrata, the rule of the demos, of the free and equal citizens and
that of modern times. Among the ancients men started from the State
and sought to secure the liberty of all by dividing political rule equally
among all. Now they start from individual liberty, and strive to give
away as little of it as they can to the State, to obey as little as possible.
The old democracy, whether absolute or modified in form, was always
direct, modern democracy is as a rule representative It is obvious that
the former can only exist in a small state, while the latter is also appli-
cable to a great nation with extended territories.
The Greeks, split up into a number of little states, sought and found
in democracy the satisfaction of their political tastes. It is undeniable
that something democratic is to be found even in the old monarchies and
so-called aristocracies of Greece, which distinguishes them from mod-
ern monarchy or from the Roman aristocracy. It is also notable that the
greatest Greek philosophers, while unfavourable in their judgment of
the absolute democracy of Athens,407 took a moderate democracy as
their ideal, and gave to it the name of polity or constitutional govern-
ment (politea) in a special sense.408
Democracy found its most logical expression in Athens, and its na-
ture can nowhere be better studied than in the Athenian constitution. In
no other state was the rule of the people so extensive; almost all impor-
tant business was brought before the ecclesia, which met so frequently,
often once a week, that it would be inconceivable if we did not remem-364/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
ber that ordinary and professional labour was carried on not by the free
citizens but by the numerous slaves.
The ecclesia was the visible representation of the many-headed
demos. It contained all citizens over twenty years of age, unless they
had become liable to any loss of civic rights. In it the Athenians felt
themselves to be the lords of the state, each individual to be a part of the
sovereign whole. The characteristic mark of democracy is that the ma-
jority shall rule and that every citizen shall have a share in the governing
power, and this was here fully developed. Every citizen had a free right
of speech, and the privileges of age, which existed in the times of Solon,
were soon swept away with all other restrictions as burdensome. An
orator had free scope for his eloquence, and could often exercise a magical
influence over the crowd. It was fortunate when great statesmen, like
Pericles, could support their opinions by oratory. More often men’s minds
were carried away by adroit and ambitious demagogues, who ruled the
mob by exciting its passions. There is nothing in the modern state which
at all corresponds to this influence of oratory, which moved its assembled
hearers far more strongly than the press can move its scattered readers.
The orator’s voice and gestures added meaning and emphasis to his
words, and the approval of the crowd as it listened in the consciousness
of power gave a mighty impulse to the debate. In our own day parlia-
mentary speeches have much less influence, partly because our assem-
blies are smaller and more select, and partly because their power is
more limited.
The powers of the ecclesia embraced the whole life of the State
Solon had limited them to the election of magistrates, the control of the
government, and advice about laws, but the demos, led by its orators,
soon overstepped these limits. The decisions of the people (yhfismata)
were as decisive as those of an absolute despot; like him the demos
could command what it pleased, even though contrary to the law.409
Legislation properly belonged to the nomothetae, but their decisions
were practically determined by the debates and votes of the ecclesia, of
which they were only a numerous committee elected in each particular
case. The assembly itself decided all the important affairs of govern-
ment. It appointed ambassadors and determined their instructions; it
heard the envoys of foreign states, decided on peace or war, chose the
generals, and fixed both the pay of the soldiers and the conduct of mili-
tary operations. In its hands lay the fate of conquered towns and coun-
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and new priesthoods, the granting of the rights and privileges of citizen-
ship. It received once in each prytany (35 or 36 days) a financial report
of the State revenue and expenditure; it levied taxes, fixed the tax paid
by aliens (metokion), regulated the coinage, and demanded voluntary
contributions. Its approval was necessary for the construction of temples,
public buildings, roads, walls, and ships. It could employ the public
revenues even in favour of private individuals by paying for their ad-
mission to the theatre. Its powers did not extend to ordinary jurisdiction,
but in exceptional cases, when a crime was not covered by the law, or
when aggravating circumstances justified extraordinary measures, it
debated criminal charges, fixed the penalty, and often decided on the
guilt of the accused. The degeneracy which rapidly followed the flour-
ishing period of the democracy increased the abuses of this popular
jurisdiction.
In the assembly the majority of citizens present was is decisive. The
intelligence of the people, even of the lower classes, was more devel-
oped than in any other state, ancient or modern. They could appreciate
the tragedies of Aeschyus and Sophocles, they listened to the speeches
of Demosthenes, they were enriched by commerce and empire, and by
the ample reward of every kind of labour. Yet even amongst such a
people as this the majority was unable to resist the seductive arts of
demagogues, and was unwilling to exercise its power with wisdom and
justice. The minority of nobler and more wealthy citizens was oppressed
and maltreated, and Xenophon, referring to his native city, declared it to
be a necessary consequence of democracy ‘that the lot of the wicked
should be better than that of the goods.’410
The constitution of Solon intended that the power of the ecclesia
should be limited and to some extent directed by the boulê senate, which
was based by Solon upon the aristocratic organization of the people into
the four tribes. The members of the tribes were divided into four classes,
of which the upper and richer had greater rights and duties to the State,
so as to secure the preponderance in the senate of wealth and education.
But from the time of Cleisthenes (B.C 510) the institution fell more and
more under the control of the masses. The senate of 500 became a small
popular assembly, filled up without any regard to property or educa-
tion. The members were not even elected, but were chosen by lot. They
were divided, again by lot, into ten sections of fifty each (prytanes),
which took it in turns to conduct business every thirty-six days. Such a
body could not exercise any independent authority over the mass of the366/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
people, from which it rose to ephemeral power and then sank back into
insignificance. It served merely to facilitate the initiation of business
and to help the mob in the task of self-government.
The archons, originally important magistrates and belonging to the
eupatrids, were to be chosen, according to Solon’s constitution, from
the richest class (the pentakosiomdimnoi). As the democracy devel-
oped, lot supplanted the previous qualifications of birth and wealth, and
the archons were henceforth only servants of the demos, and powerless
presidents of the numerous courts of justice. The latter also were demo-
cratically organised, and became a kind of popular assembly, in which
no less than 6000 jurors took part; each case, according to its impor-
tance, was decided by a hundred or a thousand jurors. The desire of the
masses to share in the profits and influence of justice, which Aristophanes
scourged with his satire in the Wasps, became a chronic disease in Ath-
ens, and gave rise to the scandalous profession of the sycophants. The
popular tribunals regarded themselves as the supporters and promoters
of popular rule, busied themselves more with party struggles and inter-
ests than with the impartial administration of justice, and became an
arena for the strife of private and public passions. The corruption of
sycophants and judges rapidly increased, and the forms of justice were
abused by the arbitrary despotism of the mob.411Chapter XXI: II Criticism of Direct Democracy
The character of direct democracy, with its advantages and its evils, is
represented for all time in the brilliant history of the gifted Athenian
people.
Democracy prefers freedom to authority. To their love of freedom
the Athenians owed the perfection of their works of art, which receive
and deserve the admiration of posterity. But the democratic freedom of
all involves the rule of all. The body of citizens wishes to govern in
person, i.e., by great national assemblies. This is only possible in small
States, and among a people which has leisure to devote itself to the
regular business of the State; and this again presupposes either great
simplicity of life and occupations, as in the small communities of moun-
tain valleys, or else the existence of a labouring class which is not ad-
mitted to citizenship. Among a civilised people direct democracy is al-
ways a sham, because it cannot exist without this servile part of the
population.
In these large popular assemblies a sense of unlimited power is eas-
ily developed, which leads to blunders of every kind, and often substi-
tutes arbitrary caprice for law and right. The individual may be both
honest and prudent in himself, but as a member of the assembly he is
liable to be carried away by the passions of the crowd, and to consent to
resolutions which, a short time before, he would have unhesitatingly
rejected. The orators can only influence by playing upon the popular
passions, and when once the storm has been raised no feeling of shame
can check its violence.412
If, then, democracy is to be a good constitution, the majority of the368/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
citizens must possess political capacity and aptness, they must excel
both in character and intelligence. Athenian history, however, offers the
warnings of experience. Among a people of conspicuous intellectual
development, whose character never appeared greater than in times of
misfortune and danger, it was for a very short period that pure democ-
racy could escape degeneracy and ruin. And even when Athens was at
the zenith of its power and prosperity, its greatness was not due to the
rule of the people but to the practical abandonment of that rule to a
single great statesman. Thucydides says of the age of Pericles: ‘Athens
was a democracy in name, but in reality it was under the rule of the first
of its citizens.’413
The populace cannot long retain its virtue after having drunk the
intoxicating wine of power. Democratic forms may exist as long as the
people retains its dread of divine justice, its regard for the restraints of
custom and law, and its reverence for the authority of the best men.
There can be no doubt that in a democratic state the mass of the people
are elevated by taking part in public affairs, and that they are distin-
guished from the citizens of other states by a richer and more conscious
development of their faculties. The individual is compelled to look be-
yond the narrow limits of his own occupation and becomes familiarised
with the great laws of history and the collective life of nations. But fear
and respect soon disappear as the feeling of unrestrained power gets the
upper hand, and this power is the more readily abused as the distinction
between rulers and ruled, which is recognised by other forms of State, is
wanting in a democracy. The populace gives the rein to its evil passions:
it envies and oppresses the nobler and better minority, whose existence
is a standing reproach and protest against its own rule. The worst quali-
ties of the demos come to the surface—pride, arbitrary caprice, the love
of frequent and useless change, brutality: the less it rules itself, the more
oppressive is its rule of others. Parties are formed whose mutual hatred
is stronger than patriotism, and whose mortal struggles distract and ruin
their common country. The State is endangered by incessant changes,
and brought to ruin by the want of stability. Thus the Athenian State
was brilliant in its greatness; but that greatness was short-lived, and
was followed by a long decadence from which Athens never recovered.414
A characteristic of every democracy is the love of equality. In Ath-
ens this principle was developed more logically and one-sidedly than in
any later democracy. Wherever it was possible the mass of the citizens
acted for themselves, because a system of representation gives a certainThe Theory of the State/369
preference and superiority to the chosen deputies. When it was neces-
sary to appoint individuals to office or to the senate, the Athenians pre-
ferred the blind system of lot to election, which might have paid regard
to superiority of intelligence and virtue. All magistrates were frequently
changed, lest prolonged authority might exalt them above the mass.415
The very existence of magistrates who demand obedience, seemed con-
trary to the democratic maxim of equality: if such inequality was indis-
pensable, it must be softened as much as possible by the use of the lot
and by frequent change. The equality which commends itself to a de-
mocracy is equality of number. Its formula is not ‘each according to his
merits,’ but ‘one as another.’416
Another consequence of democratic equality is ostrarism.417 Among
the Greeks this was carried out openly and was regarded almost as an
honour, but in modern states, though practically exercised, it is not for-
mally recognized, and is usually regarded as a disgrace. Every constitu-
tion, if it wishes to last, must have the power of expelling elements
which are incompatible with its existence. Democracy is not to be blamed
when, as in Athens, it exiles individual citizens whose personal superi-
ority is dangerous to the general equality. But it is a questionable proof
of the merits of democracy that it can endure the baseness of the masses
better than the superiority of individuals.
To sum up what has been said, it is evident that direct democracy,
as it existed in Greece, is fitted only for small states, and especially for
agricultural or pastoral peoples,418 whose life retains the simplicity of
ancient customs. In the case of a people with a higher civilization and
wider relations, it may give a great momentary impulse, but it soon
becomes insufficient and harmful. In the one case democracy appears
both natural and moderate; in the other it is prone to licence and excess.
The freedom which it promises becomes in this case the unjust oppres-
sion of all nobler elements, the unrestrained and brutal ambition of the
mob. The equality on which it professes to be founded is nothing but a
manifest lie and a crying wrong, when once advancing civilization has
brought with it its differences and its contrasts.419Chapter XXII: III. Representative Democracy and
the Modern Republic
Direct democracy has only existed in modern times in very exceptional
and very favourable circumstances, and then its form has been much
more moderate than that of Athens. It is still visible in some of the
mountain cantons of Switzerland, where every year the Landsgemeinde
meets, and by the raising of hands distributes the offices and dignities of
the little republic, usually to the most respected families, and gives its
sanction to the laws which have been prepared by the councils. These
simple democracies, little touched by the stream of European life, de-
serve our respect for their five hundred years of a history that is rich in
manly episodes and rarely stained by acts of violence, for the simplicity
of their customs and the peaceful and happy existence of their inhabit-
ants. But in recent times they have been affected by the tendency to
introduce the representative forms which prevail in the other Swiss can-
tons and in the United States of America. The French movements of
1793 and 1848 aimed at a representative constitution, and in the present
day it is the ideal of democratic parties everywhere. The modern form of
democracy may be declared to be representative democracy.
As constitutional monarchy originated in England, so representa-
tive democracy, or the modern form of Republic, as, the Americans
prefer to call it, was developed in North America. It is noteworthy that
the two chief forms of the modern State owe their origin to the political
genius of the Anglo-Saxon race.
Several causes combined to start and develop a new democratic
constitution in America. It was only partially due to the extension of aThe Theory of the State/371
territory which required hard toil before it could be made fit for cultiva-
tion. Earlier history had shown that extensive territories were not
favourable to democracy; they had usually been colonised by great
monarchies, and the colonists were kept in strict subjection. In South
America new settlements had been founded and huge tracts of land had
been occupied and made productive by a numerous population, but it
was long before that part of the continent possessed a democracy. The
real cause is to be found, not in the soil, but in the character of the men;
but at the same time it may be allowed that the extent of territory gave
freedom and security for development, while the hard struggle with na-
ture created a spirit of manly courage and self-reliance.
The English colonists brought from their old home the love of self-
government, liberty, and legality. In the new world they also found free-
dom from the oppression of feudal and aristocratic institutions. From
the first complete equality prevailed among the planters. The Puritans,
who settled in New England, belonged to the English middle class. Their
religious belief was opposed to any ecclesiastical hierarchy; they wished
to share in the common priesthood of Christians, and regarded each
other as brothers. They sought the other side of the Atlantic to escape
the persecutions of the episcopal Church and of the State which main-
tained it, to preserve their religious and their political freedom. Their
ideas were at once theocratic and democratic. They did not rebel against
the monarchical and parliamentary constitution of England, but they
wanted to free themselves from the immediate oppression of the Gov-
ernment. The first agreement of the ‘Pilgrim Fathers,’ which all signed
on their landing at Plymouth, throws light on the origin of North Ameri-
can democracy. ‘In the name of God, amen; we, whose names are un-
derwritten, the loyal subjects of our dread sovereign lying James, hav-
ing undertaken, for the glory of God, and the advancement of the Chris-
tian faith, and honour of our king and country, a voyage to plant the first
colony in the northern parts of Virginia, do, by these presents, solemnly
and mutually, in the presence of God and of one another, covenant and
combine ourselves together into a civil body politic, for our better or-
dering and preservation, and furtherance of the ends aforesaid; and by
virtue hereof to enact, constitute, and frame, such just and equal laws,
ordinances, acts, constitutions, and offices, from time to time, as shall
be thought most convenient for the general good of the colony. Unto
which we promise all due submission and obedience.’ Similar proceed-
ings were taken by the first emigrants to Rhode Island, Newhaven, Con-372/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
necticut and Providence. Thus these communities, which formed the
New England group of colonies, with Massachusetts at their head,
adopted a form of government which appeared as the joint work of free
men.
Wholly different from this were the conditions of the southern group,
which was at first called Virginia, until the name was afterwards con-
fined to the most important of the colonies. There the episcopal Church,
with its aristocratic constitution, found ready recognition. Although most
of the planters belonged to the middle class, the settlement was directed
rather by economic than by religious interests, and moreover several
members of the aristocracy held large estates there. Later the population
was recruited by the arrival of numerous adventurers, and of the crimi-
nals and vagabonds who were transported by the London police.
Still, even in Virginia, it was found impossible to transplant the
aristocratic constitution of England, and the notable attempt which was
made by Locke at Shaftesbury’s request to draw up a similar constitu-
tion for Carolina (1669) was a complete failure. The colonists had no
wish to become tenants of the proprietaries landgraves and caciques
(barons), when they might be free proprietors elsewhere, and in 1693
Locke’s constitution was abolished. Both in the northern and southern
colonies the planters, prevented by the great distances from meeting in
person, instituted representative assemblies composed of freely elected
deputies, which exercised the autonomy of the colony and controlled the
administration. The germs of the institution may be traced as far back
as 1619, and it was soon adopted in all the colonies.
There was a stronger intermixture of foreign elements in the central
group, of which New York, originally New Amsterdam, and Pennsylva-
nia were the most prominent. But there too, the influence of the English
race led to the adoption of the same constitution in essentials. The points
in which all the colonies were alike, may be thus enumerated:—
(a) English law without either landlords or feudal tenure: free prop-
erty in the soil was the basis of the economic system.
(b) Essential equality of position and rights, and the absence of any
aristocracy like that which still held power in England. This equality
was, however, broken by marked differences of race. The Red Indians,
the original inhabitants of the country, were not placed on a level with
the white men, nor admitted to share in the government of the commu-
nity; but they had special rights and laws of their own. Far lower was
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Africa. They were usually the property of the white planters, but in the
exceptional cases when they obtained freedom they were never admitted
to the political rights of citizens.
(c) The constant habit of self-reliance in contrast to State-aid. This
is visible at the time of the first settlement when the neighbours helped
each other to build block-houses.
(d) The general education of the people by means of national schools.
These were founded very early by the villages for their own youth, and
in many colonies attendance was made compulsory.
(e) A free constitution of the villages, and independent administra-
tion of the counties.
(f) The small number of officials. Of these the most important was
the governor of a whole colony, who was elected by the planters in the
chartered colonies. nominated by the proprietors in the proprietary, and
by the English Government in the crown colonies. Next to him came the
presiding judges. Both had to act in co-operation with representatives of
the citizens, the governor with his councillors, the judge with the jurors.
The justices of the peace, who were nominated in England by the king
from among the gentry, were in America always free tillers of the soil.
(g) Hardly any standing troops, their place being taken by the mili-
tia.
(h) The existence of a House of Representatives, elected in each
colony by the free men, which acted with the Senate in making laws, but
by itself granted taxes and controlled the administration.
(i) The custom of short tenure of offices, so as to provide for fre-
quent changes.
(k) Lastly, the gradual development of a free press and freedom of
combination.
On these foundations an independent representative constitution, at
first encouraged by the Crown, was built up in each colony long before
the separation from England. When the declaration of independence
(1776) broke off the connection with the English king and Parliament,
the new republics were at once complete.
The Federal constitution of the Union (1787) was only the logical
application of these provincial institutions on a grand scale to the col-
lective State then formed.
The new form of State was imitated by the French in the constitu-
tions of 1793 and 1795, and again in 1848 and 1870, but without per-
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adopted with passionate devotion by the French; but their traditions
were monarchical, and their customs very slightly republican. They have
always been inclined to call in State aid rather than to help themselves,
to prefer the glory and power of the State to legality or the unassuming
labour of constitutional life. The French tendency to centralization has
always been more in favour of monarchy than of a republic.420
On the other hand, the representative democracy of America found
a soil ready prepared for it in Switzerland, to which it was transplanted
by French intervention.
In Switzerland the greater cantons were aristocratically governed;
some, as Bern, Fribourg, Soleure, and Luzern, by a hereditary class of
patricians, others, as Zürich, Basel, and Schaffhausen, by the exclusive
corporation of burghers. But communal liberty had been retained as the
basis of the cantonal organization, and the Republic, the political ideal
of the people, had a deep root in the popular character and customs.
There were no standing troops and no permanent officials. The indepen-
dence of Switzerland had been won in a struggle with princes and nobles.
It was therefore nothing unnatural when, in harmony with modern theo-
ries, civil liberties were extended to all classes and to the whole country,
and the aristocratic privileges of the patricians and burghers were abol-
ished. this completed the change from an aristocratic to a representative
republic.421
The attempt of 1798 to form the whole of Switzerland into a united
representative democracy was not permanent. The traditions of inde-
pendence in the older cantons and the elements of internal opposition
were too strong to admit of submission to the Helvetic Republic, which
was soon dissolved. But in many cantons, and especially in the towns
and the new cantons, representative forms were retained, in spite of the
partial reaction in favour of aristocratic privileges which followed 1814.
The reforming movements after 1830 gave freer expression to the repre-
sentative form, and in 1848 it was applied to the Confederation.422
Modern democracy is essentially different from the old Greek form.
The Persian Otanes (in Herodotus, III. 82) enumerates five characteris-
tics of ancient democracy: (1) the equality of all rights (sonoma); (2)
the rejection of arbitrary power like that exercised by the oriental des-
pots; (3) the appointment to offices by lot; (4) the responsibility of offi-
cials; (5) common deliberation and decision in the popular assembly.
Three of these are admitted in the modern State, in constitutional mon-
archy as well as in the republics; but the other two, appointment by lotThe Theory of the State/375
and the popular assembly, are rejected.
The ancient democracy admitted all citizens equally to a share in
the government; the modern democracy introduces an aristocratic dis-
tinction in the election of the best men as representatives, and is thus a
nobler form of democracy. The right of sovereignty is ascribed to the
whole body of citizens, to the people, but the exercise of that right is
entrusted to the most eminent men, to the representatives of the people.
The citizens still take a direct part in public affairs in the following
points:—
(a) In the voting on constitutional laws. In Switzerland the principle
has been generally recognised since 1830, that constitutional laws re-
quire the consent of a majority of the citizens, not reckoning those who
abstain from voting.423 In the United States, on the other hand, the vote
is entrusted, not to the whole people, but to a numerous assembly of
representatives specially selected for the purpose (Convention).
(b) Sometimes in the voting on other laws. In this case the popular
decision takes either the positive form of sanction (referendum) so that
the acceptance of the citizens gives validity to a law, or the negative
form of a veto which enables the citizens to reject a law after it has been
carried by the representative chambers. In the latter case the number of
those voting against the law must exceed half of the whole body of
citizens; while in the former case a simple majority of those voting is
decisive. Both forms are borrowed from pure democracy, and as they
may easily give rise to agitation among the masses, they involve danger
to the interests of civilization and culture. They were first adopted by
some of the separate democracies of Switzerland, and in 1874 were
introduced into the Confederation.424
(c) In the election of members of the legislative body. These elec-
tions are usually based upon the mathematical principle of equal elec-
toral districts and the counting of heads, but occasionally upon organic
divisions, e.g., the communes. The representation is therefore usually
incomplete, and is determined too much by party tendencies. This defect
is by no means inherent in or confined to representative democracy; it is
equally manifest in constitutional monarchy.
The regular exercise of the supreme power is usually entrusted to
large assemblies, which are chosen as the most perfect and complete
representation of the sovereign people.
In Switzerland during the middle ages, the Grand Councils of the
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the real Councils, in which authority was concentrated, by the addition
of committees of other members of the canton for important business,
and in the towns for legislation as well. In the present day the Grand
Councils are separated from the government, raised above it, and ex-
alted to be the authorized holders of the sovereignty.425 The federal as-
sembly (Bundesversammlung), which consists of two councils, occu-
pies a similar position with regard to the federal government.426
In North America both the National Congress and the legislative
bodies of the separate States are composed of two chambers, and are
still more distinctly separated from the government.
In government the people have no longer any direct share, even in
those states which have kept pure democracy for legislative purposes.
Everywhere the work of government is entrusted to authorised repre-
sentatives who carry it on in the people’s name. In some states the choice
of the head of the government is made directly by the people. For in-
stance, the governors of most of the American states and the town coun-
cillors of Geneva are elected by the whole body of citizens.427 The Presi-
dent of the United States is chosen by electors, who in their turn have
been chosen by the primary electors. In others, on the other hand, the
choice is in the hands of the legislative body, which thus represents the
people in appointing to the chief offices. The latter system prevails in
most of the Swiss republics, where the Grand Council appoints both the
government and the chief judges, in France, and in a few of the Ameri-
can states. Under the first system the government is obviously more
independent and powerful, especially in relation to the chambers, be-
cause it can claim to be equally representative of the people, and to have
received still greater proofs of the public confidence. Under the latter
the government is more dependent on the legislature to which it owes its
existence; and therefore there is less possibility of making each power
limit and restrain the other.428
Jurisdiction is also exercised in the name of the people, but the judges,
who require special qualities and training, are usually nominated either
by the government, as in the United States and republican France, or by
the legislature, as in Switzerland. But a direct share in jurisdiction is
given to the people by the jury system, as the jurors are selected by lot
from among the whole body of citizens.
In every representative democracy the communal constitution is of
especial importance, and forms the solid foundation of the whole orga-
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self-government, and civil freedom. In them, at least in the smaller and
rural communes, it is still possible for all the citizens to meet in the
communal assembly, though in the towns this is also formed by repre-
sentation. The republics of Switzerland and North America can both
trace their foundation historically to a free communal constitution; and
if this is not true of France, it only furnishes another proof that the
French have no natural tendency to a republican government.
Leaving on one side the very slight direct share of the people in their
own sovereignty, vie see that in representative democracy the rule is that
the people governs through its officials, while it legislates and controls
the administration through its representatives. On this point the mod-
ern constitution shows a marked resemblance to those states which draw
a distinction between the rulers and the ruled.Chapter XXIII: IV. Consideration of
Representative Democracy
Montesquieu declared the principle of democracy to be virtue. But vir-
tue, as a political principle. presupposes, not the equality of all, but a
respect for the moral worth of the rulers, which is not to be found in
pure democracy. All that we can say is that a certain measure of virtue
in the mass of the people is an indispensable practical necessity for a
good democracy, and that the want of it must involve speedy ruin. It
may rather be maintained that virtue has been made the political prin-
ciple of representative democracy, which is not only a more moderate
but also a nobler form of democracy, because in the system of election it
borrows some of the advantages of aristocracy.
Its principle is that the best men of the nation govern in the name
and by the commission of the nation. But the great difficulty lies in
organizing the elections so as to secure that the best men both in intellect
and character shall be chosen.
The democratic tendencies of the present day are in favour of regu-
lating elections simply by the number of electors. Democracy, placing,
as it does, great value upon equality, readily adopts mathematical rules
for its institutions; it counts the citizens, and assigns equal rights to an
equal number.
But this system is better suited to direct democracy, which extends
the exercise of power to all citizens alike, an than to representative de-
mocracy, which distinguishes citizen, according to their worth, and only
entrusts the administration of public affairs to the better among them.
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ral that it should regulate the electoral divisions simply by quantity.
Moreover the defects of the system are far more harmful in the repre-
sentative state. The popular assembly of a direct democracy is not merely
a mass of individuals with equal rights; it is readily influenced by the
magistrates, by the great orators, and the most respected citizens; the
decision of the majority will probably correspond to the true character
of the whole nation. But in a representative democracy the nation is not
thus united; on the contrary, it is divided into a number of scattered
units, which may be equal in number, but which in regard to quality
stand in a wholly different relation to the whole, and are therefore very
unequal parts of the nation. Is it possible to maintain that the rural dis-
tricts of Brittany or the manufacturing districts of Lyons at all resemble
the electoral divisions of Paris, where one finds mixed together without
real union the wealthiest and most educated members of the community,
the numerous grades of simple burghers and artisans, and a low rabble
such as cannot be paralleled elsewhere in France? This difference in the
electoral districts demands logically that a different value shall be placed
upon their votes. True representation can only be secured by arranging
the elections so that every element and every interest in the nation shad
be represented in proportion to its relation to the whole. Number has a
certain value, but it is not sufficient by itself. Other qualities, such as
property, education, occupation, and mode of life, must also be regarded;
and it is best to do this in connexion with organic parts of the nation
rather than with merely arbitrary subdivisions.
We may thus lay down two fundamental principles for representa-
tive democracy.
(1) Whenever the whole body of citizens act together, or when a
vote is given by the whole nation, it is enough to reckon merely the
number of votes, as in a direct democracy.
(2) On the other hand, the mere counting of votes is insufficient
when parts of the nation are electing representatives for the whole. The
parts must be arranged according to quality, so as to guarantee the elec-
tion of the best men, and to give due proportion to the intellectual, moral,
and material elements of the nation.
The peculiarity of representative democracy is that it ascribes the
right of sovereignty to the majority, but entrusts its exercise to the mi-
nority. To secure that the minority shall rule according to the wishes of
the majority, the latter reserves to itself the choice of those who are to
act in its name, and new elections are held at short intervals of time.380/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
This constitution recognises that the majority has neither the leisure
nor the ability actually to exercise the self-government which it claims
as its natural right. But it credits the majority with sufficient intelligence
and interest in the State to take part in the elections, and to find the
ablest men for its representatives.
It demands less from the citizens than direct democracy, but more
from the representatives. It relics upon the self-confidence of free and
equal citizens, but at the same time it trusts that they will be modest
enough to elect their best men, and to submit willingly to the rule of
their representatives as long as these retain the confidence of the major-
ity.
The frequent elections make the rulers dependent upon the ruled,
and yet the latter have to obey during the interval. The freedom of the
subjects is more securely founded than the authority of the government.
The chief magistrates are regarded rather as the servants than as the
heads of the republic. Although, according to Guizot, a state can only
be ruled from above and not from below, representative democracy tries
to maintain as much as possible the appearance of being ruled from
below. Thus the government comes to resemble a mere administration,
and the State is like a commune on a grand scale or a great economic
institution (Wirthschaft).
The weakness of authority shows itself least in the legislative bod-
ies; in fact there is a danger that the representatives may identify them-
selves altogether with the nation and may be carried away by the illu-
sions of omnipotence. The government, on the other hand, has great
difficulty in making its authority really strong and vigorous. The fre-
quency of elections makes its position insecure and dependent upon the
changeable opinions of the people. It is only powerful as long as it is
supported by the majority, and it can only carry out extensive and far-
reaching plans, when these are in accordance with the instincts or tradi-
tions of the nation, and thus contain a security for their permanence.
The organs of government have an unassuming and civic appear-
ance. There is none of the pomp and majesty with which monarchy and
aristocracy are surrounded; the soil is too natural for the artificial forms
of court diplomacy; democracy prefers to be represented by simple
chargés d’affaires or consuls. A great standing army would be a con-
stant menace to its security and its freedom, and it has to maintain a
large militia and Landwehr. The concentration of all forces is less de-
veloped than the independent decision and free movement of every part.The Theory of the State/381
The institutions for the public service are usually good, and some-
times excellent. In a democracy one expects to find numerous establish-
ments for useful and charitable purposes, good roads and means of com-
munication, numerous national schools, cheerful festivals, etc., and
moreover one is less plagued with bureaucracy and red tape.
On the other hand, there is more difficulty than in other constitu-
tions to induce the State to attend to the loftier interests of art and sci-
ence. A democratic nation must have reached a very high stage of civi-
lization when it seeks to satisfy needs of which the ordinary intelligence
cannot appreciate the value or the importance to the national welfare.
The manly consciousness of freedom, which creates and finds ex-
pression in the constitution, elevates the middle classes who form its
chief support; while the direct or indirect contact with public affairs
develops the intelligence and strengthens the character of the citizens.
There is a wide foundation and free play for patriotism, and in times of
crisis the citizens are willing to make great sacrifices for their country.
To aristocratic dispositions the constitution offers less opportunity for
development, and the people often display mistrust or hostility towards
them. But even they can earn respect, if they will refrain from wounding
the feeling of equality by haughty pretensions, and if they enter into
rivalry with the best of the democrats in zeal and devotion for the public
good.
Note—Robert v. Mohl (Encyclopädie, p. 346) has contested the
assertion made above, that in a representative democracy the principle
of number ought not to be absolutely decisive. He says: ‘However true
it may be in general that the right of taking part in an election ought not
to be regarded as a personal right of the individual, but rather as a
delegated function or office, yet this does not apply to the exercise of the
sovereignty of the people by representation. The sovereignty of the people
is based upon the innate right of the individual to a share in the govern-
ment.’ I allow that this is the view of the modern democratic theory,
especially as it was formulated by Rousseau. But the result is that it has
never emerged from the confusion of personal with public rights, and its
so-called social state is only the patrimonial state reversed. The error is
obvious to every one who has grasped the distinction between the unity
of the nation and the aggregate of the citizens. An elector derives his
right to vote, not from nature, but from the State. Every system of elec-
tion is an institution of the State for public ends. [On the subject of this
chapter, see Mill, Representative Government.]Chapter XXIV: Composite Forms of State
Hitherto we have considered only simple States. But States are also
composite, when they consist of parts which are also States or are
organised like States. In them the differences between the simple forms
are repeated, and so far there is nothing specially notable about them.
For example, both the collective and the separate States, or the chief
State and its dependencies, may be organised as monarchies or as repre-
sentative democracies.
But it may happen that the collective and the separate States have
different constitutions. The German Confederation of 1815 remained an
oligarchy of sovereign princes, without popular representation, while
constitutional monarchy was gradually introduced in the individual States
composing it. Some of the Swiss Cantons are still direct democracies,
whereas the Federation is a representative democracy. England possesses
a constitutional monarchy, but the English dependencies in Asia are
absolutely ruled, and some of the colonies elsewhere are half-sovereign
republics under British suzerainty and protection.
Where there are great differences in nationality, civilization, and
historical conditions, a difference of constitution is natural and justifi-
able; but where these conditions are the same, as in the German Confed-
eration, such a difference is contrary both to nature and harmony.
In all composite States we meet with a new distinction (Gegensatz),
viz., that between power of the collective or chief State, and the inde-
pendence of the separate States or dependencies.
With regard to this point we may make the following subdivisions:—
A chief State ruling absolutely over subject dependencies. To thisThe Theory of the State/383
class belong many possessions of the European powers, especially in
Asia and Africa. The chief State alone has a free organisation, the de-
pendencies are unfree and subject to foreign rule. The opposition be-
tween the States is very marked, and all the energy of the ruling State is
needed to avoid a conflict.429
2. The suzerainty of one State over vassal States, or the protector-
ate of a strong State over less powerful dependencies. Here a certain
amount of independence is possible for the vassal or protected States.
The Holy Roman Empire is a medieval, and the Turkish Empire a mod-
ern example of a body politic composed of vassal States. In modern
times the protectorate is preferred to suzerainity, although the former
has no meaning except when there is a great disproportion of power,
and can never commend itself to a free nation. Examples of it may be
seen in Napoleon’s protectorate over the Confederation of the Rhine, in
that of England over the Ionian Islands,430 and that of the European
powers over Moldavia and Wallachia.431
3. Closely related with the above, but modified and ennobled by
filial loyalty, are the relations between the mother-country and its colo-
nies, which are not yet independent, but have almost developed into
complete States. Even after the internal administration of the colony has
become substantially independent, it continues to need the protection of
the mother-country in its external relations, and is therefore willing to
acknowledge a relative superiority. The first example of this was seen in
the relations of Canada with England.
4. In a Confederation (Statenbund) or Personal Union432 the con-
nected States have usually their full dignity and independence, although
these may be restricted in exceptional cases when common interests
require it. The separate States have a complete organization, but the
combination is undeveloped and has no personality of its own except in
special, and mostly external, relations. It is rather a conglomeration of
States than a real State, as it wants the necessary organs for legislation,
government, and jurisdiction. It stands halfway between a permanent
international alliance and a constituted State, and is therefore an incom-
plete and transitional form.
In this form there may be a common people, but there is no real
united nation, and the collective life and power are developed with great
difficulty. This last defect is less conspicuous in a Personal Union, which
at least possesses a single head in the common monarch, than in a Con-
federation, which has no united organ whatever. Both forms are com-384/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
pletely unfitted for action. The German Confederation of 1815 is the
best example of such a system in modern times, and the most eloquent
witness to its defects.
5. A Federation (Bundesstat), Federal Empire (Bundesreich) and
Real Union,433 have this in common, that both the collective
(Gesammtstat) and the particular States (Einzelstaten) have a complete
organization. In a Federation the particular States are more indepen-
dent, because each has a government exclusively belonging to itself;
whereas, in a Real Union, the head of the collective State is also a terri-
torial prince in his own territories (Kronländer), and these are therefore
less sovereign.434
In a Federation and a Federal Empire there is an organised nation,
and at the same time the peoples of the particular States also possess
organic unity. Thus we speak of Americans, and also of Pennsylvanians
and Virginians; of a Swiss nation, and of Bernese and Genevese; of
Germans, and of Prussians, Saxons, Bavarians, etc. The collective State
is as free in its movements and as well provided with organs as the
simple State. But the separate States are not at all vassals: within their
sphere they are as independent as simple States.435
The co-existence of two kinds of States on the same territory is
rendered possible by (1) a precise distinction between the powers of
each, and by making provision for the peaceable settlement of disputes;
and (2) by keeping the governments and the representative bodies as
separate and as independent as possible. This separation of persons and
functions is most complete in the United States; the distinction of pow-
ers is very carefully regulated in the Swiss constitution.436 In the Ger-
man Empire the organs of the Federal Government are closely connected
with those of the separate States, although the Prussian king, as Em-
peror, assumes the position of a single head of the Federation, and al-
though the Diet is completely distinct front the Chambers of the sepa-
rate States. The respective powers of the Federation and its members
are not at all clearly distinguished, in fact they have been purposely left
indeterminate. But there is ample security for the independence of the
separate governments, and for the prevention or speedy settlement of
disputes, in the regulations, that an imperial law always overrides a
provincial law, and that the consent of the Federal Council is necessary
for every imperial law.
It is usual to consider that the collective State busies itself with
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importance as an exception; while the independence of the separate States
applies to internal administration, and only very exceptionally to exter-
nal relations.Book VII: Sovereignty And Its Organs. Public
Service And Public OfficesChapter I:The Conception of Sovereignty
The State is the embodiment and personification of the national power.
This power, considered in its highest dignity and greatest force, is called
Sovereignty.
The name Sovereignty arose first in France, and the conception was
first developed by French science. Bodin made, it a fundamental con-
ception of Public Law. Since then the word and the notion have exer-
cised great influence on the development of modern constitutions and on
the whole politics of modern times.
In the middle ages the expression Sovereignty (suprema potestas,
supremitas) was used in a still wider sense. Every authority which gave
a final decision, so that there was no appeal to a higher authority, was
called sovereign. The highest courts of justice were called cours
souveraires. Thus a State contained a great number of sovereign offices
and corporations. Gradually, however, the name ceased to be given to
mere branches of administration, and came to be limited to the one high-
est ruling power in the State, and the conception was applied only to the
concentrated power of the State.
From the sixteenth century the notion was entirely dominated by the
centralising tendencies of French politics and the efforts of the French
kings to obtain absolute power. Bodin declared sovereignty to be the
absolute and perpetual power of a State (puissance absolue et perpétuelle
d’une république): and this sense prevailed. Louis XIV and the Jacobins
of the Convention of 1793 alike regarded themselves as omnipotent.437
Both were wrong. Modern representative government knows nothing of
absolute power, and there is no such thing upon earth as absolute inde-The Theory of the State/389
pendence. Neither political freedom, nor the right of the other organs
and elements of the State, are compatible with such unlimited sover-
eignty, and wherever men have attempted to exercise it, their presump-
tion has been condemned by history. Even the State as a whole is not
almighty, for it is limited externally by the rights of other States, and
internally by its own nature and by the rights of its individual mem-
bers.438
The German language has no completely equivalent expression. The
word Obergewalt (superior power), or, as the old Swiss expression ran,
‘die höchste used grösste Gewalt’439 (the highest and greatest power),
signifies authority only on its inner side, and not independence exter-
nally. The word Statshoheit signifies the dignity (majestas) rather than
the power of the State. Statsgewalt implies power rather than dignity.
We are therefore compelled, in order to express what is implied in Sov-
ereignty, to use both words, Statshoheit used Statsgewalt. At the same
time the German expressions have this advantage—that they are less
liable than the French to be misunderstood as if they implied absolute
power.
Sovereignty implies:—
1. Independence of the authority of any other State. Yet this inde-
pendence must be understood as only relative. International law, which
binds all States together, no more contradicts the Sovereignty of States
than constitutional law, which limits the exercise of public authority
within. Even the separate States (Länderstaten) in a composite State
may be regarded as sovereign, although dependent in essential matters,
e.g., foreign policy and control of the army.
2. Supreme public dignity—what the Romans called majestas.
3. Plenitude of public power, as opposed to mere particular powers.
Sovereignty is not a sum of particular isolated rights, but is a general or
common right: it is a ‘central conception,’ and is as important in Public
as that of property is in Private Law.
4. Further, it is the highest in the State. Thus there can be no politi-
cal power above it. The French Seigneurs of the middle ages ceased to
be sovereign when they were compelled to submit in all essential mat-
ters to the king as their feudal lord. The German Electors were able to
maintain sovereignty in their own dominions from the fourteenth cen-
tury,440 because they exercised supreme authority in them as their proper
right.441
5. Unity, a necessary condition in every organism.442 The division390/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
of sovereignty paralyses and dissolves a State, and is therefore incom-
patible with its healthy existence.
Notes—1. Rousseau, whose theories were translated into fact by
the French Revolution, based Sovereignty on the ‘general will’ (La
valonté generale), and thus made the mistake of substituting suprema
voluntas for suprema potesias. He then argued that since ‘power may
be transferred but not will’ (Contr. Soc. ii. I), Sovereignty is inalien-
able—a conclusion belied by history. He understands Law [Bluntschli
says das Recht, but Rousseau, ii. 6, says la loi, holding that ‘dans l’état
civil tous les droits sont fixés par la loi’] as the product and not as the
limitation of arbitrary will. In ‘Will’ he forgets ‘Ought’; and this origi-
nal error is the source of many others. The Will is a manifestation and
expression of the human spirit; but not like Sovereignty a legal institu-
tion in the State (eine Rechtsinstitution des States). Will may animate
the exercise of Law and effect changes in it, but is not of itself Law (ist
für sich kein Recht). The Will of the Sovereign presupposes Sover-
eignty, not vice versa.
2. It is illogical to consider Sovereignty as the source of the State
and of Law, and to put the Sovereign above the State. The power and
majesty of the State presuppose the States. Thus Sovereignty is a con-
ception of Public Law, and not superior to it (überstatsrechtlich).
3. Const. Franz (Vorschule d. St. p. 32) declares that after power
‘the self-consciousness of the State’ is the chief attribute of Sovereignty.
But Consciousness, though necessary for the exercise of a Right and for
the administration of Law, is not an attribute of Right or Law itself.Chapter II: Sovereignty of the People or of the
State, and Sovereignty of the Ruler
To whom belongs Sovereignty? Political parties are inclined to answer
this question in different ways. Even the scientific student has many
difficulties and prejudices to remove.
An opinion, widely diffused since Rousseau and the French Revo-
lution, assigns sovereignty to the people. Yes; but who are the people?
According to some, simply the sum, of individuals united into the State:
that is to say, the State is resolved into its atoms, and supreme power is
ascribed to the unorganised mass, or to the majority of these individu-
als. This extreme radical opinion contradicts the very existence of the
State, which is the basis of sovereignty. It is not compatible with any
constitution, not even with the absolute democracy which it professes to
found, for even there it is the ordered national assembly (Landsgemeinde),
not the crowd of atoms, which exercises the authority of the State.
Others understand the equal citizens collectively voting in one or
more assemblies, i.e., they think of the sovereignty of the demos in De-
mocracy. The principle of the sovereignty of the people thus under-
stood, and limited to this form of government, has a meaning and a
truth: it is exactly the same as Democracy. But in representative De-
mocracy the principle cannot be exactly applied, because, as a rule,
supreme power is exercised, not directly by the citizens, but indirectly
by their representatives. It is quite incompatible with all other forms of
government; for it would imply that the head of the State is on a level
with the humblest citizen, and it would subject the rulers, as a minority,
to the majority of subjects. This is to turn the body politic upside down,392/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
and to put the feet in the place of the head.
Sometimes the two preceding opinions pass into one another. The
first is anarchical, the second absolutely democratical; and yet their
defenders commonly maintain that they are universally valid. But this is
just what is dangerous in these theories: they imply and demand the
overthrow of all other constitutions except direct democracy.
Parties completely opposed443 have maintained these opinions, but
they have always been parties which were discontented with the existing
constitution or government, and were seeking to overthrow it. In the
hands of the French Revolution the sovereignty of the people became a
terrible weapon of destruction. The National Assembly, in their declara-
tion of war (April 20, 1792), officially proclaimed Rousseau’s theory:
‘without doubt the French nation has distinctly proclaimed that sover-
eignty belongs only to the people, who, limited in the exercise of their
supreme will by the rights of posterity, cannot delegate a power which is
irrevocable; it has recognised that no custom, no convention can submit
a society of men to an authority which they have not the right to resume.
Every nation has alone the power of making its laws, and the inalienable
right of changing them. This right belongs to none, or it belongs to
all.’444 After the destruction of the monarchy, the Convention revealed
the further consequences of this principle.
But even in our own days we have heard this same principle pro-
claimed again at the Hôtel de Ville of Paris. By a similar sovereign act
of the revolted Parisians in Feb. 1848, constitutional monarchy was
abolished, a Republic proclaimed, and the dictatorship given to a provi-
sional government. An official proclamation of Lamartine’s contains
these words: ‘Every Frenchman who has attained the age of manhood is
a citizen, every citizen is an elector, every elector is sovereign. The
right is equal and absolute for all. No citizen can say to another, “I am
more sovereign than thou.” Consider your power, prepare to exercise it,
and be worthy of entering on the possession of your sovereignty.’445
Some French statesmen, with good intentions but without much
success, have attempted to oppose to this destructive conception of sov-
ereignty of the people the idea of a sovereignty of reason’ or of ‘jus-
tice.’446 They attempt in this way to restrain the bad uses which the
people might make of its sovereignty. But they forget that right can only
belong to a person, and that political supremacy can only be ascribed to
a political personality, and must be exercised by them in accordance
with the principles of reason and justice. The error which recognises theThe Theory of the State/393
only fundamental form of State in absolute democracy is here opposed
by the error of ideocracy. The intention is to guide the majority by the
rule of ideas, but personality is always stronger than fiction.
According to another opinion, the sovereign is the people (German,
Nation), thought of as a unity, but not yet sufficiently organised, though
capable of organization: the people, with their language, feelings, social
distinctions, is supposed to have the right of changing the State as they
will.
We have already recognised (Bk. II. ch. ii.) in the people (Nation)
the material for a nation (Volk), and we must therefore admit that it is
the natural condition of the formation of sovereignty, but it is only the
possibility, and not the realization. The sovereignty of the people in this
sense (Volkssouveränität, or, according to the more proper German use,
Nationalsouveränität) is something undeveloped, immature and ante-
cedent to the State.
We can and we must understand the nation or people (Volk) in a
political sense as the organised totality with head and members, the
living personality of the State.
So far as the State appears as a person, so far it has independence,
honour, power, supreme authority, unity; in one word, sovereignty. The
State as a person is sovereign, and therefore we speak of sovereignty of
the State (Statssouveränität). This is not something before, nor outside,
nor above the State; it is the power and majesty of the State itself. It is
the right of the whole, and as certainly as the whole is stronger than any
of its parts, so certainly the sovereignty of the whole State is superior to
the sovereignty of any member of the State.
If party disputes had not introduced confusion, this sovereignty of
the State might conveniently be called sovereignty of the people, if we
understand by ‘people’ not a mere multitude of separate individuals, but
the politically organised whole, in which the head occupies the highest
position, and every member has its suitable place. In this sense French
publicists have spoken of la souveraineté de la nation,447 in accordance
with the usage of the French language, which, as we have explained, is
the opposite of the German (Bk. II. ch. ii). To avoid misunderstandings,
however, we have preferred the unambiguous expression, ‘Sovereignty
of the State.’
This sovereignty of the State may be looked at from without and
from within: from without, as the independence of a particular State in
relation to others, so far also in relation to the Church: from within, as394/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
the legislative power of the body politic.
In this sense sovereignty is ascribed in England to the Parliament, at
whose head stands the King,448 and which represents the whole nation.449
This is not a peculiarity of the English constitution, but a fundamental
principle of modern representative institutions. The prince is regarded
as the head, but, on that very account, as also a member of the nation;
but the highest sovereign power, that of legislation, is entrusted not to
the head alone, but to the head along with the representative body, that
is to say, to the whole body of the State. The patrimonial view, which
regards the State as a property of the prince, and therefore ascribes
sovereignty to the prince alone, and the absolutist doctrine, which iden-
tifies the State with the prince, both fail to recognise that all the power
of the prince is essentially only the concentrated power of the nation,
and that, though princes and dynasties fall, the nation and the State
retain their legal existence (als Rechtswesen bleibt).450
Besides the sovereignty of the entire nation, there is, another within
the State, the sovereignty of the highest the member, the chief, the rul-
ers, or, since it is most clearly seen in monarchy, the sovereignty of the
prince. The head of the nation has the highest power and position com-
pared with all the other members of the political organism, and with the
individual citizens. Thus in English Public Law the king is called ‘sov-
ereign’ in a particular sense, and thus in every monarchical State sover-
eignty is ascribed to the monarch.
The sovereignty of the State and the sovereignty of the prince are
not in contradiction. There does not result a division of sovereignty, as
if the one half belonged to the people and the other to the prince: there
are not two jealous powers striving for supremacy. Both imply unity
and plenitude of power; but it is clear that the whole, including the head,
is superior to the head alone. The whole nation or State makes the law,
but within legal limits the head moves with complete freedom in the
exercise of the supreme power assigned to him. The sovereignty of the
State is especially that of the law; of the prince, that of the government
or administration. The latter operates where the former is inoperative. A
conflict between them is rare in fact and impossible in principle; for it
would imply a conflict of the head alone with the head in combination
with the rest of the State, and thus a conflict of the same person with
himself.451
There can be no true peace between the democratic sovereignty of
the people and the sovereignty of the prince; but between the sover-The Theory of the State/395
eignty of the State and the sovereignty of the prince there is the same
harmony as between the whole man and his head.
Note—The phrase ‘sovereignty of the people’ is sometimes used to
express, not the supremacy of the majority, but only the idea that a form
of State or a manner of government, which is incompatible with the
existence and welfare of the majority of the people, cannot be main-
tained, or, that the form of the State and the government are there for the
people—an idea which is true, but badly expressed.
Again, if by ‘sovereignty of the people’ it is meant that the authority
of the State is derived originally from the will of the majority, we must
indeed admit that many democratic constitutions, and even some mo-
narchical (e.g., the Roman Empire, the French Empire), are based, in
theory or principle at least, on the voluntary act of the majority of the
people. In the same way the constitutions of several Swiss Cantons de-
clare, not that the people (Volk) is sovereign, but that ‘the sovereignty
resides in the people as a whole (auf der Gesammtheit des Volkberuhe),
and is exercised by the Great Council,’ (e.g., the Zürich Constitution of
1831, §1). But even this principle would not be applicable to all States,
and the term ‘sovereignty,’ which expresses a permanent right, is inap-
propriate when applied to particular and transitory acts.
Finally, if the phrase ‘sovereignty of the people’ be understood, as
has often happened in practice, to imply that the people, as distinct from
the government, or even any powerful and excited multitude, is justified
in arbitrarily overthrowing the government or destroying the constitu-
tion, this is an idea which is altogether to be condemned, and which is
irreconcilable even with democratic principles.
[In England, the question of sovereignty has in recent times been
chiefly discussed in connection with the famous definition of Austin,
Jurisprudence, Lect. vi: ‘If a determinate human superior, not in a habit
of obedience to a like superior, receive habitual obedience from the bulk
of a given society, that determinate superior is Sovereign in that society,
and the society, including the superior, is a society political and inde-
pendent.’ This abstract analysis of the conception of sovereignty, which
is quite unhistorical and difficult to apply in practice, is criticised by
Maine, Early Hist. of Institutions, Lect xii, xiii. See also F. Harrison on
The English School of Jurisprudence, in Fortnightly Review, vol. 30
(1878): Clark’s Practical Jurisprudence, a Comment on Austin, Part i.
ch. xiv: Holland s Jurisprudence, ch. iv: T. H. Green, Works, vol. ii. pp.
399ff.]Chapter III: I. Analysis of the Sovereignty of the
State
The organised nation has a right to have its dignity and greatness, or, as
the Romans called it, its majesty,452 recognised and respected. At Rome,
every serious injury to the honour, power, even to the order of the State,
was considered as a crimen laesae majestatis.
The independence of the State from foreign States. If a State is
compelled to recognise the political superiority of another, it loses its
sovereignty, and becomes subjected to the sovereignty of the latter.453
Not every subjection of a State destroys its sovereignty completely,
since the dependence may not be absolute. In composite States, Confed-
erations (Statenbünde), Federal States (Bundesstaten), and Federal
Empires (Bundesreiche), the particular States, although in certain re-
spects subordinated to the whole, have yet a relative sovereignty limited
in extent but not in content. Thus in Switzerland, cantonal sovereignty
is distinguished from federal sovereignty; similarly, in North America
and in the German Empire, there is a difference between the sovereignty
of the Union or Empire, and that of the federated States.
We can only speak of a relative sovereignty in the particular State
so long as this has a political organisation of its own, that is to say, has
all essential organs, legislative, administrative, etc., in itself, and has
not been reduced into a mere province of the greater whole. The point of
transition is sometimes difficult to mark precisely.
Externally, the sovereignty of the State is now-a-days commonly
represented by the chief or head, not by the legislative body; but this is
more on grounds of convenience than of principle.The Theory of the State/397
Internally, sovereignty is manifested, in the first place, in the right
of the people to determine as they choose the forms of their political
existence, and if necessary to alter go them. This is called the constitu-
ent power of the nation.454 This right cannot be conceded to a part of the
people, to the mere majority, but it undoubtedly belongs to the organised
nation as a whole. The individual subject may not resist the commands
of the nation, even if his political rights are thereby injured; for unless
the individual submitted in matters of Public Law, the State could not
maintain its unity, coherence, and order.
Yet it is not a matter of indifference, either from the moral or the
constitutional point of view, whether the alteration takes place in the
way of reform or of revolution. Reform implies (1) that the change is
introduced in accordance with the constitution, e.g., by a representative
body: the change must be constitutional in form. (2) The change must
conform to the spirit of the constitution: ancient institutions, if they are
put aside, must be really antiquated, and new institutions must have the
way prepared for them in new conditions.
If either the form or the spirit of the constitution is violated, a change
is no longer reform but revolution.
The right of reform is a necessary expression of the vitality of a
State. If this right is resisted, the development of the nation is denied,
and occasion is given for revolution.
There is a radical doctrine of ‘the right of revolution,’ but this is
opposed to the very conception of Public Law. Revolution is either a
forcible breach of the established constitution or a violation of its prin-
ciples. Thus, as a rule, revolutions are not matters of right, although
they are mighty natural phenomena, which alter Public Law. Where the
powers which are passionately stirred in the people are unchained, and
produce a revolutionary eruption, the regular operation of constitutional
law is disturbed. In the presence of revolution law is impotent. It is
indeed a great task of practical politics to bring back revolutionary
movements as soon as possible into the regular channels of constitu-
tional reform.
There can be no right of revolution, unless exceptionally: it can
only be justified by that necessity which compels a nation to save its
existence or to secure its growth where the ways of reform are closed.
The constitution is only the external organization of the people, and if
by means of it the State itself is in danger of perishing, or if vital inter-
ests of the public weal are threatened, ‘necessity knows no law.’455398/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
The legislative power is the normal manifestation of the sovereignty
of the State.
All public powers depend in principle upon it: thus the constitution
and legislation limit and arrange all other expressions of sovereignty. In
constitution-making and legislation the sovereignty of the State is in
active exercise: otherwise, as a rule, it is in repose. In monarchy espe-
cially the daily and changing activity of the other powers is concen-
trated in the sovereignty of the monarch. The nation, as a whole, re-
mains at rest, while its head acts either directly or indirectly by means of
magistrates and officials.
If, however, the organ which has to care for this regular activity
becomes incapable of exercising it; if, for instance, there is a vacancy
on the throne, and no successor is designated by the constitution, the
sovereignty of the State becomes itself operative in order to supply the
defect.
From a higher point of view man is never irresponsible. Nations
themselves are not only responsible to the eternal judgment of God, but
to the facts of History.456 Yet it is impossible to establish within the
State a tribunal before which the nation itself, as a whole, or its repre-
sentative as entrusted with supreme power, can be brought to account;
for in that case the State itself would be subject to this tribunal, and thus
the whole to the part, the body to the particular member.
If a State were responsible for the exercise of its sovereignty to
another State, its sovereignty would thereby be limited.
The development of International Law, or the institution of a uni-
versal State, might organise the legal (rechtlich) responsibility of na-
tions. At present this is only an ideal, which the future may perhaps
realise.
All particular powers are responsible to the organs of the sover-
eignty of the State. Ministers and the highest officials must give account
of their administration.
Note—Constituent Assemblies in recent times have usually followed
the precedent of the French National Assembly of 1789 in accepting as
the principle of their action, not the sovereignty of the State, but the
sovereignty of ‘the people,’ in the sense of Rousseau. But Rousseau
himself goes much farther. He denies complete sovereignty to any repre-
sentative assembly, and considers the mass of the people justified at any
moment in arbitrarily and directly imposing their will upon it [Contr.
Soc. iii. 15]. The consequences of this doctrine have often appeared onThe Theory of the State/399
the political horizon like threatening comets, terrifying even those ‘sov-
ereign’ bodies which had set on fire the chaotic masses round about
them.Chapter IV: II. Sovereignty of The Prince
The sovereignty of the chief of the State is in modern times only
recognised in monarchy. The president of a republic, although he cer-
tainly exercises sovereign rights, has no personal claim to be considered
sovereign.
In the old Roman Republic ‘majesty’ was ascribed to the consuls,
who had divided among them the kingly power, and afterwards to the
senate also. Modern republics are more jealous of sovereignty, and con-
sider the chiefs of the government as mere mandatories of the people,
whose sovereign rights cannot be transferred to them.457
It is sometimes held that the sovereignty of the prince is to be found
only in hereditary and not in elective monarchies; but this is to confuse
the essence of princely power with the question of its origin. An elected
prince possesses sovereignty in his own right, not less than a hereditary.
Thus the old Roman emperors and the Roman-German emperors of the
middle ages were undoubtedly sovereigns. The English king, George
I,458 was so, not less than his successors, although with him begun a new
dynasty.
On the other hand, we can scientifically distinguish an original from
a derived sovereignty of the prince, a distinction that has no application
to the sovereignty of the State, which is always original. The first is that
which is originally inherent in a prince, in virtue of rights to which he is
born, or which he has seized. To this class belong the sovereignty of
hereditary princes, that of a conqueror, and that of a prince who sets the
crown on his own head, like Charles the Great, or Frederick I of Prussia;
and likewise that of the elective German emperors, who derived theirThe Theory of the State/401
sovereignty, not from the electors, but from God.
The second is held to be transferred or derived from the people or
the electors. Thus the imperial power was given by the Roman people.459
Modern elective monarchies are of the same sort.
We shall analyse the sovereignty of the prince after ve have consid-
ered the different functions of that of the State.Chapter V: The Division of Powers: I. The
Primary Assemblies of Antiquity
The modern State has attained a far higher degree of perfection than the
ancient in the development of the legislative body. Even in ancient times
the fundamental idea had been grasped that the whole nation partici-
pates in legislation, and that the people is represented in the legislative
body; but the citizens themselves were assembled together, and thus
exercised this function directly.
The Greek popular assemblies were of a comparatively primitive
kind. A confused crowd of citizens came together in the Pnyx, or in the
theatre, at Athens: they were counted by heads, and every one had the
right of speaking. The Roman Comitia, on the other hand, were organi-
cally divided into classes, and acted only under the leadership of the
higher magistrates.460
This system has essential faults which have been remedied by the
modern method of representation:—
(1) A direct assemblage of the whole citizens is impossible in every
State whose territory is larger than that of a parish or a township. The
assembly of the people in larger States becomes a sham, as happened at
Rome in the last centuries of the Republic. The populace, or the mob of
the capital, obtains a disproportionate influence.
(2) An assembly so large and so mixed is a very helpless body, able
at the most to announce the general opinion, to express its approval or
its disapproval of a proposition already known, hut altogether incapable
of deliberating seriously on a projected law, or of solving the more com-
plicated problems of politics.The Theory of the State/403
Only in quite small States, and in very simple conditions, can legis-
lation be entrusted to a popular assembly.Chapter VI: II. Ancient Distinction of Political
Functions
The essential unity of sovereignty does not prevent the State having
different functions to fulfil.
According to Aristotle (Pol. iv. C. 14) these are three:—
(1) The deliberative (tÕ bouleuÒmenon per tîn koinîn).
(2) The magisterial (tÕ per t¦j ¢rc£j).
(3) The judicial (tÕ dik£xon).
He makes the first concerned with the great political questions of
general politics, decisions about war or peace, conclusion of treaties,
making of laws, punishment of death, exile and confiscation, and the
control of finance. Thus very different sorts of things are brought to-
gether—external politics, legislation, supreme criminal jurisdiction and
control of administration; but all these are distinguished by their great
political significance for the whole State, and for the security of the
citizens. Aristotle calls all this deliberation, not legislation, perhaps be-
cause legislation proper was not exercised by the popular assemblies till
later, and only indirectly, whilst their deliberations had a great influence
in the most important matters.461
The second class of functions corresponds in some measure to what
modern constitutions call executive power, but it is more correctly de-
scribed by reference to the ruling offices.
The third class corresponds to our judicial power.
Although the different functions are objectively distinguished [i.e.,
in respect of their character], they are often subjectively combined [i.e.,
in respect of the persons who exercise them]. We have already remarkedThe Theory of the State/405
that the Athenian ecclesia deliberated about laws, executed important
matters of administration, and exercised judicial functions. The archons
were administrative officials, and yet they had judicial powers. The
Roman State was more developed and differentiated. The legislative
functions of the comitia were more sharply distinguished from the func-
tions of the senate and the magistrates. Yet the comitia treated of impor-
tant questions of foreign policy, and in early times decided on appeals
against sentence of death. The senate did not only exercise administra-
tive functions; its resolutions came to have the character of laws. Fi-
nally, the magistrates as a rule combined administrative and judicial
functions. He who possessed the imperium possessed in the same mea-
sure jurisdictio:462 he had, besides, priestly functions (the auspices), and
by his edicts he exercised a sort of legislative power. Nevertheless, there
is observable in the institutions of the Republic a conscious effort to
differentiate the functions of government.
A new distinction arose in the Eastern Roman Empire. The emper-
ors, indeed, retained in their hands all public powers over the whole
empire, but in the subordinate grades of provincial government civil and
military offices were carefully distinguished.463 This separation which
had not been effected earlier in the interest of the subjects, who were
oppressed by the excessive power of the magistrates, was now carried
out in order to secure the throne. This involved, however, a step in po-
litical progress which has been accepted in the modern State.
In the middle ages the power of the State was on all sides checked
and limited, but internally it united in itself the most various functions;
not only the king but every count had at the same time civil and military,
administrative and judicial power, and the assemblies (Dinge) were at
the same time legislative and judicial.
Bodin was the first to point out that the prince at least ought not to
administer justice in person, but should leave such matters to indepen-
dent judges. Bodin shows that there are many reasons in favour of the
old usage: thus it made a good impression that the king should exercise
justice in the sight of all people, but he sees that there are stronger
reasons her the monarch withholding himself from personally exercis-
ing the office of judge. To be at once legislator and judge is to mingle
together justice and the prerogative of mercy, adherence to the law, and
arbitrary departure from it: if justice is not well administered, the liti-
gating parties are not free enough, they are crushed by the authority of
the sovereign. The horrors of punishment are frightfully increased, and406/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
if the prince has a cruel disposition, the judgment-seat swims in the
blood of citizens, and the hatred of the people is roused against their
chief. It is worst of all when the prince decides in his own affairs, and
with regard to crimes against himself. It is better that he should reserve
only the prerogative of mercy.464
Bodin could indeed point to precedents in French History. Certain
parliaments of peers had pronounced against the presence of the king in
trials. Most States gradually adopted the new principle. Kings began to
leave to tribunals the ordinary administration of justice, and to reserve
to themselves only the confirmation of sentences, especially sentences
of death.Chapter VII: III. The Modern Principle of Division
of Powers
The idea that the objective difference of political functions requires a
corresponding subjective separation in the organs to which these func-
tions belong, has been produced by the course of modern politics.
Montesquieu was the first to enounce the modern principle with
emphasis and effect. He demands in the name of civic freedom and se-
curity that different public functions should be exercised by different
persons. ‘If legislative and executive powers are united in the same per-
son, or even in the same body of magistrates, there is no liberty, because
people are afraid that the monarch or the senate may make tyrannical
laws in order to administer them tyrannically. There is no liberty, again,
if the judicial power is not separated from the legislative and executive:
if it is joined to the legislative power, the life and death of the citizens
may be arbitrarily disposed of, for the judge will be legislator: if it is
joined to the executive power, the judge may have the force of an op-
pressor.’465
Excessive power united in one hand certainly endangers personal
freedom. If the different branches of power are separated, they are all
mutually limited. Nevertheless, the decisive reason for such specializa-
tion is not the practical security of civil liberty, but the organic reason
that every function will be better fulfilled if its organ is specially di-
rected to this particular end, than if quite different functions are as-
signed to the same organ. The statesman only follows the example of
nature: the eye is adapted for sight, the ear for hearing, the mouth for
speaking, the hand for seizing. The body politic should in the same way408/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
have a separate organ for each function.
The favourite expression ‘separation (Trennung) of powers ‘ leads
to false applications of a true principle. A complete separation or sun-
dering of powers would be a dissolution of the unity of the State. Just as
in the body natural all the several limbs are connected together, so in the
body politic the connection of the organs is not less important than their
difference. In the State there must he a unity of power, and so the pow-
ers, though distinguished according to their functions, must not be ab-
solutely separated. Montesquieu makes the three-fold distinction—(1)
pouvoir législatif; (2) exécutif (3) judiciare.
The same division is adopted by English political theorists. This
threefold division has been carried out with rigour, but not without ex-
aggeration, in the United States of North America,466 and has been sanc-
tioned by a whole series of modern European constitutions.
To these three powers some have added, primarily in the interests of
the unity of the State:—
(4) A moderating power (pouvoir modérateur, royal). This idea of
Benjamin Constant’s has been adopted in the Portuguese constitution of
Don Pedro.
Others have added to the executive power:—
(5) The administrative (pouvoir admimstratif).
(6) The inspective (potestas inspectiva).
(7) The representative (pouvoir representatif ).
There is a mistaken view that these different powers are equal. This
contradicts the organic nature of the State. The members of an organism
have each their own power, but in subordination to one another; other-
wise the connection and the unity of the whole would not be maintained.
And so in the State: if the highest powers were really equal, and not
merely in outward form, as in the United States of North America, the
State would be torn in pieces. ‘The head cannot be separated from the
body and made equal to it, without killing the man.’ (Bluntschli, Studien,
p. 146.)
Another error, which is almost childish, is that which treats the or-
ganism of the State as a logical syllogism: the legislative power deter-
mining the rule or major premise, the judicial power subsuming a par-
ticular case under it (minor premise), while the executive carries out the
conclusion.467 All the functions of the different powers would thus be
united in every judicial decision, and government would be only the
policeman to execute this judgment.The Theory of the State/409
It is first of all necessary to distinguish the legislative power from
all others. All other functions belong to particular organs, but legisla-
tion to the whole body politic. The legislative power determines the laws
and institutions of the State themselves (Stats- und Rechtsordnung). All
other powers, on the other hand, are exercised within the existing laws
and institutions, in particular, concrete and changing cases. Legislation
arranges the permanent relations of the whole; the other powers are, as
a rule, exercised only in particular directions, and do not affect the whole
nation. These other powers cannot be divided until the rights of the
legislative body have been determined.
The legislative power does not only fix general rules of Right
(Rechisregeln)—laws (Gesetze) in the narrower sense. It has also to
found and alter the institutions of the State. If it concerns itself with
general economic arrangements in the budget (lois d’impôt), if it ap-
proves not principles but demands, if it takes account of the actual cir-
cumstances of the country, it is because these acts, although not laws in
the proper sense, relate to the whole of the State.
Rousseau explains the relation of legislation to administration by
the psychological distinction of will and power Legislation is the ex-
pression of the general will, administration Consists in particular ac-
tions of the government. ‘La loi veut, le roi fait.’ Lorenz von Stein
recognises the same distinction. But an insight into the necessity of laws
and institutions is not less important for legislation than the will to es-
tablish them: and, on the other hand, the actions of government, which
chooses the end and the means of its policy, are as certainly acts of will.
Thus it is better to make the distinction one of general and particular
will, of established order and occasional action.
As the whole is more than any of its parts or members, so the legis-
lative power is superior to all the other particular powers.
These may be divided, in the modern State, into four groups of
essentially different character. The two most important and highest are,
I, Government or Administration; II, the Judicial power.
I. Government or Administration (Regierungsgewalt). The usual
expression, ‘Executive (vollziehende) power,’ is unfortunate, and is the
source of a number of errors, misunderstandings in theory, and mistakes
in practice. It neither expresses the essential character of government,
nor its relation to legislation and the judicial power.
A person can execute a decision of his own, or the command or
mandate of another. But in any case the execution is only secondary, the410/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
decision or mandate is primary. But the functions of government are in
their nature primary: it decides and resolves, it expresses its will, orders
or forbids, and in most cases its orders are carried out without executive
compulsion. If that is necessary, it is undoubtedly the business of the
government; but as it is secondary, it is ordinarily entrusted to subordi-
nate officials, such as the police.
Even if the will of others is in question, the expression ‘executive’ is
inaccurate. It is not true that the government has only to execute in
particular cases what the legislature has established in general. As a
rule a law is not executed (carried out), but observed and applied. The
promulgation of a law is not the same as its execution. The rules which
the legislator sanctions, the principles which he expresses, are respected
by the government as the legal and constitutional limits of its conduct,
but within these limits it decides freely: treats with other States, ap-
points commissions of enquiry, adopts measures necessary for the main-
tenance of order, furthers what tends to the public weal, nominates func-
tionaries, controls the army. The expression ‘executive’ is still less ap-
plicable to the administrative government in its relations to the courts of
justice. The execution of a judgment is essentially an act of the judicial
power itself, whose business it is to administer justice, and to restore
rights which have been disturbed, and which does not call in the stron-
ger power of government, except when its own is insufficient. The rela-
tion of the two powers is not that of servant to master.
The essence of government consists rather in the power of com-
manding in particular matters what is just and useful, and in the power
of protecting the country and the nation from particular attacks and
dangers, of representing it, and guarding against common evils. It con-
sists especially in what the Greeks call ¢rc»,468 the Romans imperium,
the Germans of the middle ages Mundschaft and Vogtei (tutelle and
baillage). Of all other powers government is the ruling, and, without
doubt, the highest, being related to the others as the head to the limbs of
the body. It includes what is called the representative power.
It is called political government (politische Regierung) in the gen-
eral conduct of the State, administration (Verwaltung) in reference to
details.
II. The judicial (richterliche) power is often regarded as the power
which judges (urtheilen)—a confusion which is favoured by the French
[and English] expressions (pouvoir judiciaire). But the essence of judi-
cial power consists not in judging (urtheilen), but in laying down theThe Theory of the State/411
law (richten), or, according to the Roman expression, not in judicio,
but in jure. ‘Judging,’ in the sense of recognising and declaring the
justice in particular cases, is not necessarily a function of government,
nor the exercise of a public power. In Rome it was commonly entrusted
to private persons as judices, in mediaeval Germany to the assessors
(Schöffen), not the judges (Richter). In modern times it is often entrusted
to popular juries. Maintaining the law, on the other hand, and protecting
the rights of individuals and of the community, has always been consid-
ered as a magisterial function.
An essential distinction between judicial power and government is
that the fonder does not, like the latter, exercise rule, but only protects
and applies laws already recognized The functions of government may
be compared to the intellectual powers of man, the functions of the judi-
cial powers to his conscience.
The separation (Ausscheidung) of the judicial power from that of
government in the modern State is a very important political advance. In
ancient times and in the middle ages the same magistrates exercised
both functions. The purity of justice, the liberty of the citizens, have
gained by the change, and government has not lost in security.469 Expe-
rience proves that distinguished statesmen, and government officials,
are very seldom likewise good judges, and vice versa. The judicial power,
though independent of the government, is yet subordinate to it, in some
such way as the heart is to the head.
The functions of sovereignty may appear to be exhausted by this
three-fold distinction, and we can easily understand how recent consti-
tutions have commonly limited themselves to these. But on closer ex-
amination, we find that there are two other groups of organs and func-
tions, both of which are indeed subordinate to that of government, but
may still be distinguished from it, having much less the character of
authority and command, which in government is essential. These are:—
III. The superintendence and care of the intellectual elements of
civilization (Statscultur).
IV. The administration and care of material interests (Stats-
wirthschaft) [Political Economy in the original sense].
In these two groups there is no question of governing. The great
factors of civilization, religion, science, art, do not belong to the organ-
ism of the State. Thus the relation of the State, even to the external
institutions of religion, science and art, to the Church and the school, is
fundamentally different from the relation between government and sub-412/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
jects in its own proper sphere. Such matters cannot be subjected to the
dominion of the State: its functions are therefore limited to superinten-
dence and fostering care (Aufsicht und Pflege).
The same applies to the fourth head, Public Economy. In the admin-
istration of the income and expenditure of the State, in the maintenance
of the economic welfare of the citizens, in the support of commerce, in
the management of public works, in the control of local government,
there is no exercise of imperium in the strict sense. Economic adminis-
tration must be based, not so much on the authority of the State, as on
technical knowledge and experience. In no other matters does the action
of the State approach so nearly to that of the private person. The prop-
erty of the State may be bought and sold like that of a private person.
The material welfare of the community is the broad basis on which the
State rests, and thus, although it is a necessary condition of political
existence, occupies the lowest place, while government occupies the
highest.
This distinction in the functions of the State has only in recent times
come to be gradually recognised. We still suffer from the evils of a
confusion of commanding and fostering. Sometimes things are com-
manded or forbidden, which should only be managed or controlled: some-
times there is a timid assistance or control, where there ought to be
energetic and authoritative action. But matter are better than they are a
hundred, or even fifty years ago. Many institutions have been already
separated from the direct administration of government, and are man-
aged, without the employment of force, in a spirit of scientific and tech-
nical care, and in the interests at once of the welfare and the freedom of
the community.Chapter VIII: Public Service and Public
Function470
1. In a wide sense every service exacted by the State, or rendered volun-
tarily to the State, can be called ‘public service.’ This would include the
service of soldiers, juries, deputies, and electors, whether secondary or
primary. Not all these services, however, are public services in the proper
sense, which implies a special charge or commission given by the State.
The functionaries of parishes, of the church, and of other corporations,
are not servants of the State; their service is public, but it is not laid
upon them by the State, and is not immediately related to the State.471
The head of the State is not a public servant, in so far as he is
himself sovereign, and the source of all public services: yet Frederick
the Great was right in calling the king ‘the first servant of the State,’
because even his of rice is dependent upon the constitution, and exists
altogether for the service of the State.
2. Not all public services in the narrower sense are public func-
tions; not all public servants are State officials. A State office is a par-
ticular organ in the body politic, with special functions of its own.
A public function is limited to particular objects. The office is filled
by the person of the official. State officials or functionaries, in a wider
sense, are those public servants who, although recognising and respect-
ing their subordination to the head of the State, yet exercise their offices
according to their own judgment; in a narrower sense they are those
only who have entrusted to them a power of command (imperium or
jurisdictio), as distinct from those who have no authority of this sort.
These last we might describe by the good old term of public curators414/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
(öffentliche Pgleger). Such are professors and teachers in State schools,
directors and physicians in public hospitals, government engineers, and
many financial officials, such as treasurers and administrators of crown
lands.472
State functionaries proper are those employed either in administra-
tive or judicial matters. The former exercise the imperium; within their
sphere they order at their own discretion what they consider for the
public interest, but they depend upon their superiors, and must submit
to their injunctions. Judicial functionaries, on the other hand, cannot
exercise their own discretion as to what public interest demands: they
must lay down the law as it exists, and apply it according to fixed rules
(jurisdictio); but in doing so they must act according to their own con-
science, and are not bound by any special injunctions of the govern-
ment. In ordinary circumstances the former class of functionaries may
be expected to display a liberal, the latter a conservative tendency.
3. From both kinds of State functionaries we must distinguish the
employee of the State, and official assistants. These are certainly public
servants, but they have no special office, no authority or independent
sphere: they are merely assistants of the officials under whom they are
placed. Such are clerks, inspectors, revenue collectors, etc. They are
public servants, because their activity is employed as an organic part of
the life of the State, and in so far as their work is of an intellectual,
though not of the highest kind. If even this last element is wanting, and
merely mechanical service is the chief thing,473 they are no longer to be
called public servants, although they are used by the State. One might
call them ‘private servants, or domestics of the State’ (Statstediente):
such are lacqueys, porters, beadles, policemen, sergeants-at-arms, etc.
Their condition is regulated by private law, rather than by the essential
conditions of public service.
4. The distinction between civil and military functions, which was
first clearly made by the Emperor Constantine the Great,474 is of signifi-
cance in the modern State. The officers of the army alone can be consid-
ered public servants, as they alone have the command: the other soldiers
are only fulfilling a general civic duty, or have voluntarily enlisted un-
der the form of private contract. Military officers are chiefly distin-
guished from civil by the stricter discipline and the military obedience,
but partly also by the fact that they possess authority only indirectly,
because their functions are executive, and therefore secondary by na-
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5. A distinction is made between collegiate and individual offices.475
The fonder, composed of several persons who deliberate together and of
whom the majority decides, are better adapted for advice, the latter for
action. Sometimes collegiate deliberation and individual decision may
be united: thus a minister decides after having taken the advice of his
colleagues.
Further, offices are distinguished as higher and lower, and accord-
ing to the locality of their operation. There are central offices
(Landesämler), intermediate offices relating to provinces, departments,
districts, etc.; and, lowest of all, local or parochial (communal) offices.
Sometimes, too, there are concurrent offices, where several functionar-
ies exercise the same powers in the same district, but each by himself,
e.g., the magistracies of ancient Rome, the English Justices of the Peace.
6. Office generally implies:
(a) A certain kind and extent of public powers and duties. This is
called its competency.
(b) A local seat as the proper centre and residence of its action.
Even officials who move about have a fixed official place.
(c) A territorial sphere of operation.
7. The relations between the State and its servants are not a matter
of private law, but essentially political in character. The service of the
State is not a commission or mandate, still less merely hired service.
The rules of private contract do not explain either the appointment, or
the powers, or the dismissal of a public servant.
The State nominates to an office by an act of will, the decree of
nomination.476 This act has been called a special law, an expression
which it is better to avoid, since, as a rule, the act of nomination is not
made by the legislative body, but in monarchies by the king; in repub-
lics, sometimes by the government, sometimes by popular election. This
decree is essentially a unilateral act of authority, even in the exceptional
case where it is preceded by an actual contract, as e.g., in acquiring the
services of a foreigner. Such a contract could never serve as the basis of
a civil action to force the actual appointment, although it may entitle to
a demand for damages, as in a private contract, if the nomination of the
State is not carried out.
The functions of public service are determined by the State, and
have a public and organic character. The office exists only for the State,
and not for the individual who holds it. It cannot therefore become the
property of a private person, nor as such become an object of private416/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
trafficking. Where anything of the sort happens, as in the middle ages,
and in France even in later times, the State has not escaped from the
limits of private law, and has not yet attained a full consciousness of its
political existence.
8. The salary attached to an office belongs to private law, for the
salary is essentially intended to assure the material existence of the offi-
cial and his family. Claims to salary may quite well be decided on by a
civil judge. But this element does not affect the essence of public office.
At all times there have been unpaid honorary officials, who have the
same significance in the body politic as salaried professional officials.
The English Justices of the Peace are just as much State officials as the
salaried Prussian Landräthe (prefects).Chapter IX: Appointment of Officials
1. Hereditary offices, which were introduced everywhere in Europe in
the middle ages, are as universally rejected by the spirit of modern poli-
tics. Mediaeval history shows that hereditary offices become seigniories,
and thus destroy the unity and order of the State. Besides, heredity is no
guarantee of personal capacity. There may in modern States be heredi-
tary offices exceptionally, commonly where they are purely positions of
honour without power, e.g., the offices about the court, which have come
down from the middle ages.
2. Of more importance is the distinction between professional and
honorary offices. The former occupy the whole activity of a man, and
form his vocation: they frequently require technical knowledge, and con-
sequently preparatory education and apprenticeship or probation. Such
offices have therefore a claim to a salary.
The latter, on the other hand, require only occasional duties, and
may therefore be exercised by those who have a private vocation, as
landowners, merchants, etc., and support themselves by this calling or
by their private fortunes. Serving on juries, or taking part in representa-
tive assemblies, are duties which may be fulfilled in this way. Obviously
it is only the well-to-do classes of society who can exercise such offices.
The mass of the people lacks education, or leisure, or both.
In the modern State professional offices are the more important, but
in many cases the advantages of both sorts may be combined. Represen-
tative government and self-government afford ways in which the direc-
tion of a professional official may be combined with the assistance of
representative honorary officials. Thus in Prussia the Landrath (pre-418/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
fect) is combined with the members of the departmental committee
(Kreisausschuss); in Baden the prefect of the district (Bezirksamt)477
with his district counsellors, the professional judge with jurymen and
assessors.
3. The German States, although in many respects less politically
advanced than England and France, are ahead in the admirable organi-
zation of professional offices. A capable and trustworthy class of offi-
cials is assured by the German system, according to which:—
(a) Offices are open to all who have the qualifications. Numerous
exhibitions or bursaries (Stipendien) assist the poorer students, but the
great number belong, as a matter of fact, to the more highly educated
families, and bring with them from home a traditional culture, which in
its turn helps to elevate the general level.
(b) As a rule, the candidates for public service must have a classical
education at the Gymnasium and at the University. For certain technical
offices, e.g., of engineers, architects, etc., the education of the Realschule
and the Polytechnic schools is required instead. At the end of the course
of study there is a government examination. The scientific spirit of the
German universities refuses to limit study to mere practical preparation
for a profession, and thus the defects of the Chinese system are avoided.
The necessity of examination prevents the influences of party favour
and court intrigue.
Yet the system must not be applied in a pedantic way. Exceptions
must be made for foreigners or other persons whose talents would be
useful to the State, but who have not followed the ordinary course of
study. Again, there are appointments which cannot be made by exami-
nation, such as ministers and counsellors, or professors at the universi-
ties, where high political or scientific capabilities are required.
(e) After the theoretical examination follows the novitiate
(Referendar- oder Practicantendienst), that is to say, the practical ex-
ercise as assistants to officials or lawyers. At the close of this novitiate
there is commonly a second examination before the candidate himself
receives an office.478
(d) The State itself appoints, according to its requirements, those
who have fulfilled these conditions.
Promotion is made gradually according to period of service and
proof of capacity. Advance in title and rank and payment, in regular
order, is the rule, but the system must not be applied in a rigid math-
ematical way. Seniority must not override the more important consider-The Theory of the State/419
ation of capacity, as it is apt to do where the system has degenerated into
a bureaucracy.
(e) The salary paid by the State assures to the official a means of
support corresponding to his position. Certainly most German officials
are very scantily paid, if we compare their earnings with those of trade;
but, on the other hand, they are protected against the uncertainties of
commercial enterprise. If a certain number of honorary offices were
substituted for the too numerous professional offices, the salaries of the
latter could be improved.
(f) The German official has pragmatic rights, i.e., he has a legal
claim to a fixed salary and to a retiring pension in case of age or illness.
By this system the German officials may feel that they have an
assured and honourable position; they form a veritable professional or-
der with the consciousness of their solidarity, and they have the impor-
tance of a political power. The head of the State and the representatives
of the people must reckon with them, and cannot dispense with their co-
operation.
4. The English system is totally different. Police administration and
jurisdiction in the counties are entrusted to unpaid functionaries chosen
from the aristocracy. Ministers are not taken from the class of perma-
nent officials, but from the parliamentary parties. A great number of
public offices by party influence, without regard to any previous prepa-
ration for them, but by the patronage and recommendation of influential
members of Parliament.
But even in England the need of examining candidates is felt more
than it was. The higher judicial offices require a long legal education,
not indeed at the universities, but at the Inns of Court, and practical
experience of the profession. Examinations are now also required for a
number of technical offices: incapable persons are rejected, and the in-
fluence of parties and patronage is diminished. A change of Ministry
affects only about sixty posts, partly eminent political offices, partly
offices of the court.479
5. The system of the United States was originally based on the En-
glish, but worked in a republican and democratic spirit. In the presi-
dency of Andrew Jackson was introduced the dangerous practice of com-
plete change [‘the spoils system’]. On the election of a new president,
that is every four, or at least every eight years, if a different party comes
into power, an immense number of posts is vacated and filled by new
persons. This leads to a universal office-hunting, and the interests of the420/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
State and society are less considered than the wishes of party. Thus the
whole official class is kept in an unstable condition and exposed to vio-
lent changes, and corruption is difficult to repress. The judges alone
have a better guaranteed position, and the habit of selecting them from
experienced advocates assures their legal acquirements and abilities.
6. In France there is indeed an official class, but its position is less
independent than in Germany. The head of the State, i.e., the Ministry
for the time being, has greater power of appointing and dismissing offi-
cials, and there is less guarantee for scientific education. Special study
at polytechnic, military and normal schools, is indeed required for a
great number of technical offices; university education for the judicial
functions. But the rule is not so generally carried out as in Germany.
The official is more dependent on the government; fidelity to party is
more regarded than fidelity to his office and the State.
7. In the republics of antiquity, and partly also in those of modern
times, as in Switzerland and America, the system is adopted of appoint-
ments for a fixed period of time, generally a few years, sometimes with,
and sometimes without, the possibility of reappointment. This system
does well enough for local offices, which, as a rule, demand no higher
education, and rarely use all the powers of a man’s life, but it involves
great disadvantages when applied to State offices which require a long
professional training, such as has become necessary in our highly devel-
oped conditions. The system involves frequent changes, favours ambi-
tion and party intrigue, diminishes the security of functionaries, and
prevents the firmness and stability of political action. The advantage of
the easy dismissal of incapable officials, or of those who have lost the
confidence of the public, does not outweigh these disadvantages. This
system is less dangerous in an aristocracy, which is naturally inclined to
stability and moderation, than in a democracy which loves change and
for that very reason is inclined to the system of short tenures. There is
further the danger of the State losing the service of the most capable
men, either through the caprice of the people or because they themselves
prefer a less uncertain career.
8. The individual should be free to accept or refuse an office to
which he is appointed, not because the service of the State is to be based
on contract, but because direct compulsion cannot properly be applied
to intellectual service and indirect compulsion is difficult and imperfect
in its effects. Individual freedom is the normal source of all useful activ-
ity. No citizen can be compelled to make greater sacrifices to the StateThe Theory of the State/421
than another. This principle is recognised in almost all modern States,
republics as well as monarchies.480
Local offices are an exception: their greater number, and the small
claims which they make on the individual, make them appear a univer-
sal duty of the citizen.481
9. The question has been debated—When an appointment begins?
If we remember that the appointment is a unilateral act of the State, we
can answer without hesitation: At the moment when this act is made
public, is registered or signed: the notification of this to the person nomi-
nated, and his subsequent investiture, are only the consequences of a
perfect nomination.482Chapter X: Rights And Duties of Public Officials
1. First of all, the official has the right of exercising the functions of his
office. This is called his competence, and is entirely a matter of public
interest. It is at the same time his duty to exercise his functions as re-
quired, and to do so or not is not dependent on his individual will. The
State may change, increase, or diminish the powers of an office.
2. An official has certainly a right to the title and rank belonging to
his office, but this right depends on political reasons, and may be modi-
fied by legislation. On the other hand, rank and title may remain as the
private right of an ex-official.
3. The right of being indemnified for expenses incurred and injury
suffered in the interests of the State is a matter of private law, and be-
longs equally to paid and unpaid officials.
4. There is no similar right to payment for the services themselves.
It depends on the will of the State whether an office shall be paid or
unpaid. A paid official has a right at private law to his salary.
A distinction may be made, as in many German States, between too
elements in the payment of officials: (1) payment of rank (Standesgehalt),
(2) payment of service (Dienstgehalt). It is the duty and interest of the
State to maintain, in a suitable way, those officials whose whole profes-
sional activity it employs; but there is further the expense which is in-
volved in or connected with the actual exercise of the office
(Dienstaufwand und Representationskosten).483 This distinction is of
importance in the case of officials retiring from active service. They
retain a claim to the former kind of payment, though none with respect
to the latter. The former is in greater degree a matter of private right, theThe Theory of the State/423
latter is bound up with the exercise of public functions. Where perqui-
sites and fees are attached to particular offices they are to be considered
of the latter character, even where they are reckoned along with the
regular maintenance of the officials. The State has the right of altering
such fees: it is only a matter of equity if a fixed salary is raised in order
to compensate a diminution of fees: there is no legal claim to compensa-
tion.
5. The right to a retiring pension arises from the fact that the official
has a claim to his salary at private law if he is compelled to give up his
office through no fault of his own. The pension should be proportioned
to the salary of maintenance (Standesgehatt): or, if there is no distinc-
tion of this sort formally recognised, the expenses of actual tenure of
office must be deducted in fixing the pension. It is expedient that the
amount and conditions of pensions should be definitely fixed by law, in
order to avoid anything arbitrary in the awarding of them. A general
system of pensions constitutes a heavy burden on the treasury, but such
a burden cannot well be avoided where the State requires professional
officials. The income of a government official is in most cases very
small, compared with the earnings of commerce and industry, and com-
monly requires higher intellectual qualifications and more education. It
is therefore a duty of the State to assure those who devote their lives to
it against want. The public is compensated for the expense by better
service, and the temptations to corruption are avoided.
The widows and orphans of State servants have no legal claim to a
pension. The salary is not hereditary. Many States have the good ar-
rangement of a public pension-fund, chiefly maintained by deductions
from official salaries.
6. The duties of officials mostly follow from their rights: they owe,
further, obedience to their superiors, fidelity to the head of the State and
to the nation, and, if occasion requires, secrecy. The oath of office, which
is commonly demanded, does not create this obligation, but only strength-
ens it. It is not the condition of the official’s duties, nor does it modify
their extent.
The kind of obedience varies according to the nature of the particu-
lar function. It is different for administrative and for judicial functionar-
ies. The latter must obviously occupy, on the whole, an independent
position, but even the former are not bound to an absolute or servile
obedience. Limits are imposed by both law and morality: in particular
cases the extent of the obligation to obedience may raise very difficult424/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
questions.
(a) An official may examine if the order he receives is regular in
form, i.e., if it is one which his superior is by his office entitled to give,
and not due to some caprice, and if it is within the sphere of his own
office to execute: he may further refuse to carry out an order which is
not signed, if a signature is required. He is a public functionary, and not
a private servant, and is therefore competent to examine the form of
orders as a test of their legality.
If the question of competency is doubtful, and the superior affirms
his right to give the order, the inferior must obey. His sole right, and at
the same time his duty, is to put his scruples before his superior, and to
await a repetition of the order.
(b) In no case can an official be bound to render obedience which
would violate the higher principles of religion and morality, or make
him accomplice in a crime. Such acts can never be the duty of his office.
The servant of the State cannot he required to do what a man would
refuse from humanity, a believer from religion, or a citizen from regard
to the criminal law of the land.484
(c) The subordinate official cannot refuse to obey an order, the ob-
ject of which appears to him illegal or unjust. He can only make repre-
sentations on the subject to his superior. He ought to presume that his
superior does not wish to violate the law, and that he has not considered
the matter sufficiently, and may be led to alter his decision by respectful
and frank expression of opinion. An official should not fail to save his
superiors and the State from mistakes, but if the superior abides by his
orders obedience is due, and the superior must bear the responsibility.
To authorise resistance in such cases would be to destroy the unity of
the State, to paralyse its power, and would lead to far worse conse-
quences than single violations of the law.485 The same is to be said of
unconstitutional commands. The subordinate must not, by resisting, him-
self violate constitutional obedience.
7. The spirit of fidelity (Treue) goes further than the duty of obedi-
ence. The latter is fulfilled when the official carries out the order given
him strictly in form and substance. The former binds him in the whole
of his conduct. Fidelity or loyalty is not, indeed, as in the feudal system,
the main principle of society: the duties of officials are now determined
by legislation. It is not so much a personal allegiance to his prince as the
requirements of the State which influence his action. Nevertheless, fi-
delity still forms the basis of the harmony and moral cohesion of theThe Theory of the State/425
public service.
An official who, in important though isolated points, holds, and on
occasion expresses, political convictions different from those of his su-
periors, does not thereby violate the duty of fidelity. But if on permanent
and fundamental principles he finds himself in opposition to the govern-
ment, and hostile to it; if, e.g., in a monarchy, he is a declared republi-
can, and works for the establishment of a republic, or vice verse, he
breaks the bond of fidelity, and ceases to be a harmonious member of
the whole. It is the same with a functionary who takes part in systematic
and continuous opposition intended to overthrow or impede the govern-
ment. This is a breach of fidelity which no government can tolerate
without falling into anarchy.486 Systematic hostility to the ministry, al-
though there is no particular act of disobedience, is likewise a breach of
fidelity. An official may have absolutely divergent, and even hostile con-
victions, without ceasing to be faithful in his office. But he must not in
his official position express such sentiments. If he believes himself con-
scientiously bound to declare his hostility in word and deed, he ought to
resign his office. It is obvious that judges are in a more independent
position. Their office is not political in character, and not dependent on
the will of the government.
A further consequence of official fidelity is that no official accept
service under a foreign State, or decorations, pensions, or other distinc-
tions of the sort without permission of his own government.
8. Official secrecy is not to be understood in an absolute sense, but
only so far as specially ordered, or in matters where the revelation of
information, officially obtained, would injure the State or individuals.
Two extremes have to be avoided, a pedantic maintenance of mystery,
or a mischievous concealment of unconstitutional and illegal action on
the one side; indiscreet gossiping on the other.
9. The State can reprimand or punish functionaries who neglect or
violate their duties. Crimes, which can be prosecuted and punished be-
fore the ordinary courts, are to be distinguished from neglect of duties,
which renders a person liable to official discipline. The former are judged
by the ordinary law of the land, the latter more specially from the point
of view of the public interest. This distinction is the same as that be-
tween Justice (Gericht) and Police (Polizei). The former, as we have
said, are proceeded against at criminal law, but the State has in some
cases modified this in its own interest: (1) according to the French prac-
tice,487 the criminal prosecution of an official for an official crime can426/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
only take place with the authorization of the government, or an author-
ity specially empowered, or (2) there are special courts to try officials.488
The English practice rejects both these exceptional rules, but protects
its aristocratic officials by other means against frivolous attacks.489
Official discipline goes further, and applies in cases where the ordi-
nary law could find no sufficient ground for a charge, and even in cases
where it would have acquitted the accused. It extends to all the faults
and negligences of the functionary, even to his private life, so far as that
may injure the honour and confidence which his office should receive.490
Disciplinary punishments are either slight, such as warning, repri-
mand, and limited fine; or they are severe, such as suspension from
office, removal to another place, compulsory retirement, or dismissal.
The infliction of the slighter punishments is one of the ordinary powers
of the superior officials, and requires no special legal proceeding. The
severer, on the other hand, require a legal proceeding in order to protect
the rights of officials against an arbitrary use of popover. States the
punishment of dismissal can only tic inflicted by the ordinary law courts;
but ordinary justice is apt to judge the fault as if it were only that of a
private citizen, to take too much account of the man, and too little of the
official. This system places the interest of the official for the time being
above the permanent interest of the office and of the State, the rights of
the individual above the rights of the community. A court of justice
which has to decide on a matter of such public importance must be
composed in such a way as to be able to appreciate the interests in-
volved. Failing such a court, the right of dismissal must remain in the
hands of the higher government officials.491Chapter XI: Termination of Public Service
Office does not exist for the sake of the official, so that if an office
comes to be suppressed, the official can no longer remain such. Public
interest alone must settle the nature and continuance of an office, but the
suppression of an office does not put an end to the claims of the official
to his maintenance, which continue as long as they would have done if
the office had not been abolished.
Since the acceptance or refusal of office is usually a matter of free
choice, so also is resignation: but the too are not quite on the same level.
The freedom of undertaking an obligation does not imply the freedom of
shaking it off. In a case where the ability and good-will of the individual
are so important as in public offices, compulsory continuance of service
is inexpedient.492 On the other hand, where acceptance of office is a
compulsory civic duty, its continuance, at least for a definite period, is
likewise compulsory.493
Resignation does not of itself bring the duties of an office to an end.
An arbitrary abandonment of office would be desertion. Resignation is
only a means of moving the State to withdraw the office it has given.
Official duties are not at an end before the State has accepted the resig-
nation, and the time when they terminate may be fixed by the authorities
according to public convenience.
Termination of office in consequence of simple resignation puts an
end to the private as well as the political rights attached to it.
It is otherwise if a public servant has the right of demanding to be
placed on the retired list (Quiescrung, Inruhestandsetzung). This puts
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and a claim to payment. The amount of pension is commonly regulated
according to age or length of service. The right to a retiring pension is
based partly on advanced age (in Bavaria 70, in Prussia, Wurtemberg,
Saxony, Belgium, 65 years) combined with long service (30 to 40 years),
partly on incapacity arising e.g., from ill health. The latter only consti-
tutes a legal claim to a pension if it has been brought on by the service
itself, for in such a case the State is bound to compensate the injuries
incurred in the exercise of public duties.494
Involuntary dismissal is differently regulated in different countries.
In the time of the old German Empire [the Holy Roman Empire], through
the influence of jurists, the private rights of the officials were brought
into great prominence. Office was considered as a right bestowed usu-
ally for life, and not to be withdrawn, except for violation of duty, by a
judicial decision.495 There were indeed some protests that an honourable
dismissal might be justified from grounds of public interest, but towards
the end of the last century the first opinion was more and more widely
diffused; and in many modern constitutions this principle was proclaimed
as an advance in liberty and an important guarantee against arbitrary
government, not only in Germany,496  but more recently even in Switzer-
land, where most offices are only bestowed for limited periods.
In England, on the other hand, party struggles have long kept the
political consciousness awake to the fact that office is given chiefly for
the sake of the State, and not of the individual: so much so that the
principle became established that the head of the State had full right of
taking away as of bestowing office. An exception was introduced in the
case of the judges, in order to ensure their independence. Under William
III it was decided that the common law judges should not be appointed
as before, ‘durante bene placito,’ but ‘quam diu bene gesserint,’ the
King and Parliament remaining the sole judges of good conduct.497 The
United States of North America adopted similar principles.498 In France
administrative officials have always remained liable to dismissal at will,
though from the fifteenth century judges have been irremoveable. As a
matter of fact, however, even in France, officials enjoy a tolerably se-
cure position, except in revolutionary times.499
The German system exaggerates the importance of private rights,
but if these are not made to override the welfare of the State, it has
advantages over the arbitrary practice of other constitutional States. It
assures the private interest of the functionary, and secures the State
against party agitation and caprice.The Theory of the State/429
In any case it is a fundamental principle that the office exists for the
State, and therefore the State can in the public interest dismiss and re-
place an official. These two rights naturally belong to the same person,
i.e., in case of doubt, to the head of the State.500 This must be recognised
even in those States in which only the law courts have the power of
dismissal, so far as deprivation of office has merely political (and not
also personal) consequences.501
These rules admit of two restrictions, (1) in behalf of the indepen-
dence of the judges, (2) in the interest of the functionaries themselves. In
modern times the principle is commonly recognized that judges can nei-
ther be dismissed nor transferred against their will, and cannot be put on
the retired list without retaining their full salary. In England judges can
only be removed by a decision of Parliament, in Germany by a judicial
sentence.502
With regard to the second restriction, different cases must be distin-
guished. The reasons for removing an official may be—
(a) A crime, which shows his moral unfitness for the office.
(b) Proved moral incapacity (negligence, cowardice, etc.) without
crime.
(c) Intellectual incapacity, e.g., loss of memory, insanity, etc.
(d) External circumstances which injure an official’s activity or de-
prive him of public confidence, a case which may occur, in times of
agitation or through foreign complications, to an official who has ful-
filled his duty, nay, even just because he has done so. Thus the minister
Stein was dismissed to please Napoleon I.
In all these cases the State must possess the means of protecting
itself against injury by removing officials. It is only in the first of these
(a) that the law courts are adapted to decide the matter according to
their ordinary procedure. A judicial removal brings with it loss of title,
rank, salary, and claim to pension.
The second case (b) is more a matter for official discipline than for
the ordinary courts, but the official must always have the opportunity of
defending himself. According to the greater or less degree of his fault,
there will follow dismissal, with loss of all claim to salary, but without
any injury to his remaining political rights, or he will merely be placed
on the retired list with a suitable pension. In the latter case the govern-
ment can obviously act more freely, because the private rights of the
official are not affected.
The third case (c) justifies compulsory retirement as a rule, but not430/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
dismissal, the official not being himself to blame.
The fourth case (d) may be met either by compulsory retirement or
by transference to a different post of the same character, dignity, and
emolument.
These two last cases should be referred to the highest authorities in
the government, and when the appointment is made by the chief of the
State, his assent or command should be required for removal.
A purely arbitrary removal without reason assigned, and without
opportunity of defence, is still practiced in several States, but is not in
accordance with a well ordered system.
Temporary suspension may be inflicted either as a penalty or as a
measure of prudence. In the former case it may be inflicted either by the
law courts, or as a measure of discipline by a competent authority. It
usually implies loss or reduction of salary for the time it lasts.
As a provisional measure it may be provided by the law beforehand
in certain cases, e.g., because a criminal charge, but it may also be
adopted by the authorities as a means of withdrawing an unpopular
official from the storm he has excited. Suspension should not involve
loss of private rights, except when it is a punishment: the official should
retain that part of his emolument which has a private character, espe-
cially his maintenance (Standesgehalt). If he is suspended on account of
a criminal charge he shall retain these private rights, though the court
may order the retention of his salary, as a guarantee for the fine and
damages to which he may be made liable, but not until he is condemned
is his claim for future payment at an end.503
The EndNotes
1. In 1852 Bluntschli published his Allgemeines Statsrecht geschichtlich
begründet in one volume. It afterwards grew into two volumes. Fi-
nally, when a fifth edition (1875) became necessary, he added the
volume called Politik, the two other parts corresponding in the main
to the two volumes of the original Statsrecht.
2. A good account of the different terms for ‘Law’ will be found in
Clark’s Practical Jurisprudence: A Comment on Austin. It would be
interesting to trace the connexion between some peculiarities of En-
glish Jurisprudence and this want of a distinctive word for Jus. On
the other side, we have escaped some of the temptations into which
the vagueness of the German Recht has led the theorists of Naturecht.
Our phrase ‘rights’ is at least shorter than Recht in subjectiver
Hinsicht. (Cp. Sir F. Pollock in his History of the Science of Politics,
pp 114, 115; Prof. Holland’s Jurisprudence, 2nd edit., pp. 63, 275:
note.)
3. Steinthal, Allgemeine Ethik, p. 425, gives a meaning to the German
words which is the precise converse of that given by Bluntschli.
4. [For an explanation of this phrase of German philosophy see Wallace’s
Translation of Hegel’s Logic, Prolegomena, Ch. x.]
5. [So in German (ed. 1875). The French Transl. (2nd edit.) reverses the
remark.]
6. The same idea is at the base of the Roman view. L. 9 (Gaius) D. de
Justitia et Jure: ‘Omnes populi, qui legibus et moribus reguntur, partim
suo proprio, partim communi omnium hominum jure utuntur. Nam
quod quisque populus ipse sibi jus constituit, id ipsius proprium civi-
tatis est, vocaturque jus civile; quod vero naturalis ratio inter omnes432/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
homines constituit, id apud omnes peraeque custoditur, vocaturque
jus gentum, quasi quo jure omnes gentes utuntur.’ [Justinian, Inst.
Lib. I. Tit. ii. §1.]
7. [For Aristotle’s views on this subject, cp. Pol vii. 4: in Eth. Nic. ix.
10. §3, he says there cannot be a State (pÒlis) of ten men nor of
100,000. Cp also Pol. iii, 3. §5.]
8. [Cp. Arist. Pol. i. I. fig 15, 1253a. 30: fÚsei mn oân ¹ drm¾ n
p©sin p t¾n toiaÚthn koinwnan Ð d prîtos sust»saj megstwn
¢gaqîn atioj.]
9. Cp. Eurip. Phoenissae 369–371:
¢ll/ ¢nagkawj cei
Patrdoj r©n ¥pantaj. ×j d/ ¥llwj lgei
AÒgoisi carei, tÕn d noàn kej cei.
 Schiller’s William Tell:—
‘Cleave to thy fatherland, thy country dear,
And with thy whole heart cling thou closely to it.
For rooted in thy cat entry is thy strength;
Away in yon strange world thou stand’st alone.’
10. ‘Accepto deinde imperio regem se terrarium omnium ac mundi
appellari jussit.’ Justin, xii. 16.
Laurent, Hist. du droit des gens, ii. 5, 161: [‘Une barrière qui
paraissait insurmontable séparait les Grecs des étrangers. Alexandre
s’éleva le premier au-dessus des préjugés de sa nation. Supérieur au
philosophe, son maître, qui lui conseillait de traiter les Hellènes comme
des amis et les Barbares comme des brutes, il conçut la pensée de les
unir, en abolissant toute difference entre les vainqueurs et les vaincus...
Il épousa la fille de Darius et maria ses amis avec les Persanes les
plus illustres: la cérémonie se fit à la maniere orientale. On célébra,
par une fête magnifique, les noces de tous les Macédoniens qui aver-
ment épousé des Asiatiques: leurs noms, inscrits sur les registres, se
montaient à plus de dix mille.’]
11. Frederici Constit. Regni Siculi, i. 30: ‘Oportet Caesarem fore justi-
tiae patrem et filium, coninum et ministrum, petrem et dominum in
edendo justitiam et editam conservando: sic et in venerando justitiam
sit filius et in ipsius copiam ministrando minister.’
12. His work, De Monarchia, glorifies the empire, and in his Divine
Comedy he reverences the Emperor as the head of the divine ordering
of the world Cp. Wegele, Dante’s Leben und Werke, Jena, 1852.
13. Arist. Pol. iii. 9. §14, 1280 b. 40: pÒlij d ¹ genîn ka kwmînThe Theory of the State/433
koinwna zwÁj teleoj ka aÙt£rkouj, Cp. iii. I. § 12, 1275 b. 20.
14. Arist. Pol. i. 2, § 8, 1252 b. 30: ¹ rÒlij... ginomnh mn oân toà
zÁn neken, oâsa d toà eâ zÁn.
15. Cicero, de Rep. I, 7: ‘Necque ulla res, in qua propius ad Decorum
numen virtus accedat humana, quam civitates aut condere novas aut
conservare jam conditas.’
16. Cicero, de Rep. iii, 25: ‘Sic regum, sic imperatorom, sic mag-
istratuum, sic patrum, sic populorum imperia civibus sociisque
praesunt, ut corporibus animus.’
17. Cicero, de Rep. i. 25: ‘Est igitur, inquit (Scipio) Africanus, res pub-
lica res populi; populus autem non omnis hominum coetus quoquo
modo congregatus, sed coetus multitudinis juris consensu et utilitatis
communione sociatus.’ i. 26: ‘Civitas est constitutio populi.’ Gaius,
Inst. i. § 1: ‘Nam quod quisque populus ipse sibi jus constituit, id
ipsius proprium civitatis est. vocaturque jus civile.’
18. [Florus Prooem. ‘Non unius, populi sed generis humani facta’]
19. Hincmari de Ordine Palatii, 5: ‘Duo sunt, quibus principaliter—
mundus hic regitur: auctoritas sacra Pontificum et Regalis potestas.’
Sachsenspiegel, i. I: ‘Tvei svert lit got in ertrike to bescermene de
kristenheit. Deme pavese is gesat dat geistlike, deme kaisere dat
wertlike’ (God has given two swords for the government of
Christendom: to the pope the spiritual, to the emperor the temporal).
20. [Tac. Germ. c. 11.]
21. Lex Visigothorum, ii. I. § 4: ‘Bene Deus conditor rerum disponens
humani corporis formam, in sublime caput erexit, atque ex illo cunctas
membrorum fibras exoriri decrevit. Hinc est et peritorum medicorum
praecipua cura, ut ante capiti quam membris incipient adhibere
medelam. Sicquc in Statu et negotiis plebium ordinatio dirigenda, ut
dum salus competens prospicitur Regum, fida valentibus teneatur
salvatio populorum.’
22. Burckhardt, Die Renaissance, p. 44ff. [Engl. Tr. I. p. 81.]
23. Pichler, Theologie von Leibnitz, i, p. 23.
24. For more details see Bluntschli’s Geschichte des allgemeinen
Statsrechts und der Politik. München, 1854: Dritte Auflage, 1881.
25. Bodin, De la République i. I.
26. Hugo Grotius, De jure belli. etc., i. 1. §14: ‘Est civitas coetus per-
fects liberorum hominum, juris fruendi et communis utilitatis causa
sociatus., i. 3. §7; Prolegom. §16. cp. Leo, Weltgeschichte, iv. p.
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27. Hobbes, De Cive, c. s. §9. Molesworth’s Edit. Vol. II. p. 114: ‘Civi-
tas ergo est persona una (?), cujus voluntas ex pactis plurium hominum
pro voluntate habenda est ipsorum hominum, ut singulorum viribus
et facultatibus uti possit ad pacem et defensionem communem.’
28. Rousseau, Contrat social, I. Ch. 6: ‘Trouver une forme d’association
qui défende et protège de toute la force commune la personne et les
biens de chaque associé et par laquelle chacun, s’unissant à tous,
n’obéisse pourtant qu’à lui-même et reste aussi libre qu’auparavant:
tel est le probleme fondamental dont le Contrat social donne la solu-
tion.’
29. De jure naturali et gent., vii. a, 13: ‘Unde civitatis haec
commodissima videtur definitio, quod sit persona moralis composita,
cujus voluntas ex plurium pactis implicita et unita pro voluntate om-
nium habetur, ut singulorum viribus et facultatibus ad pacem et
securitatem communem uti possit.’
30. Werke, vii. 197 (Ed. Rosenkranz) ‘A union of many for some end is
to be found in all social contracts, but a union which is in itself an
end is only to be found in a society, so far as it constitutes a collective
being (gemeinsames Wesen).’
31. [Cp. Book V. ch. iii. below. It will be obvious that Bluntschli’s ‘legal
State’ implies what has in England been called ‘Administrative Ni-
hilism’ (by Professor Huxley, criticizing Mr. Herbert Spencer), or
‘Anarchy plus the policeman’—the very opposite therefore of what
Bluntschli calls ‘Police State,’ which implies what has been nick-
named ‘grandmotherly legislation.’ It should be observed that some
more recent German writers have used the term Rechtsstat simply in
the sense of a constitutional government, a government in which the
administration does not transgress the law—whatever that may be.
See Holzendorff, Principien der Politik (2nd edit.), pp. 213, 214]
32. Cic. de Legibus, iii. c. 3, of the Consuls: ‘Ollis salus populi suprema
lex esto.’
33. Savigny, System des röm. Rechts, i. p. 22.
34. Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (Clarendon
Press Select Works, edited by Payne, vol. ii. pp. 113, 114). Cp. also
Leo (Weltgeschichte, vi. p. 759), who works out Burke’s idea.
We are reminded of the noble words of Shakespeare (Troilus and
Cressida, Act iii. Scene 3):—
‘There is a mystery (with whom relation
Durst never meddle) in the soul of state;The Theory of the State/435
Which hath an operation more divine
Than breath or pen can give expressure to.’
Cp. also Henry V, Act i. Scene 2:—
‘Exeter. For government, though high and low and lower,
Put into parts, cloth keep in one concent
Congreeing in a full and natural close,
Like music.
Canterbury. True: therefore doth heaven divide
The state of man in divers functions,
Setting endeavour in continual motion;
To which is fixed, as an aim or butt
Obedience: for so work the honey-bees
Creatures that by a rule in nature teach
The act of order to a peopled kingdom.’
35. The historical tendency becomes a reaction, a return if possible to
the middle ages, in the writings of De Maistre and Ludwig Haller.
36. Hegel, Rechtsphilosophie, § 257: ‘The State is the realisation of the
moral idea.. It is the moral spirit as substantial will manifested, and
clear to itself, thinking and knowing itself, and accomplishing what it
knows’ and in so far as it knows it.’ Cp. his Philosophy of History,
Trans. by Sibree. pp. 40–42.
37. [The English word ‘people’ has however very often the political
sense of Volk, e.g., Volksvertretung; = ‘Representation of the people.’]
38. Austrian Fundamental law: On the general rights of citizens: Dec
21, 1867, Art. 19: ‘All tribes in the nation (Volksstämme) have equal
rights and each has an inviolable right to maintain its nationality and
language.’
39. Niebuhr, Preussens Recht gegen den sächsischen Hof: ‘Common
nationality has higher claims than the political relations which unite
or separate the different nations of one race. Grammar, language,
manners, tradition and literature constitute a fraternal bond which
parts them from foreign tribes and makes union with the foreigner
against their own tribe a crime.’
40. De Parieu, Polit., p. 304, quotes the words of the Emperor Francis
II to the French ambassador at Vienna ‘Mes peoples sont étrangers
les uns aux autres et c’est tant mieux. Its ne prennent pas les mêmes
maladies en même temps. En France quand la fièvre vient, elle vous
prend tous le même jour. Je mets des Hongrois en Italie et des Italiens
en Hongroie. Chacun garde son voisin: its ne se comprennent pas et436/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
se detestent, De leurs antipathies naît l’ordre et de leur haine réciproque
la paix generale.’
41. [‘national’ is here used in the sense of ‘based on nationality’ or
‘based on one people,’ i.e., as an adjective corresponding to Nation:
but sometimes it is used as an adjective to Volk.]
42.Eötrös, Die Nationalitätsfrage, Vienna, 1865.
43. [Rep. iii, 415.]
44. Laws of Manu, ii. 162 (edited by A. Loiseleur Deslongschamps,
Paris, 1833): ‘A Brahman shall shun worldly honour like poison, and
thirst for the scorn of men as for nectar.’ [c. ii. §162 in Sir W. Jones’
Transl, edit. by Grady, Lond. 1869, p. 33.]
45. For the history and nature of the Indian Castes, see Larsen, Indische
Alterthumnskunde, Book II. 11; Gobineau, De l’inegalité des races
humaines, ii. p. 135; M. Duncker, History of Antiquity, Book V. ch.
iv Eng ed. [See art. ‘India’ by W. W. Hunter, in Encyclopaedia
Britannica.]
46. I have treated this view in greater detail in my Die Altasiatischen
Gottes- and Weltideen, p. 29f.
47.  [For the use and abuse of ‘the cake of custom,’ see Walter Bagehot’s
Physics and Politics, p. 27, and ch. iii. and iv.]
48. [It seems simplest, for brevity, to translate Stand here and in ch xvii.
by ‘Estate’ in its old sense of a social class, as distinct From ‘Class’
in the political sense which Bluntschli gives to it. The French transla-
tion has ordre. Elsewhere ‘Estates’ is generally used only of the Es-
tates as assembled in Diet or Parliament.]
49. Caesar, de B. G. vi. 13: ‘Illi rebus divinis intersunt, sacrificia pub-
lica ac privata procurant, religiones interpretantur. Ad hos magnus
adolescentium numerus disciplinae causa concurrit, magnoque ii sunt
apud eos honore. Nam fere de omnibus controversiis publicis
privatisque constituunt.’
50. See Schmitthenner, Statsrecht, pp. 31 and 103.
51. [Cf. Arist., Pol. vii. 11. §5, 1330 b 19 ]
52. Acts v. 29.
53. Pope Gregory VII, himself the son of a carpenter, stated this clearly:
‘Rome has become great among heathens and Christians quoa non
tam generis aut patriae nobilitatem quam animi et corporis virtutes
perpenadendas adjudicaverit.’ Cf. Laurent, Étud. sur l’Hist. vii. p.
335.
54. [The clergy, as a body, declined the position of a parliamentaryThe Theory of the State/437
estate, which was offered to them by Edward I. The Lords spiritual
still sit with the temporal peers but it is probable that in the middle
ages they owed their seat rather to their secular position as tenants-in
chief than to their clerical dignity.]
55. [Mommsen, Röm. Statsrecht, ii. p. 765.]
56. Dio Cass. lii. 14–40.
57. Geschichte der Rechtsverfassung Frankreichs, i. p. 217 ff.
58. Essais sur l’histoire de France, p. 52 ff.
59. Convent, Carisiac. of 877, in Mon. Germ. Hist. Legg. p. 539. Cf.
Waitz, Verfassungsgeschichte, iv. 227: ‘Inheritance of fiefs not gen-
erally recognised in France till much later. The kings resisted the
principle till the second half of the eleventh century.’ Cf. Luchaire,
Hist. des Institutions Monarchiques de la France sous les premiers
Capétiens, ii. 19 ff.
60. Such is the old expression, Beaumanoir xxxis. 41: ‘Çascuns barons
est souvrains en sa baronnie. Voirs est que li rois est sourrains par
desor tous.’
61. Loysel, Inst. Coutum. i. I. 14: ‘Nul ne doit seoir à la table du Baron
s’il n’est Chevalier.’
62. Cp. the French legal saying, ‘Nul ne naît Chevalier.’ Loysel, Inst.
Coutum i. 1.
63. Loysel, ib. i. I. 12: ‘Nul ne peut anoblir que le Roy.’ 13: ‘Lle moyen
d’être anobli sans Lettres, est d’être fait Chevalier.’
64. Schäffner, ii. p. 160.
65. De Tocqueville, l’Ancien Régime, has shown how the abolition of
the political rights of the nobility, taken together with the continuance
of their economical privileges, stirred up the national hatred against
them. As long as they bad judicial duties, and were especially occu-
pied with public business, their freedom from taxation and their re-
ceipts from burdens on land and persons were intelligible. But after
the royal officials had taken over the whole administrative and judi-
cial business of the State, these economical privileges appeared un-
just.
66. De Parieu, Polit. 100 ff.
67. See Schäffner, vol. ii.
68. Law of 25 June, 1790. Art. I: ‘La noblesse héréditaire est pour
toujours abolié; en consequence les titres de prince, de duc, de comte
etc.—ne seront pris par qui que ce soit, ni données a personne.’
Const of Sept., 1791: ‘La Constitution garantit comme droits438/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
naturels et civils (1) que tous les citoyens vent admissibles aux places
et emplois, sans autre distinction que celle des versus et des talons,
(a) que toutes les contributions seront reparties entre tous les citoyens
également, en proportion de leurs facultes.’
Const of 1795, Art. 3 ‘L’égalité n’admet aucune distinction de
naissance, aucune hérédité de pouvoirs.’
69. Napoléon, Mém. de Sainte Hélène, Las Casas, v. p. 4: ‘Je le répète
de nouveau, j’ai fait trop ou trop peu: j’aurais dû m’attacher
l’emigration à sa rentrée; l’aristocratie m’eût facilement adoré; aussi
bien il m’en fallait une; c’est le vrai, le soul soutien d’une monarchie,
son modérateur, son levier, son point résistant; l’État sans elle est un
vaisseau sans gouvernail (?), un vrai ballon dans les airs. Or, le bon
de l’aristocratie, sa magie, est dans son ancienneté, dans le temps, et
c’étaient les seules choses que je ne pusse pas créer.... La démocratie
raisonnable se borne à menager à tous l’egalité pour prétendre et
pour obtenir. La vraie marche eût été d’employer les débris de
l’aristocratie avec les formes et l’intention de la démocratie. Il fallait
surtout recueillir les noms anciens ceux de notre histoire.... J’avais
dans mon portefeuille un projet qui m’eût rallié beaucoup de tout ce
monde-là , et qui, après tout, n’eût été que juste. C’est que tout de-
scendant d’ancien maréchal ou ministre, etc., etc., eût été apte, dans
tous les temps, à se faire déclarer duc, en présentant la dotation requise.
Tout fils de général, de gouverneur de province, etc., etc. eût pu en
tout temps se faire reconnaître comte, et ainsi de suite. Ce qui eût
avance les uns, maintenu les espérances des autres, excité l‘émulation
de tous, et n’eût blessé l’orgueil de personne.’ Cf. also v. p. 161, and
Thiers Hist. du Consulat et de l’Empire, viii. p. 116. Benjamin Con-
stant, De l’esprit de conquête, part ii. ch. a: ‘L’hérédité s’introduit
dans des siècles de simplicité et de conquête, mais on ne l’institue pas
au milieu de siècles de civilization. Elle peut alors se conserver mais
non s’établir.’ Cf. De Parieu, Polit., 108.
70. Hence, during the Hundred Days, an imperial decree was issued, 13
March, 1815: ‘La noblesse est abolie. Les titres féodaux vent
supprimés.’
71. [For the institution of Majorats, see Thiers, Hist. du Consulat et de
l’Empire, viii. p. 137.]
72. Fr. Const. of 1848, art. 10: ‘Sont abolis à toujours tout titre nobiliaire,
toute distinction de naissance, de classe ou de caste.’
73. Decree of 24 Jan., 1852; Law of 18 May, 1858 and Decree of 8The Theory of the State/439
Jan., 1859: instituting a special authority to control titles of nobility.
74. De Parien, Polit., p. 112 ff.
75. [See the Articles on Nobility and Peerage, by Professor Freeman, in
the Encyclopaedia Britannica.]
76. Legg. Wilh, i, §2: ‘Statuimus etiam ut omnis liber homo foedere et
sacramento affirmet quod intra et extra Angliam Wilhelmo regi fideles
esse volunt, terras et honorem illius omni fidelitate cum eo servare et
ante eum contra inimicos defendere.’ [Stubbs, Select Charters, 80.]
77. Cf. Gneist, Englische Verfassungsgeschichte, p. 94ff. Stubbs, Const.
Hist. of England, i 258 ff.
78. See Part II. Book ii, chap. 3.
79. Blackstone, Comm. i. 12, quotes with approval a passage from Sir
Thomas Smith [‘As for gentlemen they be made good cheap in this
kingdom, for whosoever studieth the laws of the realm, who studieth
in the Universities, who professeth the liberal sciences, and, to be
short, who can live idly and without manual labour, and will bear the
port charge, and countenance of a gentleman, he shall be called mas-
ter, and shall be taken for a gentleman.’] Cf. Gneist, Englische
Verfassungsgeschichle, p. 631 ff. De Tocqueville, Oeuvres, viii. p.
328.
80. [Bluntschli here seems to be thinking chiefly of the county gentry,
whom he regards as a lower nobility.]
81. See Gneist, Op. cit. and De Tocqueville, Oeuvres, viii.
82. Macaulay, Hist. of England, i. p. 37: ‘It had none of the invidious
character of a caste. It was constantly receiving members from the
people and constantly sending down members to mingle with the
people.... The yeoman was not inclined to murmur at dignities to
which his own children might rise. The grandee was not inclined to
insult a class into which his own children must descend.’
83. Blackstone, Comm., i. 17.
84. Gneist, op. cit., p. 620. De Tocqueville, viii. 319.
85.  [Early in the thirteenth century Eike of Repgow made a collection
of the laws in use in Saxony, calling it the ‘Mirror of the Saxons’
(Sachsenspirgel). The Schwabenspiegel appeared later in the cen-
tury.]
86. Sachsenspiegel, iii. 58. § 2. Ib., i. 3, §2. Schwabenspiegel, 5.
87. [For the meaning of Schöffen see Hallam, Middle Ages, Ch. ii. Pt. 2;
Savigny, Geschichte des römischen Rechts im Mittelalter, i. ch. 4;
and infr. Bk. vii. ch. 7.]440/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
88. Sachsensp. iii. 81. 5 1: i. 2.
89. Sachsensp. i. 3 §2; Schwabensp. 5.
90. Savigny, Geschichte des röm. Rechts im Mittelalter, iii. ch. xix
Leo, Geschichte von Italien, i. p. 399; Hegel, Städteverf. in Italien,
vol. ii. p. 213 ff.
91. Cf. Thierry, Lettre XIV, sur l’histoire de France, and Schäffner,
Rechtsgeschichte, ii. p. 554 ff.
92. For Germany see Gaupp and Gengler, Deutsche Stadtrechte des
Mittelalters.
93. Schäffner, op. cit., p. 590.
94. [Machiavelli, Ritratti delle cose dell’Alamagna. ‘Della potenza dell
Alamagna alcun non debbe dubitare, perehè abbonda di uomini di
ricchezze, e di armi.... Ma vengiamo alle comunitadi franche ed
Imperiali, che sono it nervo di quella provincia, dove sono danari e
l’ordine.’]
95. Laurent, Histoire du droit des gens, vii. p. 529. Florence followed
this noble example in 1288; Sugenheim, Geschichte den Aufhebung
der Leibeigenschaft, 1861, p. 202 ff.
96. Ordonn. i. 583: ‘Comme selone le droit de nature chacun doit naistre
franc et par aucuns usages—moult de personnel de nostre commune
peuple soient encheües en lieu de servitudes:—Nous considerants que
Nostre Royaume est dit et nomme le Royaume de Francs, et voullant
que la chose en vérité soit accordant au nom—ordenons, que
generaument par tout nostre Royaume de tant comme it peut appartenir
à nous—telles servitudes soient rameneés à franchises—à bonnes et
convenables conditions—de tant comme it peut toucher nous.’ Cf.
Schäffner, Franz. Rechtsgesch. i. 523. Still earlier the count of Valois
brother to King Philip the Fair, had enfranchised the serfs on his
domain on the ground of the natural freedom of man; Laurent, op.
cit., vii. 528; Sugenheim, Gesckickte der Auflebuung der Leibeigren-
schaft, p. 130 foll.
97. Seebohm, On International Reform, p. 26 foll. The abolition of
serfdom began in England in the course of the thirteenth century.
Many of the liberated serfs acquired the position of copyholders.
Sugenheim, op. cit., p. 289; Gneist, p. 444f. [see also Seebohm, The
Black Death, in Fortnightly Review, vol. ii. 1865, and J. E. Thorold
Rogers, Six Centuries of Work and Wages, vol. i. ch. 8.]
98. Florentinus, in Digest I, Tit. 5, de Statu hominum: ‘Servitus est
constitutio juris gentium, qua quis dominio alieno contra naturamThe Theory of the State/441
subjicitur.’
99. Ulpianus, in Dig. I, Tit. I, de Just. et Jure: (‘Manumissio) a jure
gentium originem sumsit, utpote quum jure naturali omnes liberi
nascerentur, nec esset nota manumissio, quum servitus esset incog-
nita; sed posteaquam jure gentium servitus invasit, secutum est ben-
eficium manumissionis.’
100. [Justinian, Inst., i. 8]. ‘Sed hoc tempore nullis hominibus, qui sub
imperia nostro sunt, licet supra modum et sine causa legibus cognita
in servos suos saevire.’ Gaius, i. §53.
101. Sachsenspiegel, iii. Art. 42. §3: ‘An minen sinnen ne ken ik is
nicht upgenemen ne der warheit, dat iemen des anderen sole sin, ok
ne hebbe wie’s nen orkünde.’ §6: ‘Na rechter warheit so hevet egenscap
begin von gedvange unde von vengnisse unde von unrechter walt, die
man von aldere in unrechte wonheit getogen hevet unde nu vore recht
hebben wil.’
102. Occasionally, in German law, we find serfs put on the level of
domestic animals, but this is certainly not of the essence of the older
relation Cf. Tacitus, [Germ., 25: ‘Ceteris servis non in nostrum morem,
descriptis per familiam ministeriis utuntur. Suam quisque sedem, suos
penates regit. Frumenti modum dominus aut pecoris aut vestis ut
coloni injungit: et servus hactenus paret.’]
103. See above, Ch. xv.
104. Cf. the Article ‘Leibeigenschaft’ (Russische) by Tschitschérin in
the Deutsches Statswörterbuch; T. Engelmann, Die Leibeigenschaft
in Russland, 1884.
105. For England, cp. Blackstone, Comment., i. 14. The English law of
August 28. 1838 [3 and 4 Gul. iv. 73], regulates emancipation in
English colonies, and declares every slave free who comes to Great
Britain or Ireland with his masters consent. In France, we find as
early as the sixteenth century the clause: ‘Toutes personnel sont
franches en ce Roïaume et si tost qu’un Esclave a atteint les Marches
d’icelui se faisant baptizer, est affranchi.’ Loysel, Inst. Coutum. i. 6,
24.
French law of Sept. 28, 1791. Constitution of 1848: ‘L’esclavage
ne pent exister sur aucune terre française.’ Article added to the Treaty
of Paris, 1814: ‘Sa Majeste très-chrétienne et sa Majesté Britannique
s’engagent pour faire prononcer par toutes les puissances de la
chretiente l’abolition de la traite des noirs.
[On the views held on slavery among the Greeks and Romans,442/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
see Oncken, Staatslebre des Aristoteles, ii. p. 29 ff.; Lecky, History
of European Morals, ch. iv. vol. ii. p.62 ff. (third edition)]
106. [See above, Ch. viii.]
107. The elections to the States General of 1789 had already given a
practical extension to the conception of the third estate. In the middle
ages it was limited to the citizens of the towns: in 1789 the peasants
elected as well. De Tocqueville, Oeuvres, viii. p. 139.
108. Robespierre personifies the jealous hatred of all ‘higher’ classes
united with an idolatry of the people. His declaration of rights con-
tains the sentence: ‘Toute institution qui ne suppose le peuple bon et
le magistrat corruptible est vicieuse.’ Cf. L. Stein, Geschichte der
socialen Bewegurg in Frankreich, i. p. 145.
109. Cicero, de Officiis, i. 17: ‘Prima societal in ipso conjugio est.
proxima in liberis, deinde una domus, communia omnia. Id autem est
principium urbis, et quasi seminarium reipublicae.’ Even Rousseau,
in his Contrat Social, though inconsistently with his main view, says:
‘La famille est la première image de la société politique.’ [Arist., Eth.
Nic, viii. 10. §4; Pol. i. 2.]
110. Pomponius, in Dig. 1, Tit. 17, de Reg Jur.: ‘Jura sanguinis nullo
jure civili dirumi possunt.’
111. Gobineau Sur l’inegalité des races humaines, ii. p. 270, notices
that the patriarchal view, which regards the authority of the father as
typical of the sovereign power, has been admitted by the Aryans only
in a cautious and modified way, whereas it has continued to satisfy
the Chinese in whom the yellow race predominate.
112. Gierke, Genossenschaftsrecht. 1868. i. p. 29.
113. Modestinus, in Dig. xxiii., Tit. I, de Ritu nuptiarum:: ‘Nuptiae
sunt conjunctio maris et feminae, et consortium omnis vitae, divini et
humani juris communicatio.’
Justinian, Inst. i. 9, §1: ‘Nuptiae sive matrimonium est viri et
mulieris conjunctio, individuam consuetudinem vitae continens.’
114. Gen. i. 2–24, quoted by Paul, Ep. to Ephes. v. 31: ‘Therefore shall
a man leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave unto his wife:
and they shall be one flesh.’ Tacitus, Germ. 19 (of German wives):
‘Sic unum accipinnt maritum, quo modo unum corpus, unamque vi-
tam, ne alla cogitatio ultra, ne longior cupiditas, ne tanquam maritum,
sed tanquam matrimonium amens.’ Schwabenspiegel (Wack. 6): ‘Wan
die (ein man unde sin wip) reht unde redelichen zer ê chomen sint, da
ist nicht zweiunge an, si sint wan ein lip.’The Theory of the State/443
115. Gen. i. 3–16: ‘Unto the woman he said . . . thy desire shall be to thy
husband, and he shall rule over thee.’ Paul, Ep. to Eph. v. 22: ‘wives,
submit yourselves unto your husbands.’ Sachsenspiegel, i. 45. §1:
‘Al ne si en man sine wive nicht evenburdich, he is doch ire vormünde,
unde se is sin genotinne, unde trit in sin recht, swenne se in sin bedde
gat.’ Code Civil, Art. 213: ‘Le mari doit protection à sa femme, la
femme obéissance à son mari.’ Austrian Code, §91: ‘Der Mann ist
das Haupt der Familie.’ Code of Zürich, § l27: ‘Der Ehe. mann ist
das Haupt der Ehe.’
116. [Dio Cass. lxi. 2–9.]
117. [For laws and customs restraining marriage, see Mill, Political
Economy. Book ii. chap. xi.]
118. The Laws of Manu (iii. 46) lay down rules on the subject.
119. Matt. v. 3:, xix. 8; Mark x. 11. 12; Luke xvi. 18.
120. Representative Government, ch. 8 [and The Subjection of Women]
121. Histoire de l’Amerique. vol. iii.
122. [In England female ratepayers have a vote for Town Councils and
School-Boards]
123. [Lampridius in Hist. August. chap. 4. 18, But women were not
legally excluded from the Principate. Cf. Mommsen, Röm. Staatsrecht,
ii p 764.]
124. [Bluntschli quotes Aristot. Pol. iii. 6. 16 (Schneider) for the state-
ment that many foreign nations are ruled by women. The reference is
wrong: he appears to be misunderstanding ii. 9. §7.]
125. Cf Laboulaye, Recherche sur la condition civile et politiques
femmes, Paris, 1843. It is worth noticing that, as a role, female rulers
have prospered, partly because they have been more ready than male
rulers to accept the guidance of great statesmen.
126. This view, as we find it at Rome, does not mean that the foreigner
is on the same level as the slave, but that his rights are unprotected in
the Roman State. Cf. Ihering, Geist des römischen Rechts, i. p. 219
ff. Hostis originally means ‘guest,”stranger,’ and ‘enemy.’
127. Blackstone, Comm. i. 10; Stat. 7 and 8 Vic. cap. 66. By the law of
1870, St. 33 Vic. cap.14, naturalization has been made still easier.
128. Birth in the territory of the United States constitutes citizenship.
But the children of citizens born abroad acquire it by descent. Settle-
ment in the United States is the essential condition of naturalization
which is very frequent. Cf. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution
of U. S. A., book iii., ch. 16, and Rüttimann, Nordam. Bundesstats-444/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
recht, i. 89.
129. Austrian Fundamental Law, §29: ‘Foreigners acquire Austrian
citizenship by entering the public service, by adopting a business
which involves regular settlement in the country, by a continuous
residence for ten years in the country.’ But by the Fundamental law
of 21 Dec. 1867, Art. 3, foreigners cannot enter the public service till
they have become members of the State. The other conditions were
abolished by a Court-decree of 1 May, 1833, and an Imperial Ordi-
nance of 27 April, 1860. See Ulbrich, Lehrbuch des Oesterr.
Statsrechts, p. 81.
130. Bluntschli, Schweiz. Bundesrecht, i. p. 529, and in detail Bluntschli,
Stats. and Rechtsgesch. von Zürich, ii. p. 14 ff.; Cherbuliez, De la
Démocratie en Suisse, i. p. 177 f; Blumer, Bundesstatsrecht, i. 249f.
131. [Cf Marquardt, Römische Statsverwaltung, i. p. 135.]
132. Code Civil, Art. 10: “Tout enfant ne d’un Français en pays étranger
est Français.’ Consular constitution of 1799, Art. 3: ‘Un étranger
devient citoyen français lorsqu’après avoir atteint l’âge de 21 ans
accomplis et avoir declare l’intention de se fixer en France, il y a
résidé pendant dix années consécutives.’ [The term was reduced to
three years by the law of July, 1867; cf. also l. 22–29 Jan. and 7–12
Feb. 1851. French trans.]
133. Law of 31 Dec., 1842. Prussian nationality depends mainly on
descent: the legitimate children of Prussians are Prussian citizens,
even though born abroad. In naturalisation the chief condition is do-
micile; v. Rönn Statsr. i. §87.
134. Citizenship in the German Empire (Reichsangehörigkeit) presup-
poses citizenship in one of the provinces of the Empire
(Landesangehörigkeit), and this generally depends on descent or
naturalisation.
German Law of 1 June, 1870, §1: ‘In the case of birth in a
foreign country, the legitimate child of a (North) German father and
the illegitimate child of a (North) German mother both count as Ger-
man.’
135. Code Civil, Art. 17: ‘La qualité de Français se perdra par tout
établissement fait en pays étranger, sans esprit de retour. Les
établissements de commerce ne pourront jamais etre considérés comme
ayant été fait’s sans esprit de retour.’
Austrian Fundamental law of 21 Dec., 1867, Art. 4: ‘Freedom
of emigration is only limited by the duty of military service,’ and soThe Theory of the State/445
Prussian Constitution of 1850, Art. II. The Prussian law ii. 17 §127
ff., was still stricter. By the law of the German Empire 1 June, 1870,
membership in country and empire are lost by a ten years’ residence
abroad. But the term is only counted from the termination of pass-
ports, etc., and may be interrupted by registration at a consulate,
§21.
136. Magna Charta, 1215: ‘Liceat uni cuique exire de regno nostro et
redire salvo et secure per terram et per aquam salva fide nostra. nisi
tempore guerrae per quod breve tempus, propter communem utilitatem
regni.’ Blackstone, Comm., i 10. By the law of 1870, St 33 Vic. cap.
14, a British subject ceases to be such by naturalisation in a foreign
State.
137. Code Civil. Art. 17.
138. Code Civil, Art. 18: ‘Le Français qui aura perdu sa qualité de
Français pourra tonjours la recouvrer en rentrant en France avec
l’autorisation du Président de la République et en déclarant qu’il veut
s’y fixer, et qu’il renonce à toute distinction contraire à la loi française.’
139. A man may even take part in the representation of two States at
once. Many German princes (Standesherren) are members of the upper
chamber in two or three States, in all of which they have estates and
have given their oath of allegiance. It is quite possible to conceive
that a man should have two different domiciles, one in town and the
other in the country, or one as a man of business. the other as a
private person. To dispute this as Bar does (Das internationale Privat-
und Strafrecht) is not to see that facts are wider and more varied than
theory. To allow a man to become a member of a new State without
breaking his connection with the old is no limitation to the right of
free migration.
140. Blackstone, loc. cit. My own experience has taught me that in
these cases one’s actual home has the first claim.
141. Bavarian Edict, §6. On the other hand, Swiss Federal Constitution
of 1848, Art. 43: ‘No canton may bestow citizen rights on foreigners,
unless they have first resigned their previous rights.’ See now the
Swiss federal law of July 3, 1876, on naturalization and loss of citi-
zen rights.
142. Prussian Law, Introd., §34: ‘Subjects of foreign States who reside
or conduct business in the country must be tried by the above laws.’
Austrian Code, §33: ‘Foreigners enjoy equal civil rights and
liabilities with natives, except where membership in the State is ex-446/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
pressly required as a condition.’ Code Civil, Art. 13.
143. For England cf. Blackstone, i. 10. Since 1870 aliens can acquire
real property, Stat. 33 Vic. cap. 14. In some democratic Swiss can-
tons the prohibition is still in force.
144. The prohibition was natural as long as the guilds existed: but it
long outlived them. The French constitution of 1848, Art. 13: ‘garantit
aux citoyens la liberté du travail et de l’industrie.’ Practically. how-
ever, foreigners enjoy liberty of trading.
145. The Swiss Federal Const., Art. 63, guarantees freedom of settle-
ment to foreign States on conditions of reciprocity. Act of the Ger-
man Confederation, 1815, Art. 18. Resolution of the German Con-
federation, 1817. The German Imperial law of 1 Nov.,1867 (origi-
nally enacted by the North German Confederation), first introduced
complete freedom of migration between German States: it is now
generally extended to foreigners.
146. Swiss Fed Const. of 1874, Art. 70: ‘The Confederation has the
right to remove from its territory any foreigners who are dangerous
to its safety.’
147. Bavarian Edict, of 1818, §7: ‘No foreigner can hold the higher
crown offices, posts in the civil service, the higher posts in the army,
ecclesiastical offices or benefices, nor exercise the rights of a Bavar-
ian citizen.’
French Constitution of 1848, Art. 10 ‘Tous les citoyens sont
également admissibles a tous les emplois publics.’ Cf. Austrian Fund
Law, 31 Dec. 1867, Art. 3, Prussian Const. of 1830, Art. 4.
148. French Const. of 1848, Art. 8: ‘Les citoyens ont le droit de
s’associer. de s’assembler paisiblement et sans armes, de pétitionner,
de manifester leurs pensées par la voie de la presse on autrement.’
Prussian Const. of 1850, Arts. 27, 29, 30, 32, grants these
rights to ‘an Prussians.’
149. French Const. of 1848, Art. 15. French law of July 7, 1874. Art. I.
Italian electoral law of Jan. 22, 1882. Blackstone, Comm. i, 17.
150. Bavarian Law, i. 7. 26. Edict on native rights, §8.
151. Prussian Const. of 1850, Art.70: Electoral Law of the German
Empire of 1869, §1: ‘All (North) Germans of twenty-five years of
age are qualified to vote.
152. Electoral law of Dec.28, 1878.
153. Constitutional Law of July, 1852, Art. 5.
154. Austrian Imperial Electoral Law §9.The Theory of the State/447
155. The Swiss Federal Const. of 1874, §74: ‘Every Swiss over so
years of age is entitled to the franchise.’ The Zürich Const. of 1869
fixes political majority at 20, while its civil law fixes majority at 24.
156. In the Reform Act of 1867, the borough franchise is based on
occupation and payment of rates. [70 and 31 Vic. cap. 102. The
Franchise Act of 1885 assimilates the county franchise to the bor-
ough franchise, and adds a ‘service franchise.]
157. The Bavarian Constitution of 1848, Edict on Native Rights. §8
requires for citizen rights not only ‘Indigenat’ but ‘settlement in the
kingdom, either by possession of taxed estates, stock, etc., by the
exercise of a dutiable trade, or by tenure of a public office.’ The
Austrian Imperial Electoral Law of April 2. 1873, §9, regards mem-
bership in commune as independence.
158. Instrum. Pac. Osn. v. §35: ‘Sive autem Catholici sive Augustanae
confessionis fuerint subditi, nullibi ob religionem despicatui habeantur,
nec a mercatorum. opificum aut tabuum communione, hacreditatibus,
legatis hospitalibus, leprosoriis, eleemosynis aliisve juribus aut
commerciis, multo minus publicis coemeteriis, honoreve sepulturae
arceantur—sed in his et similibus pari cum concivibus jure habeantur,
aequali justitia protectioneque tuti.’
159. Act of the German Confederation, Art. 16: ‘No difference in civil
or political rights in the countries of the German Confederation is to
follow from difference of Christian creed.’ Cf. Klöber, Acten des
Wiener Congr. ii p. 439.
160. Cf. Story, Comment. on the Constitution of U. S. A., book iii. ch.
44.
161. The new principle appears in the first article of the declaration of
the rights of man in 1789: ‘Les hommes naissent et demeurent libres
et égaux en droits. Les distinctions sociales ne peuvent être fondées
que sur l’utilité commune.’ None of the later constitutions has made
citizenship depend on creed.
162. In Norway non-Lutherans are now only excluded from the higher
offices of the State. Law of July 21, 1851, on the admission of Jews;
Law of June 15, 1878, with regard to alteration of Art. 92 of the
constitution; and law of June 14, 1880.
163. [For Aristotle’s view as to the best situation of a city, written of
course only with reference to Hellenic countries and to very small
city-states, see Pol. vii. II]
164. [Arist. Pol. vii. 5, 6.]448/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
165. [Cf. Wordsworth’s Sonnet, Thought of a Briton on the Subjuga-
tion of Switzerland:—
‘Two Voices are there, one is of the sea
One of the mountains, each a mighty voice;
In both from age to age thou didst rejoice,
They were thy chosen music, Liberty!’]
166. The ancients recognized this distinction, Hugo Grotius, De jure
belli ac pacis, ii. 3. §4, quotes Seneca, De benif. Vii. 4, ‘Ad reges
potestas omnium pertinet, ad singulos proprietas,’ and Dio Chrysost.
Orat. xxxi, ¹ cèra tÁj pÒlewj, ¢ll oÙdn Ãtton tîn kekthmnwn
kastoj kÚriÚs sti tîn autoà.
167. Instances in antiquity only occur in cases where the prince had
absolute power over land and people. Cf. Hugo Grot. i. 3. 12.
168. French Const. of 1791, ii. §11: ‘Le royaume est an et indivisible.’
For German States see Zachariä, Deutsches Stats- und Bundesr. i.
§83.
169. Prussian Const. of 1850, Art. I: The limits of this country can only
be altered by a law.’
170. Hugo Grot. ii 6. §4 ff Cf. Final Act of Vienna of 1820, Art. 6:
‘Voluntary resignation of sovereign lights over the territory of a con-
federation, except in the interest of a member of the confederation
must have the consent of all members of the confederate State.’ For
fuller treatment of the question see Bluntschli, Modernes Volkerrecht,
§286.
171. Schmitthenner, Statsrecht, p. 409: ‘Private property of a foreign
State or sovereign, in the territory of a State, does not limit the au-
thority of that State.’
172. Cf. Vivien, Étud. ordin ii. 6.
173. Vivien, op. cit. ii. 3. The cantons in France do not form corpora-
tions, but only official districts for judicial and electoral purposes.
174. [See Émile de Laveleye, Primitive Property.]
175. Proudhon, ‘La propriété c’est le vol.’
176. Cf. Thiers, De la propriété, ii, who is excellent as a critic of com-
munistic and socialistic systems, but not successful in his philosophi-
cal derivation of the idea of property.
177. Fröbel, Sociale Politik, ii. pp. 392 and 400.
178. This principle finds expression in many constitutions. The re-issue
of Magna Charta by Henry III, 1225, contains several clauses to this
effect. The French republican constitution of 1848, Art. 11, and theThe Theory of the State/449
Charter of 1844 (Art. 8) contains the clause ‘Toutes les propriétés
vent inviolables.’ Prussian Const. of 1850. Art. 9, ‘Property is invio-
lable.’
179. Marcianus in Dig. I. Tit 8, de div. Rer.: ‘Flumina paene omnia et
portus publica sunt.’ Ulpianus in Dig. xliii. Tit. 12: ‘Publicum flumen
esse Cassius deficit, quod perenne sit.’ The conception of a public
river is narrower according to Code Civ. art. 538: ‘Les chemins, routes
et rues à la charge de l’État les fleuves et rivières navigables ou
flottables, les rivages, lais et relais de la mer, les ports, les havres, les
rades, et généralement toutes les portions du territoire français qui ne
vent pas susceptibles d’une propriété privée, vent considerés comme
des dépendances du domains public.’ See also Sachsenspiegel, ii.
28. §4. Prussian Law, ii. 15 §§ 38, 41. Austrian Code, §407.
180. Cf. Pierantoni, Diritto Costitutionale, Napoli, 1873, i. p. 306 ff.
La proprietà dello Stato.
181. Justinian, Inst. ii. 1, 12: ‘Quod enim ante nullius est. id naturali
ratione occupanti conceditur.’ Cf. Gaius, ii. §66. Klöber, Oeffentl.
Recht des deutschen Bundes, §337, has put forward the theory that
adespota cannot be occupied by foreigners within the State. But why
should not a foreigner who catches a bird that flies into his room have
as much right to it as a native?
182. Prussian Law, ii. 16, §1 ff.
183. Blackstone, i. 8, quotes Bracton: ‘Haec quae nullius in bonis sunt
et olim fuerunt inventoris de iure naturali, iam efficiuntur principis
de iure gentium.’
184. Blackstone, ii. 16, 26.
185. Code Civ. Art. 713. Cf. Arts. 539, 723, 768.
186. Austrian Code, §381 ff.
187. Cf. Blackstone i. I, and many recent laws on canals and railways.
For examples see Neuester Expropriationscodex, Nürnberg, 1837,
and especially Gruntrab, Enteignungsrecht, p. 66, foll.
188. Bavarian Law of 1756, iv 3. §2.
Prussian Law, i. II. §§ 4–11. Introd. §§ 73–75. Code Civil Art.
545: ‘Nul ne pent être contraint de céder sa propriété, si ce n’est pour
cause d’utilité publique, et moyennant ur e juste et prealable
indemnité.’
Austrian Code, §365: ‘If the general good demands it, a mem-
ber of the State must give up his property in return for due compen-
sation.’450/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
French Constitution of 1848, Art. II, and to the same effect the
Charter of 1814, Art. 9, and the Code. Belgian Const. of 1831, Art.
II. Austrian Law of 1 Dec. 1867, Art. 5.
Pruss. Const. of 1850, Art. 9: ‘Property is inviolable: it cannot
be taken away or limited except on grounds of public welfare after
previous payment, or at any rate arrangement of compensation ac-
cording to law.’
189. Bavarian Law of 1837. Cf. Treichler, über die Zwangsaltretung in
the Zeitschift für deuches Recht, Beseler, Reyscher und Wilda, Bd.
xii, H. 1. For more recent works see Grüntrab, Enteignungsrecht,
1874, and for a full list of references see Meier und von Holzendorff’s
Rechtslexikon, i. 764 ff; French Law of 1841, Art. 51: Zürich Law of
1838, §7. In calculating the indirect damage to the property left in the
hands of the owner, any advantage which he gains ought to be fairly
set against it; e.g., a road is carried through a garden, the side of the
garden which is left loses value as a garden, but gains more as build-
ing land. It would be unjust for the State to compensate the first loss.
190. Bavarian Law, v. 1837, 6.
191. De Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Transl. by Reeve), Part i.
ch. 2: ‘All nations bear some marks of their origin: and the circum-
stances, which accompanied their birth and contributed to their rise,
affect the whole term of their being.’
192. Bodin, de Rep. iv. c. 1, calls the latter ‘conversiones’: ‘Conversionem
civitatis appello, cum status ipsius convertitur ac omnino mutatur id
autem fit, cum imperium populare ad unum, aut paucorum potestas
ad omnes cives defertur, contraque.’ [Contrast the views of Aristotle
who makes the identity of a State depend upon identity of constitu-
tion. Pol. iii. c. 3.]
193. Leo, Weltgeschichte, i. 393, says that ‘contract’ is the characteris-
tic element in the foundation of Rome, and in fact the ancient form of
Roman legislation recalls the customary form of obligatory contract,
the stipulatio. Nevertheless, Roman law in its essence is no contract,
between two independent persons, but a single act of the Roman people
as a unit.
194. The Athenians called this bringing together of the various cantons
into one state xunoika. Cp. the learned treatise of W. Vischer, Ueber
die Bildung von Staaten und Bünden im alten Griechenland, Basel,
1849. [t¦ xunokia is the name of the festival in memory of Theseus’
smiting all the towns of Attica under the single government of theThe Theory of the State/451
capital, Thuc. ii. 15. The union itself is called xunokisij, Thuc. iii.
3. In Attica separate pÒleij were formed into one pÒlis. This was a
more advanced form of union than the formation of a city, such as
Megalopolis out of villages. [Cp. Freeman, Federal Government. p.
28; Comparative Politics, p. 382.]
195. Cp. Maurer, Beiträge zur Rechisgesch. des germ. Norden, 1852,
Heft i.
196. R. v. Mohl works out this example in more detail, and uses it as a
confirmation of the theory of Social Contract (Zeitschrift v.
Mittermaier für ausländ. Rechtswiss. xxvii. 5, 394).
197. Q Curtius Rufus, Vita Alexandri, iv. 5. Cp. Grotius, De jure belli
ac pacis iii. c. 8. §1, where the saying of the German king Ariovistus
to Caesar is quoted: ‘Jus esse belli, ut qui vicissent, iis quos vicissent,
quemadmodum vellent, imperarent.’ (Caesar, De Bello Gallico, i.
36.)
198. Bluntschli, Studien, p. 202: ‘War is the rude form of maintaining
International Law which has hitherto prevailed. But there is a go
owing consciousness that it is only the prelude to a procedure more
just and more worthy of humanity.’
199.  [‘Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht;’ said first by Schiller in
a poem called Resignation. Cp. Hegel, Phil. d. Rechts, §340.]
200. Bluntschli, Mod. Völkerr. §701: ‘Conquest does not establish a
new and peaceful legal condition until after submission or a treaty of
peace.’
201. [Cp. Freeman, Federal Government, i. C. ii. pp. 9–15; Compara-
tive Politics, p. 387.]
202. Cp. on this point the ‘Federalist’ by Hamilton and Madison; Story’s
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States; Bluntschli,
Geschichte d. Schweiz. Bundesrecht, i. p. 352; Waitz, Politik, 1862.
203. Pözl (Deutsches Statswörterbuch, Art. Union) makes a different
distinction between Personal and Real Union. The former, according
to him, is the accidental the latter is the constitutional
(grundgesetzliche) coincidence of sovereignty over two or more states
in one person. The connexion between Sweden and Norway would
thus be a Real Union.
204. The American Declaration of Independence treats the principle
more lightly, and acknowledges the then prevailing theory of natural
rights:—
‘We hold these truths to be self-evident,—that all men are cre-452/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
ated equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain un-
alienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness; that to secure these rights, governments are instituted
among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the gov-
erned; that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of
these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it and to
institute a new government, laying its foundation on such principles,
and organising its powers in such form as to them shall seem most
likely to effect their safety and happiness. Prudence indeed will dic-
tate that governments long established should not be changed for light
and transient causes; and accordingly all experience bath shown that
mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than
to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accus-
tomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing
invariably the same object, evince a design to reduce them under
absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such
government and to provide flew guards for their future security.’
[Cp the ideas and phraseology of this Declaration with Locke’s
Treatise of Civil Government, ii. §§222, 225. ]
205. Cp. Hermann, Griechische Staatsalterthümer, Part iv. The
Phoenician colonisation was not at first the foundation of new States,
but usually came to be so.
206. Cp. Laurent, Histoire du droit des gens, ii, p. 310.
207. [Cp. Marquardt, Röm. Statsverwaltung, vol. i, p. 35 foll.]
208. Shakespeare depicts this ‘state of nature’ with brilliant irony in the
Tempest., Act ii. Scene I, line 140 ff.
209. [According to Hobbes, Leviathan, Part i. chs. xiii, xiv, the natural
condition of man, i.e., his condition ‘out of civil states,’ is ‘a condi-
tion of war of every one against every one.’ Cp. Spinoza, Tract. Pol.
c. ii. § 14: ‘Homines ex nature hostel.’ c. v. §2: ‘Homines civiles non
nascuntur sed fiunt.’ But these expressions of Hobbes and Spinoza
are to be understood rather as a logical statement of what would as
the condition of man apart from civil society, than as distinctly im-
plying a historical theory. They err from ignoring history rather than
from asserting false history. The word ‘natural’ is used merely in the
negative sense of ‘ non-civil ‘ or ‘non-political,’ and thus is the very
reverse of Aristotle’s fÚsij, which, as he tells us, is to be found in the
end (tlos) or completest development of anything. Pol. i. 2, §8,
1252 b. 32. In §16, 1553 a. 31 he says almost the same thing asThe Theory of the State/453
Spinoza, op. cit. c. ii. §14]
210. Rousseau (Disc. sur l’inégalité des conditions parmi les hommes):
‘L’homme, dans l’état de nature, répugne a la société.’ Mirabeau
answered him excellently: ‘Non seulement l’homme sensible fait pour
la société, mais on peut dire qu’il n’est vraiment homme, c’est-à-dire
un être réfléchissant et capable de vertu, que lorsqu’elle commence à
s’organiser. Les hommes n’ont rien voulu ni dû sacrifier en se
réunissant en société its ont voulu et dû étendre leurs jouissances et
l’usage de la liberté, par les secours et la garantie réciproques.’ (Essai
sur le despotisme.)
211. Plato (Rep. ii. 369) makes the State come into being, because the
individual man is not self-sufficing (aÙtark»j).
212. It is only in this sense that Niebuhr (Gesch. d. Zeit der Revol. i.
214) calls the State ‘an institution ordained by God, and belonging to
the essential nature of mankind, like marriage and the paternal rela-
tion. But it is an institution which cannot become perfect in this world.
The State, as it actually exists, is only a shadow of the divine idea of
the State.’
213. Haller (Restaur. i. p. 427) cites a fine passage of Plutarch, in which
he says: ‘A city might more easily be founded without territory, than
a State without belief in God.’ Cp. Washington’s Inaugural Speech
to Congress in 1789: ‘It would be peculiarly improper to omit, in this
first official acts my fervent supplication to that Almighty Being,
who rules over the universe, who presides in the councils of nations
and whose providential aids can supply every human defect, that His
benediction may consecrate to the liberties and happiness of the people
of the United States a government instituted by themselves for these
essential purposes, and may enable every instrument employed in its
administration to execute with success the functions allotted to his
charge. in tendering this homage to the great Author of every public
and private good, I assure myself that it expresses your sentiments
not less than my own, nor those of my fellow-citizens at large less
than either. No people can be bound to acknowledge and adore the
invisible hand which conducts the affairs of men more than the people
of the United States. Every step, by which they have advanced to the
character of an independent nation, seems to have been distinguished
by some token of providential agency.’ [The Speeches are given in
Sparks, Life of Washington, vol. ii.]
214. This is also the meaning of the Constitutio Ludovici Bavarici of454/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
the year 1338: ‘Declaramus quod imperialis dignitas et potestas est
immediate a solo Deo (i.e., not indirectly, mediate, through the Pope)—
statim ex sola electione (by the Electors—Kurfürsten) est Rex verus
et imperator Romanorum censendus.’ The Augsburg Confession
(1530) teaches in its 16th Art.: That all authority, government, law
and order in the world have been created and established by God
himself.’
215. Cp. Stahl, Statslehre, ii. §48: ‘According to the theocratic concep-
tion of the middle ages, the chiefs of Christendom are the representa-
tives of God Himself. Rulers (Pope, Emperor, and Kings) have thus
in their own persons the fulness of His authority.’
216. Oeuvres de Louis XIV, ii. p. 317, where the following passage
occurs: ‘Celui qui a donné des rois au monde a voulu qu’ils fûssent
honorés comme ses representants, en se réservant, a lui seul, le droit
de juger leurs actions. Celui qui est né subjet doit obéir sans murmurer:
telle est sa volonté.’
217. Statslehre, ii, §43. On the other side cp. Macaulay in the passage
quoted infra, Bk. vi. ch. xiv. footnote 2.
218. [The non-juring Tories were by no means in such a hurry to recognise
William III. They maintained that the de facto king was not king de
jure. Bluntschli seems to have taken his idea of the scrupulous reli-
gious Tory from the ‘Vicar of Bray.’]
219. Lamartine, Révolut. de 1848, i p. 47, says of himself: ‘Il tentait
Dieu et le peuple. Lamartine se reprocha depuis sévèrement cette
faute. C’est un tort grave de renvoyer à Dieu ce que Dieu a laissé à
l’homme d’État, la responsabilité; it y avait la un défi à la Provi-
dence.’
220. ‘Le plus fort n’est jamais assez fort pour être toujours le maître,
s’il ne transforme sa force en droit, et l’obeissance en devoir.’
Rousseau, Contr. Soc. i. ch. 3; quoted by Schmitthenner, Stats-
wissenschaft, i. p. 13.
221. [It should be noted that the Theory of Contract is applied in differ-
ent ways by Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. According to Hobbes
(Leviathan, ch. 17) men only pass from the ‘state of nature’ to the
social state by surrendering their rights to a sovereign (one, few, or
many). Locke (Treatises on Government Book ii. ch. ii. §6) supposes
rights, e.g., of liberty and property, to exist in the state of nature: by
the ‘original compact’ (Locke uses the term ‘compact,’ not ‘con-
tract’) a form of government is instituted to secure these rights (c.The Theory of the State/455
viii). According to Rousseau men pass from the state of nature to the
social state by the social contract (as on Hobbes’s theory), but the
sovereign to whom each surrenders his rights is ‘the people,’ so that
each is sovereign as well as subject (Contr. Soc. i. c. 6). This sover-
eignty is inalienable (ii. c. 1): a government is not instituted by a
contract (iii. c. 16); the government is only the minister of the Gen-
eral Will. Thus, according to Hobbes, a revolution against the de
facto government, which he identifies with the sovereign implies a
return to the state of nature, anarchy, and is quite unjustifiable. Ac-
cording to Locke, a revolution might be justifiable, where the gov-
ernment had ceased to fulfil the trust reposed in it, i.e., to protect
personal rights. According to Rousseau, a revolution would be only
a change of ministry. Contrary to what is very commonly supposed,
Locke does not speak of any contract between government and people.
His theory is almost identical with that of Rousseau Cp. T. H. Green,
Works, ii. pp. 366–396.]
222. Rousseau (i. c. 5) feigns an original unanimity which creates the
subsequent law of majorities: La loi de la pluralité des suffrages est
elle-même un établissement de convention et suppose, au moins une
fois l’unanimité.’
223. Arist. Pol. ii. 2, §3, 1261 a. 24: oÙ g¦r gnetai pÒlij x Ñmown
teron g¦r summaca (an alliance) ka pÒlij.
224. [Compare Aristotole’s phrase: fÚsei ¹ orm¾ n p©sin p t¾n
toiaÚthn koinwnan, Pol. i, 2, §15, 1253a. 30.]
225. Cp supra, p, 29, Cp. also Cic. de Rep. i. 25: ‘Ejus (populi) prima
causa coeundi est non tam imbecillitas, quam naturalis quaedam
hominum quasi congregatio.’
226. [See Essay on Machiavelli, in Essays Popular Edition), p. 47]
227. Politics, iii. 6. 1279a, 19.
228. Rechtsphilosophie, ii. 2.
229. [Humboldt’s Sphere and Duties of Government supplies the motto
to Mill’s Liberty. For Mill’s views cp., also his Pol. Econ. Book V. In
practice however Mill allows the State very extensive functions. Much
more extreme is the view of H. Spencer. The Man v. the State.]
230. [It is as old as the Greek sophists. Cp. Arist. Pol. iii. 9, §8, 1280h.
10, where Lycophron the Sophist is said to have held that ‘Law (Ð
nÒmoj) is only concerned faith the securing of mutual rights and is
not able to make the citizen good and just (ggunt¾j ¢ll»loij tîn
dikawn, ¢ll oÙc ooj poien ¢gaqoÝj toÝj poltaj)’ See Oncken456/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
Staatslehre des Aristoteles, i. p. 217. Locke, Treatise on Govern-
ment Book II. ch. ix, holds that the end of political society and gov-
ernment or, as he expresses it, the reason why men enter into society,
is that every one may the better preserve himself, his liberty, and
property.]
231. [See above, Book I. ch. vii.]
232. Aristot. Pol iii 6. §§1, 2, 1278b, 6.
233. Ib iii. 6. §11, 1279a, 17.
234. Pol. iii, 7, §§1–3, 1279a, 22 seq. [Cp. Eth. Nic viii.c. 10]
235. Aristot. Pol. iii. 7. §§5–8. §3, 1279 b, 4–26. Cicero. de Republ. i.
26, expresses the idea of Aristotle as follows: ‘Quum penes unum est
omnium summa rerum, regem illum unum vocamus, et regnum ejus
reipublicae statum. Quum autem est penes delectos, tum illa civitas
optimatium arbitrio regi dicitur. Illa autem est civitas popularis, in
qua in populo sunt omnia.’ The three perversions arise when ‘ex rege
dominus (fit), ex optimatibus factio, ex populo turba et confusio; i.
45.
236. [The term Ñclokrata is first used for the lowest form of democ-
racy by Polybius, vi. 4.]
237. Aristot. Pol. iii. 8. §6, 1279 b, 34 seq. [cp. iv. c. 4.] Misled by
several modern accounts of the matter, I had previously overlooked
this, and had thus unfairly criticised the great political philosopher.
Sparta was a monarchy, although two kings ruled together. [Not ac-
cording to Aristotle. He calls it an ‘aristocracy,’ in the lower sense of
the term, according to which it applies to a form of mixed govern-
ment; Pol. iv. I. §4, 1293b, 16; v 7. §10, 1307a, 35. The Spartan
kingship he considers only ‘ a hereditary generalship for life’—an
office compatible with any form of government; iii. I; § 2, 1286a, 2].
Venice was an aristocracy, although there was a doge at the head of
the State.
238. [Aristotle himself recognised mixed constitutions: e.g., Pol. iv. c.
7.]
239. Cicero, de Republ. i. 29: ‘Quartum quoddam genus reipublicae
maxime probandum esse censeo, quod est ex his, quae prima dixi
moderatum et permixtum tribus:’ and i. 45; ‘Placet enim esse quiddam
in republica praestans et regale, esse aliud auctroritati principum
partitum ac tributum, esse quasdam res servatas judicio voluntatique
multitudinis.’ [Polybius (vi. II) had previously described the Roman
constitution as mixed. Plato (Laws, i. 712) treated Sparta as a mixedThe Theory of the State/457
government. but without using the phrase. On the whole question,
see Cornewall Lewis, Use and Abuse of Political Terms, pp. 72-90.]
240. Tacitus, Ann. iv. 33: ‘Cunctas nationes et urbes populus aut primores
aut singuli regunt: delecta ex iis et consociata reipublicae forma laudari
facilius quam evenire, vel si evenit, haud diuturna esse potest.’
241. [It is not the same question, whether a government is mixed, and
whether it has arisen from a mixture. Cp. Aristotle’s remarks about
the Solonian constitution at Athens; Pol. ii. 12. §§2, 3, 1273b, 35.
seq.]
242. Throughout the book Bluntschli has been misled by exaggerating
the power of the monarchy in the English constitution. For a more
correct view, see Bagehot, English Constitution.]
243. Schleiermacher. Ueher die Begriffe der verschiedenen Statsformen,
in the Abhandlungen der Berliner Academie, 1814.
244. [See Plato, Laws, iv. 713.]
245. An extraordinary demonocratic state of the present day is described
by A. H. Layard (Nineveh and its Remains, vol. i, pp. 269, etc.). The
Jezidi, a tribe of the mountains of Mesopotamia, are subject to a
priestly ruler, the great Scheik, and worship Satan, who they believe
will one day be restored to his high estate in the celestial hierarchy.
246. Diodorus Sic. Hist. iii. 5, 6. Cp. Leo, Weltgeschichte, i. p. 79.
247. Diodorus Sic. Hist. i. 71, 72, Cp. Duncker, History of Antiquity
(trans. by Abbott), i. p. 188.
248. Manava—Dharma—Sastra. Laws of Manu (trans. by Sir W. Jones),
v. 96, 97; vii. 3–8.
249. Laws of Manu, vii. 54, etc.
250. Diodorus Sic. i. 73.
251. Laws of Manu, vii. 133.
252. Vuller, Fragmente über die Religion des Zoroaster (Bonn, 1831)
pp. 33, 69. Cp. Spiegel, Avesta (Leipzig, 1802–63), vol. iii; also
Dancker, History of Antiquity, v. p. 132.
253. See Leo, Weilgesch. i. 120 sq; Duncker, vi. 389 seq.
254. Deuteronomy i. 17, and xvii, 8, etc. Cp. Duncker, ii, 201 sq.
255. Numbers xxv; Deuteronomy iv and v. Cp. Duncker, ii, 219.
256. I Samuel viii. 7.
257. [The prince chosen by the seven Electors assumed the title of King
of the Romans: he was not formally Emperor until his coronation by
the Pope, which was often delayed for some time. Charles V was the
last Emperor who received this papal coronation: his successors as-458/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
sumed the imperial title on election. The Holy Roman Empire ended
with the abdication of Francis II in 1806.]
258. For other states with a theocratic tendency, see Bluntschli, article
Ideokratie in the Deutsches Statswörterbuch, v; also v. Mohl,
Encyclopädie der Statswissenschaft, §41.
259. Even the constitution of Montenegro, which a few years ago pos-
sessed a priestly-military chief in the Vladika, has approximated to
the other states of Europe by separating the priestly dignity from the
sovereignty.
260. See Duncker’s remarks in the History of Antiquity, iv. 398.
261. On the idea and the history of the Empire, see the article on
Kaiserthum in the Deutsches Statswörterbuch.
262. Hence the expressions of Homer, k d DiÕj basilÁej, diogenej,
diotrefej, Iliad, ii. 204–6:—
OÙk ¢gaqÕn polukoiranh ej koranos stw,
Es basileÚj, ú dwke KrÒnou paj ¢gkulom»tew
SuÁptrÒn t/ ºd qmistaj, na sfsi basileÚh.
Cp. Hermann, Griech. Statsalterth. §56; also Sophocles, Philoct. 138–
140:—
tcna g¦r tcnaj traj proÜcei
ka gnèma par/ Ótw tÕ qeon
DiÕj skÁptron ¢n£ssetai.
Cp. the praise of kingship in the Indian epic, Rama, in Holtzmann,
Indische Sagen, ii. p. 316:—
‘As for the body the eye always
To all sides carefully looks
So for the realm the prince of men
Root of virtue and law.
Wrapped in blind darkness
Waste and confused is the world
Unless the king keeps order
And shows what is just and unjust.’
According to Jornandes, c. 14, the Amals spring from the race of the
Asa. Hengist and Horsa are believed to be descended from Woden.
On the gradual development and extension of monarchy among the
German tribes, even among those which originally had no kings, see
Dahn, Die Könige der Germanen (München, 1861–71), and Gierke
Deutsches Genossenschaftsrecht, i p. 48, etc.
263. Aristot. Pol. iii. 14. §12, 1285b. 10. In the Scandinavian countriesThe Theory of the State/459
this characteristic of the kings is more prominent than in the known
history of any German state. Comp. Grimm, Deutsche Rechtsalt. p.
243. King Hakon of Norway, though inclined to Christianity, was
compelled by the still heathen peasants to sacrifice in ancient fashion
at the Thing, to drink from the sacred goblet, and to eat horseflesh.
Konrad Maurer, Die Bekehrung des norwegischen Stammes zum
Christenthum, i, p. 160ff.
264. Tacitus, Germ. c. 14: ‘Materia munificentiae per bella et raptus’ c.
26: ‘Agros inter se secundum dignationem partiuntur.’ In spite of
incessant alienations, the kings and princes of Germany retained ex-
tensive territories throughout the middle ages.
265. Homer, Od. iv. 45–46:—
Wj te g¦r ºelou aglh plen º sel»nhj
Aîma kaq/ Øyerefj Menel£ou kudalmoio
Comp. vi. 301, and the ‘Hallen’ of the German princes.
266. Homer, Il. ii. 100–8. Cp. Grimm, Rechtsalt. p. 241.
267. Grimm, Rechtsalt. p. 239; Thierry, Récits des Temps Merovingiens
ii. 82; Rama, l. 782 (in Holtzmann, Indische Sagen, vol. ii).
268. Comp. the history of Oedipus. Among the Indians we find a simi-
lar combination of hereditary right (by primogeniture) with election
by the princes: v. Holtzmann, Indische Sagen, ii. 184.
269. Tacitus, Germania, c. 7: ‘reges ex nobilitate sumunt.’ The German
name for king, Chuning or Kun-ing, comes from chun or chuni, fam-
ily. Childebert II became king of Austrasia at the age of five (Thierry,
Temps Méroving. ii. 43). Instances of departure from hereditary suc-
cession are more common in the history of the Visigoths and Lombards.
F. Hahn (Die Könige der Germanen, i. 32) lays more stress upon
hereditary right, Thudichum (Her altdeutsche Stat, p. 60) upon elec-
tion, but both recognise the combination of the two principles. A
similar combination is to be found among the Indians; v. Holtzmann,
Indische Sagen ii. 184 (Rama l. 22).
270. The boul» or grontej of the Greek kings corresponds to the
concilium principum which Tacitus describes among the Germans
(Germ. cc., 11, 12).
271. Tac. Germ. c. 11: ‘auctoritas sundendi potius quam jubendi.’
272. It Hence Homer calls the kings dikaspÒloi (Il., i. 238) and
qenistopÒlai. The Indians name for king, râg, comes from rag (right,
richten), as rex from regere. Comp. Lessen, Ind. Alterth. i. 808; also
Holtzmann, Ind. Sagen, ii. 184 (Rama, 1. 23):—460/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
‘The burden of justice
which the King’s majesty bears.’
273. Arist. Pol. iii. 14 §12, 1285 b. 9: kÚrioi d/ Ãsan tÁj te kat¦
pÒlemon ¹gemonaj. In many of the German tribes a successful
heretoga founded a royal dynasty.
274. Cp. Caesar, de B. G. vi. 23.
275. Dionys. Hal. v. 74, Arist. Pol. iii. 14. §§12 and 14. Cp. Sophocl.
Oed. Rex, l. 850 sq; Antig l. 451, and Oed. Col. l. 1372 sq.
276. Tac. Germ. c. 7, ‘nec regibus infinita aut libera potestas;’ and c.
11, ‘penes plebem arbitrium.’
277. In the same way inheritance among the Romans was bared not so
much upon family relationship as upon the individual will of the tes-
tator, who was free to name his own heir.
278. This is the so-called lex regia, which was renewed under the Em-
pire. Ulpian, L. 1. pr. de constit. Princip.; Cicero, de lege agrar. ii.
11. Cp. Mommsen, Römisches Statsrecht, i. 588.
279. Cp. Niebuhr, Röm. Gesch. i. 356; Rubino, Untersuch. über röm.
Verf. i. Abschn. 2; Mommsen, ibid. ii. 9.
280. Cic. pro Flacco, c. 8: ‘Opifices et tabemarios atque illam omnem
faecem civitatllm, quid eat negotii concitare in eum praesertim qui
pauper summo cum imperia fuerit, summo autem amore esse propter
corner ipsum imperil non potuerit. Mirandum Vera est homines eos,
quibus odio sunt nortrae secures’ etc. Cp. ibid. c. 34, ‘non imperium
non secures;’ also Livy. xxiv. 9.
281. Tac. Ann. iii. 26: ‘Praecipuus Servius Tullius sanctor legum fuit
quis etiam reges obtemperarent.’ Pomp., L. §1. de Orig. Jur., says
that Romulus ‘leges curiatas ad populum tulit.’ Cp. Livy, i. 8; Dion.
Hal. iv. 36.
282. Rubino (Untersuch. p. 18) has thrown great light on many points
of the public law of ancient Rome, but he has gone too far in attribut-
ing the legislative power exclusively to the king. It is true that the
terms constituere, instituere, dare jus, are used instead of the more
modest expression, rogare legem, but the former do not imply that
the senate and people had no right in the matter.
283. Cic. de Rep., ‘omnia conficiebantur judiciis regiis;’ ibid. ii. 31.
Zonaras, Annal. vii. 13.
284. Livy, ii. 59; viii. 7; ix. 16. Brisson, De Formul., p. 453, etc.
285. Rubino, Untersuch. pp. 114 and 298.
286. Ibid. p. 136.The Theory of the State/461
287.  [Mommsen (Röm. Statsr. II. Abth. ii.) rightly describes the
Principate, as instituted by Augustus, rather as a restoration than an
abolition of the Republican constitution. Comp. Mon. Ancyr. 6. 12:
‘in consulatu sexto et septimo... rem publicam ex mea potestate in
senatus populique Romani arbitrium transtuli.’ Nominally the posi-
tion of the Princeps was that of a magistrate raised above the rest by
his superior digital, though in fact the possession of the proconsulare
imperium made him supreme. But this itself was only an extension of
republicans precedent, and did not put the Princeps above the laws.]
288. [Augustus held the census in virtue of the consulare imperium.
But the censorship still existed as a separate office, and was held by
later emperors, e.g., Claudius, Vitellius, Vespasian, and Titus. It was
abolished by Domitian, and its duties were merged in the indefinite
powers of the emperor. See Mommsen, Röm. Statsr. ii. 3. §6.]
289. Tac. Ann. i. 12. In i. 1, he says of Augustus: ‘cuncta discordiis
civilibus fessa nomine principis sub imperium accepit.’ Comp. the
conferences of Maecenas and Agrippa with Augustus in Dio Cass.
52.
290. According to Mommsen Röm. Statsr. ii. 733), the name of Prin-
cess has no reference to the Princeps Senates, but is used in the sense
of Princeps omnium or civium [See also art. on Princeps by Prof. H
F. Pelham in Journal of Philology, viii. 323.]
291. Ulpianus, L. 1. pr. de constit princip.: ‘Quad principi placuit, legis
hahet vigorem, utpote, cum lege regia, quae de imperio ejus lata est,
populus ei et in eum omne suum imperium et potestatem conferat
Gaius i. 5. §6. de jure nat. [The proconsulate imperium was not
conferred by a lex populi. The Princeps was recognized as Imperator
by the salutation of the senate or of the army. On the other hand, he
received the tribunicia potestas by a law of the consortia (the comitia
tribuniciae potestatis) following me a decree of the senate. See
Mommsen Röm Statsr. ii. pp. 812–3, 838–9.]
292. Maecenas urged Augustus strongly to form a standing army
(stratiètaj ¢qan£touj), and to leave the mass of the people to
their peaceful occupations. Dio Cass. 52.
293. Lex de Imp. Vespasiani, in Bruns, Fontes Juris Romani; p. 118:
‘foedusve cum quibus volet facere liceat.’
294. Ibid: ‘utique ei senatum habere, relationem facere, remittere senatus
consulta per relationem discessionemque facere liceat ... utique cum
ex voluntate auctoritateve jussu mandatove ejus praesenteve eo senatus462/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
habebitur omnium rerum jus perinde haheatur servetur ac si e lege
senatus edictus esset habereturque’ [See also Mommsen, Röm. Statsr.
ii. 860 ff.]
295. Lex de Imp. Vesp.: ‘utique quos magistratum potestatem imperia
curationemve cujus rei petentes senatui populoque Romano
commendaverit quibusque suffragationem suam dederit promiserit
eorum comitis quibusque extra ordinem ratio habeatur.’
296. Ibid.: ‘utique quaecumque ex usu reipublicae majestate divinarum
humanarum publicarum privatarumque rerum esse censebit ei agere
facere jus potestasque sit.’
297. Savigny, System des röm. Rechts, i. p. 121 ff.
298. Lex de Imps. Vesp.: ‘Si quis hujusce legis ergo adversus leges
rogationes plebisve scita senatusve consulta fecit fecerit sive quod
cum ex lege... facere oportebit non fecerit hujusve legis ergo id ei ne
fraudi esto nevc quid ob eam rem populo debere debeto neve cui de
ea re actio neve judicatio esto neve de ea re apud... anti sinito.’
299. The name of dominus, which suggested servi by contrast, was
rejected as an insult to the people by the early emperors. Sueton.
Octav. 53: ‘domini appellationem ut maledictum et opprobrium sem-
per exhorruit.’ Ib. Tib. 27; Tac. Ann. iv. 37, 38. The gross flattery of
later times introduced the term as a regular title.
300. Compare the following words of Tiberius, which may have been
honestly meant at the time, with his actions. Sueton. Tib. 29: ‘dixi
nunc et saepe alias, Patres Conscripti, bonum et salutarem principem,
quem vos tanta et tam libera potestate exstruxistis senatui servire
debere et universis civibus saepe et plerumque etiam singulis: neque
id dixisse me poenitet.’
301. The occurrences at the time of Claudius’ accession show that the
lower classes of Rome had no great love for the republican constitu-
tion.
302. For the stages of the transition in the case of the other German
tribes which settled upon Roman soil, see Felix Dahn, Die Könige
der Germanen.
303. Charles the Great made a slight effort to remedy these evils in his
Capitulary on the division of the Empire in 806, c. 6: ‘placuit inter
praedictos filios nostros statuere atque praecipere, propter pacem
quam inter eos perpetuo permanere desideramus, ut nullus eorum
fratris sui terminos vel regni limites invadere praesumat, neque
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minuendas; sed adjuvet unusquisque illorum fratrem suum, et auxilium
illi ferat contra inimicos ejus juxta rationem et possibilitatem, sive
inter patriam, sive contra exteras nationes’ (in Pertz, Monumenta
Germaniae Historica, Legum tom. i. p. 141). C. 5 of the same law
mentions election by the people. Comp. Eichhorn, Deutsche Stats-
und Rechtsgesch. i. §§139 and 159; Guizot, Essais sur l’Histoire de
France, pp. 206ff. See especially Waitz, Deutsche Verfassungsgesch.
iii. 274ff.
304. Thus the succession to the throne was treated on the same prin-
ciples as the terra salica. Comp. Zöpfl; z. ii. §33; Waitz, iii. 274.
305. ‘Hincmar, de Ordinate Palatii Epistola [in Migne, Patrologia, tom.
cxxv. cols. 993–1008, also published separately with a French trans-
lation by M. Prou in the Bibliothèque de l’Ecole des Hautes Études,
fascic. 58], c. 29: ‘in quo placito (the Campus Maii) generalitas univer-
sorum majorum tam clericorum quam laicorum conveniebat: seniores,
propter consilium ordinandum; minores, propter idem consilium
suscipiendum et interdum pariter tractandum, et non ex potestate sed
ex proprio mentis intellectu vel sententia confirmandum.’ Ibid. c. 30
‘aliud placitum cum senioribus tantum et praecipuis consiliariis
habebatur (usually in autumn but oftener if needed), in quo jam futuri
anni status tractari incipiebatur.’ (See also Waltz, Deutische
Verfassungsgesch. (ed. 1860), iii. 478, etc.] Hence many of the Ca-
pitularies contain such expressions as ‘cum consilio servorum Dei et
optimatum meorum.’ (Cap. Kariomanni, a. 742, Pertz, i. 16), and
‘cum consensu episcoporum comitum et optimatum Francorum’ (Cap.
Pippini, a. 744, Pertz, i. 20). The treaty of 851 between the sons of
Lewis the Pious says expressly in C. 6 (Pertz, i. 408): ‘Et illorum,
scilicet veraciter nobis fidelium, communi consilio, secundum Dei
voluntatem et commune salvamentum, ad restitutionem sanctae Dei
ecclesiae et statum regni, et ad honorem regium atque pacem populi
commissi nobis pertinenti, adseusum praebebimus; in hoc, ut illi non
solum non sint nobis contradicentes et resistentes ad ista exsequenda,
verum etiam sic sint nobis fideles et obedientes ac veri adjutores atque
cooperatores, vero consilio et sincero auxilio, ad ista peragenda quae
praemisimus, sicut per rectum unusquisque in suo ordine et statu suo
principi et suo seniori esse debet.’
306. Capit. Car. Magni, a. 803, (Pertz, Legum, i. 115), c. 19: ‘Ut populus
interrogetur de capitulis quae in lege noviter addita sunt. Et postquam
omnes consenserint, subscriptiones et manufirmationes suas in ipsis464/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
capitulis faciant.’
307. Du Cange, Glossarium, s. v. mundiburdis et mundiburdium; Capit.
Car. Magni, a. 802, C. 40 (Pertz, i. 96). Hincmar, de Ord. Pal. c. 6:
‘Et rex “in semetipso nom nis sui dignitatem custodire debet. Nomen
enim regis intellectualiter hoc retinet ut subjectis omnibus rectoris
officium procuret.”’
308. Zöpfl, ii. §36. Capit. Car. Magni, a. 811, c. 1 (Pertz. i. 172):
‘Quicumque liber homo in hostem bannitus fuerit, et venire
contempserit, plenum heribannum, id est solidos sexaginta, persolvat.’
309. Comp. Zöpfl, §40; Waitz, ii. 498ff.
310. See Hincmar, de Ord. Pal. cc. 16–24: Waitz, iii. 499 ff.
311. Capit. Car. Magni, a. 802 (Pertz, i. 97–99), and a. 810 (Ib. i. 163–
4); Guizot, Essais, pp. 191ff.; Waitz, iv. 411–488.
312. Hincmar, de Ord. Pal. c. 5: ‘principes sacerdotum sacra unctione
reges in regnum sacrabant.’
313. Even before he received the imperial dignity, Charles the Great
bore the title ‘devotus sanctae Dei ecclesiae defensor humilisque
adjutor.’
314. See Hincmar, c. 5. for the reported saying of Pope Gelasius to the
Emperor Anastasius: ‘duo sunt (potestates) quibus principaliter, una
cum specialiter cujusque curae subjectis, mundus hic regitur:
auctoritas sacra pontificum et regalis potestas.’ [See Migne,
Patrologia, lix. col. 41; also Bryce, Holy Roman Empire, chap. vii.]
315. Comp. Eichhorn, i. §158.
316. ‘In Tacitus’ account of the German comitatis, he points to these
moral qualities as the basis of the institution; v. Germ. 13, 14:
‘Magnaque comitum aemulatio, quibus primus apud principem suum
locus; et principum, cui plurimi et acerrimi comites. Haec dignitas,
hae vires, magno semper electorum juvenum globo circumdari in pace
decus, in bello praesidium .... Quum ventum in aciem, turpe principi
virtute vinci, turpe comitatui virtutem principle non adaequare. Jam
vero infame in omnem vitam ac probrosum superstiten principi suo
ex acie recessisse. Illum defendere tueri, sua quoque fortia facta gloriae
ejus assignare praecipuum sacramentum est. Principes pro victoria
pugnant, comites pro principe.’
317. In French legal phrase, foi et homage.
318. The formula of this oath shows the importance attached to per-
sonal fidelity. Bracton (Rolls Series, i. p 632: ‘Devenio homo vester,
de tenemento quod de vobis teneo, et fidem vobis portabo de vita etThe Theory of the State/465
membris et terreno honore contra omnes gentes.’ Comp. Du Cange,
s. v. homagium.
319. Bracton, i. 632, gives the formula of the oath of fealty; ‘Hoc audis,
domine, quod fidem vobis portabo de vita et membris, corpore, et
catallis, et terreno honore, sic me Deus adjuvet et haec sancta Dei
evangelia.’ Comp. Du Cange, s. v. fidelitas.
320. Capit. Car. Magni, a. 811, c. 13 (Pertz, i. 175): ‘Ut missi nostri
populum nostrum iterum nobis fidelitatem promittere faciant secun-
dum consuetudinem.’
321. This is expressed in the English maxim, ‘quantum home debet
domino ex homagio, tantum illi debet dominus ex dominio.’ Reeves,
Hist of English Law (ed. by Finlason, 1869), i. 175. Assises de
Jérusalem, Haute Cour, 322 (Kausler, p. 372): ‘L’assise et la lei de
Jerusalem juge et dit que, autant doit li rois de fei à son home lige
cone l’home lige doit à luy, et ains est tenu li rois de guarantir et de
sauver et de desfendre ses homes liges vers toutes gens qui tort leur
vorreent faire, come ses homes liges sont tenus à lui de guarantir le et
de sauver vers toutes gens. Et, por ce, ne peut il mie mettre la main
sur son home lige sans esgart de ces pers.’
322. See above, Bk. ii. chap. II, note.
323. In France the cognate principle, nulle terre sans seigneur, was
accepted as early as the thirteenth century; Loysel,  ii. 2. 1. The feu-
dal system was never so widely extended in Germany or Italy.
324. According to the Sachenspiegel (i. 1). God gave the temporal sword
to the emperor alone; whence it followed that kings only received
their power through the emperor. This theory, however, was not gen-
erally accepted, and the kings, while respecting the superior dignity
of the emperor professed to derive their power immediately from God.
As an old French maxim put it, ‘Le roi ne tient que de Dieu et de
l’épée.’ Loysel, i. 2.
325. Sachsenspegel, iii. 58.
326. Hugo Capet wrote to the Archbishop of Sens: ‘Regali potentia in
nullo abuti volentes omnia negotia reipublicae consultatione et
sententia fidelium nostrorum disponimus.’ Mirabeau, Essai sur le
despotisme; Oeuvres, ii. p. 390. Comp. Luchaire, Histoire des insti-
tutions Monarchiques, i. 243 ff.
327. Guizot, Essais (No. v. Du caractère poiltique du régime féodal),
pp. 303–5.
328. This is proved by numerous local customs and judicial decisions466/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
(Weisthümer). Many of these point to a defiant attitude on the part of
the peasants towards their lords.
329. Thierry, Récits des Temps Meroving. i. 16.
330. Beaumanoir, ii. 57: ‘Ce qui li pleat a fere, doit estre tenu por à loi’;
but he adds as a limitation, ‘pourvu qu’il ne soit pas fet contre Dieu,
ne contre bonnes meurs, car s’il le feroit, ne le devoient pas si souget
soufrir.’ even in 1688, in the reign of Louis XIV, Delaunay stated the
principle in no absolute sense: ‘que la loy est la volonté du Roy et non
pas que la volonté du Roy soit loy.’ But at all times ardent partisans
could be found to exalt the monarchical power abort the limits which
the middle ages had imposed upon the Roman principle.
331. Louis XI forbade the Duke of Brittany to use the expression, ‘par
la grace de dieu,’ which had previously been usual in the case of all
the great lords. Schäffner, Französ. Rechtsgesch. ii. 273. The death
of Charles the Bold of Burgundy in a war with the Swiss, which
Louis had helped to bring about, removed the leader of the feudal
aristocracy and decided the victory of the monarchy in France.
332. Frederick the Great in the Antimachiavel 10: ‘Il n’y a pas jusqu’au
cadet du cadet d’une ligne appanagée, qui ne s’imagine d’être quelque
chose semblable à Louis XIV. Il bâtit son Versailles, il a ses maîtresses
it entretient ses armées. Ils s’abîment pour l’honneur de leur maison
et ils prennent par vanité le chemin de la misère et de l’hôpital.’
333. Hormayr, Lebenstilder, i. 256, Patent of Joseph I (20 Dec. 1705):
‘Alle Bayern seyen der beleidigten Majestät Josephs I als des ihnen
von Gott dem Allmächtigen vorgesetzten alleinigen rechtmässigen
Landesherrn schuldig, und daher ohne weiters mit dem Strange vom
Leben zum Tode zu richten. Nur aus allerhöchster Clemens and
landesväterlicher Mildigkeit (!) werde verordnet, das allezeit 15 zu
15 um’s Leben spielen und jene, auf die das wenigste Loos fällt, im
Angesicht alter aufgehenkt werden solle.’ [‘All Bavarians are guilty
of treason towards Joseph I, the lawful ruler appointed by God to
rule over them, and are therefore condemned to death by the halter.
But out of supreme clemency and paternal gentleness (!) it is or-
dained that lots shall be cast for their life among every thirty men and
that the fifteen upon whom the lot shall fall shall be hanged in the
presence of all.’] It is astounding to read such an insane interpreta-
tion of law and mercy in the eighteenth century, just before the com-
mencement of the age of philosophic enlightenment.
334. ‘Unlimited power corrupts the possessor: and this I know, thatThe Theory of the State/467
when law ends, there tyranny begins;’ speech of Lord Chatham (quoted
in Brougham, Statesmen of the Time of George III, i. 37). Guizot,
Essais p. 245: ‘C’est le vice de la monarchic pure d’élever le pouvoir
si haut que la tête tourne à celui qui le possède et que ceux qui le
subissent osent à peine le regarder. Le souverain s’y croit un dieu, le
people y tombe dans l’idolâtrie. On peut écrire alors les devoirs des
rois et les droits des sujets; on peut même les prêcher sans cesse;
mais les situations ont plus de force que les paroles, et quand l’inégalité
est immense, les uns oublient aisément leurs devoirs, les autres leurs
droits.’
335. Laurent, Études sur l’Histoire, xi. 136: ‘Si la révolution avait besoin
d’une justification, elle la trouverait dans l’incompatibilité radicale
de la monarchie absolue avec le droit et par suite avec les interêts de
l’humanité.’
336.  [Hegel (Geschichte der Phil. ii 195) calls Frederick the ‘philoso-
pher king’ (in the sense of Plato’s Republic) not because, as a private
person, he dabbled in Wolffian metaphysics and French philosophy,
but because he made the welfare of his State a principle in his gov-
ernment against particular rights, etc. Cp. Hegel’s Philosophy of
History, Eng. trans. p. 460.]
337. The Russian laws call the Czar an ‘independent and absolute sov-
ereign,’ and base his ponder expressly upon divine command: ‘God
Himself orders men to submit to his supreme authority, not only front
fear of Punishment, but as a religious duly.’ Legislation belongs ex-
clusively to the Czar, though he usually takes the advice of his Coun-
cil. Sammlung der russischen Reichgesetze (Swod), Bd. i. Sect. I.
Art. I. Foelix, Revue Étrangère, iii. 700.
338. Guizot, Essais, p. 388. [The Provisions of Oxford, which estab-
lished a very temporary system of government and which had noth-
ing directly to do with the origin of town representation, have hardly
the importance which Bluntschli attributes to them. A far greater
date in the history of constitutional government is the year 1399—
when a revolution placed the House of Lancaster upon the throne—
to which he makes no allusion.]
339. For a general view of the results of the Revolution of 1688, see
Macaulay, History of England Popular Edition) ii. p. 240; Gneist,
Engl. Verf.-Geseh. 628–724.
340. Act of Settlement, 1700, art. iv. Statutes of the Realm, vii. 638
[quoted in Stubbs, Select Charters, 528–31]: ‘Whereas the Laws of468/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
England are the birthright of the people thereof, and all the Kings and
Queens, who shall ascend the Throne of this realm, ought to admin-
ister the government of the same according to the said laws, and all
their officers and ministers ought to serve them respectively accord-
ing to the same,’ etc.
341. [Bluntschli here quotes passages from Burke and Sir Robert Peel
to prove the importance of the royal power. It is hardly necessary to
remind English readers that our constitution is a monarchy only in
the popular, and not in a scientific sense. For the real functions of the
crown in England, see Bagehot, English Const. pp. 33–88.]
342. Las Casas, Mém. iii. 32. Compare above, Book ii. ch. 10. The best
description of the ideal Napoleonic state, an ideal which was never
practically realised, is to be found in the Idées Napoléoniennes, writ-
ten by Louis Napoleon in 1839.
343. See the preamble: ‘Nous avons volontairement et par le libre exercice
de notre autorité royale accordé et accordons, fait concession et oc-
troi a nos sujets... de la Charte conctitutionnelle qui suit.’
344. ‘Bien que l’autorité toute entière résidat en France dans la personne
du Roi.’
345. De Tocqueville, Democracy in America (trans. by Reeve), i. 93:
‘In the French Revolution there were two impulses in opposite direc-
tions which most never be confounded—the one was favourable to
liberty, the other to despotism The Revolution declared itself the en-
emy of royalty and of provincial institutions at the same time; it con-
founded all that had preceded it—despotic power and the checks to
its abuses—in indiscriminate hatred, and its tendency was at once to
overthrow and to centralise. This double character of the French
Revolution is a fact which has been ads only handled by the friends
of absolute power.’
346. [The qualification for a vote was lowered from 300 to 200 francs
of direct taxes. Even after this the number of electors was less than
half a million, and this limited franchise was a prominent cause of the
failure of the Orleanist monarchy.]
347. The constitution of 1852 bore an external resemblance to the Na-
poleonic constitution of the year VIII (1801), but the differences were
really considerable. De Parieu, Pol. p. 201.
348. Napoleon III’s title ran: ‘par la grace de Dieu et la volonté nationale
Empereur des Français.’
349. De Parieu, Pol. p, 204, who alludes to M. Rouber, but withoutThe Theory of the State/469
mentioning his name.
350. In the Réveries Politiques of Louis Napoleon, which were written
as early as 1832, is to be found a sketch of a French constitution.
which bears the same relation to the constitution of 1852 as the ideals
of youth to the ripe judgment of manhood.
351. These concessions commenced with the decrees of Jan. 19, Feb. 5,
March 14 and 23, 1867.
352.  [The existing French constitution was drawn up by a National
Assembly in 1875 (25 Feb.). For an analysis of it see Demombynes,
Les Constitutions Européennes (Paris, 1883), ii. pp. 1–166.]
353. Articles 1, 2, and 14. A German translation of the constitution
appeared in the Portfolio for 1848.
354. A German translation of the constitution is to be found in Pölitz, ii
263 ff.; and in Schubert, Verf. ii. 44 ff. Comp. Gervinus, Geschichte
des XIX. Juhrhunderts, ii. 135 ff.
355. Bülau, Europ. Verf. seit 1828, p. 221.
356. Schubert, Verf. ii. 105; ff. and 116 ff. [See also Laferrière et Batbie,
Constitutions d’Europe et d’Amérique, p, 474.]
357. [For an analysis of this constitution, see Demombynes, i. 398 ff.]
358. Articles 11, 13, 71, 75, 118 of the Constitution of 1826. Both
constitutions are given in Pölitz, ii. 299 ff. the latter in Schubert,
Verf. ii. 148. [See also Laferrière et Batbie, p. 488.]
359. Schubert, Verf. ii. 173.
360. [For the contemporary constitution of Portugal, see Demombynes,
i. 487.]
361. Proclamation of 8 Feb. 1848, in the Portfolio, i. 64.
362. Theodor Juste, Grsch. der Grundung der constitutionellen
Monarchie in Belgien, 1850, 2 Bde. [For fuller details of the Belgian
constitution, see Demombynes, i. 236 ff. and for the complete text,
Laferrière et Batbie, p. 66.]
363. Schubert, Verf. ii. 368. [Laferrière et Batbie, p 321.]
364. Schubert, ii. 349.
365. [Rigdagsordnung u. Riddarhusordnung von 22 June 1866.]
366. Schubert, Verf. ii. 404 ff. Comp. art. Norwegen in the Deutsches
Statswörterbuch. [The constitution is to be found in Laferrière et
Batbie, p. 372.]
367. [For the Danish Constitution, which was voted on Nov 7, 1886,
and sanctioned July 28, 1866, see Laferrière et Batbie, p. 399.]
368. The text is to be found in Zachariä, Die deutschen470/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
Verfassungsgesetze der Gegenwart, p. 74ff. [See also Laferrière et
Batbie, p. 138.]
369. Zachariä, p.62 ff.
370. Rousseau, Contr. Soc. iii, 1: ‘Toute action libre a deux causes, qui
concourent a la produire, l’une morale, savoir la volonté qui deter-
mine l’acte, l’autre physique, savoir la puissance qui l’exécute.... Le
corps politique a les mêmes mobiles, on y distingue de même la force
et la volonté; celle-ci sous le nom de puissance législative, l’autre
sous le nom de puissance executive,’ Mirabeau, Speech of 1 Sept.
1789: ‘Deux pouvoirs sont nécessaires a l’existence et aux fonctions
du corps politique; celui de vouloir et celui d’agir. Par le premier la
societé établit les règles qui doivent la conduire au but qu’elle se
propose, et qui est incontestablement le bien de tous. Par le second
ces règles s’exécutent. et la force publique sert à faire triompher la
société des obstacles que cette exécution pourrait rencontrer dans
l’opposition des volontés individuelles. Chez une grande nation ces
deux pouvoirs ne peuvent etre exercés par elle-même; de là la nécessité
des représentants du people pour l’exercice de la faculté de vouloir,
ou de la puissance législative; de là encore la nécessité d’une autre
espèce de representants pour l’exercice de la faculté d’agir ou de la
puissance exécutive.’ Thiers, Hist. de la Révol. Franç. i. 97: ‘“La
nation vent, le roi fait,” les esprits ne sortaient pas de ces élémens
simples, et ils croyaient vouloir la monarchie, parce qu’ils laissaient
un roi comme exécuteur des volontés nationales. La monarchie réelle
telle qu’elle existe même dans les États libres, est la domination d’un
seul, à laquelle ou met des bornes au moyen de concours national....
Mais dès l‘instant que la nation peut ordonner tout ce qu’elle veut,
sans que le roi puisse s’y opposer par le véto, le roi n’est plus qu’un
magistrat. C’est alors la république avec un soul consul au lieu de
plusieurs. Le gouvernement de Pologne, quoiqu’il y eût un roi, ne fut
jamais (?) nommé une monarchie.’
371. The discord which is produced by this dyarchy was well under-
stood by the democratic-republican party in France, and they took
advantage of it to get rid of the monarchy altogether.
372. Las Casas, Mém. iv.
373. The radical-democratie party in the Frankfurt Parliament of 1848
was not altogether wrong in designating ‘constitutional monarchy’
as a ‘sinecure’ and a ‘hat without a head,’ with no function except to
‘appoint a premier’ (who will usually be opposed) and to ‘rear aThe Theory of the State/471
succesor.’
374. Hegel, Rechtsphil. §280, went too far in maintaining that ‘a mon-
arch has nothing to do but to say yes, and to dot the i’s.’ He has to say
no as well as yes and to give not only the ‘formal decision’ but also
the really decisive word. And besides deciding, he ought to take an
active initiative when necessary. J. H. Fichte, Beitrag zur Statslehre,
‘the most empty-headed regent would be in that case the ideal.’
375. Any one may be convinced by reading Brougham’s Statesmen of
the time of George III, that the individuality of the king has a great
influence upon his ministers, and that it is a mistake to suppose that
the royal will is a matter of no importance. [Bluntschli forgets that
George III’s reign was an exceptional period in English history, in
which the king strove, and for a time successfully, to make himself
more of a real ruler than his immediate predecessors had been.]
376. This was exactly what the French National Assembly of 1789 tried
to do. Thiers rightly describes the assembly as ‘démocratique par ses
idées et monarchique par ses sentiments.’ History has shown how
impossible it is for such a condition to last. In France the powerless
monarchy was destroyed by the omnipotent democracy (1792).
377. Guizot, Mém. ii. 237: ‘Dieu seul est souverain et personne ici-bas
n’est Dieu, pas plus les peoples que les rois. Et la volonté des peuples
ne suffit pas à faire des rois; il faut que celui qui devient roi porte en
lui-même et apporte en dot, au pays qui l’epouse, quelques-uns des
caractères naturels et indépendents de la royauté.’
378. For the system of government by Parliament and Ministers, see
below, Book vii.
379. Guizot, Mém. xii. 184: ‘Un trône n’est pas un fauteuil vide, auquel
on a mis une clef pour que nul ne puisse être tenté de s’y asseoir. Une
personne intelligente et libre, qui a ses idées, ses sentiments, ses désirs,
ses volontés comme tous les autres réels et vivants, siège dans ce
fauteuil. Le devoir de cette personne, car il y a des devoirs pour tous,
également sacrés pour tous, son devoir, dis-je, et la nécessité de sa
situation, c’est de ne gouverner que d’accord avec les grands pouvoirs
publics institués par la Charte, avec leur avert, leur adhésion, leur
appui.’
380. See the noteworthy remarks in Stahl, Das monarchische Princip.
p.9. Luther, Tischreden (Table-Talk): ‘There is nothing more grace-
ful or praiseworthy in a prince than to speak freely his opinion, arid
to do and say without fear whatever he has at heart.’ How could he472/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
respect the free speech of others, if his own freedom is subject to
restraint?
381. Frederick the Great, Essai sur les Formes des Gouvernement: ‘Le
souverain représente l’État: lui et ses peoples ne forment qu’un corps,
qui ne peut être heureux qu’autant la concorde les unit. Le prince est
à la société qu’il gouverne ce que la tête est au corps: it doit voir,
penser et agir pour toute la communauté, afin de lui procurer tous les
avantages dont elle est susceptible. Si l’on veut que le gouvernement
monarchique l’emporte sur le républicain, l’arrêt du souverain est
prononcé: il doit être active et intègre et rassembler toutes ses forces
pour fournir la carrière qui lui est ouverte. Le souverain est attaché
par des liens indissolubles au corps de l’État; par conséquent il ressent
par répercussion tous les maux qui affligent ses sujets, et la société
souffre également des malheurs qui touchent son souverain.’
382. Article 57 of the Final Act of Vienna (1820) correctly expressed
the monarchical principle in its first paragraph, but it included all
three kinds of monarchy, absolute, limited by class privileges
(ständisch) and constitutional monarchy. The second paragraph was
hostile to the development of constitutional forms: ‘The whole sover-
eign power must be concentrated in the head of the State, and it is
only in the exercise of certain definite rights that the sovereign can be
bound by the cooperation of the estates.’ The subsequent growth of
constitutional monarchy has made this article out of date.
383. One can see that this idea does not follow from the conception of
monarchy, by comparing the expressions of Frederick the Great, him-
self a somewhat absolute ruler. Antimachiavel. i: ‘Le Souverain, bien
loin d’être le maître absolu des peoples qui vent sous sa domination,
n’en est que le premier magistrat.’ (Elsewhere he uses the expres-
sions, ‘le premier serviteur,’ or ‘domestique de l’État’) Mirabeau, on
the other hand, abandons monarchy and sets up the Republican rule
of the people, when he says to princes: ‘vous êtes les salariés de vos
sujets, et vous devez subir les conditions auxquelles vous est accordé
ce salaire sous peine de le perdre’ (Essai sur le Despotisme, Oeuvres.
ii. 279). Still more definite were the expressions about the true posi-
tion of the monarch used by Frederick II, in his first audience with his
ministers (1 June, 1741): ‘I think that the interest of the country is
also my own, that I can have no interest except that of the country. If
ever the two should not agree, the welfare of the country must have
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384. Lorenz von Stein Verwaltunglehre, i. 86 ff, distinguishes the per-
sonal right of carrying out measures (Vollzichungsrecht) from the
power of government (Regierungsgewalt), and demands that the
former shall be independent of both the national representatives and
of the ministers. This theory opens a comfort able back-door to the
absolutism of princes, but it is fatal to the whole constitutional
organisation. (In his second edition (i. 136 ff.) von Stein has com-
pletely altered his views on this point.)
385. There are some ‘paper constitutions,’ as Frederick William IV called
them in a speech from the throne, which are easily destroyed because
they are merely built upon theory, without any real roots in the na-
tion. But a constitution does not become a ‘paper constitution’ by
being formulated in writing; on the contrary this gives greater strength
and security to its provisions.
386. Compare the article Monarchie in the Deutsches Statswörterbuch.
387. [The equality of property in Sparta is denied by Grote, History of
Greece. Part ii. ch 6. But Plato, Laws, iii. 684, certainly points to a
tradition of an original equality at the time of the Dorian conquest.]
388. The ecclesia of the Spartans had the same po\ver and importance
as the national assemblies of ancient Greece in the time of Homer.
See C. Trieber, Forschungen zur spartanischen Verfassungs-
geschichte, Berlin, 1871. p. 114.
389. Homer gives the name of basilej to these councillors of the king.
390. The Greeks did not realise this as we do, because the freedom of
the individual life did not appear especially natural to them, and the
Spartan constitution agreed with their ideal. Comp. Trieber, l.c.
391. Laurent (ii. 290) points out that the immutability of the constitu-
tion was a cause of the depopulation of Sparta.
392. [The constitution of Sparta is criticised by Aristotle in Pol. ii. c. 9:
that of Crete in c. 10: and that of Carthage in c. 11.]
393. Compare above, Book II. ch. x.
394. [For the relation of the Tribe-assembly of the plebs (Concilium
plebis tributum) to the assemblies of the populus (comitia proper),
see Mommsen, Forschungen. He distinguishes (1) the assembly of
the corporation of the plebs whose plebiscita finally acquired the
force of leges by the lex Hortensia of 287 B.C.; and (2) the assembly
of the whole people (populus) by tribes (comitia tributa), which in
the fourth century B.C. began to absorb much of the business of the
comitia centuriata. But as the numbers of the patricians diminished,474/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
the difference between an assembly of the populus and of the plebs
became almost purely formal.]
395. [The Tribunate, which was originally merely the organ of the cor-
poration of the plebs thus became practically art instrument of sena-
torial government, until the Gracchi turned it to other uses.]
396. On the constitution of the comitia centuriata compare Madvig
Verfassung und Verwaltung des römischen Stats, i. 109 ff.; and on
its later development, ib. i. 117 ff.
397. Cicero, pro Flacco, c. 7: ‘Nullam illi nostri sapientissimi viri vim
concionis esse voluerunt; quae scisceret plebes aut quae populus
juberet, summota concione, distributis partibus, tributim et centuriatim
descriptis ordinibus, classibus, aetatibus, auditis auctoribus, re multos
dies promulgata et cognita, juberi vetarique voluerunt. Graecorum
autem totac res publicae sedentis concionis temeritate administrantur.
Itaque ut hanc Graeciam, quae jamdiu suis consiliis perculsa et afflicta
est omittam: illa vetus quae quondam opibus imperio gloria floruit.
hoc uno malo concidit, libertate immoderata ac licentia concionum.
Quum in theatro imperiti homines, rerum omnium rudes ignarique,
consederant, tum bella inutilia suscipiebant; tum seditiosos homines
reipublicae praeficiebant; tum optime meritos cives e civitate
ejiciebant.’
398. Cicero, de Legibus, iii. 3: ‘regio imperio duo sunto.’ Polyb. vi. II,
§7: tîn Øp£twn xousan, telewj monorcikÕn fanet/ enai
ka basilikÒn.
399. Hence the formula in Cicero, de Leg. iii. 3: ‘ni par majorve potestas
prohibuisset.’ It is the same principle which prevailed in the Roman
private law amount co-proprietors: ‘neganti major potestas.’ Comp.
Gellius, Noctes Atticae, xiii. 12, 15.
400. [De L’Esprit des Lois iii. ch. 4.]
401. Montesquieu’s assertion that virtue is the principle of democracy
[ibid. iii. ch 3] is not nearly so correct as Aristotle’s dictum (Pol. iv.
8, §7. 1294 a. 10): ‘The characteristic of aristocracy is virtue, that of
democracy freedom.’ But historical reality has little in common with
the ideal of philosophers. De Parieu, Polit. p. 36: ‘L’aristocratie a
toujours en fait désigne le gouvernement des plus puissants plutôt
que celui des plus vertueux.’ This work of De Parieu contains marry
excellent remarks upon aristocracy.
402. See Machiavelli, Discorsi, i. 6.
403. Cicero, de Rep. i. 34: ‘nec ulla deformior species est civitatis quamThe Theory of the State/475
illa in qua opulentissimi optimi putantur.’ Comp. Leo, Naturlehre
des Stats, p. 89 ff.
404. Comp. De Tocqueville on the English aristocracy, Oeuvres, t. viii.
405. This was well known to the Frenchman Bodin, but since then many
German historians have found it convenient to forget it. Bodin, de
Rep. ii: ‘Et quoniam plerique imperium Germanorum monarchiam
esse et sentiunt et affirmant, eripiendus est hic error.... Neminem autem
esse arbitror, qui cum animadverterit, trecentos circiter principes
Germanorum ac legatos civitatum ad conventus coire, qui ea, quae
discimus, jura majestatis habeant, aristocratiam esse dubitet. Leges
enim tum imperatori, tum singulis principibus ac civitatibus, cum
etiam de bello ac pace decernendi, vectigalia ac tributa imperandi,
denique judices imperialis curiae dandi jus habent.... Sceptra quidem,
regale solium, pretiosissimae vestes, coronae, antecessio,
sutsequentibus Christianis regibus, imaginem regiae majestatis habent,
rem non habent. Et certe quodam modo jure omnibus ornamentis ac
honoribus cumulari mereatur: sed ea est aristocratiae bene constitutae
ratio, ut quo plus honoris eo minus imperii tribuatur; et qui plus
imperia possunt, minus honoris adipiscantur, ut omniun optime Veneti
in republica constituenda decreverunt. Quae cum ita sint quis dubitet
rempublicam Germanorum aristocratiam esse?’ Philipp Chemnitz
(Dissert. de ratione status in imperio nostro Rom Germ., 1640) based
his schemes of reform upon the idea that Germany divas an aristoc-
racy. Comp. Perthes, Das deutsche Statsleben vor der Revolution,
1845, §246. Puffendorf called the Empire a mongrel compound of
monarchy and aristocracy, but recognised the prevailing tendency to
aristocracy. [Nobody now denies that the Empire after the fall of the
Hohenstaufen was an aristocracy with an ornamental monarch. The
same arguments might have convinced Bluntschli that the English
monarchy is equally ornamental.]
406. In aristocratic England the importance of political heredity is still
fully comprehended. See the expressions of Burke in his Reflections
on the Revolution in France (Clarendon Press Series, p. 38) ‘You
will observe, that from Magna Charta to the Declaration of Right, it
has been the uniform policy of our constitution to claim and assert
our liberties, as an entailed inheritance derived to us from our fore-
fathers, and to be transmitted to our posterity; as an estate especially
belonging to the people of this kingdom without any reference what-
ever to any other more general or prior right.... We have an inherit-476/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
able crown; an inheritable peerage, and an house of commons and a
people inheriting privileges franchises, and liberties, from a long line
of ancestors.... A spirit of innovation is generally the result of a self-
ish temper and confined views. People will not look forward to pos-
terity, who never look backward to their ancestors. Besides, the people
of England well know, that the idea of an inheritance furnishes a sure
principle of conservation, and a sure principle of transmission; with-
out at all excluding a principle of improvement. It leaves acquisition
free; but it secures what it acquires.... Our political system is placed
in a just correspondence and symmetry with the order of the world,
and with the mode of existence decreed to a permanent body com-
posed of transitory parts; wherein, by the disposition of a stupendous
wisdom, moulding together the great mysterious incorporation of the
human race, the whole, at one time, is never old, or middle-aged, or
young, but in a condition of perpetual decay, fall, renovation, and
progression. Thus, by preserving the method of nature in the conduct
of the state, in what we improve, we are never wholly new, in what
we retain, we are never wholly obsolete.... In this choice of inherit-
ance are have given to our frame of polity the image of a relation in
blood; binding up the constitution of our country with our dearest
domestic ties; adopting our fundamental laws into the bosom of our
family affections; keeping inseparable and cherishing with the warmth
of all their combined and mutually reflected charities, our state, our
hearths, our sepulchres, and our altars.’
407. On this point Xenophon, Plato, and Aristotle are all agreed.
408. [Only Aristotle uses politea in this sense. Cp. Eth. Nic. viii. 10,
§1; Pol. iii. 7, §3; iv. c. 7 and 8. But this politea is not his ideal
state, but only the ‘best average state.’ See Pol. iv. c. 1 and 2. Plato
in the Republic places democracy below oligarchy, but in the Politicus
302, 303, he reverses their positions and distinguishes two kinds of
democracy, a good and a bad. It is to this ‘good’ kind that Aristotle
gives the name of Polity. In discussing the Solonian constitution (Pol.
ii. 12) Aristotle distinguished ¹ p£trioj dhmokrata, which may be
considered ‘a good mixed constitution,’ from the extreme democracy
of later times. Plato, in the Politicus, 293, separates the ideal State
from all the five or six ordinary forms of government. Whether one,
few, or many rule is unimportant in comparison with the question,
whether those who rule have the science of ruling or not. But since he
thinks this science of nailing is more likely to be found in one or theThe Theory of the State/477
few than in the many, he generally speaks of the ideal State as king-
ship or aristocracy (as in the Rep.) Aristotle on the other hand vindi-
cates the political capacity of the many Pol. iii. 15, §§7, 8).]
409. Comp. Aristot. Pol. iv 4, §§25, 29, 1292 a. 6, 24.
410. Xen. de Rep. Ath. c. I. §1. In c. 2. §19 he asserts that ‘the Athenian
people is fully able to distinguish between good and bad citizens. But
it prefers the bad, and hates the good; for it is convinced that the
virtue of individuals is not beneficial but harmful to the welfare of
the masses, and its object is, not the good organization of the State,
but the freedom and sovereignty of the masses.’ [But Xen. (?) de
Rep. Ath. is only an anti-democratic pamphlet, and should not be
quoted as a serious authority.]
411. For the constitution of Athens, see Hermann’s excellent book Griech.
Statsalterthümer (5. Auflage, 1875, neu bearbeitet von Bähr, p. 539
ff ).
412. Burke expresses this admirably in his Reflections on the Revolu-
tion in France (Clarendon Press edition, p. 110): ‘Where popular
authority is absolute and unrestrained, the people have an infinitely
greater, because a far better founded confidence in their own power.
They are themselves, in a great measure, their own instruments. They
are nearer to their objects. Besides, they are less under responsibility
to one of the greatest controlling powers on earth, the sense of fame
and estimation. The share of infamy that is likely to fall to the lot of
each individual in public acts, is small indeed, the operation of opin-
ion being in the inverse ratio to the member of those who abuse power.
Their own approbation of their own acts has to them the appearance
of a public judgment in their favour. A perfect democracy is there-
fore the most shameless thing in the world. As it is the most shame-
less, it is also the most fearless.’
413. Thucydides, ii. 69.
414. The great period of Athenian history began with Cleisthenes (B. C.
510), who founded the pure democracy, and ended with the death of
Pericles (B. C. 428), so that it lasted only 82 years.
415. Comp. Aristot. Pol. vi, 2. §5, 1317 b. 20.
416. The distinction is thus expressed by Aristotle ‘Pol. v. I. §12, 1301
b. 29; vi. 2. §2, 1317 b. 4): tÕ son kat/ çriqmÕn ¢ll¦ m¾ kat/
¢xan.
417. [On ostracism cp. Arist. Pol. iii. 13. §§15–25, 1284 a. 17ff.; Grote,
History of Greece, Part ii. ch. 33.]478/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
418. Aristotle (Pol. vi. 4) develops this opinion, which had been con-
firmed by experience in Greece, and was so later in Switzerland.
419. Cicero’s observation is very true, de Rep. i. 26: ‘quum omnia per
populum geruntur quamvis justum atque moderatum, tamen
aequabilitas est iniqua, quum habeat nullos gradus dignitatis.’
420. [A Republic has been established in France ever since 1870, and
the prospect of a royalist restoration seems now to be almost hope-
less.]
421. Act of Mediation, 1803, xx. 3: ‘Il n’y a plus en Suisse ni pays
sujets, ni privilèges de lieux, de naissance, de personnel on de fami-
lies.’ See Bluntschli, Schweizerisches Bundesrecht, i. 474. Federal
Const. of 1848 and 1874, art 4: ‘In Switzerland there are no subjects,
and no privileges of place, of birth, of family, or of person.’
422. [For the Swiss Constitution of 1848, see Laferrière et Batbie, des
Constitutions d’Europe et d’Amerique (Paris, 1869), pp. 84–102.]
423. Const. of Zürich, 1831, §93: ‘If the proposal (of a constitutional
change which has been twice discussed by the Grand Council) is
accepted, it must be submitted to the whole body of citizens for their
acceptance or rejection. Federal Const. of 1848 and 1874, art. 6:
‘The Federation undertakes to guarantee the cantonal constitutions,
provided that they have been accepted by the people and can be re-
vised if an absolute majority of the citizens demands it.’
424. Federal Const. of 1874, art. 89: ‘Federal laws or decisions binding
the whole Confederation which are not of urgent importance, are to
be submitted for the acceptance or rejection of the people, if this is
demanded by 30,000 qualified Swiss citizens or by eight cantons.’
425. Const. of Zürich, 1831, §38: ‘The exercise of the supreme power
in accordance with the constitution is entrusted to a Grand Council.
It has in its hands the making of laws and the superintendence of the
local administration. It represents the canton in its external relations.’
Cherbuliez, De la Démocratie en Suisse, ii. pp. 35 ff.
426. Federal Const. of 1848, §60: The supreme power in the Confed-
eration is to be exercised by the Federal Assembly, which consists of
two parts, the National Council (Nationalrath) and the Council of
Estates (Ständerath).’ Federal Const. of 1874, art. 71: ‘With reser-
vation of the rights of the people and of the cantors, the supreme
power in the Confederation is to be exercised by the Federal Assem-
bly.’
427. So in the French Constitutions of 1848, art. 43: Le peuple FrançaisThe Theory of the State/479
délègue le pouvoir exécutif à un citoyen qui reçoit le titre de Président
de la République.’ [Bluntschli apparently meant to refer to art. 46 of
the constitution: ‘Le Président est nommé, au scrutin secret et à la
majorité absolue des votants, par le suffrage direct de tous les électeurs
des départements Français et d’Algerie,’ Laferrière et Batbie, p.
cxxxviii.]
428. [The important difference between these too ways of electing the
head of the executive government is well illustrated in the French
Constitution of 1848. M. Grévy proposed that the President should
be elected by the National Assembly, but it was decided that he should
be chosen he universal suffrage. The result was to create two equal
powers, the President and the Assembly, without any means of set-
tling a dispute between them. This state of things enabled Napoleon
III to establish the Second Empire.]
429. See Mill, Representative Government, ch. 17.
430. [This protectorate was voluntarily abandoned by England in 1863
on the accession of Prince George of Denmark to the throne of Greece
as George I.]
431. [This protectorate was established in 1856 by the Treaty of Paris.
In 1858 the six powers concluded a convention with the Porte to
settle the government of the two provinces. In the next year the prov-
inces effected their own union by electing the same prince, and have
since become the state of Roumania.]
432. See above, Book IV. ch iii.
433. See above, Book IV. ch. iii.
434. [Bluntschli seems here to confuse independence in relation to the
head of the collective State, with independence in relation to the col-
lective State itself.]
435. G. Waitz, Grundzüge der Politik, p. 44: ‘Both powers, that of the
Confederation and that of the separate States, must be independent
(sovereign) in their own sphere: neither must receive delegated power
from the other.’ Since 1871 numerous publications have appeared
about the nature of Federations in general, and especially about the
legal constitution of the German Empire, but as yet no satisfactory
solution of the difficult problem has been offered. The view in the
text, which was originated by De Tocqueville and developed by Waitz,
is opposed to the essence of sovereignty as the highest power in the
State and therefore indivisible both in respect of sphere and objects.
See Seydel, Zeitschrift für Statswissenschaft, xxviii. 185 ff. Laband,480/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
Statsrecht, i. 70 (also in Marquardsen, Handbuch des öffentlichen
Rechts Part II, p. 15 ff.). Jellinek, Lehre von den Statenverbindangen,
pp. 16ff. and 252ff.
436. See Rüttimann (Das nordamerikanische Bundesstaatsrecht
verglichen m. den politischen Einrichtungen der Schweiz, 2 Thl.,
Zürich) on the means which the Swiss Federation has at its disposal
to enforce the federal laws.
437. Thiers, Hist. de la Révol. franç. ii. p. 200, says that in the opinion
of the Jacobins, ‘The nation can never renounce the power of doing
and willing at all times that which it pleases: this power constitutes
its omnipotence (sa toute-puissance), and this is inalienable. Thus
the nation could not bind itself to Louis XIV.’ The Abbé Sieyès rec-
ognized the error in this theory. Cp. Bluntschli, Gesch. d. Statsw. p.
326.
438. Hanoverian Declaration of 1814, in Hormayr, Lebensbilder, i. p.
111: ‘The rights of sovereignty do not imply any idea of despotism.
The lying of Great Britain is undeniably just as much sovereign as
any prince in Europe, and the liberties of his people establish his
throne, instead of overthrowing it.’
439. Blumer, Rechtsgesch. der Schweizer Demokratien, ii. 140, 141.
440. [The superior authority of the Electors, as compared with that of
the other German princes, was based upon the Golden Bull, issued
by Charles IV in 1356.]
441. The draft of the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) in saying ‘que tous
les princes et Estats seront maintenus dans tous les autres droits de
souveraineté, qui leur appartiennent,’ used an expression which was
new to Germany, souveraineté instead of Landeshoheit, evidently
with the intention of relaxing the bonds of the Empire. But as a mat-
ter of fact most of the Germans princes were already almost ‘sover-
eign.’
442. Imman. Herrm. Fichte, Beiträge zur Statslehre, 1848, goes too far
in declaring that sovereignty is only the ‘unity’ of the government’
(Einheit der Regierung). Complete power and majesty form the es-
sence or sovereignty.
443. We allude here to the theory of the General of the Jesuits, Lainez,
and to the Jesuits Bellarmin and Mariana, who took ‘the sovereignty
of the people’ under their protection, in order to maintain the su-
premacy of the Church over the State and of the Pope over Kings;
Kings deriving their authority from the people, the Pope alone frownThe Theory of the State/481
God. Cp. Ranke, Hist. polit. Zeitschrift, ii. p. 606 ff. (On the rise of
the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people and its development in
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by the Jesuits on the one band,
and the philosophic Jurists on the other, see the works of Gierke,
Johannes Althusius u. die Entwicklung der naturrechtlichen
Statscheorien (1880) p, 123 ff: Genossenschaftsrecht, iii. 568 a).
But the influence of Rousseau was of far more importance in spread-
ing this doctrine. According to him, the sovereign is the multitude of
individuals united by the social contract: each is at the same time
member of the sovereign and subject to the sovereign. Sovereignty is
nothing but the general will, and that is inalienable. Consequently
majorities can, if they choose, refuse obedience to the authorities,
overthrow them. and change the constitution. In doing so they only
exercise an act of sovereignty (acte de souveraineté, and before their
will the derived authority of the representative body itself disappears.
Finally, according to Rousseau, there can be no fundamental law for
the body of the people: all laws are only manifestations of their will,
and cease to have force when their will changes. [This analysis of
Rousseau appears to be based chiefly on Contr. Soc.; 7; ii. I; iii. 10,
15–18.] (cp. on Rousseau’s theory Gierke. Joh. Althusius, p. 201 ff.)
[On the Jesuit theories of ‘the sovereignty of the people’ cp. also
Janet, Hist. de la Science politique, Liv. iii. ch. 4.]
444. [Thiers, Rév. Fr. ii. note 10. This ref. is given by the Fr. transl.]
445. Lamartine, Histoire de la revolution de 1848, ii p. 449.
446. E.g., Royer-Collard, in his speech of May 27, 1820: ‘There are
two elements in society, the one material, i.e., the individual with his
force and will’—but are these material? and is not this the old error
of deriving Public Law from the individual will?—’the other moral,
i.e., Law, which results from legitimate interests. Do you choose to
derive society from the material element? The majority of individu-
als, the majority of wills, is then the sovereign. This is the sover-
eignty of the people. If this blind and violent sovereignty, voluntarily
or involuntarily, transfers itself to the hands of one or of more with-
out changing its character, it becomes a wiser or more moderate force,
but it still remains force. This is the source of absolute power and of
privilege. Do you prefer, on the other hand, to derive society from the
moral element, i.e., from Right (le droit)? Justice is then sovereign,
because justice is the rule of right. The purpose of free constitutions
is to dethrone force and to make justice reign.’ [Aristotle speaks of482/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
the ‘sovereignty of law’ (toÝj nÒmonj enai kurus keimnouj
Ñrqîj. Pol.7. iii. 11. §19. 1282 b, 2).]
447. Stuve, Sendschreiben of 1848: ‘No one will deny the sovereignty
of the people, i.e., the nation, if by nation is understood the whole
nation in its constitutional form, including both prince and people. If
a part of the whole claims sovereignty, and says “I am the State,” it
matters little whether that part is king, parliament or multitude; the
principle is false, and a false principle has always dangerous conse-
quences.’ Sismondi (Études, i. p. 88) makes all equally sharp distinc-
tion between ‘souveraineté du people,’ which he rejects, and
‘souveraineté de la nation,’ which he admits.
448. [In treating the king as a part of parliament Bluntschli has the
support of English constitutional lawyers. Cp. Blackstone Commen-
taries, Book II, ch. ii.: ‘The constituent parts of a parliament are...
the kings majesty, sitting there in his royal political capacity, and the
three estates of the realm; the lords spiritual, the lords temporal, who
sit together with the king in one house, and the commons, who sit by
themselves in another;’ Dicey, Law of the Constitution, 3rd ed. p. 37:
‘Parliament means in the mouth of a lawyer (though the word has
often a different sense in ordinary conversation), the King, the House
of Lords, and the House of Commons.’ But, historically, as well as
‘in ordinary conversation,’ parliament is distinct from the king, and
means the assembly of estates without whose counsel and consent the
king cannot enact a law. It is an old and frequently corrected error
that the king, the lords and the commons constitute ‘the three estates
of the realm.’ The three estates of the realm are the clergy, the lords
and the commons, and so far as there are three estates in parliament,
they are (as Blackstone says) the lords spiritual, the lords temporal,
and the commons. The clergy, as a whole, were invited to be an estate
of parliament in the 13th century, but refused to assume the position
(Cp. Anson, Law and Custom of the Constitution, Part I, ch. iv. §2
p. 45, where parliament is defined as ‘an assemblage of the three
estates of the realm, which one of the estates persistently declines to
attend.’) An assembly of the estates is not a parliament, unless sum-
moned by the king: without such a summons it is only a ‘conven-
tion.’]
449. This idea is expressed in a speech of King Henry VIII of England
in Parliament: ‘Likewise the judges have informed us that we at no
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when we as head and you as members are conjoined and knit together
into one body politic, so that whatsoever is done or offered against
the meanest member of the House is judged as done against our own
person and the whole court of Parliament.’ (Quoted by Lord John
Russell, The English Government and Constitution. chap. iii. p. 19,
edit. 1865.)
450. Zöpfl (Grundsätze des gemeinen deutschen Statsrechts, §§54–56)
rejects this ‘sovereignty of the State’—and that not merely as applied
to the German States—maintaining that monarchies recognise only
the sovereignty of the prince, and republics only the sovereignty of
the people. But how, then, are we to explain the Public Law of home
which proclaimed the majestas populi Romani under the Empire as
well as under the Republic, and always regarded lex as voluntas populi
Romani, while, on the other hand, under the Republic, a regium im-
perium was ascribed to the Consuls, and the Senate possessed the
supreme administrative power and the right of taxation (which is
certainly an attribute of governmental sovereignty)? How, too, are
we to explain the English Public Law, which harmonises the sover-
eignty of Parliament and of the elation with the sovereignty of the
king? As a matter of International Law, even the German States—
apart from their princes—count as sovereign persons; but if they are
persons in relation to other States, must they not also be persons in
relation to their own individual members and to their princes? The
laws in Germany are the laws of the State: and the national or state-
debts are distinguished from the debts of the princes, that is to say, in
spite of all survivals of the patrimonial or absolute power of the prince,
the Public Law of Germany recognises, along with that of almost all
civilised countries, that the nation is something other and higher than
the sum total of subjects, and that the State has an existence, a maj-
esty and a power which is not exhausted by the majesty and power of
the princes. I concede to Zöpfl, that the exclusive admission of the
sovereignty of the prince does not logically imply that his sovereignty
is unlimited but recent history has incontestably shown that this ex-
clusive principle has, in Germany as well as in the Latin countries,
been a dangerous support of absolutism and contempt of national
rights.
451. [A similar question was involved in the trial of Strafford. By the
Statute of Edward III treason was defined as certain offenses against
the ‘King.’ Stratford had undoubtedly acted with the approval of the484/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
King, and the lawyers were compelled to develop the theory that the
‘King’ was an expression for the ‘State,’ and that offences against
the latter were consequently treason.]
452. Cicero, de Oratore. ii. 39: ‘Si majestas est amplitude ac dignitas
civitatis, is eam minuit, qui exercitum hostibus populi Romani
tradidit.’ Partit. orat., c. 30: ‘Minuit is, qui per vim multitudinis rem
ad seditionem vocavit.’ Auctor ad Herennium, ii. 12: ‘Minuit qui ea
tollit ex quibus civitatis amplitudo constat,—qui amplitudinem civi-
tatis detrimento adficit.’ Comp. Heineccias, Antiquit. rom. iv. xviii.
3, 46.
453. In treaties of peace with conquered states, the Romans used the
formula ‘Majestatem populi Romani comiter conservato,’ or ‘impe-
rium majestatemque populi Romani conservato sine dolo malo’ (Cic.
pro Balbo, c. 16; Liv. xxxviii. 11).
454. Washington’s Farewell Address of 1796: The basis of our political
systems is the right of the people to make and alter their Constitu-
tions of Government. But the Constitution which at any time exists.
till changed by an explicit and authentic act of the whole People, is
sacredly obligatory upon all. The very idea of the power and right of
the People to establish Government, presupposes the duty of every
individual to obey the established Government. All obstructions to
the execution of the Laws, all combinations and associations under
whatever plausible character, with the real design to direct, control,
counteract or awe the regular deliberation and action of the consti-
tuted authorities, are destructive of this fundamental principle, and
of fatal tendency.’ [The speeches are given in vol. ii. of Sparks’ Life
of Washington.]
455. Niebuhr, who was so strong a conservative that the French Revo-
lution of July, 1830, broke his heart, expresses himself as follows
(Gesch. des Zeitalteis der Revol. i. p 211): ‘To deny the maxim “ne-
cessity knows no law” is to authorise the worst atrocities. When a
nation is trodden under foot and cruelly ill-treated without hope of
amelioration like Greece under Turkey, a tyrant without respect for
the rights of men or the honour of women, then it is a case of extreme
neceassity, and no act can be more rightful than revolt aghast the
oppressors. He who denies this must be a miserable wretch.’
456. Robespierre declared the contrary in the Jacobin Club (Feb. 1793)
‘J’ai soutenu au milieu des persecutions et sans appui, que le peuple
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n’etait point encore reconnue; le cours de la révolution l’a développée.’
France has had to pay a heavy penalty for the consequences of his
errors, and history has severely condemned them.
457. Rousseau (Contr. Soc. ii. 2) rejects the sovereignty of the prince on
the ground that the ‘general will’ (la volonté générale) can only be-
long to the whole people. A section of the people can only have a
particular will and consequently can at the most make decrees. Only
the whole people can make laws. But it is an error to see sovereignty
only in legislation and not also in government.
458. [Bluntschli says ‘William of Orange’—a better instance of an elected
king; but he founded no dynasty.]
459. Cp. above, Bk. vi. chap. x.
460. For this reason the Romans regarded the comitia centuriata as
higher than the comitia tributa. Cic. de Leg;. iii. 19: ‘Descriptus
populus censu, ordinibus, aetatibus plus adhibet ad suffragium con-
silii, quam fuse in tribus convocatus.’
461. [NÒmoi are, indeed, named as one of the subjects with which tÕ
bouleuÒmenon is concerned (Pol. iv. 14. §3, 1298 a. 5). But it is clear
that Aristotle, like the Greeks generally, thinks of a State as starting
with a sufficient code of laws, framed for it by a nomoqthj, and
requiring as little alteration as possible (e.g., Pol. ii. 8. §§16–25,
1268b. 22 seq., 11. §15, 1273 b. 21: iii. 13. §23, 1284b. 17), the
individual ruler or reassembly being concerned only with particular
details, to which the law cannot apply because it is general (kaqÒlon)
in its character (N. Eth v. 10: Pol. iii. 15. §§ 3 seq., 1286a 8). Cp. N.
Eth. vi. 8, where nomoqetik» is distinguished from boulentik».]
462.  Cicero, de Leg. iii. 3: ‘Omnes magistratus auspicium judiciumque
habento.’ Ulpianus in L. 2. D, de in jus voc.: ‘Magistratus, qui impe-
rium habent, qui coercere aliquem possunt, et jubere in carcener duci.
Ulpianus, L. 1. pr. D, si quis jus dicenti: ‘Omnibus magistratibus...
secundum jus potestatis suae concessum est, jurisdictionem suam
defendere poenali judicio.’
463. [Cp, Gibbon’s Decline and Fall, ch. xvii.]
464. Bluntschli, Gesch. des allg. Statsr. p. 42. Cp. as to Puffendorf, p.
124.
465. Esprit des Lois, xi. 6. [‘De la constitution d’Angleterre.’] Bluntschli,
Gesch. des allg. Statsr. p. 267.
466. [For the way in which the actual constitution of the United States
followed the then current theory of the English Constitutions, cp.486/Johan Kaspar Bluntschli
Bagehot’s English Constitution, pp. 27, 227 (edit. 1872).]
467. Montesquieu, xi. 6, puts the matter differently. He calls the judicial
power also ‘la puissance exécutrice des choses qui dépendent du
droit civil,’ and thus distinguishes it from the executive power proper,
‘puissance executrice des choses, qui dependent au droit des gens.’
This strange view has been followed among others by Kant
(Rechtslehre, §45), and Spittler (Vorlesungen über Politik, §15). On
the other side cp. Stahl, Lehre vom Stat, ii. §57.
468. Arist. Pol. iv. 15. §4, 1299 a. 27: tÕ g¦r pit£ttein ¢rcikètatÒn
stin. He finds the essence of authority in command.
469. Compare the words of Washington, in his wonderful Farewell
Speech (1796): ‘It is important, likewise, that the habits of thinking
in a free country should inspire caution in those entrusted with its
administration to confine themselves within their respective constitu-
tional spheres; avoiding in the exercise of the powers of one depart-
ment to encroach upon another. The spirit of encroachment tends to
consolidate the powers of all the departments in one, and thus to
create, whatever the form of government, a real despotism. A just
estimate of that love of power and proneness to abuse it, which pre-
dominates in the human heart, is sufficient to satisfy us of the truth of
this position. The necessity of reciprocal checks in the exercise of
political power, by dividing and distributing it into different deposi-
tories, and constituting each the guardian of the public weal against
invasions by the others has been evinced by experiments ancient and
modem some of then in our country and under our own eyes. To
preserve them must be as necessary as to institute them.’
470. Cp. with this chapter esp. Schulze, Lehrbuch des deutschen
Statsrechts. i. 309 ff: Laband, Statsrecht des deutschen Reichs, i.
382 ff.: Löning. Lehrbuch des Verwaltungsrechts, 115 ff.
471. Particular public inactions may be contrasted to them, but their
proper character is not thereby altered. Cp. Welcker’s Statslexicon s.
v. Statsdiener.
472. Schmitthenner. Statsrecht, p. 503. He uses the expression ‘techni-
cal officials’ (in opposition to ‘government officials’), and includes
the judges among them. The name would apply better to our second
class above.
473. Schmitthenner, Statsrecht. p. 503, rightly calls attention to this
distinction. But in calling the employees of the State ‘subaltern’ func-
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ordination, Which is equally to be found among the real officials.
‘State-officials’ (Statsbeamte) and ‘official assistants’ (Amtsgehülfen)
would express the distinction better.
474. Cp. above, Bk. vii. chap. vi. Gibbon’s Decline and Fall, chaps
xvii.
475. Cp. Pözl, Deutsches Statswörterbuch, art. ‘Amt.’
476. Gönner, Der Statsdienst aus dem Gesichtspunkt des Rechts,
Landshut, 1808, Zachariä, D. St. ii. 25 ff. Schmitthenner (Statsrecht,
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them, holds nevertheless that public services are based on contract,
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there is a contract, it affects only the private and not the public rights
of the patties: and thus eve have here nothing to do with it. Accep-
tance and refusal of a nomination are certainly voluntary acts: but
that does not affect the authoritative character of the decree. But cp
Löning, ib. p. 119.
477. [For the meaning of the terms Kreis, Bezirk, etc., cp. Book III. ch.
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478. R. v. Mohl, in Mittermaier’s Zeitschrift für Rechtswissenschaft
des Auslandes. xvi. p. 431 ff. Éd. Laboulaye, De l’enseignement et
du noviciat administratif en Allemagne, in Wolowsky, Revue, xvii.
Bluntschli, Deutsche Rechtsschulen, 2nd edit., p. 92ff. Vivien, Ét.
Adm. I, p. 205. v. Mohl, Politick, Bd. ii.
479. R. Gneist, Englisches Verwaltungsrecht, 3rd edit. (1883), 230 ff.
480. The rule holds even in Switzerland and Norway. Cp. Story, Com-
mentaries on Const. U. S. A. iii. 37, §120. For Germany, cp. Zachariä,
D. St. §136.
481. E.g., where a city has become a State, as in the case of the Free
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§120). the former maintained that the nomination gave no rights to
the official tonsil he had receipted the decree which nominated him.
The latter held that the mere nomination had effect. so that the nomi-
nating government had no longer the right of annulling it.
Zachariä, D. St. §136, limits the effects of the nomination to the
consequences in private law. This limitation however is neither nec-
essary nor correct. The nomination has effects, not as a private con-
tract but as a public act of the State: and. though the actual exercise
of official powers may not commence till after investiture, the right
to exercise them pre-exists.
483. Gönner, ibid. 144 ‘Beilage’ ix, to the Bavarian Constitution. §§17–
19.
484. [There is sorely a confusion here between the moral duty of the
individual and his legal duty as an official. As ‘a counsel of perfec-
tion,’ it is the duty of a government to respect morality, but it cannot
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he regards as contrary to (his) religion or morality, he cannot claim,
on that ground alone, to set it aside and yet retain the position of an
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Hanoverian Constitution of 1883, §161: ‘An order issued in proper
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long as I shall have the honour to govern the public affairs, I will
never knowingly place in any important office any man whose politi-
cal maxims are contrary to the general measures of the government.
This would be in my opinion a kind of political suicide.’ [Letter to
Timothy Pickering, Writings, vol. xi. p. 74, quoted in Guizot’s Es-
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487. [Art. 75 of the Constitution of the year VIII, abolished by decree of
Sept. 19, 1870 (Fr. trans.)]
488. According to the Imperial Law, Über die Einführung des
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